ML20211A148

Forwards Addl Info in Response to IE Bulletin 85-003 Re motor-operated Valve Common Mode Failures.Required Review & Documentation of Design Basis for Operation of Each Valve within Scope of Bulletin Completed

ML20211A148
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	09/30/1986
From:	Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8610150002
Download: ML20211A148 (6)

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 g h '. 157B Lookout Place

%% SEP 301986

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conaission j Region II-Attn: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 85 MOTOR-OPERATED VALVE COMMON MODE FAILURES DURING PLANT TRANSIENTS DUE TO IMPROPER SWITCH SETTINGS -

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT By letter dated May 13, 1986, an interim response to IE Bulletin 85-03 was provided for Browns Ferry. Enclosure 1 contains the additional information required to complete item a of the bulletin. The information is based on the generic methodology of General Electric Company NEDC 31322 which was submitted to NRC by letter to J. M. Taylor from T. A. Pickens of the BWR Owners's Group dated September 2, 1986.

Enclosure 2 provides an updated list of commitment milestones for completion of the remaining items of the bulletin. If there are any questions, please get in touch with J. D. Wolcott at (205) 729-3604.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY R. G idley, rector Nuclear Safety and Licensing Enclosures cc: See page 2 8610150002 860930 PDR ADOCK 05000259 G PDR p/

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Dr. J. Nelson Grace SEP 30 986 cc (Enclosures):

Mr. James Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Mr. G. G. Zech Director, TVA Projects U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 i

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r ENCLOSURE 1 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

RESPOMSE TO IE Bulletin 85-03

. Item a

. Review and document the design basis for the operation of each valve. This -

documentation should include the maximum differential pressure expected during both opening and closing the valve for both normal and abnormal events to the extent that the valve operations and events are included in the existing, approved design basis, (i.e.,-the design basis documented in pertinent licensee submittals such as FSAR analyses and fully approved operating and emergency procedures, etc.). When determining the maximum differential pressure, those single equipment failures and inadvertent equipment operations (such as inadvertent valve closures or openings) that are within the plant design basis should be assumed.

Additional Response to Item a The required review and documentation of the design basis for operation of each valve identified to be within the bulletin scope has been completed. The additional information required to complete table 1 of our May 13, 1986 response, documentation of the maximum expected differential pressures for each of the subject valves, is provided in table 1.

TVA participated with the Boiling Water Reactor Owners's G.*oup (BWROG) in producing NEDC-31322, "BWR Owners Group Report on the Operational Design Basis of Selected Safety-Related Motor Operated' Valves." The information provided in table 1 is worst case differential pressures for each safety-related valve function as determined by application of the NEDC-31322 methodology to BFN.

The worst case differential pressures in table 1 have been compared to the original valve purchase specifications with favorable results. In no case did the worst case differential pressures exceed the design specified value.

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' Response Update for Items b c. d. and f The schedule for completion of the requirements of bulletin items b, e and d is provided in enclosure 2. Items 2 and 3 of the schedule are being extended from the original commitment dates of October 31, 1986 and January 7, 1987 respectively, due to a delay in obtaining vendor services. (Note: Attachment 2 of our May 13, 1986 letter contained a typographical error in the completion date for Item 2). The Browns Ferry Units will not be operating during the extended timeframe and thus, there is no adverse impact on nuclear safety.

The final planned response is the written report required by item f of the bulletin, which is due 60 days af ter completion of the program.

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Table 1 .

Valve Max. Differential Valve Nonnal Safety Function Pressure (Ib/in2d)

Unlaue No. Description Position Description Openine Closine 71-2 RCIC stem Open Valve must close and -

1105 isolation valve isolate containment on -

RCIC stem line break.

71-3 RCIC stem Open Valve must close and -

1105 isolation valve isolate containment on RCIC stem line break.

71-8 RCIC stem supply Closed Valve must open on RCIC 1105 -

valve initiation to supply reactor stem to the turbine.

71-9 RCIC turbine Open Valve must spring close on *

• stop valve RCIC isolation signal to stop the turbine.

71-17 RCIC suction valve Closed Valve must close if opened -

39.4 to the suppression and containment isolation pool is required.

71-18 RCIC suction valve Closed Valve must close if opened -

39.4 to the suppression and containment isolation pool is required.

71-19 ROIC suction valve Open Valve must close when RCIC -

37.5 to the condensate is aligned to take suction storage tank from the suppression pool.

71-25 RCIC cooling water Closed Valve must open on RCIC 1342.9 -

supply valve initiation to ensure an adequate cooling supply.

71-34 RCIC mininun Closed Must both open and close to 1335.8 1469.7 recirculation flow provide adequate punp valve recirculation flow and adequate system flow to the vessel, respectively.

71-38 RCIC test return Closed Valve must close on an -

1200**

to condensate initiation signal while in the test return mode to ensure adequate flow to the reactor vessel.

71-39 RCIC discharge Closed Valve must open on RCIC 1129.3 -

injection valve initiationtoinjectwater to the reactor vessel through the feedwater system.

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• Valve is included for conpleteness; it has no motor-operated safety function.

• • Based on actual operating experience in test return mode.

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Table 1 -

(Continued)

Max. Differential Valve Valve Nonnal Safety Function Pressure (Ib/in2d)

Unique No. Description Position Description Openino Closino 73-2 HPCI steam Open Valve must close to isolate - 1105 isolation valve containment in case of a HPCI stem line break.

73-3 HPCI steam Open Valve must close to isolate - 1105 isolation valve containment in case of a HPCI steam line break.

73-16 HPCI steam supply Closed Valve must open on HPCI 1105 -

valve initiation to supply reactor steam to the turbine.

73-26 HPCI suction valve Closed Must open to allow the HPCI 50.3 40.6 to the suppression punp to take suction from pool the torus and must close if isolation of primary containment is required.

73-27 HPCI suction valve Closed Must open to allow the HPCI 50.3 41.5 to the suppression pwp to take pool the torus andsuction from,f must close i isolation of primary containment is required.

73-30 HPCI minimum Closed Must both open and close to 1361.8 1439.1 recirculation flow provide adequate pupp valve recirculation flow and adequate cooling flow to reactor vessel respectively.

73-35 HPCI test return Closed Must close on HPCI - 1250**

to condensate initiation to ensure adequate flow to the reactor vessel.

73-40 HPCI suction valve Open valve must close when HPCI -

95.2 to the condensate is aligned to take suction storage tank from the suppression pool.

73-44 HPCI discharge Closed Must open on !?CI initiation 1129.3 -

injectionvalve to inject water to the reactor vessel through the feedwater system.

i 73-81 HPCI steam supply Open Must close to isolate -

1105 bypass valve primary containment on a l HPCI Steam line break.

• • Based on actual operating experience in test return mode.

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. . j ENCLOSURE 2 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

REVISED COMMITMENT LISTING FOR IE BULLETIN 85-03

1. Provide the remaining information for item a as requested in the bulletin by October 1, 1986. (Complete)

2. BFN will review and establish the correct valve switch settings by February 15, 1987.

3. BFN will implement any required switch settings by April 15, 1987.

4. BFN will perform differential pressure testing to verify the established switch settings are correct or provide justification of the acceptability of those which cannot be tested by June 4,1987.

5. BFN will implement any required procedures and/or procedure revisions necessary to ensure the correct switch setting can be maintained throughout the life of the plant by September 3,1987.

6. Provide a written report in accordance with item f of the bulletin 60 days after completion of the program, i

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