ML20210C177
| ML20210C177 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/28/1987 |
| From: | Barth C, Berry G, Johnson G NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3314 CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8705060102 | |
| Download: ML20210C177 (17) | |
Text
]NY EUATED % g April 28,1987 DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR EEGULATORY COMMISSION
~87 MAY -4 A10 :51 BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE Q F,r g ^[ '
un In the Matter of
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Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
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(Civil Penalty)
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License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
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NRC STAFF FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. I 2.742, the NRC Staff requests GPU Nuclear Corporation, within ten (10) days after service of this request, to make the following ~ admissions for the - purpose of this proceeding only and subject to all pertinent objections to admissibility which may be interposed at hearing:
1.
That during 1980-81 Richard Parks was employed by the NUS Corporation as senior shift test engineer for construction, testing, and operation of the submerged demineralizer system installed at TMI-2, 2.
That Richard Parks was employed by Bechtel, Power Corporation (Bechtel) in May,1982 and assigned to the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 site.,s (TMI-2).
3.
That during these periods the aforesaid, Mr. Parks helped develop and implement the startup and test program for TMI-2 recovery.
4.
That in September 1982, an integrated organization, composed of Bechtel and General Public Utilities-Nuclear Division (GPUN) employees was formed at TMI-2 to continue.the task of clean-up after the 1979 accident at the site.
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5.
That a primary factor for the reorganization was to improve the poor morale of Bechtel and GPUN employees at TMI-2.
6.
That the integrated organization at TMI-2 consisted of five divisions, two of which were Recovery Operations (RO) and Site Operations (SO).
7.
That RO consisted primarily of Bechtel employees and SO consisted primarily of GPU or GPUN employees.
8.
That. the integrated organization at TMI-2 was directed by Robert C.
Arnold, President of GPUN; Bahman K.
Kanga, a Bechtel employee, who was Director of TMI-2; and John J.
B arton, a GPUN employee who was Deputy Director of TMI-2.
a.
That Mr. Barton had no responsibilities other than those delegated him by Mr. Kanga.
b.
That the Director of TMI-2 was responsible for supervising day-to-day operations at TMI-2.
9.
That Richard Parks was a senior start-up and test engineer in the Site Operations (SO) division at TMI-2 from May 1982 to March 1983.
10.
That during the period May 1982-February 1983 Mr. Parks " :
reported to the Manager of Plant Operations, Joseph J. Chwastyk, and to the Director of Site Operations, Lawrence P. King.
11.
That Mr. Parks' responsibilities included liaison with NRC, engineering groups, and plant staff; oversight and review of modifications to the plant to assure compliance with applicable standards,
NRC regulations, and internal procedur'es, and to develop new procedures.
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l.
12.
That Bir. Parks' only performance appraisal with respect to his job performance at TBfI-2 during 1982-1983 establishes that he met or exceeded all applicable job requirements.
- 13. That from December 6, 1982 until February 18, 1983, Richard Parks, alternate Startup and Test Supervisor, was a member of the Test Working Group (TWG), serving as alternate to the Chairman of the TWG, Edward Kitler, who represented the Startup and Test group described in AP 1047, Section 2.4.
14.
That AP 1047, Sections 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5 prescribed that other TWG members represent plant operations, plant engineering, recovery engineering and quality assurance.
15.
That no document was generated by GPU or Bechtel memorializ-ing Mr. Parks' appointment as alternate Startup & Test Supervisor and alternate start-up and test representative to the TWG.
16.
That no procedure required the appointment of any person to the TWG to be memorialized in writing.
17.
That between October 1981 and February 18, 1983, ~ several membership positions in the ""VG were vacant for substantial periods ' of "-
time.
18.
That during the period from September 1982 until February 18, 1983, procedures required by AP 1047 to be reviewed by the TWG were reviewed by representatives of departments familiar with the particular testing, rather than by a specific TWG member.
- 19. That RO, directed by James W.
Thiesing, was given the responsibility for refurbishment of the containment polar crane which was damaged during the accident at TBff-2.
20.
That SO had primary responsibility for activities at TMI-2 which had potential for affecting public health and safety, or leading to radiation releases.
21.
That in performing its assigned responsibilities, SO was required to review for approval procedures written by RO.
22.
That SO had review functions with respect to the functional description of the refurbishment and testing of the containment polar crane, and for the review of the SER for requalification of the crane.
23.
That, during 1982-1983, the review groups formed at TMI-2 were:
a.
Test Working Group (TWG), which was to review all construc-i tion test and modification procedures to ensure compliance with all legal requirements, each member of which must satisfy the requirements of ANSI N45.2.6, the professional standard for test personnel qualifications; b.
Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC), which advised SO regarding safety-related engineering change memoranda (ECM), which were reviewed for compliance with technical specifications and NRC regulations.
The members were primarily members of SO, who served qq.s the committee in addition to other assignments.
c.
Safety Review Group (SRG), composed of full time members of SO, designated to take over the duties of PORC, which was to be abolished, d.
General Office Review Board (GORB),
composed of GPU corporate personnel who advised GP,UN President Arnold; e.
Safety Advisory Board (SAB), composed of outside consultants who gave advice on all activities at TMI-2.
t
f.
Technical Advisory and Assistance Group (TAAG), composed of outside consultants who gave advice on the removal of radioactivity from the site; g.
Readiness Review Committee (RRC), a group of senior level employees, convened on March 12, 1983 to review the status of the polar crane requalification program.
h.
Generation Review Committee (GRC), composed of 5 members of GPU or outside consultants who reviewed and audited safety evaluations of significant activities; violations of codes or regulations; operating abnormalities; and reports of PORC.
24.
That during the 1982-1983 refurbishment of the polar crane, the load test frame was assembled and welded inside the containment building.
25.
That the polar crane was to be used to remove the head of the reactor vessel during clean-up.
26.
That the polar crane at TMI-2 had not been load tested prior to March 1,1983.
27.
That by memorandum to John Barton dated, January 20, 1983, Lawrence King, the Director of SO, acknowledged Barton's directive to %
SO that the polar crane refurbishment was the sole responsibility of Bechtel in RO and that SO was not to be involved in the refurbishment.
28.
That by internal memorandum #4240-83-111, dated February 10, 1983, the manager of site engineering, Edwin Gischel, stated that the polar crane safety evaluation was technically unacceptable.
29.
That on or about February 14, 1983 the Director of SO (King) and the manager of site engineering (Gischel) sent a memorandum
k 6-(#42140-83-138) to the Director of RO expressing disagreement with the polar crane Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
- 30. That the document referenced in Admission 29 is genuine.
- 31. That Mr. Barton received the document referenced in Admission 29.
32.
That on February 16, 1983, NRC representative Lake Barrett advised TMI-2 Director Kanga that the quality of proce'dures at TMI-2 was decreasing due.to the long-standing conflicts and poor coordination among GPU departments.
33.
That on February 17, 1983, after being assigned the review of
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the polar crane load test procedure, Richard Parks submitted written comments on the polar crane load test to the Polar Crane Task Force leader (WWI-4370-3891-83-PC 01), stating that; (a) the proposed crane load test constituted an unreviewed safety question; (b) the load test must be approved by TWG; (c) the test procedure did not conform to site procedure AP 1047; (d) the load test procedure was a functional test and should* be -%
performed after turnover of the crane to plant staff after approval by TWG and PORC; (e) the crane tests performed by RO did not comply with the requirements of site procedures AP 1043 and AP 1047; (f) and the sign-off of the test was not done by a qualified start-up and test engineer as required by AP 1047.
- 34. That the documents described in Admission 33 are genuine.
35.
That the documents described in Admission-33 were received by j
Mr. Kanga and Mr. Barton.
36.
That the alternate Startup & Test Supervisor is, by virtue of his position, a member of the TWG.
37.
That Mr. Parks' appointment as alternate Startup & Test Manager did not violate any procedural requirement.
38.
That Mr. Kitler's appointment of Dwight Walker as alternate Startup & Test member of the TWG was not necessary to correct a viola-tion of AP 1047 or any other applicable procedural requirement.
39.
That prior to February 19, 1983, Mr. Kitler had no prior knowledge that Mr. King would appoint Mr. Parks to be primary SO rept esentative to the TWG.
40.
That no quality deficiency report (QDR) or other report was ever generated documenting a violation of AP 1047 resulting from Mr. Parks' designation as alternate Startup & Test representative to the TWG.
41.
That no internal office memorandum or other TMI-2 document was generated prior to March 23, 1983, which required or justified .
Mr. Parks' replacement as alternate Startup & Test representative to the TWG to remedy the effects of a violation of AP 1047.
I 42.
That Mr. Parks was never informed in writing that he was removed as an alternative startup and test representative to the TWG, 43.
That prior to February 24, 1983 Mr. Kitler never informed l
Mr. Parks that he was being replaced as alternate Startup & Test
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i Supervisor or Startup & Test representative to the TWG.
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44.
That on February 18, 1983, Mr. Kitler told Mr. Parks that "everyone is ' pissed off' at you and you're being uncooperative," and j
that " people are even talking about transferring you."
45.
That Mr. Kitler's comment quoted in Admission 44 was based, in part, on comments he heard from Thomas E. Morris, a Bechtel employee.
46.
That on February 18,
- 1983, Richard Parks advised NRC representatives at TMI-2 of his fear of reprisal from TMI-2 management due to his coraplaints about the polar crane load test procedures.
47.
That during a meeting on February 23, 1983, to discuss objections to the polar crane
- program, attended by Mr. Kanga, Mr. Barton, Mr. Thiesing, Ron Freemerman (RO), Mr. Kitler, Michael Radbill (Polar Crane Task Group leader), Mr. King, Joseph Chwastyk, Blaine Ballard (Manager of QA), Mr. Parks and others, Mr. Parks repeated his view that AP 1043 and 1047 were applicable with respect to the refurbishment of the polar crane.
48.
That AP 1043 and AP 1047 were the appropriate procedures to be followed in requalifying the polar crane.
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49.
That Bechtel and GPU Nuclear Corporation were not, at ' the ,
time Mr. Parks first raised the comments enumerated in Admission 33, complying with the requirements of AP 1043 and AP 1047, with respect to approval of procedures for the polar crane.
50.
That resolution of Mr. Parks'
- comments, and subsequent revision of the polar crane load test procedure to comply with AP 1043 and AP 1047 had the effect of delaying completion of procedures required for testing the polar crane.
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51.
That during a February 23, 1983 meeting concerning the polar crane, Mr. Thiesing orally informed Mr. Parks that he had been removed from his position as alternate Startup & Test representative to the TWG.
52.
That at the time of Mr. Parks removal as alternate Startup and Test Supervisor in February 1983, the TWG had not met since October, 1981.
53.
That on February 24, 1983, Mr. Parks was appointed to TWG as the primary SO. representative by SO Director King.
54.
That on February 24,
- 1983, Mr. Parks issued a " Problem Report" describing procedural violations in the polar crane program.
55.
That on February 24, 1983, NRC representatives met with GPUN to discuss the poor quality of procedures submitted for the reactor coolant depressurization system.
- 56. That on February 25,
- 1983, Mr.
Parks met with NRC representatives, Joel Weibe and Lake Barrett, to discuss his concerns about the polar crane.
- 57. That on February 25, 1983, NRC representative Bariett met with Mr. Kanga and Mr. Barton and informed them that TMI-2 employees '-,,
were upset and perceived that reprisals would be taken if they raised safety concerns.
58.
That, on the same occasion as recounted in Admission 57, Mr. Barrett advised Mr. Kanga that the schedule was being pushed too hard, and that the continuing GPUN/Bechtel, operations / engineering animosities were a big problem onsite.
59.
That Mr. Chwastyk was appointed acting Director of SO on February 25, 1983.
60.
That on February "6,1983, Mr. Arnold directed formation of a Readiness Review Committee to review the polar crane.
61.
That on February 28, 1983, the February 17, 1983 comments by Mr. Parks were rejected in a written response by the polar crane task group on the grounds that; (a) the SER for the polar crane refurbishment concluded that the cranc load test was not an unreviewed safety question; (b) AP 1047 did not apply to construction tests; and that (c) the load test procedure was reviewed and approved by plant operation, PORC, QA, and Site Engineering.
62.
That during a meeting on February 28, 1986, to discuss the polar crane, Mr. Parks criticized the SER for the polar crane.
63.
That on March 1, 1983, Mr. Parks and Mr. Chwastyk sent a written rebuttal to the polar crane task group by internal memorandum
- 4200-83-102 in which they stated that SO would not approve the polar crane load test procedure until the concerns over the requirements of AP 1047 were resolved.
64.
That on March 1, 1983, Mr. Parks and Mr. Chwastyk issued %
internal memorandum 4200-83-105 in which they repeated their view that the requirements of AP 1043 and 1047 must be followed for the polar crane, which view, they stated, was shared by the QA group.
In the memorandum they offered four suggestions to resolve the issue.
65.
That the document referred to in Admission 64 is genuine and admissible.
66.
That on March 1, 1983, Mr. Parks issued " Problem Report" addressing PORC's approval of the polar crane no-load operational test without compliance with AP 1043 and 1047.
67.
That on March 3, 1983, Mr. Parks raised a question of the safety of the polar crane cable during a meeting held to discuss presentation of polar crane matters to the RRC formed on February 26, 1983.
ES.
That on March 4, 1983, a TWG meeting was held to discuss polar cranc procedures.
The QA representative listed 5 modifications to the crane which were not performed in accordance with AP 1043.
During this meeting Mr. Parks raised questions of the functioning of the limit switches on the crane, the proposal to use the crane without a load test, and the proposed use of dummy switches.
69.
That on March 8, 1983, Quality Deficiency Report (QDR-CHK-011-83) was issued on the polar crane for failure to follow AP 1043 and AP 1047, 70.
That on March 9, 1983, Lawrence King was, questioned at the TMI-2 site by Robert Arnold concerning the Quiltec company and %
involvement of TMI-2 employees in the company.
71.
That during the March 9 questioning of Mr. King, Mr. Arnold inquired as to Mr. Parks' knowledge about Quiltec.
72.
That a memorandum dated March 10, 1983, (6110-83-046) from the manager of quality assurance (Dallard) to RO director Theising, listed 11 deficiencies in the polar crane re.furbishment program.
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73.
That on March 10, 1983, the NRC Deputy Program Director, TMI Program Office, sent a note to J. Larson, GPUN, disapproving the polar crane recovery operations procedure No. 400--IMP-3891 (Rev. 0).
74.
That on March 10, 1987, Mr. Chwastyk advised Mr. Parks that Mr. Barton was aware that Mr. Parks had met with NRC representatives.
75.
That Mr. Barton does not deny that he asked Mr. Chwastyk why Mr. Parks had met with NRC officials.
76.
That. on March 14,
- 1983, Mr. Parks was questioned in Gaithersburg, Maryland for 3-4 hours about the Quiltec company by Bechtel internal auditor, H. Lee Hofmann, from Bechtel's corporate office
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in San Francisco, California, and Richard
- Wheeler, Mr. Parks' administrative supervisor.
77.
That Mr. Parks explained to Messrs. Wheeler and Hofmann his only association with Quiltec was to obtain some non-working-hours typing by an onsite Dechtel secretary.
78.
That neither Mr. Hofmann, Mr. Wheeler, nor anyone else affiliated with Bechtel or GPUN substantiated that Mr. Parks' held a proprietary, pecuniary, or professional interest in Quiltec or that he had ~
s any association with Quiltec other than arranging the typing referred to in the preceding admission.
79.
That on March 15,
- 1983, Mr. Parks met with Charles W.
Sanford, Vice President of Bechtel, and Messrs. Wheeler and Iloffman to discuss his safety and intimidation concerns.
80.
That Mr. Sanford informed Mr. Parks that his actions constituted a fairly serious violation of Bechtel policy and that, as a result, Mr. Parks might be terminated.
81.
That on March 16, 1983, Mr. Parks sent a letter through Mr. Kanga to Mr. Sanford offering to revise his safety concerns upon provision of an adequate technical explanation, and repeating. his prior assurance that he was in no way associated with the Quiltec company.
82.
That in the morning of March 17, 1983, Mr. Parks met with Mr. Kanga for approximately two hours to discuss the concerns contained in a letter of March 16, 1983 addressed to Mr. Sanford.
83.
That, in the early afternoon of March 17, 1983, Mr. Parks met with Mr. Chwastyk to discuss his continuing concerns with respect to compliance with administrative procedures applicable to the polar crane
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load test.
- 84. That in the afternoon of March 17, 1933, Mr. Parks was shown memorandum #4200-83-147 written by Mr. Chwastyk with Mr. Kanga's approval, which removed Mr. Parks as the SO representative from the TWG for purposes of polar crane review.
85.
That at the March 17, 1983 meeting with Messrs. Kanga and Chwastyk, Mr. Parks was asked if he agreed that his removal as primary SO representative to the TWO for the polar crane review was not ^-.
retaliatory, but neither Mr. Kanga nor Mr. Chwastyk heard Mr, Parks say, expressly, that he agreed voluntarily to being removed from the TWG or that such removal was not retaliatory.
86.
That the document referred to in Admission 84 is genuine.
- 87. That in a March 21, 1983, response to the QDR on the polar crane, Mr. Thiesing stated AP-1043' and 1047 would be used in all future modifications and related testing; and that personnel in RO would be trained in the procedures.
88.
That on March 23, 1983, Mr. Parks held a news conference concerning his safety concerns at TMI-2, and filed a complaint with the Department of Labor pursuant to Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act.
89.
That federal law protects an employee who institutes a proceeding or brings to the NRC's attention safety concerns about
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cetivities governed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, from discriminatory action.
90.
That an employee who raises concerns of the type described in Admission 89 at a news conference is engaging in activity protected by federal law.
- 91. That 10 C.F.R. 5 50.7 does not limit its protection only to employees whose safety concerns are proven valid.
92.
That on March 24, 1983, Mr. Parks was suspended with pay by Bechtel and prevented from returning thereafter to the TMI-2 site.
93.
That at a meeting held on March 23, 1983, Mr. Kanga stated that Richard Parks could not be fired at that time because Mr'. Parks' conduct was protected by the Atomic Energy Act.
- 94. At the meeting referred to in Admission 93, Mr. Kanga stated that Mr. Parks could be transferred or put on leave of absence and then gotten rid of " quietly."
95.
That at the March 23, 1983 meeting:
(a) Mr. Darton said Mr. Parks should be fired.
(b) Mr. Barton said Mr. Parks should not be let back on site.
(c) Mr. Arnold told Mr. Barton to conduct an investigation regarding the " mystery man" on March 23, 1983, t
- 96. That neither Pfr. Arnold, nor any other person acting on his behalf, conducted an investigation to determine whether Mr. Parks had "pcisoned" his working environment so as to warrant barring Mr. Parks from returning to the site.
97.
That prior to March 24, 1983, no investigation by any Bechtel i
or GPU Nuclear employee was conducted to determine whether the working environment at TMI-2 would deteriorate if Mr. Parks returned to the site.
98.
That no unsatisfactory work performance appraisals were made regarding the work performed by Mr. Parks during 1982-83 at the TMI-2 site.
- 99. That during his employment at TMI-2 as a Bechtel employee Mr. Parks' professional work had been competently done.
100. That Mr. Parks' concerns regarding the polar crane refurbishment program ultimately proved to be substantially correct.
101. That on April 7, 1983, the NRC TMI-2 program office sent a notice of disapproval of the polar crane test procedure, 4370-3891-83-PCI to GPU.
102. Thet certain Dechtel employees, including TMI-2 Director ~
Kanga, refused to swear to the truth of statements made by them to a representative of the United States Department of Labor (DOL) in connection with the DOL investigation of a complaint filed by Mr. Parks charging Bechtel with violations of the employee protection provision of the Atomic Energy Act.
103. That Bechtel did discriminate against Mr. Parks for raising safety concerns.
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104. That GPUN did discriminate against Mr. Parks for raising safety concerns.
105. That on July 25, 1983, Mr. Parks and Bechtel reached an extra-judicial settlement and the DOL complaint was dismissed.
106. That pursuant to the settlement agreement, Mr. Parks was transferred to Bechtel offices in Daggett, California in August, 1983.
107. That on February 3,1984, Richard Parks was fired by Bechtel.
Re e tfully submitted, ti l N
es A,B
'th bbre Gregor 3erry situ $ '
rge F. Jo son Counsel for C Staff Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 28th day of April,1987 I
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DGLKEIEP U%PC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'87 MAY -4 A10 31 BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE OFFICE Ur im as y 00CKETING 3. *:E W vict BRANCH In the Matter of
)
)
Docket No.
50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION
)
(Civil Penalty)
)
License No. DPR-73 (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station
)
EA 84-137 Unit No. 2)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF FIRST REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class,
or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, this 28th day of April,1987.
- Ivan W. Smith, Esq.
Ernest L. Blake, Jr.
Administrative Law Judge Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 2300 N Street, NW U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20037 Washington, DC 20555
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Steven L. Hock, Esq.
Appeal Board Thelen, Marrin, Johnson,_ Bridges U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2 Embarcadero Center Washington, DC 20555 San Francisco, CA 94111
-~s..
- Docketing and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 O
W Y
bMAO' Gregory AlarT B' trl*y Counsel for NHQ Staff
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