ML20210S943
| ML20210S943 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/13/1999 |
| From: | Boger B NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Borchardt R, Cool D, Funches J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE), NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS), NRC OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9908180240 | |
| Download: ML20210S943 (15) | |
Text
p a mag 3
g I
[m
%s UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
!J>*
WASHINGTON. D.C. 30806 4 001 L
August 13,1999 MEMORANDUM TO: Richard W. Borchardt, Director -
Office of Enforcement Donald A. Cool, Director Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
- Jesse L. Funches Chief Financial Officer Joseph R. Gray, Associate General Counsel Licensing and Regulation Office of the General Counsel-David L. Meyer, Chief Rules Review and Directives Branch e
Office of Administration Brenda J. Shelton, Chief Records Management Branch Division of information Management Office of the Chief Information Officer FROM:
ruce A. Boger, Director ivision of Inspection Prohram Ma ageihenT' Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
OFFICE REVIEW AND CONCURRENCE ON A RULEMAKING PLAN -
PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISING POWER REACTOR LICENSEES' CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO CAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY EVENTS Your concurrance is requested on the attached Commission Paper and Rulemaking Plan.
The following is a summary of this request:
1.
Tj!!g: Physical Security Requirement for Exercising Power Reactors Licensees' Capabilities to Respond to Safeguards Contingency Events.
2.
NRR Task Leader:
Richard P. Rosano (301-415-3282) i h05
\\
3.
G.oanizant Ind'viduals:
NRR - Ronald J. Albert (301-415-3216)
OGC - Kathryn L. Winsberg (301-415-1641) g, g g 13 NMSS - Charles E. Gaskin (301-415-8116)
V g
9908190240 990813
PM 77-/Y3 I
9".
E
!, 4.
Beauested Action:
Review and concurrence in Commission Paper and Rulemaking i
Plan 5.
Requested Completion Date: August 24,1999 -
6.
Backgmund Since 1992, the staff has been visiting power reactor sites to evaluate the licensess' capabilities regarding response to safeguards contingency events. This program, called Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations, is nearing completion of its first full cycle, and is scheduled to conduct its last visit in May 2000. In anticipation of the completion of this cycle, NRR formed the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task j
Force in Fall of 1998 to find more efficient and effective means of evaluating licensees' capabilities in response strategies. The SPA Task Force reported its recommendations to the Commission on January 22,1999, in its " Recommendations of the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force" (SECY-99-024) and the Commission approved the recommendations by a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 29,1999.
The Staff Requirements Memorandum tasked the staff to:
' a..
develop a regulation requiring licensees to identify target sets, develop
~
protective strategies, and to exercise these strategies on a periodic basis; 4
9 b.
propose a frequency for NRC inspector observation of the drills and exercises;-
c.
consider regulatory changes to require licensees to maintain the
. effectiveness of their contingency plans and to upgrade their security plan commitments whenever the exercises reveal weaknesses in their ability to protect against the design basis threat; and 4.
consider and propose, as appropriate, any additional rulemaking (beyond the rulemaking proposed in SECY-99-024) identified as a result of the pilot program.
The Staff Requirements Memorandum approved the development of associated regulatory guides, inspection program changes, revisions to the Enforcement Manual, and necessary training for NRC inspectors. The SRM advised the staff to ensure that the changes to the safeguards program would be compatible with the ongoing changes to the overall NRC inspection and assessment program and to interact with stakeholders in an open process.
7.
Resources will be reprogrammed from other approved work for the proposed amendment to 10 CFR 73.55. Copies of this concurrence package have been forwarded to the Controller for coordination of resource issues per the EDO memorandum of June -
14,1991.
r l
I 8.
Tte positions conveyed in this package represent those of the Director of the Office of l
Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
)
Attachment:
Commission Paper w/atts.
\\
J cc: w/ attachments H.T. Bell, IG B. Borchardt, OE J. Dyer, Rlll/ ORA J. Larkins, ACRS & ACNW E. Merschoff, RIV/ ORA H. Miller, Rl/ ORA F. Miraglia, DEDR L. Reyes, Rll/ ORA S. Treby, OGC R. Zimmerman, NRR DISTRIBUTION:
Central f/c NRR Mail Room PGEB/r/f R. Albert, NRR R. Auluck, NRR M. Case, NRR T. Essig, NRR S. Frattali, NRR C. Gallagher,ADM C. Gaskins, NMSS M. Malloy, NRR D. Matthews, NRR
~
D. McCain, NRR D. Mendiola, ADM C. Mullins J. Murphy, CRGR L. Riani, Adm B. St. Mary K. Winsberg, OGC 1
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\lOLB\\ Albert \\ concurrence To o receive e copy of this document. Indicate in the boz:
- C" = Copy without attachment / enclosure "E' = Copy with attachment! enclosure
- N" = No copy OFFICE RSS:lOHPB lE RSS:lOHPB / [
l SC:RSS:lOH6 l RGEB: DRIP E
NAME RAlbert f/3/F RSkelton (U
RPRosano O el CCarpenter G4C DATE 08/13 199 08/\\h/99 F 08/ A 199' D 8/pj($9
.BC.!ONptfPM l 4@ LPM:NRR l
l OFFICE
'I NAME fidefd iMM W er DATE 081 l 3/99
%* 08/ l3 //99 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
[1 l
3 l
8.
The positions conveyed in this package represent those of the Director of the Office of i
Nuclear ReactorRegulation.
Attachment:
Commission Paperw/atts.
cc: w/ attachments H.T. Bell, IG J. Dyer, Rill / ORA J. Larkins, ACRS & ACNW E. Merschoff, RIV/ ORA H. Miller, Rl/ ORA F. Miraglia, DEDR L. Reyes, Ril/ ORA E. Ten Eyck, NMSS S. Treby, OGC R. Zimmerman, NRR
'4 4
0 i
i
n 1
e EQB-The Commissioners.
FROM William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations
SUBJECT:
. RULEMAKING PLAN,' PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR EXERCISING POWER REACTOR LICENSEES' CAPABILITY TO i
RESPOND TO SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY EVENTS PURPOSE:
A
' To respond to the Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 29,1999 requiring the staff to develop a plan to modify the regulations to require power reactor licensees to identify target sets, develop protective atrategies and exercise these strategies on a periodic basis.
BACKGROUND-1 Since 1992, the staff has been visiting power reactor siies to evaluate the licensees' capabilities regarding response to safeguards contingency events. This program, called Operational Safeguards Response Evaluations, is nearing completion of its first full cycle, and is scheduled to conduct its last vistin May 2000. In anticipation of the completion of this cycle, NRR formed the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force in Fall of 1998 to find more efficient and -
effective means of evaluating licensees' capabilities in response strategies. The SPA Task Force reported its recommendations to the Commission on January 22,1999, in its
' Recommendations of the Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force"(SECY-99-024)
- and the Commission approved the recommendations by a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 29,1999.
The Staff Requirements Memorandum tasked the staff to:
a.
develop a regulation requiring licensees to identify target sets, develop protective strategies, and to exercise these strategies on a periodic basis; b.
propose a frequency for NRC inspector observation of the drills and exercises; CONTACT: R. Rosano, NRR 301-415-3282
2 l
consider regulatory changes to require licensees to maintain the effectiveness of c.
their contingency plans and to upgrade their security plan commitments j
whenever the exercises reveal weaknesses in their ability to protect against the design basis thrust; and d.
consider and propose, as appropriate, any additional rulemaking (beyond the rulemaking proposed in SECY-99-024) identified as a result of the pilot program.
l The Staff Requirements Memorandum approved the development of associated regulatory guides, inspection program changes, revisions to the Enforcement Manual, and necessary training for NRC inspectors. The SRM advised the staff to ensure that the changes to the safeguards program would be compatible with the ongoing changes to the overall NRC l
inspection and assessment program and to interact with stakeholders in an open process.
\\
The SRM specifically cited three questions for the staff to address in the rulemaking package, as follows:
Why were the OSREs allowed to be conducted with security measures well a.
above the licensing commitments without, at least, evaluating if the minimum i
licerusingranddions are adequate?
I b.
Why is requiring a plant to meet its originallicensing basis a back-fit?
c.
Why are the NRC inspectors not inspecting compliance for all of 10 CFR Part 73.557 DISCUSSION:
l As noted in SECY-99-024 and discussed in the Commission meeting of May 5,1999, the staff recommends a new regulation requiring power reactor licensees to periodically test their response to safeguards contingency events by conducting drills and exercises and feeding back the information gained from these drills and exercises to upgrade security at the site, as necessary. The staff also recommended (1) guidance to assist the industry in the construction of target sets, exercise strategy, and methods for evaluating success, (2) a new or revised NRC inspection procedure, and (3) training for NRC regional inspectors in tactical response testing.
This requirement for periodic drills and exercises would provide an altemative to the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation program that has existed since 1992. The
' exercise rule' would enhance performance for the licensees' security organizations through drilling, provide feedback mechanisms for the performance indicator program, and evaluate maintenance of a higher level of assurance than is provided by OSRE visits that, currently, occur at each site on an 8-year cycle.
Backfit Analysis The staff believes the rulemaking is warranted for several cualitative reasons. However, the staff acknowledges not only that the proposed rule constitutes a backfit under Section 50.109
m j
l g
(.'.
j 3
(Backfit Rule), but also that it cannot be auantitativelv justified on the basis of a substantial increase in safety or exception to the Backfit Rule. First, the proposed rule would 19.31 a licensee's capability to provide physical protection. (Currently, there is no requirement for-licensee's to test their physical protection capability, which is considered to be a significant flaw l:
in current requirements.) Second, the contemplated rule would provide added assurance that a l
licensee's physical protection capability is adequate relative to the objective of 10 CFR 73.55 -
provide high assurance that the physical protection system shall protect against a design basis threat and radiological sabotage. Third, the proposed rule will give greater specificity in existing i
generally-stated requirements regarding a licensee's physical protection capability. Therefore, the staff believes that the proposed rulemaking has merit either on the basis of the stated qualitative reasons or as an exemption to the Backfit Rule. Finally, the staff notes that when L
the " substantial increase" criterion was promulgated in its present form in 1985, the Commission said: "...the standard is not intended to be interpreted in a manner that would
- ; result in disapprovals of worthwhile safety or security improvements having costs that are justified in view of the increased protection that would be provided" (see discussion in Memorandum, from S.J. Chilk to J.M. Taylor and W.C. Parler, "SECY-93-086 - Backfit Considerations," June 30,1993)
The staff proposes that the rule include a requirement for drills and exercises. Drills would be required on a quarterly basis and are defined as single-scenario, single-shift tests that do not employ a mock adversary force actually attacking the plant, otherwise referred to as " force-on-force
- The scenarios could be limited in nature t,ut designed to present a realistic attack scenario. The response should involve the entire shift which, for reesons of site security, would l
mean bringing that shift onsite as a shadow force, leaving the security force members assigned to that shift actually employed to protect the site during the drill. A quarterly frequency would ensure that each shift has an opportunity to be tested at least once per year. Exercises are defined as multiple scenarios (one per shift, with all shifts being tested) and conducted on an annual basis.
i The new regulation and its inspection component will be incorporated into the NRC's risk-informed baseline inspection program and will be region-based. In doing so, the staff will be i
able to transition from OSRE program, which tested plants on an 8-year cycle without a formal i
feedback mechanisms to the licensees' corrective action programs, to a program that is risk informed, consistent with the agency oversight procedures, and provides greater assurance of maintenance of the high assurance objective of 10 CFR 73.55.
As for the Commission's specific questions, OSREs were conducted in the past permitting the use of security resources above those committed to in the security plan. This was due to licensees desire to use all of their " running force," that is, the number of guards typically on the site due to planning for unexpected absences and additional duties, rather than the minimum level committed to in the security plan. While this provided an assessment of the licensee's likely response in a safeguards contingency, it did not provide an assessment of the response in all situations, such as those when these unexpected absences allowed site staffing to revert to the committed levels. This practice was terminated in the modified OSRE program which was instituted upon the reinstatement on OSRE in spring 1999 and will not be permitted in the new regulation. In the current OSREs and in the proposed program, licensees will be permitted to test only using the number of guards committed to in the security plan.
L L_
r-i l
4 The Commission also asked why requiring a plant to meet its originallicensing basis considered a backfit. This question is taken to refer to the fact that a requirement to upgrade a
- security plan to address shortcomings or weaknesses exposed in an OSRE inspection has l
~ been referred to as a backfit, even though there is a licensing requirement to have an approved plan to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage.
Backfitting is defined in 10 CFR 50.109 as "the modification of systems, structures, components,...; or the procedures or organization required to design, construct or operate a
. facility; any of which may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission's rules or the imposition'of a reaulatory staff oosition interoretina the Commission rules that is either new or different from a oreviousiv soo!iemble staff oosition..." In this situation, the requirement to 1
L upgrade the Commission approved plan would seem to fall under the definition of backfitting because a previous Commission approval of the security plan is now being overridden with new l-requirements.
l Finally, the Commission asked why NRC inspectors are not inspecting compliance for all of 10 l
CFR Part 73.55. Since 1982, the staff has operated under guidance from the Office of the l,f
'. General Counsel that a licensee's approved security plan substitutes for the requirements in 10 CFR 73.55(b) through (h). As such, the approved security plan becomes the inspectable document. The issue appears to be whether the requirement in 10 CFR 73.55(a), that is, the t
requirement that licensees provide a physical protection system designed to protect against the design basis threat, should be subject to inspection and enforcement. Following up on the results of an OSRE in 1997, the staff proposed to issue a cited violation against the licensee for f
failure to satisfy that requirement in 73.55(a), but the enforcement staff of the Office of the i
General Counsel advised that a violation could not be cited. It was not clear to the staff at that time that OGC had previously advised that NRC could issue, orders to require licensees to upgrade their security plans if a test of their physical protection system shows that they are not capable of protecting against the design basis threat under their Commission-approved plan, as L
required by $ 73.55(a).
The staff has met with members of industry, including the Nuclear Energy Institute, and members of non-industry groups such as the Nuclear Control Institute. These meetings have l
provided a forum to discuss the staff's plans, but they have also raised a number of issues that attend the staff's recommendations. These additional issues are discu: sed at greater length in the attached Rulemaking Plan in preparing the Rulemaking Plan requested by the Commission relative to the deomonstration of a capability of a licensee to defend against a design basis threat, the staff recognize the need to review all the security requirement as an integrated set. The staff is preparing to undertake such a review; however, the staff intends to complete the present rulemaking on
_ drills and exercises and incorporate the experience from this into an integrated review of Part l
l
- 73. Such a review should be considered a long-term project and should include data gleamed I
. from performance indicators following implementation of the present rulemaking. The next increment would then be to ensure a clear articulation of the threat that the demonstrations are L
measuring performance against, followed by an evaluation of the remaining rule elements as to how they contribute to defending against this threat, and the final stage would be evaluation of licensees security plans against this same standard. This would be pursued in coordination 2
l l
u i
[T i
l.
5 with the' broader staff efforts of becoming more risk informed in its approach to regulations.
Questions raised during the OSRE discussions with the Commission and stakeholders have prompted the need for the integrated view to include the level of insider participation in a postulated event.
COORDINATIQH:
The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this plan and has no legal objections to its
. content. The Chief Financial Officer has reviewed the plan for resource implications and has not objections to its content. The Chief Information Officer has reviewed this plan for i
'information technology and information management implications and concurs in it.
RECOMMENDATION:
/
j That the Commission approve the staff's plan to proceed with the rulemaking. Staff requests action within 10 days in light of the fact that the Commission already approved the intent of the recommendation in the Staff Requirements Memorandum of June 29,1999. Action will not be
- taken until the SRM is received. We consider this action to be within the delegated authority of the EDO.
l William D. Travers
~
Executive Director for Operations
Attachment:
Rulemaking Plan
1
. RULEMAKING PLAN: PHYSICAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
FOR EXERCISING POWER REACTOR LICENSEES' CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY EVENTS Reaulatory issue There is currently no specific regulation requiring nuclear power reactor facilities to conduct drills and exercises on a periodic basis. However, licensees' safeguards contingency response capabilities have been tested through use of the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program which is nearing completion of its first full cycle with its last visit scheduled for May 2000, In anticipation of the completion of this cycle, NRR formed the Safeguards.
Performance Assessment (SPA) Task Force in fall 1998 to find more efficient and effective means of evaluating licensees' capabilities in response strategies. The SPA Task Force reported its report to the Commission on January 22,1999, in its " Recommendations of the r
Safeguards Performance Assessment Task Force" (SECY-99-024), and the Commission approved the recommendations, including rulemaking, by a Staff Requirements Memorandum dated June 29,1999.
The regulation proposed by the staff would require each licensee to conduct quarterly drills and l
biennial exercises designed to test the capabilities of the security organization to protect against the design basis threat. A preliminary draft of the requirement follows:
73.55(i) Dri//s and exercises. (1) The licensee shall develop target sets that describe the equipment that must be protected to maintain safe operation of the plant. These target sets shall be based on the design basis threat as defined in 10 CFR 73.1(a) and include details on the impact of operational decisions on the mitigation of the consequences of the attack.
j
.'(2) The licensee shall develop scenarios to test whether the security organization can protect these target sets against the design basis threat.
j (3) The licensee shall conduct quarterly drills in which a single scenario and single target set are selected to test the security shift's response to a simulated attack by the design basis threat. In addition, the licensee shall conduct biennial exercises in which one l-scenario is selected for each shift, using target sets identified in 73.55(i)(1), and all shifts j
. are tested against those scenarios' in force-on-force exercises.
(4) The licensee shall provide for meaningful evaluation of the performance of the security organization during drills and exercises.
i ATTACHMENT 1 i
E l[.
l-(5) The licensee shall ensure that prompt actions are taken to correct weaknesses identified in drills and exercises, including upgrading security program commitments where necessary.
Current Reaulatory Framework 10 CFR 73.55(a) requires that licensees have a physical protection system designed to protect against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage. However, there is no current regulatory requirement for licensees to periodically test the performance of the security organization in exercises that simulate a design basis threat attack.' Although the performance has been subject to testing in the Operational Safeguards Response Evaluation (OSRE) program, participation in this program is not required. Without a requirement to test, the NRC is unable to provide assurance that power reactor licensees are capable of protecting against the design basis threat of radiological sabotage.
How Rulemakina Will Address the Readatorv Problem The rulemaking will address the problem by instituting a performance oriented and risk based requirement for periodic tests of the licensees' security organization against a simulated design
' basis threat attack. The information that results from these tests will provide the means by
^
. which to measure each licensee's compliance with the requirement in 10 CFR 73.55(a) to have a physical protection system capable of defending against the design basis threat.
In the course of this rulemaking, there were a number of associated issues that surfaced that should be addressed in the process of developing the rule and guidance. While the staff is not,
t prepared to offer solutions to these issues at this point, answers will be developed during interactions with stakeholders and from experience gained while conducting the remaining OSREs. Some of the issues are discussed below.
Active Insider. Some stakeholders have criticized the past program of performance assessment (OSRE) for failing to include an active insider in the attack scenarios, as described in the design basis threat (DBT). There are a number of components of the security and fitness-for-duty programs designed to protect against the insider, including requirements for background investigations, psychological evaluations, pre-access drug and alcohol testing, behavioral observation, random and for-cause drug and alcohol testing, and employee assistance l:
programs. These components are examined as part of the routine inspection program, and the protection against an overt attack is examined during the OSRE. However, the staff recognizes the importance of this issue and will consider changes to the application of the active insider through the pending rulemaking process.
Definition of "radioloaical sehntece". The Nuclear Energy Institute raised the possibility of using 10 CFR Part 100 radiological limits to define " radiological sabotage" as the term is used in 10 CFR 73.55(a). This question relates the tradition of using core damage as the goal of the attack in OSREs. NEl argues that core damage could be achieved, but the releases contained, without producing a harm to the public and that, therefore, this traditional definition of success for an 2
L
1 attack scenario is flawed. The staff recognizes this issue as a significant part of understanding the purpose of scenarios and performance testing. The staff also agrees that radiological sabotage should be limited to events which pose a threat to the public. During the process of revising the regulation to require drills, the staff will consider ways to clarify the meaning of radiological sabotage in a way that is meaningful for the protective strategy and which informs the process of performance testing.-
l Cwie;ets.cv with 10 CFR 73.46. Since 1988, the Office of Nuclear Materials, Safety and Safeguards has had in place a regulation (10 CFR 73.46) which contains requirements for security contingency exercises at nuclear fuel fabrication facilities. The proposed modification 10 CFR 73.55 to include requirements for power reactor licensees to conduct drills and exercises would make the two regulations more consistent. The staffintends to strike a balance between strict consistency with 73.46 and the need to define requirements that are unique to the reactor security environment.
- Rulemakino Ootions 1.'
The staff would propose no new rule and would allow the Operational Safeguards
~
Response Evaluations to end with completion of the first fulltycle in May 2000. This is y.
inconsistent with the Chairman's reinstatement of the OSRE program in November 1998 and is also inconsistent with the Commission's SRM of June 29,1999 directing the staff to initiate rulemaking to require drills and exercises.
2.
The staff would propose no new rule, but would continue the OSRE program as modified in 1999. This option would necessitate development of guidance to formalize the OSRE process, including guidance on how to construct target sets, develop scenarios of attack, and carry out drills using these scenarios. This option is consistent with the Chairman's reinstatement of the OSRE program in November 1998 but is inconsistent with the
- Commission's SRM of June 29,1999 directing the staff to initiate rulemaking to require t
drills and exercises.-
3.
The staff would initiate rulemaking with a requirement for licensees to test their capabilities. This is consistent with the Commission's SRM of June 29,1999 directing the staff to initiate rulemaking to require drills and exercises. It is also not inconsistent with the Chairman's reinstatement of the OSRE program in November 1998 since that action was intended to avoid a cessation of testing. The new regulation would provide the mechanism for testing that would substitute for the OSRE program.
j Imoact on Licensees if the preferred option is selected, licensees would be required to expend resources to develop target sets and scenarios, then to test these scenarios with live participation by security force members on a periodic basis. Licensees would not be required to increase staffing, unless they o
chose to employ experts in the process of developing target sets and scenarios. Resource 3
l
requirements for the development of this program are expected to be approximately $XXXX.XX per year per site.
Benefit The NRC would be able to provide assurance, through analysis of the results of these tests, of the licensees' capabilities to protect against the design basis threat. Currently, that ability to assure resides in the inspection program which examines compliance with regulations and commitments. The new regulation takes a performance-oriented view toward compliance by requiring test of integrated components of the security program. Licensees will benefit from this program since it will be a more define and documented program, totally implemented and -
managed by the individual sites.
Preferred Option
- Option 3 is preferred by the staff and is consistent with Commission direction.
Office of the General Counsel Leoal Analysis DAckfit Analyjig
. The staff believes the rulemaking is warranted for several cualitative reasons. However, the staff acknowledges not only that the proposed rule constitutes a backfit under Section 50.109 (Backfit Rule), but also that it can not be auantitativelv justified on the basis of a substantial increase in safety or exception to the Backfit Rule. First, the proposed rule wouldigst a licensee's capability to provide physical protection. (Currently, there is no requirement for licensee's to test their physical protection capability, which is considered to be a significant flaw in current requirements.) Second, the contemplated rule would provide added assurance that a licensee's physical protection capability is adequate relative to the objective of 10 CFR 73.55 -
provide high assurance that the physical protection system shall protect against a design basis threat and radiological sabotage. Third, the proposed rule will give greater specificity in existing generally-stated requirements regarding a licensee's physical protection capability. Therefore, the staff believes the proposed rulemaking has merit either on the basis of the stated qualitative reasons or as an exemption to the Backfit Rule. Finally, the staff notes that when the
" substantial increase" criterion was promulgated in its present form in 1985, the Commission said: "...the standard is not intended to be interpreted in a manner that would result in i
disapprovals of worthwhile safety or security improvements having costs that are justified in view of the increased protection that would be provided" (see discussion in Memorandum, from S.J.
Chilk to J.M. Taylor and W.C. Parler, "SECY-93-086 - Backfit Considerations," June 30,1993).
1 Aareement State implementation Issues The new rule will not apply to facilities or licensees regulated by Agreement States, i
4
FL h
Succortsng Documents A. regulatory analysis and an OMB statement will be prepared. An environmental assessment will be prepared for this rule in compliance with 10 CFR 51.22 and 10 CFR 50.109.
l l
lasuance by EDO or Commission This rulemaking will be issued by the Commission.
i Interoffice Manaaement Steerina Group i
This rulemaking will affect only NRR; however, due to the possible generic safeguards implications of the requirement, this action will be coordinated with the Office of Nuclear Material, Safety, and Safeguards.
Staff Level Workina Grouo/Concurrina Official 4
The staff level working group will consist of Rcnald Albert, Robert Skelton, Ray Hsu, Dennis Gordon, Charles Gaskin, Andrew RayWd and Sandra Frattali. The concurring officials will be Richard Rosano, Robert Gallo, and Bruce Boger.
I Public/ industry Particioation
- This rulemaking will use the interactive rulemaking web site, as appropriate, to enhance input from the public. In addition, a stakeholder has already expressed a willingness to work with the NRC staff on this rule and a series of public meetings have been scheduled to facilitate this cooperative effort. Similarly, other stakeholders have expressed an interest in this new regulation and every effort is being made to keep these stakeholders informed of the process and aware of upcoming public meetings.
Ep.gources it is estimated that this rulemaking will require XX NRR FTE and XX OGC FTE over a 22 month period to develop the regulation and associated guidance, and to develop and implement the inspector training necessary to carry out this new inspection module. When the rule becomes final, the staff intends devote a portion of its FTE to direct observation of the licensees' drills and exercises. Currently,2.6 FTE from headquarters and $90,000 in contract money is dedicated to OSREs, resources that can be redirected to the new regulation and may result in no additional requirements from headquarters. The new regulation will be coordinated with the agency's new Baseline inspection Program, which is already budgeted for regional inspector activities and may not require any additional FTE expenditures from the regions. These issues will be examined during development of the regulation.
l l
NRR Lead:
Ronald Albert 5
I t
e NRR Support Sandra Frattali CGC
Contact:
Kathryn Winsberg Schedule Rulemaking package for office concurrence September 9,1999 CRGR and ACRS review TBD Proposed Rulemaking Plan to EDO September 13,1999 Rulemaking Plan to Commission -
September 17,1999 Proposed Rule to Commission March 31,2000
, Proposed Rule published in FederalRegister May 31,2000 with 75-day comment period
,I Resolution of public comments October 31,2000 Final Rule to EDO December 31,2000 Final Rule to the Commission January 31,2001 Publication of Rule May 31,2001 l
l 6
!.