ML20210L721

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Insp Rept 99900403/99-201 on 990720.No Violations or Deviations/Noncompliance Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Documentation Re Fabrication of Reactor Pressure Vessel Surveillance Specimens & Surveillance Capsules
ML20210L721
Person / Time
Issue date: 08/05/1999
From: Correia R
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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ML20210L714 List:
References
REF-QA-99900403 NUDOCS 9908100013
Download: ML20210L721 (5)


Text

4 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Report no: 99900403/1299201 Organization: GENE

Contact:

Kenneth Brayman (408) 925-6587 Nuclear Activity: Manufacturer and supplier of components and services to the nuclear industry.

Date: July 20,1999 Inspectors: Gregory C. Cwalina, Senior Reactor Engineer Matthew Mitchell, Materials Engineer Approved by: Richard P. Correia, Chie Reliability and Maintenance Section Quality Assurance, Vendor inspection and Maintenance Branch Division of Inspection Program Management l

9908100013 PDR 990805 GA999 ENVGENE 99900403 PDR

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1 INSPECTION

SUMMARY

The NRC inspectors examined documentation related to the fabrication of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) surveillance specimens and surveillance capsules. Specifically, l the inspectors reviewed the documentation for the surveillance materials and capsules l l associated with the RPVs manufactured by Chicago Bridge and Iron Works (CB&l) for four BWR/6 units (Clinton 1, Grand Gulf 1, Perry 1, River Bend 1) in the United States.

Pertaining to the above, the inspectors examined the traceability of these materials to the original RPV materials.

! No violations or nonconformances were identified.

2 STATUS OF PREVIOUS INSPECTION FINDINGS l No previous inspection findings were examined during this inspection.

3 INSPECTION FINDINGS AND OTHER COMMENTS 3.1 Review of the Fabrication History of Reactor Piessure Vessel Surveillance Soecimens and Surveillance Caosules l

a. Inspection Scope l The NRC inspectors reviewed GENE document files related to the fabrication of j RPV surveillance specimens and surveillance capsules associated with RPVs

! fabricated by CB&l. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the documentation for four BWR/6 facilities in the United States: Clinton 1, Grand Gulf 1, Perry 1, and River Bend 1. The inspection traced the documentation on the survei!!ance materials from the Certified Material Test Reports (CMTRs) for the RPV plate and weld materials; to the CB&l procedures for and records of fabrication for the surveillance specimens; to the shipping and receipt information as the specimens we.a transferred from CB&l to GE; and, finally, to the documentation on the fabrication of the capsules and their shipment to the facilities.

b. Observations and Findinas b.1 Document Review The GENE documentation was presented in two categories: generic documents which were referenced or used in the development of epah plant-specific case, and plant-specific documents. The package of generic dwuments included:

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. GE Drawing 166B7063,"Charpy impact Specimen"

  • GE Drawing 137C5365, "Charpy impact Specimen" -
  • OCCI No. C-102.01, " Certification Procedure for Surveillance Program (SP), P/L 83X629 G001, G002"

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CB&l procedure STP-10," Surveillance Test Specimen Preparation Plan,"

which defined the surveillance test specimen preparation plan that was used at CB&l for cutting, machining, and marking the Charpy specimens supplied for the GE surveillance programs.

The documentation provided in the plant-specific files began with the GE Purchase Orders for each of the RPVs and accompanying surveillance specimens. It continued with the Vendor Print File (VPF) associated with the surveillance test specimen production for each of the RPVs. The VPFs for each facility examined contained:

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  • CMTRs for the RPV plates and weld materials used to fabricate the surveillance specimens
  • Welding procedures used to fabricate the surveillance welds Heat-treatment history for the surveillance materials l Results of the non-destructive examinations (NDE) on the surveillance plates and weldments Cutting, machining, and dimensional verification and marking procedures used on the finished Charpy specimens.

GE Product Quality Certification records that were required when the surveillance specimens were transferred from CB&l to GE and when the l finished surveillance capsules were shipped from GE to the facilities.

b.2 Traceability l

, The inspectors review of the traceability of the surveillance materials ano ihe l

documentation that accompanied them identified four primary tracking numbers associated with the surveiliance materials for each RPV, as shown in the following table.

Reactor General CB&l Vendor ~

Reactor Vessel Electric Contract : Production File. . _ Vessel Code Purchase Order Number Number - Number -

Number River 205-H8968 73-C112 3614-651-1 72 Bend 1 l Clinton 1 205-H8989 73-6735 3653-615-1 78 l

Perry 1 205-AE028 73-C108 3521-502-1 70 i Grand 205-AE027 - 73-C109 3519 738-1 67 Gulf 1 Table 1 - RPV Tracking Numbers  ;

in addition, each material type (surveillance plate, weld, and heat affected zone (HAZ)) for each RPV's surveillance program was identified at CB&l and GE by a unique identifier as listed below.

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Base metal P1 B Weld P2 W ,

Heat affected zone P3 H Table 2 - Material Type identification l

The GE Purchase Order Number linked the documentation for a RPV to the l appropriate CB&l Contract Number cnd Vendor Print File Number for the  !

fabrication of the surveillance program specimens. The CB&l contract number I was the primary identifier of the documentation used to record the fabrication history (heat treatment, NDE, etc.) associated with the surveillance material for each RPV along with the P-number to identify which specific rhaterial was being discussed. In some cases, the reactor vessel number was used on the documentation (in lieu of the CB&l Contract number) along with the appropriate P-number since this also uniquely identified the RPV material to which the documentation applied.

Regarded the traceability of the surveillance materials themselves, the inspectors' noted that CB&l procedure STP-10 required that the original blocks of surveillance material be uniquely marked using the appropriate material P-number and the CB&l Contract Number. After sectioning into sub-blocks (approximately 7 inches by 6 inches by 3 inches), each sub-block was marked with the material P-number, CB&l Contract Number, and Reactor Code Number. ,

Prior to cutting the Charpy specimens from the sub-block, the P-number and l Reactor Code Number were stenciled on either end of what would become a finished Charpy specimen. This Charpy specimen marking convention was consistent with GE Drawing 166B7063, as referenced in CB&l procedure STP-

10. Therefore, the inspectors concluded that, throughout this process, positive control was established for maintaining specimen identity and traceability.

The inspectors reviewed the material traceability process for the specimens during shipping to GE's Wilmington, North Carolina facility for insertion into the surveillance capsules. In one case (Clinton 1) this was a direct shipment from CB&I, while the others went via GE's San Jose facility. When the specimens

arrived at Wilmington, they were inspected and the results appropriately documented. The inspectors found two characteristic comments noted on the receipt documentation for each surveillance material shipment
first, no certification documents were sent along with the specimens and second, the material samples were not marked in accordance with the GE drawing.

l The first comment can be resolved by noting that all of the GE Product Quality

! Certification Documents were maintained at San Jose and were readily reproduced for this NRC inspection. The GE Ouality Control procedures for surveillance program certification (OCCI No. C-102.01) did not require that the certification documentation be sent to Wilmington with the specimens. The 1

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! inspectors were satisfied that maintaining the documentation at GENE, San Jose, was acceptable.

The second comment stemmed from the fact that in the time between when the specimens were fabricated by CB&l (in the 1974 - 1975 time frame) and when they were received at Wilmington (in 1978), a new GE drawing on Charpy specimen fabrication had been produced (Drawing 137C5365). This drawing required that base material specimens be marked with a "B," weld material specimens with a "W," and HAZ materials with an "H,"instead of the P number designation used by CB&l (see Table 2 above). It was this drawing,137C5365, that was being used by the GE staff during receipt inspection at the Wilmington facility, which resulted in their decision to have the specimens remarked. The NRC inspectors' noted that this remarking did not compromise the traceability of the material since it was evident that the Wilmington staff knew the correlation between the P-number marking and the material type such that they could unambiguously have them remarked before insertion into the capsules. The documentation regarding the shipment of the capsules to the appropriate facility was also reviewed and found to be in order.

c. Conclusions Based on the information reviewed by the inspectors, it was concluded that the documentation provided by GENE for the four BWR/6 RPV surveillance programs was sufficient to assure traceability of the materials to the material used to manufacture the reactor pressure vessels.

LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED James Klapproth, Manager, Engineering and Technology Thomas Caine, Manager, Structural Assessment and Mitigation Louis Quintana, Manager, Nuclear Services Quality Betty Branlund, Technical Leader, RPV Kris Kotak, Desgn Engineer ,

Patrick O'Neil, Co-op student .

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