ML20210F489

Comments on Draft Generic Ltr Proposing BWR Containment Requirements,Per 861204 Request.New Requirements Identified in Generic Ltr Must Be Imposed by License Amend or by Rule

ML20210F489
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/12/1986
From:	Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC)
To:	Bernero R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20210F497	List: IR 05000293/1986030 ML20210F489 ML20211C003 ML20211C010 ML20211C025 ML20211C047 ML20211K596
References
FOIA-87-10 NUDOCS 8702110091
Download: ML20210F489 (1)

Text

F 8

UNITED STATES

[

7, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 k.....,o 8

December 12, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of BWR Licensing, NRR FROM:

William J. Olmstead Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle, OGC

SUBJECT:

BWR CONTAINMENTS - SEVERE ACCIDENTS Your December 4, 1986 memorandum to the General Counsel requested com-ments on a draft generic letter which proposes BWR containment require-ments.

A number of issues are raised by the draft which require further consideration.

Page 21 of the drcft containment performance analysis suggests there are two possible bases to justify the required containment improvements:

1) they are needed for safety, 2) they are backfits justified by cost-benefit analysis.

~ tion for agency action in order to assure consistency with Severe Accident Policy Statement.

If the basis selected is that the action is necessary to provide " adequate assurance of no undue risk to public health and safety" then generic rule-making is the Commission's preferred method for establishing the new require-ments you identify in the draft generic letter.

While the draft indicates that "these requirements are intended to be an optimized use of existing equip-ment", it also indicates that the equipment changes "are required".

In any event, new requirements must be imposed by a proper legal procedure, namely, by license amendment or by rule.

If the basis selected is that the new requirements will provide a " substantial' increase in l

the overall protection of the public health and safety" then a backfit analysis is required by 10 CFR 50.109 In addition, the severe accident implementation program is proceeding in three distinct steps:

l generic l_e.tter under 50.54(f) which asks for the IPE's, (2) staff review of (1) a the IPE's, and (3) imposition of plant-specific or generic backfits which meet i

the 50.109 criteria.

Your proposal seems to move directly to step three (for Mark I containments),

the Commission's policy statement if this approach is Selected.which may r i

l Mr. William Shields of my staff will be happy to work with your staff to resolve these and other specific comments which he has on your draft.

William J. Olmstead Assistant General Counsel for Rulemaking and Fuel Cycle Office of the General Counsel h38 '8b'M 37 b i // 0o5 /-4 qf-

/

t

EheBoston Gobe Boston. Massachusetts 02107 Te'ephone 617 929-2000 December 29, 1986 Donnie Grimsley, Director FREEDOM OF INFORMArk)n Division of Rules & Records ACT REQUEST U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission "af [ */

Washington, D.C.

20555 q /g/.p Re:

Freedom of Information Act Request

Dear Mr. Grimsley:

Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. 552 et, seq., I hereby request that you provide me with copies of the following documents:

All NRC documents relating to the Public Service Co. of New Hampshire's proposed reduction of the emergency planning zone at Seabrook.

That would include summaries of neetings with the applicant, discussions with Brookhaven National Laboratory on its review of Seabrook studies and other relevant material.

I would also like any documents on changes to containment that NRC is considering for General Electric plants generally, and to Pilgrim and Vermont Yankee in particular.

All documents regarding the inspection of Pilgrim I since its shutdown in April.

In the event that the search and reproduction fees involved in complying with my request do not exceed the sum of $25.00, I would be grateful if you would send me copies of the documents requested along with your statement of search and copying charges.

In the event that those fees do exceed the sum of $25,00, I would be grateful if you would inform me of the total charges in advance of fulfilling my request.

] f,)I O } & ]r

Mr.. Donnie Grimsley December:29, 1986

'Page two.

1 i

4-Thank youjin advance for your anticipated

. cooperation in this matter.

I shall look forward to receiving your response to'this request within 10 days of our receipt of it.

Si cerely, 4

LarryTyb Globe Staff-4 i

k t

S

'b 4

k e

It 1

1

'k

'i' g

t

- r e

)

)

I s

?

s-

.. ~.

p 1986 13:gs enr tory Lv rnsue;1 es;3goux -

e m

~

.'*an

. ~...

3

.*,. e r'; v 14.

50 r... td (Ti$. -sw

• t

.,').r

} r.

3.:

$:I-I*' '

Vermont Yahkee l

MT 95 utsu assa t..

OE MARK I PRESSURE-SUPPkESSION DESIGN

t.. -

..e.

. s s.

g xis",'{v.

.tkynf*

o. s.<

f. sp. ' A.

s,is.$.y, s.-

t y, Jacqueline Coates Vermont Public Interest Research Group

..p~. e., i 43 State Street

~

."4.0 Montpelier, Vermont 85602 802/223-5221 0

i j

.f s....

,e

1 4'

flf,

_.A h<:.:.

7.

g.g.

O t..

s'

~

86/25/1996 13:55 UT DEPT CF ICTmMICLES~

' M2 82B M58 ~ P.s3 m.*f,.fr+*

?one of the 'besic purposes of the primary containamat

. system is to pr. ovide a minimum of one protective barrier

. ~ between the reactor core and the environmental surround-i legs...To fulf(11 its rete as an insurance' barrier, the primary containment is dealgaed to remain intact before.

. during and. subsequent to any desiga basis accident."

ksMt f.14

' Vermont Yankee Techateal'Speciftestions*

a.- 4 4..,

P y n.W

c. :

INTROCOCTION

'.,,})7

.. i."

i

~

The consequences of the disastrous chernobyl nuclear y s...... <, accident in the Soviet Union compelled the Vermont Public

~'

rest Research Group (VPIRG) to examine the capacity of the t.

fNat' Yankee Nedlear Power Plant te ienatata radioactive

' F Imaterial during a serious transient.

The result of WPIhC's study has led to the conclusion that vermont Yankee's General Electric

a Company (GE) designed Mark I pressure-suppression containment system would probably fail in the event of a reactor core melt t

l accident.

O h

BARLY AEC INVESTIGATION OF PRESSURE-SUPPRESSION CONTA!WMENT

• I.

Iri 1971, while Vermont Yankee's operating license was

.2;'p nding', serious ques'tions respecting safety inherent to CE,'s pressure-suppression containment

. (be111Dg water reactor (BWR)

I des _ign were studied within the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).

1ABC staff concluded in a ' Pressure-Suppression Containment *

.,T I report'(Appendix A 2-4) that GE BWR containsent was so inherently :

flawed by safety problems that the AEC should "....' adopt a policy of discouraging further use of pressure-suppression containments, and' that such design not te accepted for constr.uction permits..."

I 5.

g-

o w ises 13157 ~ 'dr DEPT OF fimR i4 HIC 1.ES^~

~

882 8;g d p h

~

(gapha' sis added.)

Af ter weighing safety advantages (none eeu14 '

l he documented) and disadvantages of pressure-suppression,, the -

p.

report's author, Stephen,3. Banauer, stated *...on balance I.

E%

belle've'the disadvantages are proponderaat.*

These ' safety disadvantages

• et concern to ARC r. evolved f

arousdl the small, low pressure rated containments used by CE, and the reel and potential danger of a pressure-suppression systaan e

-: ~f a il ure.

The report also stated that bypass steam leakages, enreliable valves and faulty valve position indicators leading to

nas-pressurisation of the containment and/or a hydrogen Naion could result in containdent f allere.

ABC staf f des s.

M'/hhessed concern that the smaller size of pre'ssure-suppression I

b dta'Insentandthedivisionoftheprimarysystemhadledto

• over-crowding

• and a *1 imitation of access to reactor and primary system components for surveillance and in-service te st ing. "

i C-Pressure-suppression and a small, low pressure rated t

,1 b;

.g containment had been CE's answer to the problem of making BWR's Because

,,no[sically gompetitive.with other reactor types.

,Lling water. reactors contain more energy in the form of hot "

ter and steam than hostinghouse pressurised water reactors

) of the samis megawatt rating, a BWR dry containment design old have to be larger and capable of withstanding higher v..

Wernal pressure than the containment for a PWR of the sama 5

size.

Out this approach would not have been marketable.

Joste'ad, through the use of a design that suppressed the steam 4

e j

..- 40; >

4.m..

t.

g' *.+

Y.,'... ' pressure, ct presented safety and socident data to th d4 1968*s justiiying the use of an economic, small coatatamont hesilt w,

te withstand low internal pressure - all at' a lower 'eost,

• " ' essential to attR marketability.

(Appendia S).

'i In 1971, the ABC

• Pressure-Suppression Containment *. report

(

k

' Staff simultaneously re-evaluated and rejected those ten-year old f.-

p4.' p test results, as *using data f rom testa not oppilcable to 1

• @ accident conditions 5

( Appendix A 2-3)."

In a personal l'nterview

?.

.g' Washington, D.C. on June 6,1986, union of Concerned entists (UCS) senior Weelper Sagineer tobert pe11 erd (the wee

'taf f at AEC in 1971) explaimed ta EPNto that the original N

i;..

ge h 4.,puter codes used by GE in its safety / accident data were scale s

flatied, and f ailed to accurately predict forces on the containment in a pressure-suppression system.

(See page 8-18 of this report.)

on November 9 and December 1, 1971, an AEC Task Force

$t e r

reviewing

• Bypass Ef fects in GE Pressure-Suppression Containment" Q

(Appendix A 5-8) rejected GE's M attion that an accident. is "too a

robable to ' worry about," and. agreed that since small primary

~<a were "rather probable *, the ABC aust *get a commitisent -to

" edy and f1x the problem in whatever way is, found."

Task Force adeords reveal that in response to the comment that 'GR wants us 3,.-

And ACRS not to mention the problem publicly.

They are af raid of. -

,e

.'.. delaying hearings in progress."

The Task Force decision was that.

• u "all safety evaluations issued from now on for plants affected

'"- I will have to discuss the problem.

In any event, this is Y*..

3 I

' ',s,..

2

~

MjfpH

~

. Y?.

g w 5/i m 13:59 U1 EFT CF PCTUt WICLAS M2 SB 3R56 P.h>

~

I' "

}

po'tMt1al ' trouble for the Vermont Tankee and pilgria hearings it

.. 'pwin ma,. to se f..ed.

. re.i.ol. ties fe.w, am,6...

y y

'l w m., -

p za consienten, the emot Peree rooemananded that establimman, a program to resolve the technical question of bypass leakage was necessary.

They decided tes

• 1) Talk to 08.right I

i away... review must include resolution of this problem...

2) tell i

og. Dad applicants that our SE's (safety evaluations) must mention 1 ' '.

[ the problem.

3) Make decision on requirements for... Vermont 2.

..as soon as possible.*

?.e en september 2s,1972. ABC Research Director manauer sent

+

t?

' pressure-suppression research to Joseph M. Wendrie, a senior 7,(

NhNin'ffi'clal and later Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), with a note saying -

"Here is an idea to kick around.

Please let me know your reaction."

(Appendix A 1)

Five days later Hendrie sent a note to AEC Director of

..m..

j

.y Elconsing John F.

O,' Leary (Appendix C 1), saying -

"to ban

$ ;m:gy pressure-suppression containment schemes is an attractive one in

=

have this notable advantage of ways., Dry containments (P$tR) simplicity in dealing with a primary blowdown l

ident)... free of the perils of bypass leakage.

However, the

. tance of pressure-suppression...is firmly imbedded in the

'aventional wisdom.

Reversal of this hallowed policy...could b(1 be the.end of nuclear power.

It would make unlicensable the.

CE... plants now in review, and would generally create mo're turmoil than I can stand to think about."

(Emphasis added.)

.V i13 a

. m....

. * 'N ^;r...

p.

4 s.

...M

.'\\

., _.. _,.. -. - ~ _ _.... -,. _ _

..e_,_,4.,,.,_.,

,,,,,a

f s w ises 14:01 VT DEPT CF PCTUR W4QIS

• ' ' ~ ~ggr gag agg p,y x.gs.

4..

.-. h-b' Leary would later say, "The frequency 'of serious and l

., potentia 11'y estastrophic suele'ar facidents sepperts the aoghalusies that sooner, or later a major diameNr. R11 soeur at a,

YA &w e

I

'i h,f.,,.eer generating foo111ty.

The Istc...has beee eend111ag to i

il

- $ my to the policy commequences of assigning hi$ prehab l ey U

serthus nuclear socident...Seocassive Ceestiastems simply

}

g.-sw.., g...44 accept the posalbility of a mariens accleast as a A leg parameter."

(Appenodia D) 4 e question of pressure-apppression design tafety was

,,c h " potential tr ub1pt M

• 1tja A M,,'. y latas a 8.real soluttes.

h

[ t f':

y jl

'.*gpecifications, Primary coatalement Oktteeterietee4 9

IoactorBlowdown (Appendix page 5.2-1), state att is '

i considered that ci rc um fe rential failure of a recirculation pipe or reactor vessel f ailure of tais magnitude to be of such low to be considered incredible."

peqbability as

1. y

. sNbn!en -

.7.,m -

m AsuuYSIS OF MARK I CONTAllDLEar? INTECRITY l

l reing to OSCks Robert Pollard (6/4/96), any Asc -er asac l

E.

i

,"on pressure-suppression since mandrie's warning "not to roo11," have been, " unrelated to the real problems to small, low pressure rated containment.

These systems

,,ene to bypass steam leakage and are dependent upoa l

vos, valve breakers and position indicators that can and do the If steam bypasses the pressure-suppression scheme, fail.

es Open doors, bad i

gj{fi,hcreasedloadcouldrupturethecontainment.

h.

l A:

5 w

~~ emn, wu vi ei u-m.nw wou.a.,

w e seu w.m u ns e.us q

$N.

YNMe* oracks, stuck valves, had.'6M%Nrmechanteel

', f N

M'

'%u #dits, $r hMan error, can'enke^a pat &Y sypese leakage.

s.

,t d me heals lter saylas the shamese et M laease,ad, r

as og Tieere is as

.e,g-pressurisation leading.to an accident are law.

i;.4c.r,esi

• fin' for this safety problem - It is labarent in 'the

.i

$ 7 's* Iga itself.*

(emphasts added.)

t

! l; eV.\\Ts i

.. d'. 4.,Je11ard mise spoke at length on "amether ma$er disadvantage *

. g

'y-

' pressure-suppression containment

• the risk of a i

r:

an esplosion similar b Chernebyl."

(Chernoby1 was a. Ice m eeston plaat,est in.

..,We

1.,

5%

s.. >. t g_

k I

adustry's desire to

)p,411andag M to i.* *

'drywell altrogen with air prior to abetoote end af ter

~

startup, instead of requiring the plant to remain inert unless completely shutdown.

The introduction of air while the plant is running is extremely dangerous, since the smallest spark can l4f

,' -Ah h of f a hydrogen explosion.

We know that Chernoby1's A

Y.

hdgen explosion occurred as the plant was starting up.*

~

k. - :

I thR Pollard is not alone in his criticisas of Mark c.

"re-suppression.

In ita June 9,1955 issue of Instee astC, tw Elll's opening story was. entitled "Denten Urges Indungry ttle Doubts about Mark 1 Containment.'

(Appendia B) etarold 3-

,' brector of MRC's Of fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

/the U.S. nuclear industry to give top priority to settling

,.c

'ering uncertainties about the ability of GE Mark I containment to withstand a severe core melt accident.

In a 8.kd'

~

' -' g....L.g..

.w ii ad. ~

f ca r e.

r~' s p e-Ylndus'try' leaders at 'en Elect e'aY hower Assearch

'+

g.r J.. a -

a.

, ast 49te opnfarenee, Destoa quete4 NRC's 1974 heecter safaty 3

'(

1499) as[prodleting a 99 poseent paphabitity of'sta'rk 1 unge y.4 to thish serl.=aly== ut' v r

gg,..,,g~ g iatamant ias! ne.

44ty to cope with such an evoet if it were to ecour at y.or f

44 8 Desten said.

(taphasta Added.)

aton stated that questions about Mark 1 containment

,, h gre have taken on new importance following Chernobyl, "and ustry and the WRC should focus en the integrity of Mark I i

, et, rather than merely debatp accident probab.ility.

s #111189 ** 8**c*de tha't M they geoq geopts) j;f.j i

now and them at W.5.' plants...Det they want to haow

't turn into the Chernobyl-type event."

(Sapbasis added.)

Denton concluded by saying that questions of Mark I containment integrity and ways to prevent early containment f ailure due to i

,ever-pressurization should be top NkC priorities.

I.

. b A July 1985 WRC publication, NUREG-8956 " Reassessment of the.

nical Basis for Estimating source Terms" (Appendix F) raises potential accident scenarios for :sia nuclear reactor i

i

?

The report's findings en Mark I pressure-suppresalon l

ta'1 ament conf Arm that pollard's and Denton's concerns are well 4*

od and provide an invaluable background for evaluating

'nt Yankee's containment and Vermont's evacuation Iplan.

,- Vermont Yankee's primary containment is camposed of steel th reinforced concrete, according to its engineering

., Specifications (Appendix G). "The drywell is dest'gned for an i

y.'.

Q w(

7 i

ic l

6:':Q&i.

a S

r.

s e lgeb 14:26 VT DE OF PCTIR W41Q.ES 952 828 asOS P.

6 1

-a.,.-

atarma'l pressure of 62 peig ipressure ag.. 3uare inch genge) gu.

.,,y...

inaldent. with a temperature of 241 degrees F, plus the dead, l

A..

s

%., ? 9{ ghlisi['and seismic leada imposed on the abell.

Thus, in mooerganae M

..the ASAS 54PV Code, Seetten Ilke 'the drywell design pressure

.7 f.

'ps ig.

Thermal stress in the ate,e1 shell due to temposature en

-4.

.g ents are taken into account la the design.*

Adding 14.7 to g to get the absolute pressure, Vermont Yankee has a psia i

sure square inch absolute) of 78.7.

The speci-fications b

ate (page 5.2-19) that during a recirculation line break, ression chamber water temper 4tque will approach 147

,.mbd the maximum prigy Mt4(mment syh.am pressure..N..r

~

i 3

t a bout 43 5 pe ig... S t r e am flew wo uld be neg 11ble..."

,i*fl

?

Yankee calculates "a peak accident pressure of 44 peig'

. 'J' i (54 7 psia).

The plant's secondary containment consists of a reactor building with little or no pressure or heat resistance.

q According to NRC documents supplied to Congress by NRC i

sy.

AWh issioner James Asselstine (Appendia N), Chernobyl had two concrete catainments within the reactor building, an inner Ith six-inch diameter pipes at a. pressure of 27 peig and an ene at $7 psig with threeJfoot diameter,plylag.

UR8G-9956 results indicate that because of the relatively tgas volume in the Mark I design in comparison to all.other naents, non-condensible pres.sures build rapidly.

(page x.

)

The study estimates that' internal pressure on containment

.,'ari accident will reach 132 psia within 4e minutes to two urs.

The report speculates, however, that significant leaks i.

1..

s

. in.l,4. '..

=

sd

. - _ _ _ - - - _, _ _. - - _ ~.. _. _

~

~

VT DEFT CF MTUR \\EHIO.25 0B2 838 3E58 P.11 a w iset 14:06

)

velop over the 5 tp.117 pela pressure range...such t,het g,..,..;g e Mtrophie failure might be prevented...'

I

'i s,..

p 4g S e dry well atasaphore was solemlated to beat briefly gp' 6.5 Se'Q%,_.,rene er 65s degrees se ese deersos e and settle down ta

)

~,

e,et Ses degrees ta 788 degresa for the moet part... Mart 3

e.

are within the first few hours following oore melt.would

i' "il

..-- 1%

-t rather likely.*

(NURSC-4954 page C.1-12) tM

, mark I releases are numerically higher than those in the r saf ety study...due largely to the indicated early t f atiste and the Mbeequent rolesse of large s.'

les '(of radIatieafd.uW 'thF haet 1 a' M4 ant se(seesee C -

e l

k

^

assumed bypass of the reactor building when the dry well (NUREG-8956 page 8-4)

'In all three accident sequences analyzed (including a recirculation line break), Mark I containment failed due to over-e,sur i sa tion. " (NUREG-8956 page 4-6)

% \\ '.

..p.,5be source term study, which was completed more than a q.,'

,.r ~

af ter the relea'se of, the Reactor Safety Study, provides le indicating that Mark I, eentainment,f ailure is more te occur at the knuckle hf' the dry well and at a lower ute than previously believed. ' 'As a result, it is expected

'11owing containment f ailure, any release of fission ts...will escape from, the primary containment without og through the suppression pool.

Me predicted

'[

(lsk...is...very sensitive to the timing of containment failure the subsequent capability of the surrounding reactor building

.]

7j{-

s.. 3 e n.

y k.i: r.1 a

.. ~

emisa i o err vT mr1 m mTta usH1cus

~ anz eras M p ta 5

')

.e,-

-~

m..

<*.. t

.; - 3

..-r.

~.

.,- r e.

s.,

,1m a9d suppress the risa. lea, product rakease to the C

at.*

(NUAE04pH page D-25)

The stiedy also states. the

. s h.. g.

e'

,e

, perd' design ratings of several.edd1tional oantainment-related q

• , ts under aseident aseditions.

(Appendia F)'

21, IMS, Rhc Commissioner James AssMa$1me addressed

. talament safety and accident eenceras la a statement p.5. :Subeceusittee en Energy Conservation and Power x I).

Commissioner Asselstine faulted the NRC for "the broader lessons of the Chernobyl accident for fety in tha W.S.&..hav41mg) to de with the Q ef tore'malf

• ~a'oeidents and the adequactai Maid I fo'rts to prever$t such accidents and to minimise their 3

nces should one occur.'

He outlined three ' inescapable conclusions regarding the risk of core meltdown in the U.S.*:

t

)

An accident can be expected in this country within 26 unless further steps are taken to effectively account for performance, external accident initiators and t he degraded of plant systems and components in the present risk "As the commissioUs chief safety officer acted ts.

y, serious operating events illustrate that in the real

,Isystem and component reliabilities can degrade below V...assum(ed) in estimating core melt frequencies."

i..'3)

There are nuclear plant accident sequences that can 3ead t-depture or containment bypass.

...our reactors were not ned for large-scale core meltdown accidents.

Because such

^

(

~

~

is

$ ?4-Q i

L m

I e V S 1986 14:09 UT IET CF QM9 U3 bgg

'C 3 3 g p,b 7

i

~

c..:

c.

y n-

..y. -r m..y..ve.n.

, g' 7

dents wars assumed to, be se unlikely as be.be leeredible, 4

s f ;,.

gy.

t s

l 1

+<.r iheir eere sudsee se he ske.14e et the seassa has s er p ants.

D M %.6enee e.this p umptre. 1..that s.s. e 2

.. *

• P.4 -

c. *-

+

i ta mere sentenes to withstmas me rupter..c a Aar, s.s.

~ pe but not designed to withstame 1 erg-creta esee e

i

..,uns.*

(Esphasta added.)

"" k' The extent to which c.5. containments can withstand such i

l

' s depends upon the sequence of events, the individual sign (*each design has its own eore melt 4

l

,7 Atiad.) and the essy the plank &ag operagtad and j.

,.y

~

.. y;4...

' m.

3.5. reas44ts "qd ' tot 4$!skt%Gy 44th.' **She <

.g. g Ime is 'that, gitem the present level of safety being i l

by the operating nuclear power plaats in this oeustry,

- t-i i

h t 20

. que can expect to see a core meltdown accident w th n t e nex s

l j

^

years and it is possible that such an accident could result in

\\

i.

-site release of radiation which are as large as, or larger 1

the releases estimated to have occurred at chernobyl."

~

sis added.)

e *1essons of Chernobyl are simple and straightforward.

he oncertainties and plant perfo'rmance,.the occurrence of i

' e core meltdown accident over the next 28 years is t

o

\\

table.

That was the judgement of the President's l

'ston on the three Mile Island accident six years ago, and -

5!

We should return to the safety en less true today."

lr ilosophy of the Kemeny Commission "to pursue all practical aures bot.h to prevent and minimize accidents."

This safety

^'

C.

gg KrM..

Md..

_hr.

.Y 9.*

--.-r.,,,.

-.-----,-r,

~

~

a w asub a4:ae vigwy97 m mis ge o p,g

., 9

.a

,,. f:.

o 3..,.

p.,y q.

,1s fun asen at lly "At odds,with the pesalen ier p

d W/

' atton that bas 'been sweeping the suolaar ladustry and the 4

4s Een e>ver the peat.two years.*

p.

t,;

.J k*

s I

l r

, is the ineseapable conclusion of this report that Vermont a containment design will provide little or no protection j.4nuclearaceldent.

En fact, the pressure-suppression ett Laeresses the prebability of containmaat failure 1eakage reamittag 46,or-pressarianties.

,A.

l r

a n. v-N.3

/A

+

l

?g?

.asl A*

(

[

r s

.t s

A F

8 s:s

.2

. t..

,e l

l s

i

• 0

.1 Y

~

~

12

., t.

l p' -

l 3

I l

em gern co m t.,:

, y.. gg

• g

,,4.

se

.',~

~

sesnoix gn, 3

aneigy' 4ammission (Aac) mete'tren stephes aanaus r (9/2s/73)....................s.. A.t.

.m easmee-8uppteaaion containoent* report...........i..A 2-4'

. Forceimaview on *Dypass Ef fect in SE Pressure-suppression containment reeerds 11/9/71 and 12/1/71)...........................,.....A.5 S 74

'0 '

' Sa f Vol. 15, 800. 2, March-April 1974,

,ons and Current Status.of the MEL Lament System *, G. 5. Made,, Magnager of.

esic Power Equipment Se

.............. g.. S Joseph M. Rendrie to John 'F.

0,' Leary (9/25/727...C e.

th censored portiona as first received 9C8................................'.................C 2 ?

s' 7

Lehter f rom John O' Leary to Carter-Mondale l

0 Policy Planning (11/1/76).............................D

, r,T.

'Inside NRC, Vol. 8, No. 12, June 9,

1986, "Denton Urges Industry to Settle Doubts

,y

.;pbout Mark 1 Containment", pag e 14 3................... E 1.M hasessment of the Technical Bassa for timating Source Te rms," NUREG-8 9 5 6, J uly 19 8 5.......F

"* 1ankee Technical 8pecificationa....................G spec 1fleatione satanitted to Coagreas 87..

WRC Comm i s si one r James Asse1 st i ne.................. N e

instoner, James Asselstine's speech before Bubcommittee on Energy Conservation Power (5/22/86).........................

.........I t

'k A.

g.,

e I

it TDTAL P.15 l

i

---

r

--