ML20210R257
| ML20210R257 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1985 |
| From: | Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210R237 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-653 NUDOCS 8605160177 | |
| Download: ML20210R257 (8) | |
Text
-
,+
t STATEMENT BY JAMES K. ASSELSTINE COMMISSIONER, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE SUCC0fMITTEE ON ENERGY CONSERVATICN AND POWER F0USE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE JULY 10, 1985 Good morning, Mr. Chairman. As you know I have expressed rather strong concern about the way in which the Commissicn handled the Diablo Canyon case.
In my testinery teday, I do not intend to address all of the minute details of those concerns.
Instead. I want to focus on the broader implications of the Ccmmission's decision.
4 When reduced to their essence my concerns about the handling of the Diablo Canyon case are really about one thing - fairness. Was it fair to the parties to the Dicbio Canyon proceeding to remove the consideration of j
the complicating effects of emergency planning as an issue in the litigation and treat it as a generic issue?
In order to answer this cuestion, one must first answer another question.
Is there any basis for the Commission's decision to issue a generic rule which bans any consideration of the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning in individual licensing proceedings?
I believe not, and apparently NRC staff experts and the Commission's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) aoree, i
l I
8605160177 860415 PDR FOIA BELLBS-653 PDR l
~
The Comission's position on this issue, as carried out by the staff in the past, has been to treat all relatively infrequent natural phenomena in the same manner.
Emergency planning for each nuclear powerplant site takes into account whatever are the most likely to occur natural phenomena i
which could complicate an emergency respense. Thus, most plans consider the effects of rain and fcg, which are relatively frequently occurring phenomena at most plant sites. However, the staff also considers less frequently occurring natural phenomena such as tornados, hurricanes, blizzards, very large floods, and earthquakes. The staff determines what the most likely of these is and considers what effect they would have on 4
emergency response for that site. Thus, the staff censiders blizzards for I
plants in flew England, but not for plants in Florida; it considers hurricanes for plants in Florida, but not for plants in Kansas; and it considers tornados for plants in Kansas, but not for plants where the risk of tornades is not high. The staff has also considered the effects of earthquakes on emergency response for plants in areas of high seismic risk like California.
a flow this scurds like an eminently sensible way to handle this issue - to determine on a site-specific basis the most likely to occur natural phenomena and to determine whether the emergency plan accounts for the effects that those phenomena might produce and provides for alternative responses if necessary. However, the Commission has concluded that earthquakes are so different from all other natural phencrena, and so much more unlikely to occur, that at no site in the country need the effects of l
ecrthquakes on emergency response ever be considered. This determiraticn is based on three subsidiary determinations.
The Commission says that:
1.
Earthquakes below the Safe Shutdcwn Earthquake SSE will not require emergency response because the plant is designed to safely shut down if those earthouakes cccur sn there will be no radiological release and rc reed for emergency planning.
2.
Earthouakes above the SSE are extremely unlikely. And, 3.
The coincidence of an earthquake and a separately caused accident has such a low probability of occuring that it need not be censidered.
The Comission concludes that given these probabilities every eventuality has beer ccvered and there is no need to consider the impacts of earthquakes on emergency planning. The Comission's reasoning is flawed.
First, the Comission ignores all of the uncertainties in those probabilities it so firmly relies upon. There are always uncertainties in any probabilistic determination, and especially in determining seismic probabilities. The determination of the probability that er earthquake will occur end its magnitude is far from being an exact science. In fact for Diablo Canyon, the ACRS recomended, and the Comission imposed, a license condition which requires a new seismic evaluation for Diablo Canyon 5 years from now - precisely because of such uncertainties.
Even granting for the sake of argument that the probabilities cited by the Comission for the occurrence of earthquakes are accurate, those probabilities show earthquakes to be more likely to occur than other occurrences which we routinely consider for emergency planning purposes.
Further, the Commission ignores a fundcmental precept of emergency planning: we plan for low probability occurrences because no catter how safe we try to make
3
-4_
nuclear power plants there is always a possibility that some event will i
occur which will require use of one or core aspects of emergency planning.
The Commission's reasoning else is not as comprehensive as they would i
have you believe. The Commission igncred a fourth scenario: the possibility that an eerthquake below the SSE could occur and could cause damage to the plant which would not result in inrediate radiological 4
release, but which would require emergency response in the form of getting equipment or people to the plant.
In fact the Diabic Canyon emergency plan specifically recognizes this.
It requires the ifcensee to shut down the plant and to take specific actions when earthqeskes less than the SSE occur.
The NRC staff experts on this issue do not egree with the Commission.
The staff has maintained all alcng that there is no basis for excluding earthquake impacts from consideration in erercency planning for all plants.
In areas of high seismic risk - and those are the staff's words, not mine -
j planning should take earthquakes into account, at least for earthquakes below the SSE. And, in a recent cemo to the Commission, the staff questioned the technical basis for excludirg consideration of those earthquakes above the SSE.
Apparently the ACps also does not agree with the Ccmmission.
In a recent letter to the Cornission, they stated:
We see no technical reason for the exclusion of carthouakes from the natural phenomena considered in off-site emergency planning
--- w--
m
for nuclear power plants. However, we believe that only limited consideration of earthquakes is appropriate. For sites where en earthquake capable of severely damaging emergency travel routes is sufficiently likely to occur, the local off-site authorities should baue the benefit of studies irdicating the types and potential locations of such damage. The study of this kind already performed for the regicn surrounding the Diablo Canyon site would clearly meet the intent of this comment.
While there are large portions of the country where the risk of damaging earthquakes is probably too low to be a concern, California at least is not one of those places.
In fact, the nuclear plants with the most stringent seismic requirements are located in California - Diablo Canyon and San Onofre. The Connission has recognized, by imposing such stringent requirements, that seismic risk plays an important part in the risk for Diablo Carycn and San Onofre. Yet, in the same breath the Commission says that the seismic risk is too low to be considered for energency planning.
The Commissicn simply can't have it both ways.
Further, the NRC staff has identified Diablo Canyon as a site for which seismic risk is high and where earthquake impects cught to be considered. Clearly, Diablo Canyon is one of those sites for which earthquakes should be considered, as the staff and the ACRS have asserted.
Thus, there is no basis for generically excluding the impacts of earthquakes on emergency response for t.ll plants.
It is a site specific issue like all other natural phencrena, and Diablo Canyon is one of the i
sites for which this issue is relevant. The question is, then, material to the licensing of Diablo Canyon, end the parties to the Diablo Canyon proceeding should have been given er cpportunity to litigate any factual issues. There are clearly factual issues associated with a determination 1
of whether the Diablo Canyon cinergency plan is indeed adequate to account for the impacts of earthquakes and to provide for alternatives where necessary.
LLwas not fair to the parties to sirply remove the issue from the proceeding under the guise of treating it as a generic issue, ano to refuse them an opportunity to contest these issues.
In the past I have stated my view on why the Commission ignored all of its experts end chose to issue a generic rulemaking on this issue.
I stated that I thcught it was simply because they did not want to delay licensing of the Diablo Canyon plant.
The Comission majority has denied this.
I am not going to reargue the Comission's motivation. You have the transcripts of the Comission meetings and the Comission's explanations.
You can u-'w ycur own conclusion about why they chose the course of action they chose. What I will do, however, is point out the practical effect of the Comission's decision, and that is, that the two plants for which this issue is most relevant, Diablo Canyon and San Onofre, have been licensed without giving the parties to the proceeding an opportunity to litigate the issue.
Now some might argue that in the overall scheme of things this particular issue is not of very high importance. However, my concerns about the Comission's handling of this issue go beyond the relative importance or unimportance of the substance of the issue itself. What I am most concerned about is the integrity of the Ccmmission's licensing process.
of whether the Diablo Canyon emergency plan is indeed adequate to account for the impacts of earthquakes and to provide for alternatives where necessary.
Lt_was not fair to the parties to sirply remove the issue from the proceeding under the guise of treating it as a generic issue, and to refuse them an opportunity to_ contest these issues.
j In the past I have stated my view on why the Commission ignored all of-its experts end chose to issue a generic rulemaking on this issue.
I stated that I thought it was simply because they did not want to de' lay licensing of the Diablo Canyon plant. The Commission majority has denied.
this.
I am not going to reargue the Commission's motivation. You have the transcripts of the Connission meetings and the Commission's explanations.
i You can draw your own conclusion about why they chose the course of action they chose. What I will do, however, is point out the practical effect of the Comnission's decision, and that is, that the two plants for which this issue is most relevant, Diablo Canyon and San Onofre, have been licensed 3
withcut giving the parties to the proceeding an opportunity;to litigate the issue.
1 Now some might argue that in the overell scheme of things this particular issue is not of very high importance. However, my concerns i
about the Commission's handling of this issue go beyond the relative importance or unimportance of the substance of the issue itself. What I am t
I most concerned about is the integrity of the Ccmmission's licensing process.
i 1
m
7-Public confidence will play vital rcle in determining whether [1uclear power will have a place in our future. An essential element in establishing-public cerfidence is the belief that the NRC has the public interest in mind when it licenses and regulates nuclear power plants. The i
public must see the NRC as an inpartial adjudicator when it licenses plants, and the public must be able to trust the Ccmmission to be fair to all parties. The Comission cannot be perceived as manipulating the 5
process to achieve a particular end.
Continued resort by the Comission to procedural shortcuts like these in the Diablo Canyon proceeding can only further erode public confidence in the fairness and objectivity of our regulatory process. This hurts not only the Comission, but the nuclear industry as well. Thank you.
l t
O me h
g k
g 6
+
re e
{
r s-J p u
J' r
~
jy
+.
m-n-
r-+
f. /
UNITED STATES o
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
.h WASHINCTON D.C.20555
%,*****/
September 24, 1985 OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER Samuel W. Speck Associate Director State and Local Proo,ams and Support Federal Emergency Fanagement Agency Washington, D.C.
10472
Dear Mr. Speck:
I read with interest your letter received by the Commission on September 20, 1985.
In that letter you expressed your support for the Comission's " initial position" on earthouakes and emergency planning.
You argued that the rule proposed by the staff in SECY 85-283 which sets out procedures for the consideration of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena on emergency planning is unnecessary.
Hcwever, the only reason you gave in support of your position was the followag general statenent:
"The probability of severe, low frequency natural phenomena in the vicinity of a corriercial nuclear power plant is very low. The probability of a concurrent radiological incident at the nuclear power plant is lower yet."
Unfortunately, the NRC staff and the ACRS were unable to reach the same conclusion you reached. The staff identified several very difficult issues associated with relying merely on a statement that the probability is too low to be considered.
- See, SECY 85-283 and various staff memoranda on this subject.
I would appreciate it greatly if ycu would provide me with any relevant information you might have to support your conclusion.
I am specifically interested in information which would bear on the issues raised by the staff in SECY 85-283. Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely, I
James K. Asselstine 1
( r. k Q R,A S 3 ' -
N f*
y