ML20211F024

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Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Listed Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 1) Re Identification & Classification of Reactor Trip Sys Components
ML20211F024
Person / Time
Site: Hatch, 05000000
Issue date: 06/12/1986
From:
NRC
To:
Shared Package
ML20211F020 List:
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8606180035
Download: ML20211F024 (4)


Text

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SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)

EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1,2 DOCKET NOS. 50-321/366 INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated marually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.

The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment.

Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up.

In p.

this case, the reactor wds tripped manually by the operator almost coin-cidentally with the automatic trip.

Followi'g these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for n

Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.

The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, I

the Commission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8, 1983 )

all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

860618o035 860612 PDR ADOCK 05000 1

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This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Georgia Power Company, the licensee for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1,2 for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.

Item 2.1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all Reactor Trip System

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components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:

Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, in-cluding maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.

EVALUATION The licensee for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1,2 responded to the 2

requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) with submittals dated November 7,1983,

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February 29, 1984, and June 3, 1985.

The licensee committed in the first two submittals that all components that are required to perform the reactor trip function would be reviewed to verify that these components are classified as safety-related equipment. The licensee further stated that all safety-related components were considered "Q" but that the "Q" designation is not restricted

to safety-related components but is used on plant documentation for procurement, maintenance, and other plant activities to identify quality requirements.

In the last submittal the licensee confirmed that the review of the components required to trip the reactor had been completed and that all equipment needed to trip the reactor had been verified to be properly identified as "Q" on plant documentation. The sole exceptions were the source range neutron monitors which were to be reviewed further regarding their safety classification and licensing basis.

CONCLUSION Based on our review of these responses, we find the licensee's statements confirm that a program exists for identifying, classifying and treating com-ponents that are required for performance of the reactor trip function as safety-related. This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of the Generic Letter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.

REFERENCES 1.

NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.

2.

Letter, L. T. Gucwa, Georgia Power Company, to J. F. Stolz, NRC, November 7, 1983.

Principal Contributor:

D. Lasher Dated:

June 12, 1986

4-REFERENCES (CONT.)

3.

Letter, L. T. Gucwa, Georgia Power Company, to J. F. Stolz, NRC, February 29, 1984.

4 Letter, L. T. Gucwa, Georgia Power Company, to J. F. Stolz, NRC, June 3, 1985.

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