ML20211A955
| ML20211A955 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/20/1987 |
| From: | Taylor J DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Shafer W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| LAC-12057, NUDOCS 8702190269 | |
| Download: ML20211A955 (4) | |
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D DA/RYLAND hhh[ COOPERATlVE P O BOX 817 2615 EAST AVE. SO LA CROSSE. WI (608) 788-4000 JAMES W. TAYLOR j
General Manager January 20, 1987 In reply, please j
refer to LAC-12057 j
l DOCKET NO. 50-409 1
Mr. W. D. Shafer Chief Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch i
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE DPR-45 RESPONSE AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO EXERCISE WEAKNESSES IDENTIFIED IN INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-409/86011 (DRSS)
Dear Mr. Shafer:
This letter is being submitted in response to your letter of December 31, 1986, regarding Inspection Report No. 50-409/86011 (DRSS).
Included are the required written responses to the identified weaknesses.
EXERCISE WEAKNESS #1 Communications with the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota were inadequate in that the scope and content of the information provided was marginally sufficient to allow the states to formulate appropriate protective actions.
(Open Item No. 409/86001-01) (See Section 5.b and 5.e)
DPC RESPONSE A meeting with the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota is scheduled for January 27, 1987 at which time the problems identified during this and other past exercises will be discussed. Some preliminary discussions in this area have already been conducted with the States of Wisconsin and Minnesota and representatives of Kewaunee and Point Beach nuclear plants. Dairyland has obtained forms used by these facilities that have received approval of the states.
It is hoped that at this meeting on the 27th, significant progress will be made in the area of communications. Also, a telephone will be added in the EOF to further facilitate communications to offsite agencies.
IO 0702190269 07o3po R
PCI-17 ADOCK 05000409 21987 PDR
e Mr. W. D. Sh fsr-2 Jr.nuary 20, 1987 Chief Emergency Preparedness LAC-12057 The Technical Support Center (TSC) personnel involved in making the offsite notifications were interviewed in an effort to determine the source of the communications problems there. Both the Operations Parameter Director (0PD) and the communicator remembered using both the formal message form found in Appendix H to Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2 and a hand written sheet containing the more specific information about the event for Site Area Emergency notifications. The communicator did, however, use the formal ALERT message when making an update call while the plant was still in the Alert status. This could have caused misunderstanding on the part of the evaluator in that the very next message transmitted wan lor the Site Area Emergency which, of course, calls for a different message.
Update message forms are also being considered and will be discussed at the meeting of January 27.
EXERCISE WEAKNESS #2 Notifications to the NRC failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(3) which requires notification immediately after notification to the State and local agencies, but not later than one hour after the declaration of an Emergency Class.
(Open Item No. 409/86011-02) (Section 5.b)
DPC RESPONSE Emergency Plan Procedure No. 2 will be changed to require notification of the NRC immediately after notification to the state and local agencies, but not later than 30 minutes after the declaration of an Emergency Class. This change, plus reminding the control room, TSC and EOF personnel of the importance of the NRC notification, should resolve this weakness.
EXERCISE WEAKNESS #3 The Offsite monitoring team demonstrated numerous inadequacies and failed to find the plume centerline.
(Open Item No. 409/86011/04) (See Section 5.d)
DPC RESPONSE This weakness was broken down into 6 individual items and each will be addressed.
(1) When the team was initially dispatched, they failed to take a key to the storage facility for the emergency kit. Hence, they had to return to the protected area in order to get the key.
DPC RESPONSE Emergency Plan Procedure No. 8 is currently being revised.
In that revision, a prerequisite step will be added that requires obtaining the key to the emergency kit storage room before leaving the OSC/TSC area.
(2) The team did not perform an inventory when they picked up the kit and did not realize that a tweezers was missing. Later, when they had to pick a filter cartridge out of the air sampler without tweezers, they damaged the filter and fragments of it were dispersed.
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Mr. W. D. Shafer 3
Jrnurry 20, 1987 Chief Emergency Preparedness LAC-12057 DPC RESPONSE This item was apparently a misunderstanding on the part of the evaluator in that a pre-departure inventory isn't required by Emergency Plan Procedure No. 8.
Had an inventory been done, no deficiencies would have been noted because a tweezer was not part of the equipment included. Dairyland Power appreciates and agrees with the suggestion that a tweezer be a part of the offsite kit and one will be added. A review of equipment necessary for performing successful offsite surveys will be conducted and any other items thought necessary will be added.
(3) The survey meter used by the offsite team was not zeroed by the Health Physics Technician (HPf). Therefore, whenever the controller told the team that the radiation dose rate was "as read" or was background," the HFf reported the dose rate to his Radiological Assessment Director as "five mR/hr." This may have contributed to point No. 4 below.
(4) The Team never found the plume centerline.
(5) Occasionally the air sampler was improperly placed under the vehicle's raised hood in such a way that engine air from the radiator fan was interfering with the air flow thru the sampler.
DPC RESPONSE Training for Health Physics Technicians in areas related to Emergency Preparedness is being upgraded.
In addition to classroom training, each technician will be required to demonstrate proficiency in each area of concern to Emergency Planning on a semi-annual basis. These areas include, but are not limited to:
1.
Offsite Surveys 2.
Onsite Surveys 3.
PASS Samples 4.
Offsite Dose Calculations It is thought that this extra commitment to training of the Health Physics Technician will prevent further problems in the area of offsite surveys.
(6) Use of the phrase, "This is a drill" was not generally observed in the radio communications to and from the offsite team.
DPC RESPONSE All potential UHF-FM radio operators will be reminded of the importance of preceding each transmission with "This Is A Drill."
Other items listed in the inspection report including both open items and suggestions for improvement will be addressed as well as the suggestions from the LACBWR staff evaluators. The implementation of the changes necessary to upgrade the LABCWR emergency plan procedures will be accomplished by April 17, 1987.
PCl-17
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e Mr. W. D. Shafer 4
January 20, 1987 Chief Emergency Preparedness LAC-12057 If you have any question in regard to this response, please contact us at 608-689-2331.
Sincerely, M
JWT: REC:sks cc: Document Control Desk NRC Resident Inspector R. Bevan, LACBWR Project Manager N. Williamsen, NRC Region III t
W. Snell, NRC Region III a
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