ML20210S817
| ML20210S817 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Satsop |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1975 |
| From: | Rosa F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Oreilly P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-1685 NUDOCS 8605290423 | |
| Download: ML20210S817 (7) | |
Text
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AUG E D G15
%,%y4 P. O'Reilly, LWR 1-3, RL+
r 4 'ag THRU: Thomas A. Ippolita, Chief. EI&CS Branch, TR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, WPPSS NUCLEAR UNITS NUMBERS 3 AND 5; LIST OF CONCERNS FOR THE WPPSS APPLICATION Plant Name:
WPPSS Nuclear Units Nos. 3 and 5 Docket Numbers:
50-508/509 Licensing Stage:
CP Milestone Number:
Responsible Branch LWR 1-3 and Project Leader:
P. O'Reilly Technical Review Branch Involved: EI&CS Branch Description of Response:
List of Concerns for the WPPSS Application Requested Completion Date:
August 6, 1975 Review Status:
Complete The enclosed list of concerns was prepared by TR:RS. Electrical.
Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch. These concerns reflect our review of the WPPSS application through Amendment Nisnber 21 (which reflects CESSAR through Amendment Ntsnber 32). The list contains CESSAR related as wetl as other items.
We are prepared to meet with the applicant to discuss these itens at a mutually agreed time.
Original Signed By F. I:osa Faust Rosa, Section Leader Electrical Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch Division of Technical Review Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulat6on
Enclosure:
As stated distribution DOCKET FIlFS cc-S. Hanauer RR READING A. Giambusso EIC READING R. Heineman F. ROSA V. Stello
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ENCLOSURE
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I.
List of concerns for WPPSS 3 & 5 (EISCSB)
A.
CESSAR Related Items 1.
Loss of load trip and bypass (RTS) - Does not conform to IEEE Std 279-1971.
Requirement: We' will require documentation that the design of the loss of load trip and bypass will satisfy IEEE Std 279-1971 except for the seismic qualification of the trip sensors.
2.
Turbine Stop Valves - Closure of these valves during a steam line break accident.
Requirement: We will require that the instrumentation, control and electrical equipment to be utilized for closing the turbine ~
stop valves during steam line break accident be designed in accordance with the requirements set forth in IEEE Std 279-1971 excluding seismic qualification.
3.
Containment High Pressure Bypass during Leak Test - Present design does not appear to include provisions to facilitate this test.
Requirement: Documentation which provides a description of how the present design will facilitate this test.
4.
Containment Isolation Actuation Signal - Study to be performed to establish these variables that will assure isolation occurs under all appropriate circumstances, including both small and large piping break accidents.
Re'quirement: Documentation of the results of the study.
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. 5.
Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) - Achievingscold shutdown from the control room must be accomplished t.hile preventing overpressurization of the SCS.
Requirement: Documentation ccncerning the implementation of achieving cold shutdown from the control room consistent with preventing overpressurization of the SCS.
i 6.
Regulatory Guide 1.75 Requirement: Commitment that in the event that there is future need to take any exceptions to RG'1.75, the specifics for the exception will be submitted as an amendment.
7.
Interconnection design between Protection System Cabinets -
(Degrading the Protection System)
Requirement: Demonstrate the capability of the design to withstand all design basis events or codify the oesign to assure complete independence of these cabinets.
8.
Card mounted fusable links between redundant Class IE channels -
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A failure of a single link to isolate a fault in a channel could propagate to other channels resulting in the loss of function.
Requirement: We will require that an analyses and/or test results substantiating the adequacy of the fusable links be submitted for review and approval prior to the design fabrication and installation.
9.
Safety Injection Tank (SIT) pressure rectoration - Positive means be provided to restore pressure.
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1 Requirement: We will require that the design be modified to include positive means of assuring that the SIT pressure is restored, when required, to that used in the safety analysis and that the instrumentation, control and electrical equipment pertaining to this design change satisfy the requirements of IEEE Std 279-1971.
- 10. Connection between plant computer and protection system - Ins'apendence between protection system and plant computer.
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Requirement: Documentation to indicate that analyses and/or tests will be performed to demonstrate that tne connections between the plant computer and the plant protection system will not jeopardize the independence of the plant protection system.
- 11. Underfrequency decay as related to the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP). Pump coastdown and flow rate as related to DNBR.
Requirement: Conformance with CESSAR interface requirements for underfrequency decay rate (latest CESSAR amendment indicates 3 Hz/sec.).
- 12. Generic resolution of concerns relating to RTS.
Requirement: Documentation concerning those resolutions.
- 13. Interface requirement that the reactor coolant pumps shall remain electrically connected to the turbine generator for 20 - 30 seconds (applicant complies with this requrement)
Requirement: Documentation which establishes the safety significar.=a of this interface requirement.
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. B.
Additional-Items 1.
The Auxiliary Feedwater System - Compatibility of Figures 7.4-2 and 10.4-7.
Requirement: We will require that the required control power diversity be provided and that the design be in full cnformance with IEEE Std 279-1971 and IEEE Std 308-1971.
2.
IEEE Std 323-1974 - Conformance to the aging and/or on-going qualification requirements of this document.
Full confor' ance to this Standard.
Requirement:
m 3.
Regulatory Guide 1.47 - Possible exceptions to this guide.
Requirement: Full conformance to this guide.
4.
Periodic response time testing - Programs for periodic testing of protection system response times not included in the PSAR.
Requirement: Full conformance to branch position (including sensor) concerning response time testing of protection systems.
5.
Battery installation - Two batteries per room (Category I) with a barrier between the batteries.
Requirement: Separate rooms (Cateogry I) for each battery.
C.
Items for Discussion 1.
Power to Safety Injection Pumps'& Valves from onsite source in 10 sec.
CESSAR Requirement: Flow to the core attained within a maximum of 30 seconds.
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- 2.
Loss of Offsite Power at sometime after an accident.
CESSAR Requirement: ECCS flow re-established in 13 seconds.
and emergency feedwater established within 15 seconds.
3.
Regulation of the. voltage on the plant vital instrument buses will be + 2%. (What above frequency tolerance?)
CESSAR Requirement: Regulation of the vol'tage on the plant vital instrument buses shall be within 1%.
4.
Throttling of flow during the recirculation mode to match the available NPSH. (Low Pressure Pumps).
5.
Definition of safety related portions of the CVCS - (These portions tobeconnectedtoonsitedieselgenerators).
Requirement: An emergency generator shall be utilized to supply power to certain equipment following failure of the normal power supply.
6.
Turbine stop valve closure - No MSIS,will be provided to close
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the turbine stop valves for a steam line break accident.
Requirement: See Item A2.
7.
The MSIVs will not be designed to fail closed on loss of electrical control power. (However, redundant actuators provided for these valves).,
CESSAR Requirement: The MSIV shall be fail-close valves and in the event of a loss of power to the valve controllers or a loss in air supply to the valves (if air operated 1 the MSTVs chall anta==+4e=11v claco
)
.. 8.
Atmospheric Dump Valves Requirement: We will require that the consequences of a steam line break with a failure of the atmospheric dump valve be demonstrated to be acceptable by either analysis or suitable equipment modifications. The instrumentation, controls and electrical equipment pertaining to any design modification must i
be designed in accordance with IEEE Std 279-1971 and i
I 9.
A MSIS will not be provided for the MSIV bypass valves since they
'will be de-energized during normal power operation.
l Requirement: Passive valve and conforms to EICSB Position 18.
- 10. Verification that valves of one train (e.g., SI-669, SI-664, SI-666 and SI-660, see Figure 6.3-1A) will not be powered from the same load center within that train to prevent single failure (during the recirculation mode) from causing possible
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radiological consequences in excess of the dose guideline values l
of 10 CFR 100.
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