ML20210H957
| ML20210H957 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1986 |
| From: | Mcdonald J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8609260374 | |
| Download: ML20210H957 (32) | |
Text
- _. - -
4 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Watts Bar Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 800 Spring City, Tennessee 37381 September 17, 1986 Mr. Harold Denton Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Dear Mr. Denton:
In the Matter of the Application of
)
Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328
SUBJECT:
EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) to this letter transmits for NRC's review two reports addressing Sequoyah Nuclear Plant employee concerns in the construction category.
(These reports have been reviewed and approved by the Senior Review Panel).
To assist you in your review of these reports, Enclosure 2 provides a comparison between the ECTG Writer's Guide recommended report format and the transmitted reports. Enclosure 3 provides a listing of the report numbers and the related employee concerns.
Please feel free to contact Martha Martin at 365-3587 (Watts Bar) if you have any questions.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY h'
J. A. Mcdonald Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site Licensing Manager MSM: SRB Enclosures 1960T k
P q 't An Equal Opportunity Employer
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2 Mr. Denton September 17, 1966 cc (Enclosures):
Dr. B. D. Liaw, Branch Chief U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Ave, Room T-1132 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 Mr. B. J. Youngblood, Project Director PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing - A U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Room 440, 5 Story Phillips Bethesda, Maryland 20814 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. Gary Zech 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
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i CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY Enclosure 2 ECTG WRITER'S GUIDE ELEMENT REPORT FORMAT 1.0 Issue I.
Introduction Characterization II.
Summary of Perceived Problem 2.0 Sunnary IV.
Sununary of Findings Couclusions (Portion) 3.0 Evaluators Cover Sheet Information 4.0 Evaluation III.
Evaluati6n Pror.ess Methodology
5.0 Findings
- IV., Summary of Findings 6.0 Root Cause V.
Root Cause (Collective Significance)**
Overall Root Cause will
$S not be considered at this report level.
7.0 Attachments /
VIII. Attachments List of Concerns Other items included VI.
Corrective Actions in Construction Element (To be provided by Reports line orgainzations)
VII.
Generic Applicability 1905T
Page 1 of 2 SEQUOYAH EMPLOYEE CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY CONCERN ELEMENT REPORTS NUMBER ISSUE C011207 XX-85-101-002 Improper Installation as Related to Construction C010900 Cable Pulling Cable Minimum Bend Radius EX-85-157-002 IN-86-266-006 WI-85-100-013 Maximum Pull Tension and Sidewall Pressure i
EX-85-076-003 EX-85-086-001 IN-85-213-001 IN-85-255-001 IN-85-295-003 IN-85-325-005 IN-85-433-002 IN-85-436-004 IN-85-581-001 IN-85-733-001 IN-85-856-005 IN-85-935-001 IN-85-978-001 IN-86-028-001 IN-86-199-001 IN-86-201-001 I
IN-86-259-001 IN-86-259-004 IN-86-262-003 XX-85-008-001 XX-85-094-004 Cable Coating IN-85-259-005 IN-86-268-002 OW-85-007-004 480-volt Receptacle IN-85-009-001 1933T T
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a Page 2 of 2 SEQUOYAH EMPLOYEE CONSTRUCTION CATEGORY CONCERN ELEMENT REPORTS NUMBER ISSUE C010900 Splicing Cable (continued)
MAS-85-003 Minimum Bend Radius JLH-86-002 Insulation Damage 00-85-005-014 Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable Concern IN-85-120-001 Firebarrier Concerns IN-85-018-004 XX-85-094-005 Cable Routing Concerns IN-85-300-002 IN-86-268-003 Splicing Concern IN-86-314-005 1933T
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C011207-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER:
1 TITLE: Improper Installation as Related to PAGE 1 0F 2 Construction REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TAS and SRP comments.
PREPARATION
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SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES CEG-ity A//
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APPROVED BY:
ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) 1484T
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TVA EMPLOYEE' CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C011207-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM l
REVISION NUMBER; 1
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PAGE 2 0F 2 SUPPLEMENT FOR SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN)
I.
Introduction This report addresses one concern XX-85-101-002 that states:
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" Improper installation of non-nuclear sygtem could adversely affect public health and safety."
i II.
Summary of Perceived Problems i
The concerned individual felt that the improper installation of the a
non-nuclear system could adversely affect public health and safety.
lR1 3
5 III.
Evaluation Methodology Reviewed expurgated files and other available files to gain additional information regarding this concern.
This concern was very vague and needed additional definition for a meaningful evaluation.
IV.
Summary of Findings Review of ECTG files at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant which included the QTC l
expurgated files revealed no additional information to-help better l
define this concern. The concern is relative to non-nuclear system.
IR1 Therefore, improper installation of the system would not normally l
constitute a safety-related problem. The evaluation of the other element reports of subcategory workplan/ work control did not reveal a problem with improper installation or work control.
Conclusion This concern cannot be evaluated due to the broadness of scope and lack of definition of the concern. The other specific evaluations involving concerns about improper installation or work control did not reveal a problem therefore, no further evaluation was necessary.
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Root Cause None VI.
Corrective Actions None
-VII.
Generic Applicability None
i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Element REVISION NUMBER:
1 TITLE: Cable PAGE 1 OF 25 REASON FOR REVISION:
Revised to incorporate TAS and SRP comments en PREPARATION PREPARED BY:
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SIGNATURE DATE REVIEWS PEER:
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OYkY/b5 SIGhAT'URE BATE TAS:
SIGNATURE DATE CONCURRENCES CEG-H:
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SR SIGNATURE DATE SIGNATURE DATE 4
APPROVED BY:
ECSP MANAGER DATE MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY) 1365T,
i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 2 OF 25 I.
Introduction The following concerns have been evaluated in relation to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) specific and issues made generic during the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) evaluation relative to all areas of the cable program:
WON GENERIC SQN SPECIFIC CABLE PULLING Splicing (1 concern)
MAS-85-003 Minimum Band Radius (1 concern)
Maximum Pull Tension and JLH-86-002 Sidewall Pressure (21 concerns)
EX-85-076-003 Insulation Damage (1 concern)
EX-85-086-001 00285-005-014.
IN-85-213-001 IN-85-255-001 IN-85-295-003 IN-85-325-005 IN-85-433-002 IN-85-436-004 IN-85-581-001 IN-85-733-001 IN-85-856-005 IN-85-935-001 IN-85-978-001 IN-86-028-001 IN-86-199-C01 IN-86-201-001 IN-86-259-001 IN-86-259-004 IN-86-262-003 XX-85-008-001 XX-85-094-004 Minimum Bend Radius (3 concerns)
EX-85-157-002 IN-86-266-006 WI-85-100-013 Cable Coating (3 concerns)
IN-86-259-005 IN-86-268-002 OW-85-007-004 480-volt Receptacle (1 concern)
IN-85-009-001
i TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 3 OF 25 WBN GENERIC SQN SPECIFIC Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable (1 concern)
IN-85-120-001 Firebarrier (2 concerns,1 IN-85-018-004 XX-85-094-005 Cable Routing (2 concerns)
IN-85-300-002 IN-86-268-OO3 Splicing (1 concern)
IN-86-314-005 II.
Summary of Perceived Problem The perceived problems evaluated in this elenent report are:
Cable pulling - Allowable limits for maximum pull tension (MPT),
cable sidewall pressure (SWP), and minimum bend radius (MBR) have been exceeded.
Cable coating - Flamemastic 77 has been applied thicker than specified by site procedures allowing too much heat buildup in cable trays.
It has also been removed from cables with sharp instruments which resulted in possible cable damage.
Firebarriers - Inadequate controls and improper tools havt been o
used to breach firebarriers (Room Temperature Vulcanizing (RTV) silicone foam) in wall and floor penetrations.
Insulation damage - Insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which feeds the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor (part of Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System), and was incorrectly repaired using electrical tape.
480-volt receptacles - Receptacles have not been properly sized for Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) specified wire size for receptables found throughout the plant.
g3 Cable routing - Cables were improperly routed outside of cable o
trays.
Splicing (MAS-85-003) - This covered a specific instance of an improper splice.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 4 OF 25 Splicing (IN-86-314-005) - There was improper splicing at the plant site.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables - Cables were not supported.for long distances once they exited the raceway to the NIS detectors.
List of Evaluators Lead Evaluator Rob Brown Evaluator Guy Huff Mike Shirley Beth Solewski Chris Haerr g(
III.
Evaluation Methodology It was determined whether other investigations had been performed on these issues.
The expurgated Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) files were reviewed to determine if additional information was available to assist in evaluation.
Cable Pulling Sidewall Pressure (SWP) and Maximum Pull Tension (MPT)
R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Mason, dated December 2, 1985 (B43 85 1203 915) was reviewed to determine the significance of Division of Nuclear Engineering's (DNE) program for addressing class IE installed cables.
Modifications and Additions Instruction M&AI-04 " Control, Power, and Signal Cable," Revision 8, was reviewed to determine the site requirements for monitoring maximum pull tension.
NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed to determine the inadequacies cited in TVA's cable pulling program, and to determine if findings, conclusions, and recommendations were adequate.
R. M. Pierce's memorandum to K. W. Whitt, dated July 8, 1985 (F01 85 0708 601), " Nuclear Safety Review Staff Investigations of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing, Installation, and Inspection Practices - NSRS Report Number I-85-06-WBN" was reviewed to determine the NSRS recommendations regarding the adequacy of the program for cable pulling.
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test" conducted by the Division of Operations Support Central Laboratories Service Branch was reviewed to determine test results.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 5 0F 25 SQN Generic Concerns Task Force (GCTF) Report titled, " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits," was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning conduit overfill.
SQN GCTF' Report titled, "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods,"
was reviewed to evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning sidewall pressure and maximum pull tension concern issues.
Discussions were conducted with cognizant Modif1 cations engineers involved with cable pulling.
Discussions were conducted with cognizant DNE design engineers involved in walkdowns and calculations addressing conduits with multiple bends between cable pull points which could cause excessive SWP.
s W. S. Raugley's memorandum to J. A. Raulston dated September 2, 1986 (B43 860903 905) was reviewed to determine DNE's response to the NRC's request for information in their letter dated August 4, 1986 to Steven A. White with regard to sidewall bearing pressure-concerns.
Rt Minimum Bend Radius (MBR)
Site procedure M&AI-4, all revisions, General Construction Specification G-38, Revision 8, and Design Specification DS-12.1.5, " Minimum Radii for Field Installed Insulated Cable Rated 15,000 Volts and Less," were reviewed to determino applicable requirements for MBR at SQN.
Two personnel knowledgeable of the design, construction, and operation of SQN were interviewed to determine if any work.has been done concerning NBR, violations at SQN.
SQN GCTF Report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violation of Cables Due to Imprcper Cable Installation Methods,"
was reviewed to determine the findings and conclusions relative to this evaluation.
P
-Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed a
to determine the findings and, recommendations applicable to this evaluation.
W. S. Raughley's memorandum dated September 2, 1986 (B43 860903 904) titled " Class 1E Cable Bend Radius" was reviewed to determine what additional work needs to be completed before Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's restart concerning the bend radius of Class 1E cables.
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O TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN 1
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 6 OF 25 Cable Coatinq Site personnel in Modifications (1) and Electrical Maintenance (3) i were interviewed about the existence of procedures for the removal i
of Flamem'astic cable coating and if they had removed Flamemastic in the past.
M&AI-13, Revision 6, and SQN Inspection Instruction (II) A4, Revision 1 and Revision 6, were reviewed for any precautions against the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic and for acceptance criteria for the depth of coating to be applied.
The SQN Generic Concerns Task Force Report on OW-85-007-004 and i
IN-86-262-002 was reviewed for adequacy of findings and conclusions.
Reviewed the Joslyn Research Center Report on the use of Flamemastic information relative to this evaluation.
Members of the W3N ECTG walked down trays in the Cable Spread Room for evidence of excessive depth of cable coating.
WBN element report titled " Cable" was reviewed to determine if the conclusions and recommendations regarding excessive cable coatings j
were applicable to SQN.
Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Surveillance Instruction SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Nechanical" was reviewed.
Surveillance Instruction, SI-233.2, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Electrical" was reviewed.
Physical Security Instruction, PHYSI-13, Revision 48, " Fire" was reviewed.
The Safety Supervisor was interviewed on the subjects of o
i penetrations, SI-233.1, SI-233.2, and control of breaching.
His section prepared SI-233.1, SI-233.2, ar.d PHYSI-13.
Firebarriers (Breaching Tools) l Modifications and Addition Instruction M&AI-13, Revision 6,
" Elect'rical Pressur.e Seal, Firestop Barrier, and Flame Retardant Cable Coating" was reviewed.
A knowledgeable Modifications supervisor was interviewed on the subject of bre, aching electrical penetrations.
I A knowledgeable general foreman was interviewed on the subject of o
breaching electrical penetrations, i
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 7 OF 25 Insulation Damage o
Personnel knowledgeable of the equipment at SQN were interviewed to determine the location and function of the discharge gates hoist motors specific to this evaluation.
o Observation of the supply cables on the above motors was performed to determine their status and condition.
o Workplan 11043 and Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720 were reviewed to determine what work had been done on the cables and what were the changes and reason for changes of the ECN.
480-volt Receptacles o
A walkdown was conducted along with two electricians to determine the manufacturer and model number of 480-volt receptacles in the fifth diesel generator area.
Discussions were conducted with the cognizant DNE' procurement supervisor to determine the acceptable cable diameter. range for the receptacles found in the walkdown.
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer to determine the cable diameter for number 2 wire.
e Cable Routing o
II-28 " Cable Pulling Inspection," Revision 4, M&AI-04 " Control, Power and Signal Cables," Revision 0 through Revision 8, G-38
" Installing Insulated Cables Rated Up to 15,000 Volts," Revision 8, SOP-104 " Electrical Cable Installation" Revision 1, and E-6
" Cable Storage and Installation," Revision 0 through Revision 7, were reviewe ' for information on the acceptability of running l
cables outside of cable trays.
o Two Modifications electrical engineers and two DNE onsite engineers were interviewed on the acceptability of running cables outside of cable trays and on the removal of' temporary cables.
The DNE engineer responsible for revisions to G-38 was interviewed o
on the interpretation given to step 3.2.1.8.2(b) regarding the acceptability of routing cable outside cable trays, i
o A walkdown of cable trays in the cable spread room was conducted to locate examples of improperly routed cables.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER; C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
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PAGE 8 0F 25 Splicing (MAS-85-003)
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Electrical Maintenance engineer, in regards to split insulation on cable to the CS Component Cooling System (CCS) pump that had been taped during construction.
Maintenance Request (MR) A561116 was reviewed to determine if the splice had been reworked using a Raycbem sleeve.
Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of Nonconformance Reports (NCR) 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual responsible for the SQN Experience Review Program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224.
A discussion was conducted with cognizant DNE nuclear-licensing i
and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
Applicable DNE and site documentation of the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774 was reviewed for actions taken at SQN on the subject.
A discussion was conducted with SQN DNE and EED engineers with respect to the disposition of NCR 6623/6774.
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cable The SQN GCTF Report on concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed to o
evaluate the findings and conclusions of that report concerning the supports for NIS cable.
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IV.
Summary of Findings Cable pulling (MpT and SWp)
Review of R. W. Cantrell's memorandum to C. C. Mason dated December 2, 1985, revealed the purpose of the evaluation was to collect ~and review operational, maintenance, and surveillance test data on cable from TVA's operating plants and any readily available equivalent data from other outside sources to determine if cable failures could be attributed to past cable pulling RI practices. As a result of the evaluation, DNE determined that
TVA EMPLCYEE CONCERNS R.' ORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 9 OF 25 no cable failures could be attributed to past cable pulling practices, i.e.,
violations of the minimum bending radius or maximum allowable sidewall pressure. The following statement was given in an executive summary attached to the memorandum:
"From the evaluation, DNE concludes that past class 1E cable installations could not adversely affect startup, operation, or safe shutdown capabilities. DNE has used historical data, ongoing surveillance requirements and a random failure concept to arrive at this conclusion."
For specifics on representative cable test data see Section II titled, " Collection and Evaluation of Cable Test Data" of subject memorandum.
Review of M&AI-4 revealed the following statement concerning mechanical assistance on cable pulls:
"On pulls requiring mechanical assistance, the craft foreman shall notify the cognizant engineer that mechanical assistance will be required on that particular cable pull. The cognizant engineer will in turn perform the sizing of the pull rope and necessary calculations (refer to Sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.1) prior to the cable pull."
Methods for determining the maximum pulling force were given in Section 6.0.
Table 6.2.1.3.c provided manila break rope sizes for various conductor sizes.
Non-Class 1E cables were not monitored for maximum pull tension nor sidewall pressure.
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NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN was reviewed and three problem areas of the cable program were found that were applicable to this evaluation:
(1) the fact that TVA did not include sidewall pressure (SWP) calculations in their cable pull procedure, (2) the way TVA defined their method of calculating maximum pull tension (MPT) on multi-cable pulls, and (3) the way DNE resolved the question of exceeding minimum bend radius.
The NSRS recommendations consisted of establishing values for pulling and training radii that were fully supported by manu fa'c tu rer's# test data. These values were to be used to disposition NCRs on the subject. The report suggested a sample at
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 10 0F 26 WBN, (the plant to which the report was written) unit 1 for Class IE cables for inspection of pulling and training radii.
If the evaluation failed to justify the as-installed conditions, then it was suggested that a formal inservice surveillance / inspection program b'e considered.
A review of "NSRS Investigation of an Employee Concern Regarding Cable Routing, Installation, and Inspection Practices," revealed the following conclusion and recommendation concerning the adequacy for cable pulling:
"The DNE and Nuclear Construction established and documented program was determined to be inadequate to, accomplish the cable pull activities. The past and present programs have been inadequate, inconsistent, and in violation of the accepted industry standards and practices."
"DNE management should revise G-38 and G-40 to incorporate resolutions to the identified problems discussed in this report; and, subsequently, WBN DNE, NU CON, and ONP management should revise the relevant DNE documents, as well.as NU CON and ONP procedures. The final adequacy of the present cable installation should then be evaluated per revised acceptance criteria."
A similar program to that given for pulling and training radius was also suggested,
" Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Test," was reviewed and the o
' objective and results are summarized below:
The objective of the test was to determine the maximum Sidewall Gearing Pressure (SWBP) possible on cable pulls without cable degradation.
Representative samples of power, control, signal and instrument, and coaxial cables from TVA's nuclear power plants were pulled through a conduit test setup containing four horizontal 90-degree bends. The applied tension was controlled and measured during each cable sample pull to achieve maximum SWBP. With the exception of the larger power cables, size No. 2 and larger, each cable was tensioned to near its ultimate breaking strength. The maximum SW8p values achieved are summarized in the following j
tables.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 11 OF 25 The maximum SWBP values achieved were as follows:
Cable Types Maximum SWBp (1bs/ft) power Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 1398 The cable with the highest tensile strength 3104 Control Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 602 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1831 Signal and Instrument Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength
_447 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1496 Coaxial Cables:
The cable with the lowest tensile strength 373 The cable with the highest tensile strength 1242 After pulling, the cables were inspected, dimensioned, and outer jackets were removed from multiconductors. They were then subjected to dielectric breakdown tests (See Section 6.0 of the above mentioned test for the acceptance criteria).
"All cables met the established acceptance criteria."
Review of GCTF report titled " Overfill of Cable Trays and Conduits," revealed the following:
There was no computer program check or QA records kept on the total cross sectional area fill of cables in conduits.
SCR SQN EEB 8529 was generated to document conduit overfill of 55 conduits at Sequoyah. The recommendation for the disposition was use-as-is.
The reason given was that,
exceeding the percentage conduit fill did not constitute a failure - that it was a violation of values given to prevent damage to cable during installation. Tests and inspections were performed on the cables in question, and no damage was revealed. Therefore, the SCR was closed out on-January 28, 1986.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 12 OF 25 Review of GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables Due to Improper Cable Installation Methods," revealed the following conclusion stated in the report:
"The'NSRS Recommendation No. I-85-06-WBN-02 and the DNE walkdown procedure are appropriate actions to determine if "Ovartensioning of Cables" is a problem at SQN."
The evaluation agreed with the findings of the report.
Discussions were conducted with a cognizant Modifications engineers concerning monitoring of MPT during cable pulls. The following information was obtained. MPT had been monitored in the past using break ropes and other devices. General Construction Specification G-38 was recently revised which changed the way MPT and SWP were determined. The majority of the cable were pulled RI before these changes and were pulled by the old requirements.
Discussions with two DNE cognizant engineers revealed TVA selected and conducted a walkdown of 16 conduits which should meet the worst case configurations to determine whether the allowable sidewall pressure (SWP) or MPT for cable in conduit had been exceeded. The conduit :onfigurations were tabulated, isometric sketches were drawn, and cable pull cards were obtained for SWP calculations.
SWP calculations were not complete at the writing of this report.
Concerning conduit overfill, SQN had no QA records kept on conduit fill.
Each plant's responsible design engineering group determined conduit overfill in routing cable. SQN design i
engineers used cable outside diameter and weight data from TVA Design Standard DS-E12.1.13, which was recently revised to incorporate average cable diameters (Revision 2), which were not previously used.
l Concerning cable pulls with trucks, cherry pickers, or other devices, the use of a mechanical device was acceptable when pull a
tensions were monitored by break ropes or dynamometers. The use of a choker was also acceptable for safety purposes only. The choker was used to prevent the cable from whipping out and hitting personnel if the break rope broke.
l Review of W. S. Raughley's memorandum to J.A. Raulston dated l
September 2, 1986, revealed.the following response to the NRC's l
request for information concerning the methods used by TVA in I
determining the acceptability of sidewall pressure exerted on class 1E cable:
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 13 0F 25 "The purpose of the calculations was to determine acceptability of sidewall bearing pressures exerted on Class IE cables in existing conduits.
All Class 1E (approximately 10,400) conduits were evaluated through preliminary screening, fiel'dcinspection and detailed calculations.
A.
PRELIMINARY SCREENING The screening analysis was performed as follows:
(1) Developed a list of assumed worst-case configurations based on vertical conduit with four 90 degree bends in pulling end of conduit. The cable pull was assumed to be upward.
See figure:
A T5 l
3" Conduit
'T' 4
t 3 Cables t
We =1.4 1
K = 0.42 R = 0.955 Ft T3l a = 908 (1.57 rad) l Sidewall bearing pressure a
(SWP) = 300 lbs/ft F
tT2 (Conservatively assumed)
T' 1
W = Cable weight per foot L1 i
a (2) Calculated maximum pulling tension allowable to avoid exceeding sidewall bearing pressure limits (300 lbs/ft for l
power and control; 100 lbs/ft for instrumentation).
, EXAMPLE:
y=
3(SWP)R (3We -2)
T = 391 lbs. for above figure (3) Calculated length of conduit in terms of W that would correspond with allowable sidewall bearing pressure limits. This was done for all the conduit sizes and number of cables in each conduit.
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TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 14 0F 25 EXAMPLE:
Ti = WL1 T ZTi,Ea = Ti (1.93) 2 T ZT2 eKa = Ti (3.72) 3 T ZT3 eKa = Ti (7.18) 4 T ZT4,Ka = Ti (13.86) = WLt (13.86) 5 i
Li=
TS
=
391
=
28.21 (13.86)(W)
(13.86)W W
(4) Screened the conduit schedule for lengths exceeding the calculated lengths by using nominal weights of cables.
A large number of extremely short cables were eliminated from further analysis because they were shorter than the length of four 90 degree bends.
1 The original number of 10,400 conduits was reduced during the preliminary screening process to a list of 1914 conduits requiring further evaluation'.
Conservatism was used in the screening method because:
(a) Sidewall bearing pressure criteria was 300 t
Ib./ft. Test results of 600 -1500 lb./f t. were l
later reported.
(b) Four - conduit bends were assumed back to back.
Using a more typical conduit with bends distributed throughout the conduit could result in i
pulling tensions 1/2 to 1/4 of those in screening.
(c) Initial conduit section assumed to be vertical.
This assumption doubled the resultant tension as compared to pulling through a horizontal section (which is far more typical).
4 FIELD INSPECTION
~
Obtained a sample size of 81 worst-case conduits for detailed l
calculations (approximately,20 conduits per voltage level).
The worst case condui,ts wer,e selected by visual inspection of 778 conduits using the'cri,teria of multiple bonds (>3600),
long lengths, elevation changes and' conduit fill (130%) (EEB Engineering Procedure 22.29).
DETAILED CALCULA'rIONS i
i The detailed calculations of the 81 worst-case conduits showed i
twelve (12) conduits exceeding the sidewall bearing pressure limits of 300 lbs./f t. or 100 lbs./f t. as applicable. These values are based on the assumption that the cables were pulled in the direction that would cause sidewall bearing pressures to be greater."
g{
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 15 OF 25 i
==
Conclusion:==
Maximum Pull Tension and Sidewall Bearing Pressure issues were actively being evaluated by DNE. The program inadequacies were identifiep in NSRS report I-85-06-WBN and later addressed in SQN GCTFs repoht titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bend Radius Violations of Cables due to Improper Cable Installation Methods."
The Sidewall Bearing Pressure test results were favorable based upon the conservative approach and SWP limits reported between 600-1500 ft./lb. depending on the type of cables and configuration tested. However, the final resolution will depend on DNE's final response to NSRS report I-85-06-WBN not yet available.
8I M_ B_R, Applicable procedures were determined to be as follows:
o Design Specification DS-12.1.5 M&AI-4 Construction Specification G-38 RI Four concerns were evaluated concerning minimum be'nd radius o
(MBR). Interviews with two personnel involved in both the design and construction of SQN and knowledgeable of the problems concerning MBR, revealed that some attention had been given to j
this issue at SQN.
Review of NSRS Report I-85-06-WBN (see report for details) revealed that a comprehensive review of cable bend radius issues from 1979 through 1985 identified various areas of potential Rl inadequacies.
The SQN GCTF report on MPT and MBR was reviewed and no pertinent information was discovered.
R1 Interviews with personnel inv'olved in the installation of cable at a
l
,SQN as well as some limited field' evaluation indicated that j
violations of MBR requirements existed.
(
Review of W. S.' Raughley's memorandum dated S3ptember 2, 1986, titled " Class IE Cable Bend Radius" revealed the purpose of the memorandum was to provide direction to each project concerning
, specific work actions which were necessary to resolve concerns on bend radii of class lE cables before each plant could operate.
j The following direction was given pertaining to SQN:
"The Electrical Engineering Branch has evaluated the adequacy of the bond radius to which Class IE cables were installed.
i The basis for the evaluation was the comprehensive investigation conducted by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff on 8I
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 pAGE 16 OF 25 the same subject during February to April 1985. The measures specified herein are expected to comprise the majority of any project specific corrective actions resulting from this investigation.
EEB's final report documenting the evaluation and providing con.clusions and recommendations based upon an independent review of our evaluation will be issued in September 1986.
Each project should proceed inmediately to perform the following inspections, as applicable, and to forward the results to the respective engineering projects".
1.
(Pertained to WBN and BLN only--for details see above referenced memorandum).
2.
All projects shall perform a field inspection of all conduits containing Class 1E medium voltage power cables for the existence of any straight-thru pull box or condulet type (C, ELL, TEE, etc.) raceway fitting or any conduit raceway fitting other than a standard conduit bend around which a cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size, and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
3.
All projects shall determine the minimum size conduit that the following coaxial, triaxial, and twinaxial cables, if utilized in Class 1E applications and routed in conduit, are installed in.
If any of these cables are installed in Class 1E applications and in a conduit smaller than indicated below, the project shall perform a field inspection for the existence of condulets of any type (ELL, TEE, etc.) in which the cable is bent. The existence of any such fittings, including the raceway number and size, the fitting description, manufacturer (if available) and size and the location shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
In addition, each project shall verify that the following. list includes all
^
coaxial, triaxial, and twinaxial cables installed in Class 1E applications. A positive statement to this effect or a list of additional cable mark numbers shall be addressed to my attention.
RI
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 17 0F 25 Minimum Condulet Cable Mark No.
Description Size (Inches)
WTJ Coax RG6A/U 2
WTJ-5'r 1/c #21 Coax Solid Cu Clad Steel 2
WT K
- 22 Coax RG59B/U 1-1/2 WTK-1 Coax RG59B/U XLP 1-1/2 WTL COAX RG216/U Except 3 Shields 3
WTL-4 Coax 55 ohm #22 AWG 1-1/2 WTM Coax RG114A/U Except 3 Shields & ST 3
WTM-6 1/c Coax #26, 7 Strands, LOCA 3
WTY-1
- 21 AWG, Coax, RG58C/U 1-1/2 WTU
- 20 Triax RG 11/U 3
WTN Triax RG-59U #22, 2 Shields LOCA 2
WTN-1 Triax Similar to RG11/U LOCA 3
WTN-2 Twinax RG220/U 3
WWK TP #22 W/SH TP #20 2/c #22 2-Coax 3
4.
The Watts Dar project shall perform a field inspection of all Class 1E coaxial, twinaxial, and triaxial cables which were installed or modified during the period of May 25, 1979 to May 18, 1981, under the guidance of Design Information Request (DIR) No. E-9.
In addition, all projects shall inspect all Class 1E coaxial and twinaxial cables which were installed or modified during the period of September 20, 1983 to April 23, 1986, under the direction of DS-E12.1.5 Revision O.
The cable shall be verified to be installed to a bend radius equal to 8 times its outside diameter.
This inspection need not address the bend radius in standard conduit bends as this has been addressed generically in PIRGENEEB8605. The inspection of the bend radius in condulets is covered in item 3 above.
Therefore, provided the project establishes that all cable tray fittings were procured with a radius equal to or greater than 8 times the outside diameter of the largest cable in question or.that the cable was restricted to use in conduit and that all conduit bonds meet the minimum requirements of DS'E13.1.7, this inspection may be limited to cables in free air (transitions from raceway to raceway or raceway to equipment) and to the points of tenmination.
All installations which do not conform to the specified 8 times factor shall be documented as a nonconformance and forwarded to the respective engineering project for disposition.
The documentation shall include the cable and, if applicable, the raceway number, the location of the violation, the actual installed bend radius and the results of a visual inspection noting any discernible stress on the cable jacket in the area of the bend or any ripples in the cable jacket which could indicate shield deformation, gg
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 18 OF 25 Each Lead Engineer should prepare a fragnet reflecting the individual project's approach and schedule for resolving these issues.
" Resolution of these concerns has been tied to plant restartand should be scheduled for implemantation accordingly."
==
Conclusion:==
Minimum Bond Radius issues were actively being evaluated by DNE.
The program discrepancies were identified in NSRS Report I-85-06-WON mentioned above.
SQN GCTF report titled "Overtensioning and Minimum Bond Radius Violations of Cables due to Improper Cable Installation Methods," also identified the problem at SQN.
Based upon the above findings, we concur with the Sequoyah GCTF report and EEB's final report (mentioned above) will be required to provide a resolution to 8!
the minimum bend radius concerns.
Cable Coating The use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified. ONP had no written method for removing Flamemastic, but through conversation with a cognizant general foreman, it was determined that it was not approved practice to use sharp instruments to remove the coating.
He also stated they had never removed Flamemastic except at penetrations where the cables were terminated.
Here the procedure was to flex the cable until the coating cracked and then peel it off.
There was some question that the Flamemastic coating had exceeded the limits set by DNE for depth of coating. However, the examples noted in the spread room which appeared to have excessive coating were Non-QA trays (trays VCA, VCB, and WB). The trained trays were much neater.
In a review of the Joslyn Research Center report 'on the effects of Flamemastic on grouped cables, it was noted that this report was almost identical to the Factory Mutual Report on.Vimasco.
(Refer to WBN element report) and the-same RI conclusions were reached as at WBN - the above mentioned test did not appear to be adequate for the configurations in the plant.
Therefore, the same recommendation is made for SQN as for WON in NSRS report I-85-569-WBN.
The recommendation consisted of testing using trays which were filled as found at the plant sites.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the above findings, the concern (IN-86-268-002) for the use of sharp instruments to remove Flamemastic was never verified.
However, the concerns (IN-86-259-005, OW-85-007-004) for Flamemastic coatings exceeding the limits set by DNE for depth of coating were verified.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 19 0F 25 Firebarriers (Site Procedure Control)
Review of Surveillance Instructions (SI-233.1, Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Mechanical," and SI-233.2,' < Revision 0, " Visual Inspection of Penetration Fire Barriers - Electrical"), and Physical Security Instruction PHYSI-13, Revision 48, " Fire," along with an interview with the safety supervisor revealed the following:
SQN had only one procedure for control nf breaching fire barriers. This has been PHYSI-13, " Fire," Attachment F,
" Procedure for the Control of Breaching Fire Barriers." The condition of attempted control through multiple organizations of ONP and NU CON at WBN has not existed at SQN. 'SQN has not had a problem with fire barrier breaching control.
Surveillance instructions are in place at SQN to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
==
Conclusion:==
Based on the above findings, SQN had adequate procedures and control to verify the integrity of the penetration fire barriers.
Firebarriers (Breaching Tools)
M&AI-13, Revision 6, stated that a metallic breaching tool may be used. The foreman must note and sign the data sheet that the metallic tool is free of burrs and sharp edges before use.
Both interviews had the following findings. There was no known fish-hook tool for foam removal.
As with the WBN ECTG Report,'it was assumed that the concerned individual had meant to use the term fish tape.
Fish tape had been used at SQN to breach the fire barriers. This was acceptable by M&AI-13. No problems were identified because of the use of fish tape.
==
Conclusion:==
a Based upon the above findings, the' c'oncern was not verified. However, WDN NAI-14 had been revised to exclude the use of fish type.
Fiberglass or wooden rods were to bi used to breach penetrations.
This same change should be evaluated at SQN for inclusion in#SQN M&AI-13.
Insulation Damage This concern stated that insulation was mistakenly cut off of a 440-volt cable which fed the back flow or discharge gate hoist motor of the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) system.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 20 0F 25 Electrical tape wan supposedly used to reattach this insulation.
The concerned individual gave four motor numbers (1AA, 100, 2AA, and 288) as well as four conduits (1-PL-6370-B, 1-PL-6360-A, 2-PL-6370-B, and 2-PL-6360-A).
Discussions with various personnel from the Electrical Engineering Branch-site, Elet'.rical Maintenance, and Operations units revealed that these motors were used to control the gates which prevented the backflow of hot condenser circulating water to the intake when the Essential Raw Cooling Water Pumps (ERCW) were located at the intake. This was a necessary precaution needed to maintain the ERCW supply temperature requirements.
However, the ERCW pumps have been moved to a separate pumping station (ERCW pumping station) and the need for these backflow gates 'no longer existed.
Currently, these gates have been blocked in the open position and the subject cables have been deenergized.
A field evaluation of these motors verified that they woro numbered as the concerned individual stated, and they.had been taken out of service as described above. This field evaluation did reveal a disconnected cable inside a control panel with a tag referencing Workplan 11043.
A review of this workplan revealed i
that this work was done to remove several instruments from service. This was required according to Engineering Change Notice (ECN) L5720.
A review of this ECN revealed that it gave the same information concerning these gates as that stated above.
==
Conclusion:==
Based upon the fact that the subject cables were not energized, and no longer needed, and had been taken out of service, the need for further action concerning this item was not required.
R1 480-volt Receptacles A walkdown was conducted and assisted by two electricians. During
,~
t the walkdown, the electricians removed covers from two of,the 480-volt receptacles in question. These were box 4097 (480-volt Recep~ tacle-DSL Auxiliary Board C2-S) and box 4100 (480-volt Receptacle - DSL Auxiliary Board C2-5).
Both of the receptacles were Crouse-Hinds model number AEQ 01648.
Both of the receptacles were wired with 3 conductor number 2 wire. This was the only model number found in the fifth diesel area.
Discussions with the Procurement Section Supervisor (DNE) revealed i
that catalog information for Crouse-Hinds catalog number 4700 (catalog page IP-27), model number AEQ 1648 stated the cable diameter range for the receptacle was from 0.64 inches to 1.37 inches.
-l
s.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 21 0F 25 Discussions with an Electrical Maintenance engineer revealed the diameter of one number 2 wire is O.476 inches.
By using TVA Cable Splice and Termination drawing number SD-E12.5.8, Revision 2, the evaluator determined that 3 conductor WMf wire now being used had R1 a minimum. diameter of 1.02 inches and a maximum of 1.30 inches.
==
Conclusion:==
This investigation demonstrated the receptacles being used were rated for 3 conductor number 2 wire and therefore were not a problem.
Cable Routing From a review of site Nuclear Construction (NU' CON) and a
Modifications instructions, no specific references to maintaining cables in cable trays was discovered until M&AI-04 Revision 8, dated December 31, 1985. This was due to a misinterpretation of G-3 8.
G-38 step 3.2.1.8.2(b) was worded such that there was a difference of interpretation between site DNE and Modifications personnel and DNE personnel in Knoxville. This difference was extremely significant because site personnel belicFed before December 31, 1985, it was acceptable to run cable outside of cable trays while DNE in Knoxville said something entirely different.
The wording must be made clear. This will mean a reevaluation at R)
WBN if the response is that as stated by Knoxville.
It will also
.mean a walkdown at SQN and WBN to verify all permanent cables are in the cable trays and to correct those that are not (an example of " improperly" routed non-QA cable was discovered at SQN in the 480-volt Shutdown Board Room 2A2 in cable tray JAN.) It should be noted all examples found were non-QA.
The removal and/or identification of temporary cables had been the 4
o source of improperly routed cables at WBN (refer to WBN " Cable" element report). The cables had not been identified or they had R1.
not been removed.at the end of use by NU CON. The major source of
, these cables was temporary security cables.
SQN site personnel stated they had seen oke or two cables ' running outside of cable trays in various locations around the plant (no' specific locations given) but there were no massive amounts of unsupported cable. There were large amounts of cable running outside cable trays at'WBN.
As stat *ed previously, these cables i,
were determined to be temporary NU. CON cables and tem orary i
security cables in a walkdown of the cable trays.
DNE and i
Modifications personnel were confident that all temporary security cables had been removed in 1981 or 1982. The DNE response *to NCR W-283-P (the NCR written at WBN which dealt with unidentified cables in cable trays) reads that " Abandoned cables are spares not given numbers"yet.
Spare cables have no function, thus cannot El l
P.
e 4
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 22 0F 25 affect safe operation and/or shutdown of the plant." This would indicate that if there are unidentifidd temporary cables they are not a problem as far as the safe operation of the plant is concerned.
A walkdown of all cable trays should identify all cables routed outside of cable trays.
R1
==
Conclusion:==
This evaluation concentrated on the removal of temporary cables because this was the problem identified at WBN.
Based upon the above findings, removal of temporary cables was not verified. However, the interviews conducted pointed to the fact that the temporary cables were removed. The concern for cable routing outside cable trays was valid becauso site personnel believed it was acceptable before the December 31, 1985 revision to M&AI-04.
Splicing (MAS-85-003)
Discussion with a knowledgeable engineer in Electrical Maintenance revealed they were aware of a specific case of split insulation on cable to the CS CCS pump that had been taped during construction.
The concern had been that this cable might still be taped according to earlier procedures rather than maeting II-10, Revision 11, which required the use of Raychem for splices.
A review of MR A561116 revealed that cables IPL47355 and 1PL47365 were inspected and repaired.
Cable 1PL47355 had Raychem sleeves placed on it.
Cable 1PL47365 sleeve was found to have no damage.
==
Conclusion:==
The taped insulation on cable 1PL47355 had been replaced with Raychem sleeves and was no longer a problem.
No further action was required.
Splicing (IN-86-314-005)
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNE engineer on the disposition of NCRs 6208, 6224, 6536, 6623, and 6774. The*
s NCRs had been identjfied as the problem areas in the W8N Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) report on cable.
It was determined that NCRs 6208, 6224, and 6623, 6774 were to be grouped together because they were NCRs on the same subject with different affected units (one for unit 1 and one for unit 2).
When a potential generic memorandum was sent to SQN or any other project, the memorandum dealt wTth a subject, not a specific NCR. The engineer had information on NCR 6208/6224 and 6536. The problem defined in NCR 6536 was determined not to exist at SQN because the site used a different series of products to make a splice than at WBN.
The engineer referred to ONP for further details on NCR 6208/6224. He had information that the NCR was to be handled by the Experience Review Program.
V.
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 23 OF 25 A discussion was conducted with the cognizant individual in charge of the SQN Experience Review program on the disposition of NCR 6208/6224.
This program was a method of handling questions generated by NRC bulletins, INp0 reports, SCRs, etc.
The licensing, unit would assign the questions to the appropriate plant sections which would respond as to whether a problem existed onsite.
In the case of this NCR, all splices in inspected and corrections were made as necessary. question were The documentation was then sent to the Environmental Qualification (EQ) project to become a part of the EQ binder.
The NCR in question was considered closed on the SQN site '
A discussion was conducted with cognizant DNE Nuclear Licensing Section and Electrical Engineering Branch (EEB) personnel on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774. These NCRs questioned all splices in harsh environments in that it questioned the environmental qualification of the Raychem products used before December 1985.
They had documentation that a potential generic applicability memorandum had been sent to SQN and 'that a response had been received.
Applicable DNE and site documentation was reviewed to determine what had been decided on the generic applicability of NCR 6623/6774.
This included reviewing the potential generic applicability memorandum from DNE to SQN and their response.
It was determined that the activities in question were applicable to SQN and Significant Condition Report (SCR) SQN EEB 8631 was generated.
A discussion was conducted with the cognizant SQN DNL and EEB engineers on the disposition of SCR SQN EEB 8631.
The SQN DNE R1 engineer said that there were three parts to the SCR.
The part that dealt with the use of liVS Raychem kits was not applicable to SQN because this particular kit was not used onsite in the timeframe noted.
The part that dealt with the application ranges of WCSF-N tubing was explained away by the fact that the ranges for use were broadened, and therefore any applications before this change were well within the specified range.
The site'DNE engineer referred to the cognizant E,EB engineer on tuo disposition
- of the last part of the SCR which dealt with the use.of breakouts and end caps with no oversleeve in' harsh environmNnts'.
The EED engineer said that this part of the SCR was being dispositioned use-as-is according to an EEB calculation which was in the process of being finalized.
This calculation was to prove that there was no problem with circulating current, which was the cause of concern for cables whose ends were not sealed to keep the shield (or drain) wire separated from the ground.
.- ~-
v.
e TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN SPECIAL PROGRAN REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 24 0F 25
==
Conclusion:==
No problem was found at SQN with NCR 6536. NCR 6208/6224 had been found generic, but all work associated with this NCR had been completed. NCR 6623/6774 was in the process of being dispositioned use-as-is.
This should be followed up to ensure the final disposition reaches the same conclusion.
~
Nuclear Instrumentation System (NIS) Cables The SQN Employee Concerns Task Force Report on WON Concern IN-85-120-001 was reviewed for adequacy. The evaluation agreed with the report. The design of the system was.different between SQN and W8N.
The SQN orientation did not have the large distances found between the raceway and the detectors, i
j
==
Conclusion:==
This evaluation agreed with the SQN Employee Concerns, Task Force report. The layout of the NIS cables at SQN was different from WON because the orientation of cables at SQN did not have large distances between raceways and detectors and the concern was not verified at R1 SQN.
V.
Root Cause Cable Pulling MPT, SWP, MDR - The upper-tier document (G-38) for pulling cable was inadequate which, in turn, resulted in inadequate site procedures. The reason was failure to recognize a need to monitor maximum pull tension, sidewall bearing pressure and adhere to the manufacturers minimum bend radius limits.
El Conduit Overfill - The Design Project used non-auditable records for conduit fill. There was no Quality Assurance record kept on the total cross sectional area fill and TVA Desig'n Standard DS E 12.1.13, Revision 1 (recently revised) did not incorporate average cable diameters also resulting in some error.
El Cable Coating The root cause of cable coating concerns was a failure to follow the manufacturers recommended maximum thickness.
Inadequate i
administrative control over the application of Flamemastic was the major cause of the excessive coatings.
R\\
i
E- --
l l
TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: C010900-SQN l
SPECIAL PROGRAM REVISION NUMBER:
1 PAGE 25 OF 25 Cable Routing The root cause of the routing problem was inadequate site procedures due to a misinterpretation of Construction i
l Specifica' tion G-38 in regards to routing cables outside of cable trays. These procedures have since been updated.
g 4
VI.
Corrective Actions The corrective actions are as decided by line management.
E)
VII.
Generic Applicability The concerns which dealt with MPT, MBR, and SWP have been determined in the WBN ECTG report on cable to be applicable to Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) and Brown's Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN).
The cable coating concerns were found to be potentially generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
One of the five barrier concerns (IN-85-018-004) was found to be potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
The other concern (XX-85-094-005) was determined to be potentially l
generic to BFN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
Splicing concern IN-86-314-005 was considered potentially generic to BFN and BLN in the WBN ECTG report on cable.
No new generically applicable concerns were found in the SQN evaluation.
r i
VIII.
Attachments None
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~,,.
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