ML20211A971
| ML20211A971 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20211A956 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9709250031 | |
| Download: ML20211A971 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES
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,j NUCl. EAR REEULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 3066d64001
.....,o SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.120 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 AND AMENDMENT NO.105 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-18 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY LASALLE COUNTY STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-373 AND 50-374
1.0 INTRODUCTION
l By letter dated July 1,1997, Commonwealth Edison Company (Comed, the I
licensee) submitted a request to modify the LaSalle, Units 1 and 2, Technical i
Specifications (TS). The proposed changes revise the definition of Channel l
Calibration and corrcet miscellaneous errors in the TS.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Definition of Channel Calibration The definition of Channel Calibration in Section 1.4 of the TS states that a c:libration consists of the adjustment of the channel output such that it responds with the necessary range and accuracy. However, thermocouple and RTD sensors, which are required by TS to be calibrated, are not adjustable and in some cases not accessible. The curm nt TS definition was derived from NUREG-0123, "BWR 5 Standard Technical Specifications." The licensee proposes to modify the definition to be consist with the wording in NUREG-1434,
" Standard Technical Specifications, General Electric Plants, BWR/6."
The revised definition of Channel Calibration will include the following statement:
" Calibration of instrument channels with resistance temperature detector (RTD) or thermocouple sensors may consist of an inplace qualitative assessment of sensor behavior and normal calibration of the remaining adjustable devices in the channel." The licensee currently uses an inplace qualitative assessment for these sensors and, therefore, the change to the TS will not change current practice. The proposed change will allow compliance with the TS definit hn and is consistent with NUREG-1434. Therefore, the proposed change is acceptable.
2.2 Editorial Corrections Manually Initiated Isolation Valves TS Table 3.3.2-1, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation - B. Manual Initiation, lists the valve groups which are manually closed to provide primary 6)10%9d 9709250031 970915 PDR ADOCK 05000373
1 conthiament isolation.-
TS 3.3.2 requires that a minimum number of channels of actuation instrumentation for these valves be operable. The table lists valve group 7 under both inboard and outboard valves. Table 4.3.2-1 requires a channel functional test for these valves on a refueling outage frequency.
-The licensee proposes to delete group 7 from the outboard manual isolation function.
Valve group 7 contains-the valves for isolation of the Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system. TIP system isolation consists of two valves outside of primary containment for each of five penetrations. The inboard isolation valve is a ball valve that automatically closes due to reactor vessel water level low and drywell pressure high. The inboard valves also close on a manual initiation signal and valve group 7 is correctly listed under B.1, Inboard Valves. The j'
outboard isolation valves for the TIP system penetrations are explosive squib
(
valves. These valves would be actuated using a keylock switch in the main control room if the TIP does not withdraw to allow closure of the associated ball valve. These valves are not actuated by the primary containment manual isolation logic since they are only actuated if the TIP fails to withdraw following receipt of a valid isolation actuation signal. Therefore, inclusion of these under TS 3/4.3.2 is inappropriate. The outboard isolation squib valves will continue to be required to be operable by TS 3.6.3, " Primary Containment Isolation Valves" and verified operable by TS 4.6.3.5. -Inclusion of valve group 7 under B.2, Outboard Valves, is an administrative error that has existed since initial licensing. Based on the above, the deletion of valve group 7 from Table 3.3.2-1, Trip Function B.2, is acceptable.
IRM Rod Block TS Table 3.3.6-1, " Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation", Trip Function 4.a Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM), Detector not full-in, provides the applicable conditions and minimum operable channels for-this rod block. The purpose of the IRM detector not-full-in rod block is to assure that no control rod is withdrawn during low neutron flux level operations (during refuel and startup modes) unless proper neutron monitoring capability is available in that all IRM detectors are correctly located. The Table currently has a note (e) associated with trip function 4.a.
Note (e) states that this function shall be automatically bypassed when the IRM channels are on range 1.
The licensee proposes to delete the reference to note (e) in trip
- function 4.a.
The IRM detector not-full-in rod block is required to be functioning whenever the IRMs are required to be operable, this is, in operational conditions 2 and 5.
There is no automatic bypass installed for this rod block other than the
- reactor mode switch in Run position which bypasses all IRM trip functions.
Therefore, note (s) has never been applicable to this trip function and its inclusion in this TS was an administrative error. Based on the above, the deletion of note (e) from Table 3.3.6-1, trip function _4.a, is acceptable.
1 9
L Bases Chance TS Bases Section 3/4.3.1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation, has a
- typographical error. The fifth paragraph of this section refers to Note f, which is applicable ta Table 3.3.1-2, Functional Units 3 and 4.
TS Table 3.3.1-2 Functional Units 3 and 4, are modified only by note it. Therefore, the reference to Note # is a typographical error. Therefore, replacing Note f with Note ## in this Bases section is acceptable.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendments. Th9 State official had no comments.-
4.0-ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERAT'.ON The amendments change a requirement with respect to the ins estion or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20. - The NRC staff has detennined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 40848). Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(g).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment used be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
D. Skay Date:
September 15, 1997 i
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