ML20210F604
| ML20210F604 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 12/19/1986 |
| From: | Mcdonald R ALABAMA POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| RTR-REGGD-01.108, RTR-REGGD-1.108 NUDOCS 8702110116 | |
| Download: ML20210F604 (4) | |
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o-g Alabama Power Company 600 North 18th Street Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291-0400 Telephone 205 250-1835
. OI AlabamaPower R. P. Mcdonald Senior Vice President thG mfern Gla:tocsystem December 19, 1986 Docket Nos. 50-348 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II, Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street N. W.
Atlanta, GA 30323 Attention: Dr. J. N. Grace Gentlemen:
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Units - 1 and 2 Annual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report Attached is the i nual Diesel Generator Reliability Data Report which is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.
This report provides the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each diesel generator at Farley Nuclear Plant for 1985.
Also provided is the information identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1,1977 for each failure.
If there are any questions, please advise.
Respectfull s ubmitted, S
R. P. Mcdonald RPM / JAR: dst-T.S.6 Attachment cc: Mr. L. B. Long Mr. L. S. Rubenstein l
Mr. E. A. Reeves l
Mr. W. M. Bradford V
B702110116 861219
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ATTAQ9ENT ANNUAL DIESEL GENERATOR RELIABILITY DATA REPORT FOR 1985 This' diesel generator (DG) reliability report for the year 1985 is submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.12.. Table 1.shows the number of tests (valid or invalid) and the number of failures for each of the five DGs at Farley Nuclear Plant.
-TABLE 1 Diesel Generator 1-2A 1B 2B 1C 2C TOTAL Valid Successful 67 64 66 45 36 278 Tests Invalid T.ests 10 12 12 4
2 40 Failures 3
1 1
0 0
5 The following paragraphs provide the informption identified in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1,1977 for each of the failures identified above.
1-2A DG Failure of 4-17-85 At 2302 on 4-17-85, the 1-2A DG was started to prove operability as a part of normal surveillance. After approximately twenty minutes of operation, the DG load began oscillating, and load swings as large as two megawatts were noted.
The DG was shut down manually by the control room operator. An investigation revealed that the oil level in the DG governor was low; however, the level was higher than the low level mark on the sight glass. Approximately four ounces of oil were added to the governor and the governor was vented. The DG was started and found to operate properly. The DG was returned to service at 0441 on 4-18-85.
As a result of this event, governor oil levels have been added to the
' Diesel Building logsheets with the instruction to ensure that the oil is at the upper mark on the sightglass when the DG is not running.
This was the first failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG, No change in the surveillance interval was necessary. The surveillance interval remained at fourteen days in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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1B DG Failure on 4-20-85 At 2302 on 4-20-85, the 1B DG was started as a part of the Safety Injection / Loss of Offsite Power test. This test is performed during a refueling outage. The DG tripped on overspeed before the output breaker closed. No cause for the trip was discovered. The DG operated properly during subsequent testing. For further discussion of this event, see the description of the IB DG trip which occurred on 7-23-85.
The DG was returned to service at 0320 on 4-21-85.
This was the second failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG. No change in the surveillance interval was necessary. However, the surveillance interval was changed to seven days. This change was made because of a previous test which had been incorrectly determined to be a failure. Technical Specifications require that the surveillance interval be changed to seven days when three or more failures have occurred in the last 100 starts for a particular type of DG.
2B DG Failure on 5-27-85 At 1501 on 5-27-85, the 2B DG was started for normal surveillance. The DG started normally and had been loaded to 1000 Kw in accordance with the surveillance procedure. At approximately 1525, a low rocker arm lubricating oil pressure alarm was received. The control room operator shut the DG down manually. The problem was investigated and it was found that the rocker arm oil reservoir makeup valve was stuck in the closed position. The valve was freed and observed to operate properly during subsequent surveillance. The DG was returned to service at 0200 on 5-28-85.
This was the third f ailure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG.
Technical Specifications require that the surveillance interval be changed to seven days when three or more failures have occurred in the last 100 starts for a particular type of DG. However, the surveillance interval had already been changed to seven days following the failure of the 1B DG on 4-20-85. Therefore, the surveillance interval remained at seven days.
1-2A DG Failure on 6-26-85 At 1515 on 6-26-85, the 1-2A DG was started as a part of normal surveillance.
The DG was synchronized to the bus. As the operator started to increase the DG load, the DG load began oscillating. Load swings as large as two megawatts were noted. The DG was shut down manually by the control room operator. An investigation revealed that the oil level in the DG governor was low and a small oil leak was found on the governor oil sightglass. The Diesel Building Operator had checked the governor oil level before the DG was started and he found the level to be at the low mark on the sightglass.
In accordance with the note on the Diesel Building logs, the governor oil level should have been up to the upper mark on the sightglass. The Operator should have recognized and reported the low oil level so that corrective action could have been taken. However, tnis was not done.
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The leak was repaired, oil was added and the governor was vented. The DG was started and found to operate properly. The DG was returned to service at 2200 on 6-26-85.
The Diesel Building Operator was counseled concerning his failure to recognize and report the low governor oil level.
This was the fourth failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG. No change in the surveillance interval was necessary. The surveillance interval remained at seven days in accordance with Technical Specifications.
1B DG Failure on 7-23-85 At 2032 on 7-23-85, the IB DG was started to verify operability prior to removing the 1-2A DG from service. Approximately five seconds after attaining rated speed, the IB DG tripped due to overspeed. An investigation was conducted under the direction of a Technical Representative from the DG manufacturer.
It was concluded that the electrical governor was not controlling the DG speed.
The voltage regulator assembly was replaced which corrected the problem with the electrical governor.
It was also determined that the mechanical governor was set too high. The mechanical governor was readjusted. The combination of both governors operating improperly had left the DG without proper speed control which led to the overspeed trip. The DG was returned to service at 2233 on 7-26-85.
The trips of the IB DG which had occurred on 4-20-85 and 7-23-85 were determined to have been caused by the same problem. The problem was identified and corrected following the trip on 7-23-85. The two failures were considered to be one failure for purposes of determining the DG surveillance interval.
Therefore, this event was not considered to be an additional failure and the surveillance interval remained at seven days in accordance with Technical Specifications.
1-2A DG Failure on 10-27-85 At 1730 on 10-27-85, the 1-2A DG was started as a part of normal surveillance.
At approximately 1903, the Diesel Building Operator informed the Control Roon Operator of a fuel oil leak on the number nine cylinder.
It was decided to shut the DG down since the leak rate was approximately two gallons per minute. The leak was found to be on the number nine cylinder return line from the injection pump to the return header. The leak was repaired and, following surveillance testing, the DG was returned to service at 0425 on 10-28-85.
Since this was the second failure in the last 100 starts for this type of DG, no change in the surveillance interval was necessary. Therefore, the surveillance interval remained at fourteen days in accordance with Technical Specifications.
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