ML20210K604

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Provides Response to Request for Addl Info Re Submittal Titled Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46,GL 87-02 RAI Response
ML20210K604
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 08/11/1997
From: Dennis Morey
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-SC, TASK-A-46, TASK-OR GL-87-02, GL-87-2, NUDOCS 9708190331
Download: ML20210K604 (48)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-_-___-_-- o Dave lArt:y Southern Nucl:ar Vice hesident Op ratag Compary tadey Project F O. Box 1295 e Bwmingham, Alabama 35201 Tet 205 992.5131 August 11, 1997 SOUTHERN COMPANY Energy toServe nurWorld" Docket Nos: 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 Joseph hi. Farley Nuclear Plant Verification Of Seismic Adequacy Of hiechanical And Electrical Equipment In Operating Reactors LJutssohssijafety issue (USl A-46L Ogngselstter 87-02 RAI Respqnss Ladies and Gentlemen: This letter is in response to the Request for Additional Information (RAl) dated hiay 15,1997, concerning our submittal dated October 28,1996, titled " Unresolved Safety Issue (USI) A-46, Generic Letter 87-02 RAI Response." The enclosure provides the Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) response to the RAl. If you have any questions, please advise. Respectfully submitted, hl hbi'H't Dave hforey / Enclosure 95 '), EWC:maf RAIA46. doc cc: hir. L. A. Reyes, Region 11 Administrator ' hir. J.1. Zimmerman. NRR Project hianager hlr. T. hl. Ross, Plant Sr. Resident inspector i n n1 o* 1 w,,, a .t appFltMl? 9708190331 970811 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P PDR

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O 7 f-SNC RESPONSE TO GL 87-02 RAI i 1 Question: I a in your Final Safety Analysis RepmI(FSAll), you have committed to Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 100, which requires,in part, that,"Where the maximum vibratory acceleration of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake at the foundations of the nuclear power plant structures are determined to be less than one-tenth the acceleration of gravity (0.1 g)...,it shall be assumed that the maximum vibratory accelerations of the Safe Shutdown Earthquale at these foundations are at least 0.1 g." Hased on the Cl,ASSI/SilAKE analysis referred to in your response to question 6 of the August 29, 1996, staff request for additionalinformation (RAl), did the computed maximum ground accelerations at the foundation levels of the diesel generator building (DGH) and service water intake structure (SWIS), as well as at grade elevation 155 feet, comply with the above quoted regulatory requirement? If the requiren"nt in 10 CFR Part 100 was not met, justify your deviation from your FSAR commitment.

Response

As part of the reduced-scope study for the IPEEE program at Farley Nuclear Plant (FNP), new seismic response analyses were conducted for selected structures to generate freefield and in-structure response spectra using the CLASSI/SilAKE computer programs. The analysis results have been documented in reti:renec 6. The resulting icsponse in the freelield at the Diesel Generator Building (DGB) and Service Water Intake Stmeture (SWIS) foundation elevations satisfy the 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A requirement that the maximum ground motion is assumed to be at least 0. log. The seismic input for FNP was the plant Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), with the horizontal zero period acceleration (ZPA) at 33 Ilz anchored at 0. log as shown in Figure 3.0 2 of reference 6. Selected pages from reference 6 are included as Attachment 1. Diesel Generator Buildine and Plant Grade (EL 155') The Diesel Generator Building (DGB) is located in the Main Plant Area. The soffit ofi's 1 basemat is at Elevation 151', which is about 3.5' below grade. The basemat does not have any effective embedment. The control point for the Main Plant Area at the Farley site was dermed at the top of the Compact Overburden soil layer at Elevation 130' This defmition of the location of the SSE Ground Response Spectrum (GRS) is more conservative than that specified in FNP FSAR Section 2.5.2.10, i.e., ground surface or plant grade; but was done to satisfy the current Standard Review Plan (SRP) requirements (reference 7). Figure 4.1-2 of reference 6, which is included in Attachment I, schematically shows the location of the control pomt relative to the soil layers, and the convolved motions at the various levels of the soil column calculated by StIAKE. The surface motion, shown at kwation P1 of Figure 4.1-2, envelopes the SSE. Figure 4.1-4 of reference 6 provides a more detailed plot of the response spectra of the surface motions at grade at Elevation 154.5' for the 3 soil cases .j required by the SRP (reference 7) which significantly envelop the SSE, with a ll'A approximately at 0.15g. Therefore. at grade elevation (EL 155') the ZPA is greatc than 0.lg. i 1

r. L l 4 ~ Since the DGB was treated as a surface founded structure supported on caissons, these {: - surface motions (Figure 4.1-4),- including the le. site ampli6 cation efTects, were used - - directly as input to the DGB's foundation level in the generation of new in-structure response spectra. Thus, the 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A requirement of maximum ground motion . assumed to be at least 0.10g at the foundation level in the freefield is satisfied for the DGB. In regards to motion at plant grade, elevation 155', the foundation motion for the DGB in the frec6cid is the freefield motion at plant grade elevation 155' which has a ZPA approximately at 0,15g which is greater than the 10 CFR Part 100 Appendix A minimum of 0.lg. . Ser ice Water intake Starlun; c The Senice Water Intake Structure (SWIS) is located in the Pond intake Area. Figure 4.2 2 of reference 6, shows schematically the location of the control point in relation to the soil

layers, and the convolved motions at the various levels of the soil column calculated by SIIAKE. The grade is at Elevation 195', and the control point is specined on a hypothetical outcrop of the Lisbon layer at Elevation i10' to satisfy the current SRP (referenco 7) requirements for this soil pro 61c The bottom of the SWIS base slab is founded at two levcis, viz. Elevation 164' and Elevation 148.5' The embedment depth ranges from 31' to 46.5', with an equivalent embedment ratio of 0.68 leading to considerable wave scattering etTects.

Figure 4.2-7 (Attachment 1) shows the horizontal soil responses in the freefield at the - various levels of the soil column calculated by SIIAKE. The enveloping spectra of the 3 soil cases are depicted therein for the respective foundation levels at Elevations 166' and 148'. The et,isting soil colunm model has sublayer divisions at these elevations uhich essentially represent the motion in the frecfield at the two SWIS foundation elevations. It is clear that the ZPAs at the foundation levels in the freefield arc both higher than 0.10g. Thus, the 10 l CFR Part 100 Appendix A requirement of maximum ground motion assumed to be at least 0.10g at the foundation level in the freefield is satisfied for the SWIS. 2. Question: With respect to your response to question 6 of the August 29,1996, staff's RAI,' discuss the significance of changes in the amplitudes in the newly generated in-structure response spectra (IRS) for the DGB and SWIS as a result of using the - CLASSI/SIIAKE codes, which may have used a soil damping value different from the FSAR-specified limit of 7% If a soit damping greater than the 7% value was used in the CLASSI/SII AKE-hased analysis, provide justification for exceeding the FSAR value. Additionally, since you elected to employ the soil structure interactive approach, which is not referenced in your FSAR for performing the seismic analysis, discuss in detail how the following three provisions of Section 3.7.2 of the Standard Review Plan are incorporated in you/ analysis for generating the IRS: (1) limitation of the extent of reduction to foundation motion; (2) accounting ofincreased foundation rocking due to wave scatteringt and (3) consideration of soillayering effects and frequency dependency -of the foundation impedances. Also, discuss how the debonding of the top 20 feet of soil or half the embedment, whichever is less, was implemented in the embedded SWIS 2

foundation analysis, l.astly, provide a brief summary of the code verification process that validates the applicability of the CLASSI code for the IRS generation.

Response

As discussed in the FNP Unresolved Safety Issue A-46 Summary Report (reference 1), the DGB and the SWIS are caisson supported structures. The simplified treatment of these structures in the original soil structure interaction (SSI) analysis was state-of-the-art at that time But due to the fact that this modeling technique was not able to capture the efTect of the soil surrounding the caissons, new modern soil-structure interaction analyses were performed tc more accurately capture the response of these caisson supported structures. The new modern SSI analyses followed the guidance provided in the NRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800, Revision 2, September 1989 (reference 7) using the Farley SSE spectral shape and the horizontal peak ground acceleration (pga) of 0. lg. Using the SSI techniques described in the FNP FSAR, including soit damping, would not, for these caisson supported structures, produce an accurate estimate of the structure's seismic response. The following is a discussion of the significance of the changes in the amplitudes in the newly generated IRS for these caisson supported structures as compared to the original IRS. J)iesel Gengnitor Building The DGB is a stiff, single story shear wall structure with fundamental fixed base frequencies in excess of 27 Itz in the horizontal directions. Such a stitTbuilding founded on soft soil is expected to result in a ftmdamental soil structure mode where the structure responds as a rigid bcdy. The results of the new SSI analyses show that the fundamental soil-structure swaying mode is approximately 6.5 llz for the best estimate soil case, as may be inferred from the spectral peak in Figure 7.1-1 of reference 6 (Attachment 1). This Figure also compares the current best estimate soil case with the original IRS. The most notable difTerence between the two analyses is a marked shin in the ftmdamental system frequency from about 1.6 llz in the previous analysis to 6.9 llz in the current analysis. This frequency shin is attributable to a major difference in the two analytical approaches - the previous work modeled the entire 56' height of caissons as an equivalent freestanding column completely uncoupled from the surrounding soil. On top of this column was added the stick model of the DGB. Soil springs were then attached to the bottom of this column. Ignoring the lateral support provided by the soil surrounding the caissons resulted in an overly flexible system. The current analysis employed the impedance function approach and treated the caissons as a part of the soil mediv:n. The frequency shiR between the two approaches may be estimated by the simple calculation shown in Figure 7.1-2 of reference 6 (Attachment 1). In the FSAR analysis, the stifTness calculated based on the force required for unit displacement at the top of the caissons is 9.24E4 k/R. This stifTness is derived mostly from the properties of the freestanding caisson. The total mass of the DGB including the basemat is 899.6 k-s /R. 2 Therefore, the fundamental soil-stmeture frequency of the FSAR model is computed to be 1.61 Hz. In the current analysis, the impedance stiffness term for translation at the base of the DGB is about 1.7E6 k/ft. Therefore, the ftmdamental soil-structure frequency of the current model is 6.9 Hz. The actual frequency shin obtained in the analyses is shown in Figure 7.1-1 and corresponds well to the computed value. Another phenomenon that is treated differently between the original FSAR seismic analysis and the current methods is the 3 J

l E 4 : l~ specification of seismic input. Applying the Farley SSE to the soil springs at the base of the caisson and propagating the motion up through the freestanding caissons over simphfied the actual physical phenomenon. The current study performed wave propagation analyses 'through the soil medium to establish the freefield surface motions for use in the SSI analyses. The spatial variation of scismic input along the height of the caissons may also bc represented by wave scattering functions in the substructure method. However, the DGB caissons are flexible relative to the surrounding soil mass and wase scattering effects are minimal for horizontal excitation. Therefore, a surface foundation was assumed in the SSI analysis for the DGB. i ne peak spectral acceleratic - (SA) of the new DGB IRS is slightly lower than the peak. SA of the original DGB IRS. This is due to the fact that the modern SSI analysis approach used to calculate the new IRS, which satisfies the current SRP (reference 7), properly models the behavior of the soil layers below the DGB and implicitly accounts for soil radiation of energy clTects which is typically a major contributor to any reduction in the S A amplitude. Also strain compatible soil material daniping or hysteretic soil damping was considered following SRP requirements, but this efTect is less a contributor to any reduction in the SA amplitude. Service Water Intak_ellmst!Lrg - The SWIS is moderately stiff with fixed base frequencies in excess of 12 Hz in the ] horizontal directions. The structure is deeply embedded in the soil and therefore scatters vertically propagating shear waves. Generally, embedment reduces the translation and increases rocking response of the foundation. In the vertical direction, the caissons are anchored into the Lisbon formation at Elevation i10'. Since the caissons have high stiffness in the axial direction, the foundation input motion is similar to the vertical motion of the Lisbon layer at depth. - Comparisons of the original IRS with the current best estimate soil case IRS are shown in Figures 7.2 9 and 7.2-10 of reference 6 (Attachment 1).' These Figures show significant reductions in peak spectral acceleration, as well as the zero period acceleration (ZPA) for the - new IRS.: Also, a frequency shiR from about 1.17 Hz to 2 Hz is noted. The lower frequency _ obtained in the FSAR analysis is due to the modeling of caissons, i e., caissons were represented as an equivalent freestanding column completely de-coupled from the surrounding soilf As discussed in the foregoing subsection on the DGB, ignoring the lateral support provided by the surrounding soil to the caissons resulted in an overly ficxible system The amount of frequency shift from inclusion oflateral soil support is estimated in ' Figure 7.2-11 of reference 6 which is enclosed. In the FSAR model, the stifthess calculated based on the force required for unit displacement at the top of the freestanding caissons is about 8.78E4 k/fl. This stiffness is derived mostly from the properties of the caissons. The 2 total mass of the SWIS including basemat is 1.3E3 k-s /ft Therefore, the fundamental soil-structure frequency of the FSAR model is computed to be 1.31 Hz. In the current / modern analysis, the impedance stiffness terms for translation at the base of the SWIS is about 5.0E5 k/fl. Therefore, the fundamental soil-structure frequency of the current model is 3 1 - Hz. The actual frequency shift obtained in the analyses is shown in Figure 7.2-9, it is noted in Figure 7.2 9 that the current analysis has a spectral peak at about 2 Hz instead of at the soil-structure frequency of 3.1 Hz. This peak at 2 Hz corresponds to the foundation input motion._ The proper treatment of the deep embedment of the SWIS in the layered soil and the 4

4 associated reduction in motion due to soil radiation of energy effects is probably the primary reason for the suppression of the spectral peak associated with the soil-structure system. The 2 Hz peak is merely the foundation input motion propagated into the structure. Compared to the DGB, the frequency underestimate in the original FS AR analysis is less severe for the SWIS. To summarize, the current SWIS IRS differs from the original IRS in three important aspects: Caissons were treated as a part of the soil medium in the impedance calculation, instead of as a freestanding part of the structure model. Instead of applying the seismic input at soil springs attached to the base of the caissons, the variation of the freefield motion over the height of the caissons to the basemat was properly accounted for. Proper consideration was taken for soil radiation of energy etTects which is inherent in the modern SSI analysis approach used for the SWIS as well as a reasonable strain dependent material or hysteretic soil damping that is not allowed to exceed the SRP limit, as opposed to the arbitrary limit of 7% on soil damping used in the original analysis. The following is a discussion of the differences in the soil damping limits as specified for the original FSAR analyses versus that used for developing the new modern IRS for the DGB and SWIS. The spectra generated for the DGB and SWIS were produced for utilization within the Seismic IPEEE and USI-A46 programs. As such, the methodology for developing response for these two programs does not necessarily require the use of FSAR requirements such as the 7% soil damping limitation. Developing new IRS for the DGB and SWIS follows the current accepted SSI methods including soil damping. The original FSAR in-structure f response analyses employed the freestanding caisson columns with dashpots to account for the soil structure interaction effects. There was a limit of 7% on soil damping used for the development of the original FSAR 1RS. The new CLASSI/SilAKE based analysis applies the frequency dependent compliance / impedance ftmetions to model the supporting soil. At the seismic input level comparable to the Farley SSE, high strain-compatible soil properties including shear moduli and damping were developed, as documented in reference 6. The mean degradation curves for sand by Seed & Idiiss (reference 8) were applied for the cohesionless soil type reported in the FSAR for the plant site. As indicated in Tables 4.1-1 an 4.2-1 of reference 6 (Attachment 1), the soil material damping for the 3 soil cases are all less than 14% hysteretic damping ratio, below the maximum level of 15% permitted in Section 3.7.2 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), reference 7. In regards to the request for details of how three provisions of Section 3.7.2 of the Standard Review Plan were incorporated in the analysis for generating the new IRS, the following discussion is provided: (1) Limitation of the extent of reduction in foundation motion: 5

\\ l L f Since the DGB was treated as a surface founded structure supported on caissons, the new ground surface motions including the local site amplification effects were used directly as input at the DGil's foundation level. Therefore, there was no reduction of motion at the foundation level, but an amplified SSE motion due to the conservative definition of the control point. This can be seen in Figure 4.1-4 of reference 6 (Attacluuent 1). For the SWIS, the control motion was placed at a hypothetical outuop of the first competent soil layer; which is the Lisbon layer located at Elevation i10'. The ground motions at the soil surface at the finished grade (Elevation 195'), and at the SWIS foundation levels at a Elevations 166' and 148', were generated for the freefield condition by convolving the control motion through the soil profile using SilAKE. See Figure 4.2-7 in Attachment 1. Since the structure foundation levels are at a higher elevation than the control point location, the amplified horizontal ground acceleration response spectra in the freefield at the foundation levels are calculated to be typically higher than the Farley SSE. Thus, as seen in Figure 4.2-7, the SRP criterion on limitation of the extent of reduction in foundation motion is satisfied for the SWIS. In fact, due to the conservative definition of the control point, the SWIS foundation response actually is amplified (rather than de-amplified) from the SSE motion over most of the frequency range ofinterest. (2) Accounting ofincreased foundation rocking due to wave scattering; and (3) consideration of soil layering effects and frequency dependency of the ioundation impedances: In the calculation of foundation impedances for the subject Farley structures, the underlying soil was modeled as a horizontally layered viscoetastic medium. To account for the j " primary nonlinearities" in soil behavior under seismic loading, soil properties consistent with the level of shear strain induced by the Farley SSE were developed. The high strain compatible soit properties then were used in the calculation of the impedance's and wave scattering functions. The caissc,n piles were modeled as a part of the soil medium considering the effects of pile-soil-pile interaction, also referred to as the group effects, using the computer program SASSI. The impedance matrix desenbes the force-displacement relationship of the foundation (assumed massless for the calculation) supported by the soil. The impedance matrix is complex-valued and frequency dependent in its most correct fornt The scattering matrix relates foundation input motion to the freefield ground motion taking into account wase scattering and foundation averaging or integration etTects. The foundation mput motion differs from the freefield ground motion in all cases, except for surface foundations subjected to vertically incident waves. First, the freefield motion varies with soil depth. Second, the soil-foundation interface scatters waves because points on the foundation are constrained to move according to its geometry and stiffness. For vertically propagating seismic waves impinging on rigid surface foundations, the foundation input motion is the same as the freefield motion. The contribution of caissons to the horizontal soil impedance terms is less than 6% for the DGB, and the wave scattering effect is minimal for this surface founded structure and, therefore, was conservatively not considered. j 6 1

The high embedment ratio for the SWIS leads to considerable wave scattering efTects. The scattering functions were computed using SASSI models. The basemat and side walls of SWIS were assumed to be rigid. The computer program SASSI was then used to calculate hoilzontal translation (S11) and rocking (S 15) at the foundation reference point due to horizontal translation at the freefic!d ground surface. Separate SASSI rtms were performed for the three soil cases - the lower bound, best estimate, and upper soil cases respectively. Also, as described, the foundation impedances were calculated properly accounting for soil layering effects and frequency dependency. The following is a discussion of how potential debonding between the soil and the embedded walls of the SWIS was addressed: Because of the high embedment ratio for the SWIS, the side soil adjacent to the sidewalls contributes to the soil impedances in the SSI analysis. However, to account for the potential debonding of the side soil from the structure during an carthquake, only about 50% of the stiffness and damping values associated with the side soil was inchided in the total soil impedance functions. The average embedment depth is 4 l', therefore debonding of the top 20' of the embedment with the side soil was included in the model. This satisfies the embedment effect consideration of AISC Standard 4-86, reference 8, which states that half of the embedment or 20 feet, whichever is less, is acceptable. Lastly, a brief summary of the code verification process that validates the CLASSI code for IRS generation is provided as follows: EQE has conducted program validation for both the CLASSI and SHAKE codes as a part of l their Quality Assurance program. Generally, features of the CLASSI code were salidated l independently and the combined code was validated by comparison to other program results and test data when available. Quality Assurance documentation is available for review if requested. 1 3. Question: Discuss the basis for using the Compact Overburden layer that exists at 24.5 feet below grade at the main plant area as control point for the diesel building analysis. What is the shear wave velocity of the compact overburden layer? Also discuss the rationale for adopting the 85-feet below grade Lisbon formation as control point for the SWIS.

Response

Main Plant Area The DGB is located within the main plant area. The soil properties at the main plant area are given in Figure 2B5B-7 of the FSAR. Figure 4.1-1 of reference 6 (Attachment 1) summarizes the general soil profile and low strain dynamic properties. The top soil layers between grade (elevation 154.5') and elevation 130' comprise relatively soft material with initial shear wave velocity of 600-970 fps. Per the SRP (reference 7), the control point is defined either at grade or on a hypothetical outcrop of a competent layer at depth. The most 7

logical location for establishing the control point for this profile is, therefore, on the Compact Overburden layer at elevation 130' which has a shear wave velocity, Vs, of 2520 fps. Senice Watsr intake Area The physical properties of the soil at the SWIS area are based on Figure 2B5B 7 of the FSAR and discussions with the site investigation firm of record (Weston Geophysical Survey). The subsurface condition in the outlying SWIS area is sufficiently different from the main plant area to warrant separate treatment. A best estimate soil profile is shown in Figure 4.2-1 of reference 6 (Attachment 1). The top layers between grade (elevation 195') and the Lisbon at elevation i10', comprise relatively soft material with an initial shear wave velocity of $50-900 fps llence, to satisfy the SRP (reference 7), the control point is specified on a hypothetical outcrop of the Lisbon at elevation 110', which has a shear wave velocity, Vs, of 2400 fps. This specification coincides with the original FSAR analysis of the SWIS. 4. Question: With respect to the comparison of equipment seismic capacity and seismic demand, for those equipment located on floors within 40 feet above the effectisc grade and where the IRS exceeded the Reference Spectra (RS or 1.5 times llounding Spectra) in the l structures identified in Attachment I of the enclosure to Reference 3, you have elected to use Method A in Table 41 of the GIP-2. Identify,in Appendix A (composite Safe Shutdown Equipment List) of Reference 1, the list of equipment installed at floor elevations where the IRS exceeded the RS and Method A in Table 41 of the GIP-2 was used. Provide a technical justification for not using the IRS provided in your 120-day response as the seismic demand for those equipment. It appears that some A 46 licensees are making an incorrect comparison between their plants' safe shutdown ( earthquake (SSE) ground motion response spectrum and the Seismic Qualification Utilities Group (SQUG) Hounding Spectrum. The SSE ground motion response spectrum for most nuclear power plants is dermed at the free field ground surface. For plants located at deep soil or rock sites, there may not be a significant difference between the ground motion amplitudes at the foundation level and those at the ground surface, llowever, for sites where a structure is founded on shallow soil, the amplification of the ground motion from the foundation level to the ground surface may be significant.

Response

The floor elevations where the licensing basis IRS cxceed the SQUG reference spectrum were identified in question I of reference 3 as follows: auxiliary building Elevation 12l' auxiliary building Elevation 139' = auxiliary building Elevation 155' = auxiliary building Elevation 175' = containment building Elevation 140' e 8

containment building Elevation 149' = containment building Elevation 155' e A list of SSEL equipment located in these buildings and clevations that utilized GIP method A for the equipment capacity versus demand check is included as Attachments 2 and 3 for the auxiliary and containment buildings respectively. The following provides our technicaljusti6 cation for not using the IRS provided in our 120-day response for the seismic demand for the equipment. Method A of GIP Table 4-1 provides a methodology to evaluate the scismic adequacy of equipment by comparing equipment capacity based on earthquake experience ground response spectra at database sites with the plant's SSE ground response spectrum (GRS) The composite carthquake experience ground response spectrum from the database sites (reference spectrum) is reduced by a factor of 1/l.5 to account for possible additional ampli6 cation of motion in nuclear plants compared to database plants and is referred to as the "I ounding Spectrum" in the GIP. The scismic capacity of equipment defmed by the Bounding Spectrum is compared to the seismic demand at the effective grade using the plant licensing basis SSE GRS. The GIP method conservatively limits use of this approach to equipment which has natural frequencies above about 8 Ilz and is located lower than about 40 feet above the efTective grade of the building. These restrictions prohibit the use of GIP Method A for tlose equipment with lower natural frequencies and for those higher elevations in buildings where equipment amplined responses are typically higher. Additional details justifying the use of the GIP Method A may be found in the report "Use of Seismic Experience in Nuclear Power Plants" prepared by the Senior Scismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP), February 28,1991. This report, included as Reference 5 in GIP-2, summarizes SSRAP's judgment on this subject by stating on pages 102 and 103: '..the use of very conservative Door response spectra should be avoided when assessing the seismic ruggedness of Door-mounted equipment...Only for cases of equipment mounted more than 40 feet above grade or equipment with as-anchored-frequencies less than abont 8 lit is it necessary to use Door spectra." Method A of GlP Table 4-1 is an approved and legitimate method for evaluating seismic capacity to seismic demand for resolving USI A-46. There are no requirements in the GIP or SSER No. 2 on the GIP, that prohibit the use of Method A in lieu if using existing IRS. All the specine requirements for proper application of Method A were met for application at FNP. The location of the FNP SSE GRS is defmed at the " surface", i.e., plant grade, as described in FS AR Section 2.5.2.10, and not at the plant foundation level. Therefore, no soil ampli6 cation needs to be considered when applying Method A. As was typical during the time of the original analysis and design of this plant, the SSE GRS was applied to the base cf the scismic building models. Depending on the structure being analyzed, the SSE GRS was applied either at plant grade for surface mounted structures or at the top of the Lisbon 9 _ _. 1

I layer some 60' below the ground surface for structures supported on that layer We ao not believe it is correct to state that the SSE GRS is " defined" at the plant foundation level simply because the analytical methods used to generate in-structure response spectra conservatively applied the input motion at the base of the building mc.dels, Of course, Method A was only applied for equipment which has natural frequencies above about 8 Hz and is located lower than about 40 feet above effective grade. i lt should be noted that the new ground surface motion (Figure 4.1-4 of reference 6 provided in Attachment 1) developed for the surface founded tanks and used for seismic input for developing new DGB IRS is enveloped by the SQUG Boundits Spectrum. Therefore, using either the original SSE GRS dermed at Plant Grade or the new ground surface motion based on derming the location of the SSE GRS some 24 feet below grade per the current SRP (reference 7) would not affect the results of using SQUG GIP Method A.! seismic capacity to seismic demand screening for the equipment itself. 5. Question: In Reference 1, you indicated that you intended to revise the licensing basis for Unit I to allow application of earthquake experience data as acceptable alternative for seismic qualification of safety related mechanical and electrical equipment through 10 CFR 50.59 cvaluations, if you have donc so, we request that you submit for the staffs review the complete documentation associated with your evaluation of the unreviewed safety question associated with 10 CFR 50.59 for carrying out the FSAR changes for seismic qualification of equipment.

Response

In early 1996, a change was approved to the FSAR to allow use of earthquake experience data as an attemative method for verifying the scismic adequacy of new and replacement ~ 4 equipment in accordance with the Generic implementation Procedure (GIP) which was developed by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG). The FSAR change was I made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation was performed by comparing the overall SQUG GIP methodology to the previously approved FNP license basis on a program level. The conclusion of the safety evaluation was that the GIP was overall a more conservative methodology for verifying the seismic adequacy of equipment. SNC recognized that certain isolated aspects of the SQUG GIP may be less conservative than the corresponding aspect in the previously approved method. However, due to the SQUG GIP being the more conservative method overall, no unreviewed safety questions wer: identified. SNC became aware of potential NRC questions relative to the use of the SQUG/ GIP methodology. As a conservative measure, SNC initiated another FSAR change to withdraw the change that would have allowed the use of earthquake experience data for verifying the seismic adequacy of new and replacement equipment. This. ~ FSAR change deleted the previous change and effectively prohibited the use of the SQUG GIP methodology for verifying the seismic adequacy of new and replacement equipment. No new or replacement equipment was installed or used at FNP that relied on SQUG GIP methodology and no evaluations were performed during the time period that the FSAR had been changed to allow use of SQUG GIP methodology. Therefore, the carthquake experience data and SQUG GIP methodology will not be used as a general alternative 10

D method until the NRC questions associated with its utilization have been resolved. Any . application of the SQUG GIP methodology will be implemented on a case-by-case method with the NRC staff approval; 6. Question: In Reference 3, the response to NRC question 5 stated that evaluations of bolt performance for LC Transformer in DGH, MCC IK in Service Water intake, and 125-V-dc Service Water Huilding Battery No.1, followed the procedure for anchors with excessive gaps provided in EPRI TR-103%(0), dated June 1994. This EPRI report has not been reviewed or endorsed oy the staff. We request that you submk this report for staff's review.

Response

Since the referenced EPRI report is a licensed and proprietary report, EPRI was contacted to 1 obtain the necessary agreement to transmit the repon to the NRC as part of the response to this RAl. EPRI recommended they formally transmit this report, EPRI TR-103960 entitled " Recommended Approaches for Resolving Anchorage Outliers," dated June 1994, to the NRC instead of the individual utility. This report was transmitted to the NRC by EPRI in a letter from Mark D. Fox. EPRI Intellectual Property Attorney, to Document Control Desk, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, dated June 16,1997. Please refer to this transmittal to obtain the referenced report for your review. 4

7. -

Question: Referring to your response to question 7 (Reference 3) with regard to cable and conduit raceways, provide two limited analytical review (LAR) evaluations that contain the least safety margins selected from the containment internal structure and auxiliary buildings, respectively.

Response

The Limited Analytical Review (LAR) samples were analyzed per section 8.3 of reference 4. The seismic demand for the limited analytical review of cable and conduit raceways, as described in section 4.2.4.4 of reference 1, is equal to 2.5 times the zero period acecleration (ZPA) of the IRS at the attachment point of the raceway support as determined per section 8.3.4 of reference 4. The original FSAR 1RS were used for the evaluation of raceways in the auxiliary and containment buildings and the newly generatri IRS for the DGB and SWIS were used for raceways located in these buildings. LAR selection number FNPCSS is located at elevation 139' in the auxiliary building. This cable raceway support is a steel frame structure consisting of two S" x 5" x 5/16" tube steel columns with 2" x 2" x 1/4" tube steel cable tray support arms connected to both columns. One of the columns is cantilevered, with the restrained end bolted to the reinforced concrete floor, while the other cohmm is bolted to the floor and the ceiling. Each column is anchored by two 3/4" diameter expansion anchors at each attachment point. The LAR for this support i1 1 1

a- _ indicates a total bolt pull out load of 4.43 kips at the base of the columns. The allowable pull-out load for the anchors is 4.69 kips as taken from Table C.2-1 of reference 4, which results in the least safety margin (4.69/4.43=1.06) among the auxiliary building LARs. Ilowever, considering the conservatism of the LAR, the safety margin is actually much greater. He anchor bolt loads for support FNPCSS were conservatively calculated by lumping the total tributary loads on the support to the cantilevered column and applying the proper lateral plus dead loads. This analysis approach was used to minimize the time and cost of analysis. This analysis did not consider the frame action of the support that would greatly reduce the anchorage loads nor did it consider the fact that some of the lateral load will be taken by the ceiling connection of the other column. LAR selection number FNPCS12 is located at elevation 129' in the containment building. This cable raceway support is a steel frame structure connected to the wall of the containment building. The horizontal support arms and vertical members are constructed of 2" x 2" tube steel and 3" x 3" tube steel respectively. The LAR for this support indicates a maximum moment in the support arms of 8.04 in-kips versus an allowable moment of 10.72 in-kips, which results in a least safety margin (10.72/8.04=1.33) among the containment building LARs. The evaluations described above are available for review at the SNC offices in Birmingham, AL l -{ l 8. Question: l Referring to your response to Question 11 (Reference 3), provide a summary calculation of the refueling water storage tank that shows a 5% less capacity in overturning moment when comparing with the SSE-induced overturning moment. Also, provide a summary of the calculations for the refueling water storage tank based f on the seismic margin methodology that indicates a margin of 1.5 against the new ground spectr:. at' elevation 154.5 feet.

Response

Two seismic evaluations were performed for the refueling water storage tank (QIF16T0501) as discussed in our October 28,1996, RAI response on USI A-46 (reference 3). The first followed the GIP guidelines on vertical tanks (Section 7 of reference 4). This evaluation resulted in a slight exceedance ofless than 5% when comparing overturning moment capacity to overturning moment. The tank shell capacity was the limiting condition. This GIP evaluation is considered conservative as discussed in our previous RAI response -(reference 3). But to provide assurance of the seismic adequacy of this tank, the tank was also evaluated using the seismic margin methodology following Appendix l1, " Flat-Bottom f, Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks," of reference 5. The seismic capacity was found to exceed the seismic demand of the new ground spectra by a m.rgin of 1.5. This seismic margin is considered sufficiently high to screen out the tank for IPEEE and resolution of USI A-46. The following is a brief summary of each of the two seismic capacity calculations. GIP Evaluation: 12 l H

- Section 7. " Tanks and Ileat Exchangers Review," of the GIP (reference 4) for vertical tanks was followed. The input data was gathered following Step 1 and parameter ratios following Step 2 were calculated. In Step 3, the fluid-structure modal frequency (Fr) was calculated to be 5.07 IIz. In Step 4, spectral acceleration (Sa) was conservatively selected at the peak spectral acceleration, SA, for the 4%' damped new ground response spectrum which equals 0.532g at 611z. which occurs only for the lower bound soil stiffness case. See Figure 4.1 11 of reference 6 (Attaelunent 1).. For the best estinute of the soil stiffness, the peak SA is 0.45g at 7 llz and for the upper bound soil stiffness case the peak S A is even lower at 0.316g. Since soil-structure interaction (SSI) efTects were not explicitly considered, the peak S A of 0.532g was used. This is a very conservative assumption for several reasons, One, the peak SA of 0.532g only occurs for the extreme lower soil sti!Tness condition. For the other two soil stitTness cases, the best estinute and upper bound soil stiffness, the peak SA is significantly less. Also, the fluid-structure natural frequency, based on a fixed based estimate, is lower than the frequencies of the peaks of the new ground spectra. If SSI effects were explicitly considered, the tank / foundation system would be less stiff. Therefore, one would expect the primary fluid-structure mode natural frequency to reduce and, therefore, move to an even lower spectral acceleration value. The primary fluid-structures modal frequency would not be expected to increase and move towards the peak SA that was conservatively used in this evaluation. Proceeding to Steps 5 and 6, the base shear (Q) and base overturning moment (ht) were calculated to be Q=1.6E3 kips and ht=3.2167E4 fl-kips. The next series of steps relate to determining the overturning moment capacity. The allowable bolt stress from Step 7 (F ) 6 L was calculated to be 61,545 psi. But the tank shell stress per Step 4 controlled the tank anchorage capacity which produced a reduced allowable tensile stress of the bolt (F,) of 19,832 psi. Step 9 considers the tank shell stresses associated with the anchor bolt load transferred to the tank shell as a combination of direct vertical load and out-of-plane bending moment due to the eccentricity between the bolt centerline and the tank wall. The GIP equation is based on a very conservative clastic stress approach. Our consultant, Dr. Robert P. Kennedy, stated that one could perform a nonlinear fmite element analysis and should be able to demonstrate a much higher tank anchorage capacity that would be acceptable for this evaluation. Next, the axial buckling stress capacity of the tank shcIl was evaluated, i e., Steps 12 through 16. Elephant-foot buckling mode controlled producing an allowable stress for shcIl buckling of 7,865 psi. The overturning moment capacity (hly) was calculated per Step 17; hty=3.066E4 fl-kips and, finally in Step 18, overturning moment capacity (ht,) is compared to the overturning moment (hi); hi,=3,066E4<h1=3.2167E 4ft-kips. Next, in Steps 19 and 20, the base shear load capacity (Q,) is calculated and compared to the shear load (Q); Q,=2.056E3 kips > Q=1.6E3 kips. The final check is of the freeboard clearance versus the slosh height, Steps 21 and 22. The calculated slosh height (hs) equals 15.5 in, and the available freeboard height (hr) equals 25.36 in. Therefore, there is enough freeboard clearance to prevent forces being applied to the tank roof from the sloshing liquid. Based on the above discusson about the fact that the calculated fluid-structure modal frequency would not ince se but would decrease if SSI efTects were explicitly considered, a more accurate upper boa.,J impulsive mode seismic demand can be calculated. Defining the seismic demand as the cinclop of the three soil cases for the 4% damped surface ground motion spectrum (Figure 4.1-11 of reference 6 provided in Attachment 1) and broadening the best estimate soil case by +/- 15%, the maximum SA demand at 5.0711z and below is 0.49g. This would reduce the base overtuming moment by a factor of 0.49/0.532 = 0.92. With this 13 i

improved but justined seismic demand, the overturning moment to os estuming moment capacity evaluation would show the tank os erturning moment capacity exceeds the demand by 43.5%. Even though this refmement was not originally applied, it is provided here as additional documentation that the FNP refueling water storage tank has sumcient seismic capacity at the FNP SSE level. himlidaminAnentat11 As previously discussed, to provide further assurance of the seismic adequacy of the refueling water storage tank, the tank was also evaluated using,Oc seismic margin methmlology following Appendix 11, " Flat Bottom Vertical Fluid Storage Tanks" of EPRI NP-6041 (reference 5). The evaluation follows the criteria of the Conservative Deterministic Failure Margin (CDFM) Approach as described in reference 5. Weights and centers of l gravity were calculated. Next, the horizontal impulsive mode response was conservatively estimated by using the peak of the new GRS at $% damping. As described in Appendix 11, 5% damping is a conservative estimate of median damping for the type of response being evaluated,i.e., some nonlinear tank uplift and slight elepinnt foot buckling. As discussed under the GlP evaluation, a lower spectral acceleration could be justi6cd due to the fact that the calculated impulsive mode natural ft,quency is below the peak of the new broadened / enveloped ground spectrum at grade. The impulsive base shear was calculated to be 1481 kips and the impulsive base moment was 29,600 ft kips. Also, the impulsive pressure was calculated to be 3.91 psi. Next, the convectiva (sloshing) mode response was calculated; the spectral acceleration for 0.5% damping at the convective mode natural frequency was determined. The convective mode base shear was calculated to be 65.6 k and the convective mode base ovennrning moment was d termined to be 1905 fl-k. The conteetive pressure was also determined which varied over the height of the liquid and was an order of magnitude less than that calculated for static, impulsive, or vertical response. Next the vertical Guid response was determined and the associated additional pressure. This pressure increased with depth of the liquid. The impulsive, convective, and inertia loads associated with the tank itself were combined to produce a total base shear of 1.65E3 Lips and an overturning moment of.; 33Et R-kips. A table of combined pressures that varied along the height of the tank w,* wn:. also developed. Next, a capacity assessment of the tanks was made. First, the tensile capacity of the tank anchorage was determined. Again, the tank shell stress controlled, produciy, a TBC of 35,000 !bs or an equivabnt bolt stress of 19,806 psi. This value is considered a conservative lower bound estimate since it is based on a narrow width of the bolt chair top plate which is actually continuous around the perimeter of the tank shell. On the compression side, elephant foot buckling controlled as before with a CB of 4760 lbs/in. Ilold down forces resulting from Guid pressure acting on the tank bottom are considered as described in Appendix H, and these hold down forces can contribute significantly to the overturning moment capacity. The resulting overturning moment capacity, MSC, was calculated to be 4.879E4 fl-kips. Next the shear capacity, Vsc was calculated to be 3.625E3 kips using a median centered coef6cient of friction of 0.7 per Appendix H. The tank is anchored to a concrete foundation with the tank bottom plate made up of slightly over-lapping plates setting on a sand layer. ~ Finally, capacity to demand evaluations were made in the terms of calculatiig a high-con 6dence-of low-probability-of failure (llClJF) based on the FNP SSE GPS of 0.lg PGA 14 j

. __ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. m being applied on a hypothetical outcrop of the Compact Overburden layer at El 130', which is approximately 24.5' below grade in the main plant area. The FNP SSE GRS of 0.lg PGA was applied at the plant grade for the FSAR original design of FNP surface mounted tanks. Also, the FNP SSE GRS is dermed c' the ground surface per the FSAR. Ilut new ground response spectra at the plant grade were developed for evaluation of the surface mounted tanks in the plant yard as discussed in references 1 and 3 specifically to meet SNC commitments as a result of the FNP IPEEE response to NRC GL 88 20 Supplement 4 as documented in SNC letter to NRC dated September 14,1992. The following are the calculated ilCLPF values with the FNP SSE of 0.1 g PGA dermed at a hypothetical outcrop of the Compact Overburden, El 130'; note the llCLPF values are dermed at the same hypothetical outcrop: Msc Tank Overtuming Moment: Msh (0.lg) = 4.879E4 tbk (alg) =0.15g 3.33E4 ft.-k Vsc (0.lg) = 3.625E3k (Oj ) = R22g Tank Slidm.g: Vsh 1,65E3k g hr Slosh ticight: g(0.lg) = 25.36"-13.86,, (0. lg) = 0.18g Capacity static 18.7 psi 6.965 psi Tank lloop Stress: (oJg) = 0.28g ku(Seismic) 0.8(5.23 psi) As previously stated, the lowest margin of 1.5 is considered sufficiently high to screen out the refueling water storage tank for IPEEE and for resolving USl A-46, 4 . Question: With respect to your response to question 12 (Referente 3), discuss la more detail the basis for screening out the 40,000 gallon buried tank in the outlier screening evaluation.

Response

The diesel fuel oil storage tanks are buried in the plant yard. They are horizontal c3 ndrical 1i tanks anchored to a common reinforced concrete mat foundation with a continuous reinforced concrete saddle for cach tank, The tanks and the mat foundation are buried in well controlled / engineered backfill. The Scismic Margin Assessment (SMA) c-iteria for buried tanks provided in EPRI Report ' NP-6041, reference 5, as well as the original seismic report for these tanks, were used as the basis to evaluate the buried tanks. EPRI Report NP-604 I states that buried tanks are not particularly vulnerable to seismic damage. It was the opinion of the authors of the SMA methodology that damage could possibly occur at piping connections if there is large relative notion between the soil surrounding the buried tanks and the tank itself. Therefore, the SMA " panel" recommended 15 l:

that for a seismic margin earthquake up to a PG A of 0.5g, or 5% damped peak spectral acceleration of 1.2g, that only piping connections to the tank need be evaluated for possible large relative displacement of the surrounding soil. The Seismic iteview Team (SitT) walked down the buried fuel oil tanks to the estent possible. The manway covers were removed and the interior of the manway was inspected. No concerns were identified with the fuel oil pump or piping. The manway covers are bolted to the manway and; therefore, there is no possible way for a cover to fall into a manway. The fuel oil tanks are in the area that will not experience any lateral slope displacement. The 1 1/2 in, diameter fuel oil lines will only experience forces and moments caused by ground shaking with no expected differential settlement between the fuel oil tanks and the diesel generator building. Therefore, no large relative displacement of the surrounding soil is expected due to the FNP SSE. He piping layout drawing for the fuel oil system show the l-1/2 in. diameter lines esiting the manways. After exiting the manways, the lines, which are buried, have either long runs to the diesel generator building or interconnect to the five tanks that are supported on a common mat foundation. The cfTect of ground shaking is not considered to be significant because of the flexibility of the 1-1/2 in. lines. The fuel oil lines are classified as Seismic Category I. These lines are schedule 40 carbon steel pipe and the fittings are socket welded. These lines enter the diesel generator building through 4 penetrations made of 4 in, diameter pipe sleeves that provide flexibility at that kication. Due to the flexibility and the routing of these lines and no large relative displacement of the surrounding soil, the piping and their connections were determined to be adequate and could easily accommodate the expected ground motion. The original seismic stress report was also reviewed which showed the tank and its anchorage to the mat foundation to be adequate. he buried fuel oil tanks and the buried fuel oil lines were, therefore, sucened out for the FNP SSE. 10. Question: Questions I of your response dated October 11,1995 (reference 2) included a memorandum which stated,in part, that the operations department had reviewed the lists and assumptions regarding the plant safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL). The operations department agreed that procedures exist that would allow safe shutdown of the plant assuming the SSEL equipment was available, and that operators were trained on the use of the procedures. The review was conducted using the " Desk Top" method. As part of this Desk Top review, were any in plant actions that need to be performed by the operators identified? Describe what,if any, barriers to successful operator performance of these actions were considered and dispositioned as part of the seismic and relay evaluation, llow were factors such as ambient lighting and other potential l hazards or environmental factors such as temperature, humidity, debris, or damaged structures, which could inhibit an operator from accomplishing procedural actions, evaluated? Ilesponse: l 16

'Ihe " desk top" review perfonned by the plant operations department did not seveal any new or additional in-plant operator actions that were not already r.ddressed by cristing procedures. The FNP A-46 shutdown paths allow ample time for any required in plant operator actions. 'the potential (br barriers such as damaged equipment or structures which could inhibit an operator's ability to access plant equipment was considered during the development of the SQUG GIP (reference 4) and found to be very unlikely. 'lhis is because carthquake experience has shown that typical industrial grade equipment and structures are inherently rugged and are not susceptible to damage which would inhibit operator access at A-46 plant SSE levels. 'Ihcrefore, it is considered very unlikely that operators will be faced with hazardous or unfamiliar circumstances which are not covered by existing plant procedures and training. It is for this reason that the GIP, in Section 3.2.7, allows operator action to be used as a means of achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown condition provided procedures are available and the operators are trained in their use, which is the case at FNP, in addition, it should be noted that all SSEL equipment requiring operator acti1n is hicated in Seismic Category 1 structures. 'lhe FNP Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) conducted for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), demonstrated that these structures were casily screened out at the FNP Review Level Earthquake of 0.lg peak ground acceleration in actuality, per EPRI NP 604 I (reference 5), these structures have a liigh-Confidence Low Probability-of Failure (llCLPF) level of at least 0.3 g peak ground acceleration. Therefore, it has been demonstrated that these structures will remain intact with no structural damage that could hinder operator actions. All equipment and structures inside these structures, including masonry walls, are designed as either Seismic Category I or 11/l, which assures that they will be prevented from falling or moving in such a way that they would hinder movement of the plant operators. In the unlikely event that plant emergency lighting was not available ibilowing a loss of ofTsite power, operators would use hand-held battery operated lights as required. 'I1erefore, there are no barriers to successful operator perfonnance ofin-plant actions that may be required. l 17

O

References:

1. Letter, with enclosures, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC, " Unresolved Safety L

1ssue A 46 Sununary Report for Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1," dated May 18, 1995.

2. letter, with attachments, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC, Response to NRC USI A 46 Request for Additional information for Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1, dated October 11,1995.

l l

3. Letter, with enclosures, from Dave Morey (SNC) to NRC, " Response to NRC USI A 46 Request for Additional Information for Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1," dated October 28,1996.
4. " Generic implementation Procedure for Seismic VeriGcation of Nuclear Plant
Equipment," Revision 2, Seismic Qualineation Utility Group, February 14

-1992. $. "A Methodology for Assessment of Nuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin (Revision l),"lil'RI NP 6041 S1, Revision I, Final Report, Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, California, August,1991. 6 EQE Report No. 52197 R-001,"J. M. Farley Units 1 & 2: SSI Analysis of Selected Class l Structures," prepared for Southern Company Senices, Inc., Rev. O, May 1995. 7. "U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Standard Review Plan," NUREG 0800, Revision 2, September,1989. 8. "Scismic Analysis of Safety Related Nuclear Structures and Conunentary on Standard for Seismic Analysis of Safety Related Nuclear Structures," ASCE Standard 4 86, American Society of Civil Engineers, September,1986. I8

e 6 i ATTACHMENT 1

52197 R 001 RQv. O Page 25 of 100 TABLE 4.1 1 CONTROL POINT ON COMPACT OVERBURDEN AT ELEVATION 130' STRAIN COMPATIBLE SOIL PROPERTIES FOR MAIN PLANT AREA - Lower Bound Case Wolght Poisson's Material Layer Thick Density Ratio Damping Vs Vp G E' 1 4.5 0.100 0.36 0.035 395.9 846.4 486.7 2224.8 2 10.0 0.100 0.36 0.045 620.0 1325.6 1193.8 5457.3 3 10.0 0.100 0.36 0.066 568.9 1216.4 1005.1 4594.9 l 4 15.0 0.110 0.38 0.026 1709.5 3885.7 9982.8 51578.0 5 20.0 0.110 0.38 0.031 1683.6 3826.8 9682.9 50028.1 6 30.0 0.130 0.33 0.020 5360.0 10640.9 115989.1 457133.4 Hallspace 0.120 0.40 0.010 2600.0 6368.7 25192.6 151155.6 Best Estimate Case Weight Poisson's Material Layer Thick Density Ratio Damping Vs Vp G E' 1 4.5 0.100 0.36 0.022 580.3 1240.8 1045.9 4781.1 2 10.0 0.100 0.36 0 028 924.9 1977.6 2656.8 12145.6 3 10.0 0.100 0.36 0.040 892.0 1907.2 2471.0 11296.2 4 - 15.0 0.110 0.38 0.016 2474.3 5624.1 20913.4 108052.8 5 20.0 0.110 0.38 0.021 2445.6 5559.0 20432.3 105567.1 6 30.0 0.130 0.33 0.020 5360.0 10640.9 115989.1 457133.4 Halfspace 0.120 0.40 0.010 2600.0 6368.7 25192.6 151155.6 Upper Bound Case Weight Poisson's Meterial Layer Thick Density Ratio Damping Vs Vp G E' 1 4.5 0.100 0.36 0.014 837.0 1789.7 2175.9 9947.1 2 10.0 0.100 0.36 0.017 1343.3 2872.1 5603.8 25617.3 3 10.0 0.100 0.36 0.026 1316.1 2813.9 5379.2 24590.8 4 15.0 0.110 0.38 0.011 3537.2 8040.2 42742.9 220838.2 5 20.0 0.110 0.38 0.014 3516.6 7993.4 42246.4 218273.3 6 30.0 0.130 0.33 0.020 5360.0 10640.9 115989.1 457133.4 Halfspace 0.120 0.40 0.010 2600.0 6368.7 25192.6 151155.6 P:\\52197 01ymfrpt1

52197 R 001 Rev. O Paga 38 of 100 Table 4.21 CONTROL POINT ON LISBON AT ELEVATION 110 FT STRAIN COMPATIBLE SOIL PROPERTIES FOR SERVICE WATER INTAKE AREA Lower Bound Case Layer Thk Density Poisson's Material Vs Vp G E' No. (ft) (kef) Ratio Damping (f/s) If/s) (ksf) (ksi) 1 5 0.125 0.367 0.039 357.9 780.7 497.1 2366.1 2 5 0.125 0.367 0.078 304.1 663.5 359.1 1709.1 3 5 0.125 0.367 0.112 266.3 580.9 275.2 1309.9 4 5 0.125 0.367 0.136 236.7 516.5 217.6 1035.4 5 9 0.125 0.418 0.080 494.1 1316.3 947.6 6725.8 6 9 0.125 0.418 0.096 464.2 1236.7 836.5 5937.0 7 9 0.125 0.418 0.107 443.9 1182.6 765.0 5429.5 8 9 0.125 0.418 0.114 431.6 1149.8 723.1 5132.0 9 9 0.125 0.418 0.122 415.3 1106.4 669.5 4752.1 10 3 0.125 0.483 0.129 402.3 2218.3 628.1 19102.8 11 17 0.125 0.483 0.139 382.3 2108.1 567.3 17252.3 12 Half 0.130 0.435 0.010 2400.0 7100.0 23254.7 202136.6 Space ) Best Estimate Case Layer Thk Density Poisson's Material Vs Vp G E' No. (ft) (kcf) Ratio Damping (f/s) (f/s) (ksf) (ksf) 1 5 0.125 0.367 0.028 524.6 1144.4 1068.1 5083.7 2 5 0.125 0.367 0.052 484.4 1056.7 910.8 4334.6 3 5 0.125 0.367 0.071 442.4 965.2 759.8 3616.3 4 5 0.125 0.367 0.090 411.8 898.3 658.2 3132.8 5 9 0.125 0.418 0.055 784.2 2089.1 2387.1 16942.4 6 9 0.125 0.418 0.065 748.7 1994.5 2175.8 15442.9 7 9 0.125 0.418 0.075 711.7 1896.2 1966.5 13957.5 8 9 0.125 0.418 0.086 684.7 1824.0 1819.8 12915.9 9 9 0.125 0.418 0.094 663.9 1768.7 1710.9 12143.5 10 3 0.125 0.483 0.097 653.9 3606.1 1659.9 50480.0 11 17 0.125 0.483 0.102 642.6 3544.0 1603.2 48756.7 12 Half 0.130 0.435 0.010 2400.0 7100.0 23254.7 202136.6-Space Upper Bound Case Layer Thk Density Poisson's Meterial Vs Vp G E' No. (ft) (kcf) Ratio Damping (f/s) (f/s) (ksf) (ksf) 1 5 0.125 0.367 0.018 760.2 1658.4 2243.3 10676.9 2 5 0.125 0.367 0.034 729.1 1590.6 2063.7 9821.7 3 5 0.125 0.367 0.045 701.8 1531.0 1911.9 9099.7 4 5 0.125 0.367 0.055 678.0 1479.2 1784.6 8493.6 5 9

  • 0.125 0.418 0.037 1181.6 3147.8 5419.7 38466.3 6

9 0.125 0.418 0.043 1157.3 3083.3 5199.7 36905.5 7 9 0.125 0.418 0.049 1131.7 3015.1 4972.1 35289.7 8 9 0.125 0.418 0.054 1111.7 2961.6 4797.5 34050.3 9 9 0.125 0.418 0.059 1092.0 2909.2 4629,1 32855.0 10 3 0.125 0.483 0.061 1078.1 5945.5 4512.2 137223.8 11 17 0.125 0.483 0.065 1058.9 5839.5 4352.8 132377.0 12 Half 0.130 0.435 0.010 2400.0 7100.0 23254.7 202136.6 Space P:\\$2197 o1\\jmfrpt1

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j o 3 / \\ U 2.r.r-5 \\ X / .t-N- / . 5-- 0 I 2 g3 20 SO 20 Frequency (Hz) mm eu Ca Legend: Notes: " $2 ARTIFICIAL T/H Acceleratton in gs h Spectral acceleration at D-0.05 FNP HORIZ SSE o' O 32 E O Figure 3.0-2: COMPARISON OF ARTIFICIAL T/H TO FARLEY SSE: X-COMPONENT pot

52197 R 001 R;v. O Page 26 of 100 Soil Vs A Poisson's E L. 2 Layers (fps) (k/ft ) Ratio 1 54.5' - {-- j Surficial 600 0.1 0.36 150' - I i I Overburden 970 0.1 0.36 i a 130' - Compact 2520 0.11 0.38 Overburden l l 95* - .s.... lll%g::':S:$!N:.

.xz s :::0::
0::..

fi5ii: '6[i:5 %!si:j448;igi: zss.s.d". s: '

'+4.:s;:.,s Lisbon 5360 0.13 0.33

...,s.. /< ;n:i.isi:xix% ss:s 3:As.. Si:!, ::iijsjiisil!!l* .is.:!.:.,:*t:0:!ss.is..* ~a. ' XM + . A;ii($i$

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'""^'u."' 6 5' - Lisbon 2600 0.12 0.40 s s Figure 4.1 1: General Soil Profile at Main Plant Area (Ref. Rig. 2B58 7 of FSAR) P il2197 01 JC 41-t lim

t i h I t I 4 1 camp.ss 5 Each cwve reposants tio 1 u envetop of 3 sod cases 0 0.8 b

1 4

E cm c 0.6 o i = cu u 1 Pi,,,,, c) c) e o 04 - s,.- s a o I , sSE s ,s 0.2 ^# ' ' - - + ~ ~- m. -,~,~,, \\ '., P2 , ' ', ~, p3 w %. v-m i 0 i 0.1 02 0.5 1 2 5 10 20 50 i Frequency (Hz) i i 1 p P1 Surficial - 154 5' 1o ci ~ pg$$$$5N(f?4TN6 erbr'denMnyM5f[$$ MN3'M L h ${ u [9 _ 3 3g. j i l! Compact Overburden. > P3 [ j E I t"i:s.:. :M:i 3!MsiD.9:x :6ki:s%%ss8iM@s.isss%iisii?M8i!:ss:Miisisidii::.,.+<.. 8%M +e:::sse:ss.u+;... 2:. <~cw.++<-::< a ~ - :au a:. <<^.:ssis:6sM -:.; -, f" Sin 8 ssss i:M. f. <ssu.. .:s2cwwz +su .sa:<9.- ; psj<ggu>usrat:2:8wup-w:3:+xmo uate- :e m n. g !!hhhbkhk!kh!b ! ! M ss8. h!kkhi! !k Ra$ h b N! $ 2 i S'+8 'ENbd ~ o Usbon evnescTan 5 Figure 41-2: SHAKE Analysis of Main Plant Area, ] Control Point On Outcrop of Compact Overburden at EL 130'

o X to s* .6 6 r I\\ i \\ .:n .+- f 1 i a: I 1 i P I l1 J 4 i% 8 l 'i / f I f f ,R,J' / )(\\ \\ e ff'RJ" g.w- /, r N/ \\ p. 1 A .1-- .C ~ .0 I 16 10 10 to Frequency (Hz) y, 5N Legend: Notes:

  • en h> M SSE 9 Control Point Acceleration in rj 's Wh Lower Sound Soil Spectral acceleration at D=0.05

]8 Best Estimate S021 o" 0 32 Upper. Bound Soil y o Figure 4.1-4 FNP: SHAKE ANALYSIS OF MAIN PLANT AREA (C. P. 9 El. 130*) JUll Horizontal Motions on Free Surface at Grade (E l. 154.5') fnpogsn.:

" - ew$ OO" 8<. O a 5o ro) aO 1 4 nsgop n i 4 0 o 0 t 0 ta n o si t g a )) ~ r \\ \\ 'Y 0 S. n e 3 a l e 1 4 [ n c 5 o c . 1 i a l / t E al l \\ \\ W\\ r a 9E ,'i 0 e r ( \\ )\\ n\\Ig 1 s l t P. d l e e c e e /*\\ ',s o' t c e o c p Ca e r '!( N A S r ( e )z G a H A I I [J )# Et ( Ra y A [2 'N c e n T c 4 f,9 e Na f u Af If q Lr e Pu h/ r S N F I e Ae r 1 F Mr F 0 f On o S I s Sn Yo Li At t No n l AM i i ol ol 1 El P i S i 1 o o - Ka At l S eS 1 Hn o t 4 So rd ad t n mn e z r i n ui u uPr o ot o gNo C B sS i 6 d E F FH U - y 3 2 1 a o, 1 n @ r r o e et e t g E w s p 835;s e S o e p x L S L B U 3 0;y3fg= lp a g L

~- ~ - - 52197 R 001 Rov. O Pago 39 of 100 EL. Soil Vs Poisson's 3 Layers (fps) (k/ft ) Ratio 195' - j i Surficial 550 0.125 0.367 175' - i 't s \\ ,s Overburden 900 0.125 0.418 .:v 'J D--jk s -T31 i l

W '

.~ .,: qz ., ' ' py Q e, '. te x. ' M J

,: 1,;;,&',

-'; k 'h?~Y ~lh}h ~ 130' - gi.:$.ik.:. :i$i:i .s ::0: 8':

Si*!!;giisi;i:
,s;:U:.-

A;:;:.A:::.: ih. i!!: < Dense Sand 900 0.125 0.483

!!!F:

52: s.:.s.. .s 35553 ids!:WF! illjiljSi3;jhj:ii 110' - Lisbon 2400 0.130 0.435 sj> s Figure 4.2-1: General Soil Profile at Service Water intake Area P(52137 011:C4 31 PA52197 Olymfrpt1

i t I I f 1 Damp =5% 2 Each curve represents s e L> enwetopof 3 sodcases 3 0.8 1 ] c i 1 ,.-s I ,b i T l 0.6 co 4 j 2:: m_ m 1 _m ', p a l 80.4

,'- 'f~n 4

o R ss e s E - -\\ - 0.2 r- - - ^ - - - * ~~, ,s' pg )s.. ~~_~... 1 i g i 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 2 5 to 20 50 s Frequency (Hz) i i ,g/y.- -..,,, f P1 y,, - t 95-W Surficial o m a u '.., / - 175' 'S "a e s a Overburden oy o ' o, s .4 I -' %g. 4;p+ff;WDense Sa d '" *5"*+<* 7'F+^" ' (++ ":X+3F :+9?:ss# :.. 558:::<69 +>x :::.149.. 5ssn:y.... - 130' - _o.

  1. ~. - M::Q-- MEy 3%jVX+"

wj$t4. 924:s:4?u ggp: +x*:SM " : p By; 4 i 02:: ann u: -... E s....,yS:.3:p 3.-A:.- ,g.:..f :gu.:.,.fy.,22 3.g..y J e>5+ '.3'~ CP o xj,/< <y, n XE pg+MMY -u?X<+ 4 G+X+>X+Xd.o'x.:.c::. '3;, nX

  • F/ZsR?%%XM"MGbm.xgt.g 2.yq g.

+3 g, o a 1 OM. X+...- ..s +>>9X4X<+X+ - e.s6e- <-X : MX re - 110 Usbon O l g '"*' " " Figure 4.2-2: SHAKE Analysis of Service Water intake Area, i j Control Point on Outcrop of Lisbon at EL 110' i d { t

.5 i .4 Q N : y l a M h 8 '3 j l y \\ 4 l \\ / b f. I NR \\ s g P ~V / \\ t s {l / ((JQ [ / s ~ ~ /,/ l i \\

\\ Ahc%==

.1 y .r )f, ,/ A ~ w_ _. - _.---- -. / g ,c- / j 1 1 ~6 10 10 10* Frequency (Hz) Legend: Notes: Surface Motion Env Acceleration in g's Env Resp 9 Elv 166' Control Point 9 Elev. 110' Env Resp 9 Elv 148' Spectra calculated at 5% damping FNP SSE GRS 9 0.10g Service Water Intake Area 60% of FNP SSE GRS Figure 4.2-7 J.M. Farley NPP: SHAKE Analysis - Freefield Horizontal Soil Response Envelopes of 3 Soil-Case Responses 9 Respective Elev.

li i!l1 j1Iil 4!ll

i).

liIlllil1 j!l,jlll1ilil)!j)

Illljjl!!

Un.owsgO mo#- t . t 7eoo qD o Oo ( 1 9oras S J rO I T C E R I D o L + t A 5 + T 0 -+ Jr 0 0 + Z - I D 2 R O. H s g l w 5' n 5 i 1 no L n d E t i a A l r C ~ '0 2 e ~ s 1 E t ~ e E e GT t D r OA ~ o 0 r LM s A BI J J t t ) T z RS H OE ( T ~ AT y RS c s n EE s J B e r E u n\\ q Gs t i i1 .v 1 e i n 't1 Ii1I I1:It L r ER F SA 1I1II1I1IlIii 111 ES 0 G I IF i I t / 0 / L / 2 ',l / .A J T t 4 I f AG LI PR O R ) ) AF S W EO i L r E t Ct l 1 t ( - UO a J S e et 1 t I t t n 7 YR a a o eEA m m z ruLP - ~ gRM i I I t t r AO i ^ . s s o FFC 6 d e eH 0-E o e 6 -2 O 1 ne t t R o' 1 t g s s A C ue'e *"o4 e e eS x L B B F E83E16O a; ,)'j

52197 R 001 Rov, O Page 80 of 100 FSAR MODEL (See Ref. 23) i ~a= 1 y DGB Stick Model 2 M = 899.6 kips /ft t..g,, -K oid ,e K c = 9.36E4 k/f t 56' i g K = 2.42E7 k/ft h f' L4f Kr = 3.24E10 k ft/ rad K K'K Ke = Caisson Stiffness h Kh = Horizontal Soil Spring K oid = K r K e + 56 2 K K + K Kr h e h Kr = Rotational Soil Spring = 9.24E4 k/ft fold = h3 9 24E 1.61 Hz g, 9E CURRENT MODEL (See Ref. 6)

  • a= 1 +

f K = 1.7E6 k/ft h K new -WVAMr K = 2.0E10 k/ft ~~ r 1 1.7E6 K new =K h = 1.7E6 Inew= En 3 = 6.92 & 8.99E2 FREQUENCY RATIO (TRANSLATION ONLY) fnew 6.92 f oid 1,61 Figure 7.12: Diesel Generator Building: Estimating Frequency Shift Between FSAR Model and Current Analysis .m,,,,m,m,,, P:\\52197 01\\jmfrpt1

m p. $hO' 8<_ O a. umcc [ o* i -s r a b I 7 o 6 + t 5 1 0 + L 0 E - D ( 4 fO s. I 'g T C E n R a I E D n W o U S s T E t CS J t a UA r RC 0 3 e T 1 s SE l e E e T t D c EA 0 O c KM 4 i f r A AI l z TT g% H S Jr ( I E N y RT c ES s n TE e AB t u W q s \\ e EV \\ r C \\ I A i) F 1 \\ l k VA \\ RS ( I I EF I . o I I S I I t. L / l A / T N / NI AG 7 LI PRO R / AF EO L l 9 CN 0O a et

2. t S 4

I t n 7 YR a o eEA m z ruLP a 2 AM t r g ' '6 AO i s o FFC d E H 0 e 6 + 0 1 n o1 e t A t g sA c E&y e eS x L B F yS;;ew 0= 6 t = ,ll! !l

x to y 1.0 S G i'r i Q . e-- 1 I l C 1i o. 6-- g \\ t I \\ I \\ o u .a-- l / u I .r\\ % I / % g- / / / ~ / / . 0- +

44 +

1b 10 10' tu Frequency (Hz) g g, cm ea Legend: Fiates o _. {S Current SAP F10DE 3 E-H DIAECTIors (EL 167'l

  1. 5 00 FSAA Horizontal Accelerdtnon an g 's.

U=0 OS ]o o -~ 3's o Fgure 7.2-10: F AAL E Y T40 CLEAR PLAT 4! SEnv!CE WATER It4TAKE 51Ruclunt COMPAAIS0tt OF OI4 IGI re AL FSAA Vs BEST ESTIMATE CASE f *= * ' 's w -

52197 R 001 Rov. 0 Page 95 of 100 j ESAR MODEL (See Ref. 23) 3,3 J r SWIS Stick Model 2 M = 1.30E3 k s /f t T f Kc = 1.01E5 k/ft p -Ke oi 50' r K = 1.39E6 k/ft j h yfNr Kr = 3.23E9 k ft/ rad Ke = Caisson Stiffness K Kh = Horizontal Soil Spring oid = K r K c + 50 K Ke + K K r 2 h h Kr = Rotational Soil Spring

8.78E4 h3 aB foid

1.31 Hz = E CURRENT MODEL (See Ref. 7) i - a= 1 q g K = 5E5 h =4 K new - -4WMr h Kr = 1.5E10 1 SES K =K h=SE5 new Inew = 2K3 1.3E3 FREQUENCY RATIO I 3.12 new = 2A f jo 1.31 o c!gure 7.211: Service Water intake Structure: Estimating Frequency Shift Between FSAR Model and Current Model (0' P:\\52197 01\\jmfrpt1

G 6 l ATTACHMENT 2

5 5 8-SBI :-2 $f 3 3N = - lgE 1 1 5 3 5 D. g-gg. i 3 ^ C 38 = - jf E ~$ El. a E E E E E E E E E E E 4 E E E E E E 'S' E = v- -,f R$ 2 { kk{ T 3 3 3 3 3 Y T T Y 3 3 3 3 g'Og 20 be 2. Do 2 Do 2. 6. So bo 6o Oo Oo 2o no -o -o -o -o _Ss "a' ea. I~E a 6 -s$m ei tan ga. 0E*2 sglg 2 S Ea A Q @ E$ 5 g g g a a a o a o o o o o i

==d us 15 E9 eea eeeeeeeeeeeee4 -Ej: 5: E 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5- !s~ =r zl = kv 3 I E E 3 5 W I I I E E E E I I I l ~ l!!!$ l 9 =! l iga s =

== = f f f f gg rs. m = Iwggehhl l5[ ] gg-a g e g c e m NS 5 ~ bN N 5 g g h! seusumuml l Q g E* I I I 8 E g a s i I W'5 E gg

r

=E ars - W R W sesRIr8 8 o m a a m me a e Ee EE EE I r 0 E 8 $s E aa a W W g y e y n d e = E s 5 = m a, a 7 I k k 4 e o W = h,eI =f l a a 3 m 9-8 8 8 0 I " i i e' a s i w E' E-5 K E c-e = a a = c = c = = c c a = l E E E E E B G G B B B B B E 5 G E E t m-. Eh hh! R R 3 3 3 2 3-2 2 2 2 ao pf !dgE

I_E >EE-J 6E 11 = - I E lE a a n a a s a a a a a 8E E 6 ^1 ie 31 : - {= }A

  • E E

E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E E 2j E -E W-E M-E N M E E M E e-8 c .a g 9 g 9 g g g g g g g g g 9 E_Eg ]5 5 5. 5. !. 9. !. 3. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5. !. 5. E. s. R. a EE .a s -sEs = =. 28 g g8 52 2 2 2 2 C C 4 s 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 5" C Q A A $ $8 8 d 8 8 8 =c ! 2 8 8 .i-un-9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 99 9 9 4 '4 9 9 9 -=lsfg'!;-E95 5 5 5 5 5 5_ E E5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 Mgs el 2 5. =

h. v i I-3 3

I E I I E I E E R R R R I E R I5 i l 81y Irw

--l-1 g i s

g g g s5-! ! ! g

n.
  • e e

1. -E-. Wui 1W =.vvle EE 1 y 9 E ! R H R 1.a! Egi r-85 s. 1355s=lmllg s_i g g a 5 laEs8*8.8 { 89 g a w t 2 s I l-r*_I r*_3 rg vg.a g-e l l l_i 2 r s! n se i =vr us. g = = a m s a a a : i i i 2 w g? g g g e 5 s E2 2 8 E 8 E 5 g8 ? 8 g 5 = 8 m ~a a I g b5 5 l h I U I E E B E I W e e N I l t w a = 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 = s s-5 sssss 1 a a a a a a a a a s a a s a a a a s C a g 1'S

3. 5-5 2

2 ~$ E B B R R 2 E E a. i }} ! vie-

- 4, ~ 1 E 1 sJEE------------ E ) _1 E t J'E-a I a a a a a a a a a na a a a E E 2 ^1 e 3R = - ']= ]A

  • E E

E E E E E E E E E E E E-E E E E }}1-2 i m a a s m -a s s a a sss a s a m.s . g I .n

5's. 31
w. !: !.'w. 5. L. 3. Ba E. 5. S. E. E. 5. 5. 5. 5. 5.

w g 9 9 9 9 9 9 w w w w w Sg 55 5 aa e i D *_ U k REE ,A E 4 i, y Ein c. -i 5 5 5 55 5.5 5 5 5 5 5 5 a, as a a es-l

2 nu n,, 5.a! ! !

= ! - is = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =

== !E1 L = m 'k'v 9 3 5 W. E E W W W W W 5 W W E E E a a l l-.I E E E 8 8 8 ll ~* - g a a a nW W E E E a c Es E Iii:iIl.G3.i" ""l.,,=s<E-E l hh l! U 4 -- ! - l i E. Eu EE 0 i si sill, 1,5 1 1 Ej *iiiiiii!-!!!!ll!!11ms' E 88 o 1 = m m _s_x; - 4r m i.l- .w.x w, z< I sg sg sg EE EELE w a aa W in in in EW ml 5 i i i - i if if if W E: 2' .f a ? a i 5 1-i 1 T I., E' E M E E E ... E E 'T .E 'N i hI lx1NE E i. I .K a e I,- g l, ! a e e e e e I. 5 E' -E E. E E E E E E E-E E E E E E E an - s n ir I a a a a a a a1 4-es!= a-a a a a a a a f 8 E' - - - - = < - ---w--. e-e ,,b., ,,,w, .-,w, -w, -w ~

Page to. 4 FARLET tu!T 1 Report Dete/Tlme: 07-02-97 / 16:53:28 SCREEutsc VERIFICATION DATA SMEET (5405) AUKILIART SMILD!nG ELEVATIONS 121' to 175* EQUIP CADACITY VS DEMAND CNECK PER CIP METN00 A ' LINE EQUIP SYSTEM /ESU!PIEENT EQUIPICiff LOCATleil > Base Capacity Dammad Cap. > Cavests Andier Inter-Essip NO. CLASS WIK NO. DESCRIPTION Building Ftr.Elv. Am. er Rem /Cel. Elev. <40*7 Spectrian Spectrian aumentt 80 en act SK7 SK7 motes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 07 Q1P17HV3045-A COf RETWEN FROM Rt? TIIElglAL AB 121-80 0223 121-0 V 85 CR$ Y Y MA Y T BANRIER ISCULTION 8 07 Q1P171Mr3057-8 CDI RETURE Flugl [1tCESS LET0eWN A8 121-80 9223 121-0 T SS CRS Y Y MA Y Y 0 07 Q1P17HV3095-8 CCW SUPPLY TO EXCESS LETDOWN MEAT A8 121-00 0223 121-0 Y SS CRS Y Y mA Y Y i EXCHANGER 0 l 1 004. Q1P1740V3052-A CCW 70 RCP THEmeAL BARRIER A8 121-00 0223 121-0 Y SS CRS T T mA T T ISOLATION O 084 Q1P17MOV3182-A CDf RETURW FiltBE RCPS A8 121-00 0223 121-0 Y SS CRS T T mA Y Y O 07 Q1P19HV2228-8 PRESSURIZER PORY BACK-UP AIR A8 121-00 0223 121-0 Y 85 CRS T T mA Y Y SUPPLY VALVE O 04 Q1R118005-8 LC TRANSFORMER IE A8 121-00 0229 121-0 Y BS CR$ T T T T T 0 03 Q1R15A007-8 4.16KV SWITCHGEAR IG A8 121-00 0233 12b 3 Y SS CR$ Y Y Y Y Y 0 02 Q1RIE8007-8 600V LOA 0 CENTER 1E A8 121-0C 0229 121-0 Y 85 GRS T T T T T 0 \\ 01 Q1R178002-8 MCC 18 A8 121-00 0209 121-0 Y 85 CBS 9-N N N u O l 16 Q1R21E0094-1 IWWERTER 1A A8 121-00 0224 121-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 l 16 Q1R21E0098-2 INVERTER 18 A8 121-00 0224 121-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T 16 Q1R21E009C-3 luvERTER IC A8 121-00 0226 121-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y T T 0 16 Q1R21E0090-4 INVERTER ID AB 121-00 0226 121-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 16 Q1R21E009F-A INVERTER 1F AB 121-00 0224 121-0 Y 85 CRS Y T T T T o 16 Q1R21E009C-8 IkvERTER IS A8 121-00 0226 121-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 14 01R21L005A-A 120V vlTAL AC O!STRIBLTION PANEL A8 121-00 0224 12S-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T IJ 0 14 Q1R21L0058-8 120V VITAL AC OISTRIBUTION PANEL A8 121-00 0226 125-0 Y SS CRS Y Y T T T IK 0 l i

- ---~--~ Page 50. 5 FARLEY UNIT 1 Report Date/ Time: 07-02-97 / 12:53:28 SCREENING VERIFICATION 0473 SMEET (SVDS) AUI!LIART SUILDING ELEVATIONS 121' ts ITS' EQUIP CAPACITY VS CONO OtECK PER CIP METH00 A LINE EQUIP SYSTEM /10UIPMENT - EQUIPMERT LOCATION - > Base Capacity Demand Cap > Caveats Ancher Inter-Equip NO. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPilon Balla 4 Ftr.Elv. Es. cr Rom / Cal. Elev. <40^7 Spectrum Spectrum Demand? OKT OK7 act OK7 OK7 Bates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (5) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (IT) 14 01R41LOGIE-8 125VOC OISTRIBUTION PANEL IE AB 121-00 0233 124-0 Y 83 CRS T T T T T 0 14 Q1841LO0lF-8 125VDC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IF A8 121-00 0209 124-0 ? 83 CRS T T T T T C 02 Q1R428001A-A 12SVDC BUS 1A A8 121-00 0224 121-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T C 02 Q194290018-8 125VDC BUS 18 AB 121-00 0226 121-0 7 85 CRS T T T T T 0 16 QlR42E001A-A AUX BLOG BATTERY CHARCER 1A A8 121-00 0224 121-0 7 83 CBS T T T T T C 16 QIR42E0018-8 AUX SLOG BATTERT CHARCER 18 AB 121-00 0225 121-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 15 QlR4?E002A-A AUX BLOG BATTERY 1A A8 121-00 0214 121-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y T T T C IS' QlR42E0028-8 AUX BLDG BATTERT 18 AB 121-00 0212 121-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T C 20 Q1R43E0018-8 SEQUENCER Blc A8 121-00 0229 121-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y T T C 20 Q1R43E0028-8 SEQUENCER 81C AUX RELAT PANEL A8 121-00 0233 126-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T C 20 GlC55NM0048-A ALTERN SHUTDOWN NEUTRON FLUX MON A8 139-00 0332 139-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T $1CitAL ApFLIFIER 0 20 01EllLQ3594A-A CTNT Slpe LEVEL TRANSMITTER PodER A8 139-00 0318 139-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T SUPPLT 0 20 Q1EllLQ35948-8 CTNT Supe LEVEL TRANSMITTER POWER A8 139-00 0318 139-0 Y 83 CBS T T T T T SUPPLY 0 10 Q1E16H007-A MCC 1A 20(78 CDOLER AB 139-00 0332 139-0 Y 83 CRS Y T T T T 0 10 QlE16H009-A 600Y LOAD CENTER ID ROOM COOLER A8 139-00 0339 1M-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 20 Q1H21E004-A 4.16KV SNITCNCEAR IF LOCAL CONT AB 139-00 0343 139-0 Y 85 CRS Y T T T T PANEL 0 20 QIH22LOGIE-A MULTIPLYING RELAT CABINET IE AB 139-00 0318 139-0 ? SS CR$ T T T T T 0 20 QlH22L001F-8 MULTIPLTING RELAT CA8tNET IF AB 139-00 0318 139-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 I

r t x Pete No. 6 FAALEY UNIT 1 Report Dete/ flee: 07-02-97 / 16:53:28 SGEENING WERIFICATION DATA SNEET (SWOS) ASIILIARY BUILDING E1194TIONS 121' to 175* EQUIP CAPACITY VS DOWND CHEIX PER GIP METNOS A - LINE EQUIP . SYSTEM /L. .at EqulMEENT LOCATION > 8ese Capactity Beamed Cap.

  • Cavests Anther Inter-Eeulp NO. ~ CLAS$

IMAK NO-DESGIPfleN Sulldin8 Fir.Elv. he. er Bem/ Col. Elev. 448*T Spectrum Se 8mmend? SK7 SK7 act SKT OK7 Notes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (s) 19) (18) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) l 28 Q1N22LOS2-A TRANSFER RELAT CABINET 1 A8 135-08 BMT 135-0 Y 85 25 T 8 Y N N O 28 Q11t22 LOO 4-8 TRANSFER RELAT CASINET 3 A8 135-88 83M 139-0 Y BS CR$ T T T T T l 0 20 Q1H25L008-A TEISqlNATION CABINET' A8 135-00 0318 139-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y Y Y i 0 20 Q1N25LO29 8 TEIDf1st4 TION CA8! NET AB 139-00 ' 0318 139-0 Y BS GPS T T T T T 0 t 04 Q1R118004-A LC TRANSF0GIER 10 AS 135-00 0335 139-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 03 Q1R15A006-A 4 16KV SWITCNGEAR IF A8 135-00 0343 139-0 Y 85 CR$ Y Y Y Y T O j 01 Q1RI78001-A MCC 1A A8 a_s-00 0332 139-0 Y BS CRS T N N Y N O 01 Q18178008-A HC 15 A8 139-00 0347 139-0 7 25 CRS B U N Y N 0 + j 01 Q1R178009-8 MCC 1Y A8 139-00 0334 135-0 Y BS CRS T N Y T N O 14 Q1R188029-A POWER DISCDNNECT SWITCH AS 139-00 0332 142-0 V 85 CRS Y Y Y Y Y j 0 14 Q18188030-A POWER DISCONNECT SWITCM A8 135-00 0332 142-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T 0 14 Q1R188031-A CIRCUIT BREAKER 80I AS 13b-00 0332 142-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T i 0 i 14 Q1R188032-A CIRCulf BREAKER 80K AS 135-00 0332 - 142-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T l.. 0 l 14 Q1R188033-8 POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH A8 139-00 0322 142-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T i, 0 14 Q1R188034-8 POWER D!$ CONNECT SW1TCM A8 139-00 0322 142-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y 0 14 01R188035-8 CIRCUIT OREAKER 80K A8 138-00 0322 142-0 Y 85 CR$ T T T T T i 0 14 Q1R188036-8 POWER DISCDNNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0322 142-0 Y 1s CRS T T T T T 0 14 Q1R188038-A MOV POWER OISCONNECT SWITDI AS 139-00 0332 142-0 Y ES CRS Y Y T T T E 0

- Page No. T FARLEY UNIT 1 Report Date/Tlee; 07-02-9T / A:53:28 SutEENING VERIFICATION DATA $NEET (SVDS) ~ Aut!LIARY SUILDING ELEVATIONS 121' to IT5' EQUIP CAPACITY VS DEMAND CHECK PER GIP METN00 A ' LINE EQUIP SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT <------- EQUIPMENT LOCATION > Sase Capacity nemeval Cap. > Cavents Ancher later-Eaulp l NO. CLASS - MARK NO. DESCRIPiloN BulldIn9 Elr.Elv. Re. er Rom / Col. Elev. <40*7 Spectrum Spectnse Demonsi OK7 OKT act 8K7 8KT Notes (1). .(2)- (3) (4) (5) (6) (T) (8) (9) (10) (11) (14 (13) (14).(15) (16) (IT) 14 ' -Q1R188039-A MDW POWER S!$ CONNECT SNITCH AB 139-00 0332 142-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 14 - Q1R188040-A. Nov P:.*It DISCONNECT SWITCH A8 139-00 033F 142-0 Y 85 CRS Y. T T .Y T 0 -14 QlR188041 8 MOV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH A8. 139-00 0312 142-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 14 Q1R188042-8 MDV POWER DISCONNECT SWITCH A8. 139-00 0312 142-0 Y 85 CR$ T T T T T 0 14 Q1R188043-8 MOV PONER DISCONNECT SWITCH AB 139-00 0312 142-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 14 Q1R218001C-3 VITAL AC BREAKER 801 A8 139-00 0318 139-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 14 Q1R218001D-4 VITAL AC 8REAKER 80X AB 139-00 0318 139-0 f BS CR$ T T T T-Y 0 14 Q1R21 LOGIC-3 VITAL AC DISTRIBUTION PANEL IC A8 '139-00 0318 139-0 Y 85 CRS T T-Y Y. Y C 14 Q1R21L0010-4 VITAL AC OISTRIBUTION PANEL 10 ' A8 139-00 0318 139-0 7 85 CRS T T T T-T 0 14 Q1R41LD018-A 125 N DISTRIBUTION PANEL 18 A8 139-00 0343 144-C T BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 14 Q1R41 LOGIC-A 125VOC DISTRIBUTION PAhEL IC A8 139-00 0312 139-0 Y BS CRS T T T-T T 0 -20 QlR43E001A-A SEQUENCER 81F AB 139-00 0335 139-0 Y BS CRS T T T T .Y 0 20 Q1R43E002A-A SEQUENCER 81F AUX RELAT PANEL AB 139-00 0343 143-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T 0 20 NIHl!NCMC82500A-A8 MAIN EONTROL C0ARD SECTION A A8 155-00 0401 155-0 Y - 85 GR$ T N Y N N 0 20 Q1H11NCASC2506C-8 AUX SAFEGUARDS CABINET C A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CRS T T T N N O 20 Q1H11NGASC2506D-A AUX SAFEGUARDS CA81 NET D A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T N N O 20 Q1HilNG82504J-A 80P INSTRUMENTATION CABINET J A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CRS T ~/ T N N 0 20 Q1H11NG82504K-8 80P INSTRUMENTATION CA81 NET K AB 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CR$ T T T N N 0 ._m c.

Cage No. 8 FARLET UNIT 1 Report Date/Tlee: 0T-02-9T / 16:53:28 SCREENING VERIFICAfl0N DATA SHEET (SWOS) ADIILIARY 8UILDING ELEVATIONS 121' to 175* j EQUIP CAPACITT VS DEMAND CHECK PER CIP METHOD A ) e 1 LINE EQUIP SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT LOCATION > Sase Capacity Demand Cap. > Cweats Ancher Inter-Equip j No. CLASS MAPK NO. DESCRIPTION Building Fir.Elv. Es. er Rom / Col. Elev. <40*T Spectrum Spectrum Demeru!T OKT OKT act OKT OKT Notes (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (T) (8) (9) (10) ill) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (IT) 20 Q1H11NCCOt2523A-A ICDtS PROCESSOR CA81tET TRAIN A AB 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS Y

  • s

? N N 0 j 20 Q1N11NGCEM25238-8 ICDts PROCESSOR CA8fuET TRAIN 8 A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T N N 0 y 20 Q1H11NCPIC2505A-1 PROCESS PROTECTION CABINET CHANNEL AB 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 1 0 20 Q1H11NGPIC25058-2 PROCESS PROTECTION ICABINET DIANNEL A8 155-00 0416 155-0 7 BS CRS T T T T T 2 0 20 Q1H11NCPIC2505C-3 PROCESS PROTECTION CA81 NET CHANNEL A8 155-00 0416 155-0 f 85 CRS T T T T T 3 0 20 Q1H11NCPIC2505D-4 PROCESS PROTECTION CA8INET CHANNEL A8 155-00 0416 104 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 4 0 20 Q1H11NGPIC2505E-1 PROCESS CONTROL CA81 NET CHANNEL 1 A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 20 Q1NilNCPIC250$F-2 PROCESS CONTROL CABINET CHANNEL 2 A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 20 Q1Hl!NCPIC2505G-3 PROCESS CONTROL CABINE) CHANNEL 3 A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T 0 20 Q1HilNCPIC2505H-4 PROCESS CDNTROL CA8INET CHANNEL 4 A8 155-00 0416 155-0 ' 85 CRS T T T T T o 20 QltllNCR25041-A8 RADIATION MONITOR PANEL A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T N N 0 20 Q1H11NGSSP2506C-8 SOLID STATE PROTECTION INPUT A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS T T T N N CABINET 0 20 Q1H11NGSSP2506J-B SOL 10 STATE PROTECTION TES: A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CRS T T T N N CABINET 0 20 Q1H11NGSSP2506K-A SOLIO STATE PROTECTION INPUT A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y N N CABINET C 20 Q1N11NCSSP2506N-A 50L10 STATE PROTECTION TEST AB 155-00 0416 155-0 Y BS CRS T T T N N CABINET 0 18 Q1411PT0474-P2 STEAM CENERATOR 1A PRESSURE A8 155-00 0462 159-0 Y 85 GRS T T T T T 0 18 Q1NI]PT0475-P3 STEAM CENERATOR 1A DISCHARGE A8 155-00 0462 158-0 Y BS CRS T r T Y Y PRESSURE 0 18 Q1N!!PT0476-P4 STEAM CENERATOR 1A DISCHARGE A8 155-00 0462 158-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T PRESSURE O

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Page flo. 10 FARLEY UNIT 1 Report Date/ Time: 07-02-97 / 16:53:28 SCREENING VERIFICATION DATA SMEET (SVOS) ANIILIARY SUILDING ELEVATIONS 121' to 175' EQUIP CAPACITY VS DEMMO CHECK PER CIP IETlWD A

  • 7,

' LINE EQUIP -SYSTEM / EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT 8.0 CATION > Sase Capacity Demand Cap. > Cavests Ancher Inter. Equip NO. CLASS MARK 110. DESCRIPfl0N Sullding Fir.Elv. he. er Rom / Col. Elev. 44G'? Spectrum $pectrue temand? OK7 OK7 act OK7 OK7 Notes .(1) (2)- (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 14 QSR19 LOO 2A-A-120V AC CONTR. PNR. PANEL 1R AS 15v00 0409 159-0 Y 85 GRS T T T T-T' O 14 QSR19L0028-8 120V AC CONTR. PWR. PANEL IS ' A8 - 155-00 0409 159-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T 0 20 QSV49HS3313AB-A CTRL RM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A8 155-01 0416 155-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y' T T T A 0 20 QSV49NS331388-8 CTRL DM A/C LOCAL CONTROL STATION A8 155-00 0416 155-0 Y 85 ' CRS T T T T T 8 0 09 Q1v47C012A-A AUXILIART BLOG A TRAIN BATTERY A8 175-00 0501 17e-0 Y 85 CRS T T T T T R004 EXHAUST FAN O 09 Q1V4700128-8 AUXILIARY BLOG 8 TRAIN 8ATTERY A8 175-00 0501 176-0 Y BS , GRS. T T T T T ROOM EXHAUST FAN O 10 QSV49K001A-A CONTROL ROOM PACKAGE A/C UIIIT AB 175-00 0501 175-0 Y 85 GRS Y Y Y T T C 10 QSV49K0018-8 CONTROL ROOM PACKACE A/C UNIT A8 175-00 0501 175-0 Y 85 -CRS T T T T T 0 = __

ja k I l i ATTACHMENT 3 mm,.

t Page No. 1 FARLET UNIT 1 Report Date/ flee: 07-02-97 / 16:57:52 SCREENINC VERIFICATION DATA SMEET (SVDS) CONTAllBIENT ELEVAIONS 140' to 155' ~,, EQUIP CAPACITT VS 0014ND CHECK PER CIP METM00 A

  • ' 71 LINE EQUIP SYSTEWEQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT LOCATION

> Base Capacity Demorri Cap. > Caveets Ancher Inter-Egulp Ir. CLASS MARK NO. DESCRIPTION Sullding Fir.Elv. Am. er Rom / Col. Elev. <40'? Spectrua Spectrum Bemend? OK7 OK7 ' act OK7. OK7 motes (1) (2) (3) (4) c(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) - (12) (13) (14) (15) -(14) (17). 07 Q1831PCV04448-8 PRESSURIZER PONER RELIEF VALVE CE 155-00 CTNT 170-0 Y 85 CRS T Y M4 .T T 0+ 18 Q1C22LT0474-P1 STEM CENERATOR 1A NARROW RANGE CB 155-00 CTNT 155-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y, Y Y 'Y LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0475-P2 STEAM CENERATOR 14 IIAR110W RANGE C8 155-00 ' CTNT 155-0 Y BS CRS Y Y 'Y Y' -T LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0476-P3 STEAM CENERATOR 1A MARROW RANGE CB 155-00 CTMT 155-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0484-P1 STEM CENERATOR 18 IIARROW RANCE - C8 - 155-00 CTNT 159-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y LEVEL 'O 18 Q1C22LT0485-P2 STEM CENERATOR 18 IIARROW RANCE CB 155-00 CTNT 159-0 1 85 CRS Y Y T N N ~ LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0486-P3 STEAM CENERATOR 18 IIARROW RANGE C8 155-00 CTMT 159-0 Y 85 CR$ T T T Y -T LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0494-P1' STEAM CENERATOR IC NARROW RANCE E8 155-00 CTNT 158-0 Y BS CRS T T T T T LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0495-P2 STEAM CENERATOR IC NARROW RANCE C8 '155-00 CTNT 158-0 Y BS CRS Y Y Y Y Y l LEVEL 0 18 Q1C22LT0496-P3 STEAM CENERATOR IC MARROW RANCE CB 155-00 CTNT 158-0 Y 85 CRS Y T Y Y Y LEVEL 0 18 Q1831PT0455-P1 PRES $URIZER PRESSURE C8 166-00 CTMT 145-0 Y 85 CRS T Y Y Y Y O 18 Q1831PT0456-P2 PRESSURIZER PRES $URE C8 '166-00 CTNT-145-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y Y Y Y 0 18 Q1831PT0457-P3. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE ' C8 166-00 CTNT 145-0 Y 85 CRS Y T T T T 0 07 Q1831PCVC445A-A PRESSURIZER POWER RELIEF VALVE C8 173-00 CTNT 170-0 Y BS G4 Y Y NA Y Y 0+ 08A Q1831MOV8000A-A PRESSURIZER PONER REl1[F ISOLATION 08 ' 175-00 CTNT 170-0 Y 85 CRS T T NA Y Y VALVE O 08A Q1831MOV80008-8 PRESSURIZER POWER REllEF ISOLATION C8 -175-00 CTNT 170-0 Y 85 CRS Y Y NA Y Y VALVE O l F i .}}