ML20211E014
| ML20211E014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/10/1986 |
| From: | Shoemaker C NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| To: | MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| References | |
| CON-#286-541 OL, NUDOCS 8606130195 | |
| Download: ML20211E014 (4) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, ,0\\ y, o> (9 \\ Q\\ i 5 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NV \\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO..,f g\\ ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPE OARD go Administrative Judges: Q c$c.-{ A$I6l s c', June'10[1986 3 / Alan S. Rosenthal, Chairman Gary J. Edles y Howard A. Wilber ) g@NED M In the Matter of ) ) PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, --ET AL. ) 50-444-OL ) (Offsite Emergency Planning) (Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) and 2) ) ) MEMORANDUM AND ORDER At oral argument on June 18, 1986, the Attorney General of Massachusetts will be expected to focus, inter alia, upon the claim of the applicants and the NRC staff that his appeal will not lie. The factual foundation of that claim is that the Attorney General was admitted to the proceeding i as an " interested State" under the provisions of 10 CFR l l
- 2. 715 (c).
In these circumstances, the applicants and the staff contend, the rejection of the Attorney General's contention did not terminate his participation in the proceeding. Accordingly, the argument proceeds, that rejection is not now appealable under 10 CFR 2.714a (or otherwise). In support of this proposition, our attention is directed to Gulf States Utilities Co. (River Bend l Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-329, 3 NRC 607 (1976). {$hho 3 61 1 02_
e 2 Most particularly, counsel presenting the oral argument on behalf of the Attorney General should be fully familiar with all of the documents in the record bearing upon whether the applicants and the staff are right that, for the purposes of their participation in this proceeding, the Attorney General and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts are to be deemed a single entity. Our own preliminary examination of the record suggests that the following are among those documents: 1. The April 21, 1982 " Supplement to the Petition to Intervene of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts" (which supplemented the November 18, 1981 petition for leave to intervene filed in the name of the Attorney General). 2. LBP-82-76, 16 NRC 1029, 1078-79 (1982) (in which the Licensing Board denied the offsite emergency planning contentions set forth in the April 21, 1982 supplement and 6 then granted " MASS standing in the proceeding at this time l under 10 CFR S 2. 715 (c) "). l 3. The Attorney General's July 15, 1983 petition for directed certification of the Licensing Board's decision on the applicants' 21st motion for summary disposition (in which, at p. 3, it was stated that " Attorney General Bellotti, the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, has been admitted to this license proceeding as a representative of an interested state").
3 4. August 30, 1983 unpublished Licensing Board memorandum and order ruling on contentions on the New Hampshire emergency response plan (in which the Board, at p. 2, referred to contentions that had been submitted "by the Attorney General for the commonwealth of Massachusetts
- ,a}
In the event that, on the basis of the foregoing documents and any other relevant portions of the record, the Attorney General now acknowledges that he (together with the Commonwealth) was admitted to and participated in this proceeding as an " interested State," his counsel should be prepared to address the following questions: 1. May a state (or state official) who has been accorded and has taken advantage of Section 2,715(c) status later choose to relinquish that status for any reason other than a desire to discontinue any association with the proceeding? 2. If the answer to question 1 is in the affirmative, does it appear in the record below (and, if so, where) that the Attorney General formally announced that he was relinquishing that status on his behalf and that of the Commonwealth? 3. If the Attorney General's Section 2.715(c) status has not been relinquished, why is not the River Bend decision (ALAB-329, supra) controlling here? In this
[ o a 4 i connection, how can the Attorney General's attempted distinction of that decision in his May 30, 1986 response to the questions posed in our May 22, 1986 order be squared with the discussion in River Bend, 3 NRC at 610-11? It is so ORDERED. FOR THE APPEAL BOARD I 0_.Om-abM C. JQn Sh6emaker Secrevary to the Appeal Board 1 1 l l l l i _ -. _}}