ML20211G773
| ML20211G773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1997 |
| From: | Allen D UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-2020, NUDOCS 9710030244 | |
| Download: ML20211G773 (6) | |
Text
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United Litt;s Enttchm:nt Corroration 2 Democracy Center 6903 Rockledge Deeve 4
g Betheada. MD 20817 41 (301)$64 3200 l's niinl Mittn 1 titia lit:H' tit (hipinitioti September 30,1997 ODP 97 2020 l
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 0001 Portsmouth Gascous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) Docket No. 70-7002 Event Report 9715 Pursuant to 10 CFR 95.25 (h), I?nclosure 1 provides the required 30 day written !! vent Report (!!R) for an event involving an unattended security coniainer having classified matter found unlocked. is a list of commitments made in the report.
Should you require additional information regarding this event, please contact Scott Scholl at (614) 897 2373.
Sincerely,
/
ale Allen f
'eneral Manager Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant DIA:SScholl:cw
'fL ec:
NRC Region Ill D. Ilartland, NRC Resident inspector, PORTS NRC Division of Security Nft
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PDR Offices in Paducah, KentuckV Portsmouth, Ohio Washington, DC
I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3
Sepgmber,30,1997 i
PagE Two '
Distribution NRAP Reader File i
bec' J. Adkins,1IQ J. Anzelmo, PORTS M. Boren, PODP
-S. Brawner, PODP L. Calvert, PORTS R. Corlell, PORTS J. Dietrich, LMUS f
L. Fink, PORTS -
,1 Fout, PORTS i
R. Gaston, PORTS M. Itasty, PORTS a
J. llenricks, PORTS J. Ifutsebaut PORTS M. Kelly, PORTS J. Lebarraque, PODP B. Lantz, PORTS R. Lipfert, PORTS R. McDermott, PORTS 4
W. McLaughlin, PORTS J. Miller, llQ 4
J. Mize, PGDP J. Morgan, PORTS J, Oppy PORTS i
J. Parker, PORTS S. Polston, PGDP i
G. Price, PORTS =
II. Pulley, PGDP A. Rebuck Main,llQ R. Robinson, PORTS S. Routh, liq S. Scholl, PORTS B. Sykes, PODP K. Tomko, PORTS R. Wells,11Q Plant Shift Superiatendents j
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f Docket No. 70 7002 Encpsurel Fage1of3 Event Report 97-15 Description of Event Monday, September 1,1997, at approximately 1722 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.55221e-4 months <br />, while conducting routine security checks in the X-343 Feed Vaporization Facility Managers Omce, Guard Force personnel discovered classified container 43 05502 unlocked and unattended. All of the container doors were closed, but the container handle was in the unsecured "open" position. X 343 First Line Manager (FLM) on-duty was immediately advised of the discovery. The on duty FLM inspected the container and verified that the classified document required to be seemed in the container was present. Following the discovery the container was properly secured by Guard Force personnel and an "Open Safe lleport" was filed.
At FORTS an unlocked security container found unattended constitutes a security infraction.
l Security containers are used to protect classified information. The container was located in a facility l
that is continuously occupied within the plantsite controlled access area. Personnel having access to the controlled area mu:t have the appropriate access authorization level for entry or be under positive escort of e cleared employee. Due to these facts it is beheved that no unauthorized access I
was gained to the container and no classified infonnation or material was compromised. An unattended security container having classified matter found unlocked is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 95.25 (h).
Tuesday, September 2,1997, the Security Section was notified of the incident. A Security investigator responded to the X 343 Facility and conducted interviews with the Section Manager.
The Section Manager stated that he had been advised of the incident on September 1,1997, and had interviewed all FLM's assigned to the facility over the holiday weekend. The Section Manager in the presence of the Security Investigator conducted an additional inventory of the container confirming the classified matter was present and properly identified.
On September 2,19')7, the X-343 Section Manager recounted that the FLM in charge during the morning of August 30,1997, had reported that he unlocked the container to retrieve Tamper Indicating Devices (TIDs) and forgot to secure the container after use. The Section Manager also stated the FLM reported that he did not cenify opening or securing the container on form SF-702 "Securite Container Check Sheet," because he could not locate the SF-702 when he accessed the container, llowever, the Guard Force Omccr who discovered the unsecured container indicated that the SF-702 was located at the container on September 1,1997.
Cause of Event The root cause of the event was the FLM failed to follow procedure XF2 SS SS1039 "liandling and Control of Classified Documents." The FLM failed to follow the procedure when he forgot to secure the container aller closing the container drawer. The FLM also failed to follow the procedure by not
Docket No. 70 7002 Encpsure l Page 2 of 3 Event Report 9715 entering the date, time and his initials on a new SF 702, since he could not locate the existing SF.
702. Ily not initiating the SF 702 check sheet the FLM could not certify that he opened, closed or had second check verification.
-The procedure adequately details the custodians responsibilities in section 6,16 " Repository Storage of Classified Documents." 'lhe procedure specifies that upon opening a classified repository, the custodian shall initial the SF 702 assigned to the repository and record the date and time of access in the "open by" portion of the SF 702 The procedure further states that when securing a classified iepository, close all drawers, spin the combination dial at least four times in either a clockwise or counterclockwise manner, test each drawer to assure that the locking mechanism is operable and -
initial and fill in the time that the repository is secured in the " closed by" portion of the SF 702.
Following the securing of the repository the procedure requires the custodian to a.k a fellow employee, where practical, to check the repository by spinning the combination dial at least four times in either a c; ;kwise or counterclockwise manner and then test each drawer to assure the locking mechanism is operable.
During April 1997, an assessment of 40 of 165 security containers, performed by the Security Section, revealed deficiencies associated with 36 security containers on plantsite The deficiencies ranged from SF-702's being outdated, inconsistent checks by custodians and no second party checks, All Facility Managers and container custodians affected by the assessment were issued a copy of the assessment and the responsible managers were directed to document in writing their corrective actions, Container 43 05502 was one of the containers assessed that had no discrepancies.
On August 16,1997, filleen days prior to this event, a similar event occurred in the X-344 Facility (Event Report 97-14) The corrective actions, recommended and approved by Management on September 11,1997, following the August 16, 1997, event, had not yet been implemented throughout plantsite.
Corrective Actions 1.
On September 8,1997, the FLM was issued a security infraction. The FLM also reviewed XP2 SS SS 1039, which specifies the custodial responsibilities for the protection ofclassified i
information. The FLM was counseled on the correct process foi securing a security container and completion of the SF-702 " Security Container Check Sheet,"
2, 13y November 15, 1997, Organizational Managers having jurisdiction over security containers will review this event with the container custodians within their organization.
3.
Ily November 17,1997, the X-343 Section Manager will transfer the classified matter to X-300 and have the container declassified.
Docket No. 70 7002 Encgsure }
Page 3 of 3 Event Report 9715 4.
By October 30,1997, Organizational Managers having jurisdiction over security containers, will provide evidence to the Security Section that they have walked down and verilled the requirements contained in procedure XP2 SS SS1039 (section 6.16), as it applies to the opening and securing of classilled containers are being met. (Duplicate corrective action from Event Report 97-14) l Extent of Exposure ofIndividuals to Radiation or Radioactive Materials There were no exposures to individuals from this incident to radiation or radioactive materials.
Lessons Learned Forgetting to secure a security container is a human perfunnance probicm. Usage of check sheets such as the SF 702 have proven to be efTective in climinating the majority of unsecured containers on plantsite. In this event and in tws previous an similar events, the people who accessed the containers failed to document container entry on the SF-702 check sheets. Managers need to be vigilant in periodically assessing that the SF-702 check sheets are being filled out as required by.
procedure.
Docket No. 70 7002 Enc)psure,2 Page1of1 Event Itcport 9715 List of Commitments 1.
Ily November 15, 1997, Organizational Managers having jurisdiction over security containers will review this event with the container custodians within their organization.
2.
Ily November 17,1997, the X 343 Section Manager will transfer the classified matter to X-300 and have the container declassified.
3.
Ily October 30,1997, Organizational Managers having jurisdiction over secutity containers, will provide evidence to the Security Section that they have walked down and verified the requirements contained in procedure XP2 SS SS1039 (section 6.lC), as it applies to the opening and securing of classified containers are being met. (Duplicate of corrective action from Event Iteport 9714) p
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