ML20210C235

Supplemental Annual Operating Rept,New Procedures & Procedure Changes,Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant,1985

ML20210C235
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	12/31/1985
From:	Gridley R TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
NUDOCS 8705060122
Download: ML20210C235 (4)

Text

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, ENCLOSURE l SUPPLEMENTAL ANNUAL OPERATINC REPORT NEW PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURE CHANCES

, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT (BFN)

~ JANUARY 1, 1985'- DECEMBER 31, 1985

- During 1985, various procedures as described in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) were drafted or revised. These changes were reviewed against 10 CFR

- 50.59, and no procedures were initiated that constituted an unreviewed. safety question (USQ). A brief description and safety evaluation summary is~given

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for the following procedures which affected details of the SAR.

I. -Procedure Change. 0I-32. Control Air

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A. Description of Activity - Revise OI-32 for units 1 & 2 to change valve position of HCV-32-576C, HCV-32-577C, and HCV-32-2385 from closed ~to open for normal operation. These valves allow bypass flow around FCV-32-29 -28, & -91, respectively.

B. References - TVA Drawings 47W847-6 & 47W847-7, OI-32, FSAR sections 10.14 (Control Air) & 5.3 (Secondary Containment),-technical specification section 4.7.c.

C. Reason for Activity - Malfunctioning of Air-operated Control Air Isolation Valves (FCV-32-29, -28, & -91) causes loss of control air to reactor building. This change will allow for uninterrupted control air supply.

D. Unreviewed Safety Question Determination

1. Is the probability of occurrence.or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment import' ant to safety previously evaluated on the Safety Analysis Report increased?

Yes No X Leaving these valves open will not allow for secondary containment isolation in the event of a control air line break.

However, these control air lines are not of sufficient flow area to compromise secondary containment integrity as shown by a I separate analysis.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different

! type than any evaluated previously in the Eafety Analysis Report

! created? I l Yes No X -

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This change will affect secondary containment only, and this' effect has been analyzed.

l- 3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any-g Technical Specification reduced?

Yes No X i- ' Standby Gas Treatment' System will still be-capable of.

maintaining the Reactor Building at -1/4 inch water gauge. vacuum' with less than 12,000 cfm total leakage.

II. procedure Chanze SI4.7.B (now 4.7.B.1. 4.7.B.7.'and 4.7.B.10). Standby i . Gas Treatment System ~(SGTS) '

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1. 1 1. . Description of Activity ,

4-s- . -

Removal of requirement for SGTS charcoal filter heaters. -

4 B. References i

Nemorandum from N. R. Beasley to G. R. Hall on Standby Gas Treatment System: charcoal filter heaters.

C. Reason for Activity i

Heaters are to be permanently removed from SGTS design. This is a temporary measure until DCR and technical specification change can be processed.

D. Unreviewed Safety Ouestion Determination a

1. Is the probability of an occurrence or the consequences of an 4

accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previcusly evaluated on the Safety Analysis Report increased?

Yes r- X

-t Co:.sistent with paragraph 3.4.d of Regulatory Guide 1.62 R1-1978  !

and paragraph 2.2.3 of ERDA 76-2, each train is operated 10 i

hours per month to control moisture buildup on the absorber bed (technical specification 4.7.2.d). This is sufficient to ensure-

moisture will not accumulate on charcoal filters; and, therefore, there is no increase in probability or consequences j of an accident previously analyzed.

2. Is the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different A

type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report created?

Yes No X I

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A Since they will effectively no longer exist,~ charcoal filter heaters will not increase the probability of any unanalyzed accident.

3. Is the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical specification reduced?

Yes No X This alteration will not affect the operability of any SGTS trains, so that the safety margin will not be reduced. _

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, ~ ,, E TENNESSEE VALLEY: AUTHORITY.. -

CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 SE 157' Lookout ~ Place MAY 011987 10 CFR 50.59 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cosunission ATTN: -Document Control Desk

- Washington, D.C. 20555

. Gentlemen:

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-259 Tennessee: Valley Authority _) 50-260-50-296 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT - SUPPLEMENTAL ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT -

JANUARY 1.-1985, TO DECEMBER 31, 1985, BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 . DOCKETS NOS 50-259, 50-260, 50-296 - OPERATING LICENSES DPR-33, DPR-52, AND DPR-68 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59, the enclosed supplement to the annual; operating report for Browns Ferry units 1, 2, and 3 is. submitted.to report changes to procedures as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

, I-R.Grdiey,.Dir]ctor Nuclear Safety innd Licensing .

Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

Mr. G. G. Zech, Assistant Director Regional Inspections Division of TVA Projects Office of Special Projects U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission Region II 101 Marietta St., NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Browns Ferry Resident Inspector Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant P.O. Box 311 Athens, Alabama 35611 fcA1 F *[

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l An Equal Opportunity Employer

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