ML20210C094
| ML20210C094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1987 |
| From: | Zahnleuter R NEW YORK, STATE OF |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210C056 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-3, NUDOCS 8705060079 | |
| Download: ML20210C094 (23) | |
Text
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00CMETED llSNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 57 MNf -1 A10:15 Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board crre
-re-LJ,
)
In the Matter of
)
)
Long Island Lighting Company
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
I THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONSE TO THE LILCO NOTION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF DAVID T.
HARTGEN AND ROBERT C. MILLSPAUGH INTRODUCTION On April 13, 1987, the State of New York (the " State")
submitted the testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C.
Millspaugh ("Hartgen Testimony") on the site circulation and traffic problems which will arise in and around LILCO's reception centers in the event of a Shoreham accident.
On April 18, 1987, LILCO filed a Motion to Strike Testimony of David T. Hartgen and Robert C. Millspaugh (" Motion To Strike"), in which LILCO asserts that portions of the Hartgen testimony should be excluded because the Hartgen Testimony (1) attempts to expand to EPZ out to 40 miles from the plant; (2) uses population projections in its analysis; (3) makes assumptions concerning shadow phenomenon and (4) allegedly addresses other issues, such as road construction, which have already been decided.
LILCO's motion ignores the issues identified by the Board, misconstrues the Hartgen testimony, and misapplies the previous rulings in this case.
LILCO's motion should therefore be denied.
8705060079 B70430 PDR ADOCK 05000322 9
W II. DISCUSSION A.
The Hartgen Testimony Addresses The Issues Identified By The Board And Does Not Seek To Exoand The EPZ The Hartgen Testimony addresses the amount of time it would take to reach the reception centers by first analyzing the false assumptions of the LILCO traffic analysis.
The Hartgen Testimony then provides its own analysis of whether the roads carrying traffic to the reception centers can handle the anticipated number of people who will seek monitoring.
LILCO argues that the Hartgen Testimony addressing road capacity must be excluded because such testimony " seeks to create a de facto 40 mile
' evacuation zone'" and " seeks to impose evacuation time limits."
Motion to Strike at 2.
These arguments are absurd and constitute a lame effort to avoid the consequences of LILCO's own decision to locate the reception centers 40 miles from the Shoreham plant.
The importance of the transportation issues to a decision on the adequacy of the reception centers was underscored by the Appeal Board, which reversed the original Licensing Board decision on the use of.the Nassau Coliseum as a reception center, stating:
It did not deem it to include, as well, consideration of either the Coliseum's accessibility to evacuees from and around the plume EPZ, or other factors that could likewise affect its utility as a reception center.
But manifestly, a reception center that is beyond the reach l
of the persons it is set up to serve -- -... - - _ -.._..
cannot fulfill its intended purpose, no matter how well the facility might be designed and equipped.
Lona Island Liahtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 11, ALAB 832, 23 NRC 135, 161 (1986)
Given the clear guidance of the Appeal Board, this Board specifically identified two issues which concern traffic:
a.
the transportation and traffic problems which might develop as a result of the reception centers' location.
b.
the adecuacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facilities proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic concestion on the way to and in the vicinity of the facility, and LILCO's Revision 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau County roadways.
Egg Memorandum and Order (Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand of Coliseum Issue) (December 11, 1986) at 7 and 16-18 (emphasis added).
The Hartgen testimony is directly relevant to these issues.
LILCO has submitted extensive testimony and analysis on the very issues of traffic congestion and "the total times required to service this evacuating traffic at the three reception centers."
LILCO Testimony at 37, and agg cenerally LILCO Testimony at 30-38.
Yet, LILCO now wants to deprive the State of its right tc address those time issues and to respond to LILCO's testimony by arguing that the routes leading to the reception centers, which the State has analyzed, are not the routes that the Board had in mind when it established the scope of this 1. _ _ _._.. _ _.
i i
proceeding.
Such a position is preposterous.
LILCO appears to attempt to make some distinction between " approaches" -- its own term -- and the routes analyzed by the State's experts.
But it fails to articulate what " approaches" are and why the State's analysis falls outside of the unspecified, but arbitrary, boundaries LILCO is attempting to apply.1/
LILCO's failure to define " approaches" is evidence of the absurdity of its position.
As the Appeal Board indicated, a reception center is useless if people in and around the EPZ cannot reach the facility.
If people cannot reach a reception center because of traffic problems 10 miles from a reception center, that is just as important as impediments existing 10 feet from a reception center.
Moreover, the words of the Board must be given their plain meaning.
The " adequacy of evacuation routes" means just that -- the routes which people seeking i
1/
LILCO's inability to develop reasoned definition of the issue is clear in the following quote:
i On the other hand, LILCO recognizes that, in light of the Appeal Board's remand, it is necessary to litigate the acoroaches to the l
reception centers to determine their i
accessibility to evacuees -- whether the centers are "beyond the reach of the persons they serve."
ALAB 832, 23 NRC at 161.
But other subjects, such as the capacity of the road network between the EPZ and the acoroaches l
12 the reception centers are not properly within the admitted issues.
LILCO Motion at 3 (emphasis added).
LILCO is attempting to draw a distinction without a difference - a position which indicates the poverty of LILCO's position. --
monitoring must take to the reception centers.
The Board imposed no arbitrary limits as to how close those routes must be to the reception centers.
LILCO cannot unilaterally do so now.
Furthermore, the fact that the Hartgen Testimony analyzes parts of a road system outside of the EPZ pursuant to issues identified by a licensing board does not constitute an attempt to expand the EPZ or challenge the NRC's regulations.
LILCO's argument that the State is seeking to expand the EPZ is nothing but rhetorical posturing.
As to the assertion that the Hartgen testimony is seeking to impose evacuation time estimates, the Hartgen Testimony simply does not concern evacuation time estimates --
i.e.,
the amount of time required to evacuate the EPZ.
Rather, the Hartgen Testimony attempts to assess the amount of time it will take an individual to reach the reception center and be monitored.
The length of time required to monitor the public is an issue specifically raised by Section J.12 of NUREG 0654, which requires that
" personnel and equipment available should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period all residents and transients in the plum exposure LPZ arriving at relocation centers" (emphasis added ).
If evacuees arriving at the LILCO reception centers cannot be monitored within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, then the LILCO reception center scheme does not satisfy Section J.12.
The Hartgen Testimony addresses this very issue; not the question of evacuation time limits. -.
In fact, LILCO's arguments are belied by its own testimony, which discusses " sensitivity studies to quantify the ability of the highway system to accommodate the projected demand."
LILCO Testimony at 30.
Two studies, KLD TR-192 and KLD TR-201 were attached as Exhibits M and S to the LILCO testimony.
These studies assign traffic to " major access-controlled east-west highways connecting the EPZ to the reception centers and onto the approach roads linking major highways to the reception centers."
LILCO testimony at 31.
The studies also contain a queue analysis and how queues will effect the highway system.
The LILCO testimony thus puts the highway system at issue, and the State must be allowed to respond.
B. Epoulation Growth LILCO also moves to exclude some testimony on the ground that it discusses future population levels which, LILCO argues, have no place in emergency planning.
This argument is without merit.
In general, the Hartgen Testimony's use of future population figures is limited to a discussion of the population level five years from now.
This is an attempt to inject some conservatism into the traffic analysis,2/ in sharp contrast to LILCO which has 2
2/
Egg the Hartgen Testimony at 17, 40 and 45.
For purposes of comparison, the Hartgen Testimony also uses a 20 year projection Hartgen Testimony at 17.
This projection is used, however, to illustrate that a plan which is presently unworkable will be completely impossible only half way into the life span of the Shoreham Plant. -
used 1985 -- i.e. two years outdated -- populations figures in determining evacuation traffic demand in the analyses supporting its own testimony.
It should also be noted that at the time LILCO developed its Plan in 1983, the population figures it used were croiected 1985 population figures.
Apparently LILCO itself once recognized the value of using conservative projected population figures --
although it lost sight of that principle after 1985 when it continued to adhere to out-of-date data.
Egg LILCO Plan, Appendix A,Section III at 1.
In short, the Hartgen Testimony uses future growth projections to demonstrate how in the very near future LILCO's Plan cannot work even if a very low percentage of EPZ evacuees are assumed to travel to the reception centers.
This is a proper approach; one that any emergency planner would recognize as prudent.
C.
Evacuation Shadow LILCO also argues that the portions of the Hartgen Testimony which discuss additional traffic demand generated by those who seek monitoring although not told to do so should be excluded because they attempt to relitigate a previously decided issue.
This argument must fall on three separate grounds.
First, the LILCO Motion does not distinguish between additional traffic demand generated by the evacuation shadow phenomenon and
the demand generated by monitoring-seeking behavior.
Egg the Response of Suffolk County to LILCO's Motion to Strike the Testimony of Stephen Cole et al.
(" County Response").
As set forth in the County Response, monitoring-seeking behavior is a separate phenomenon from the evacuation shadow, and LILCO's witnesses and counsel have specifically recognized this distinction.
Sgg 14 Indeed, LILCO itself has raised the issue of " monitoring shadow", so the use of data and assumptions regarding such behavior in the Hartgen Testimony can hardly be objectionable to LILCO.
A fair reading of the Hartgen Testimony demonstrates that the additional traffic demand it address is generated by monitoring-seeking behavior.
For example:
neither the LILCO Plan nor KLD's analysis take into account the fact that people from outside the EPZ may try to use the sites.
Likewise, they do not consider the possibility that some people within the EPZ who were not among those advised to evacuate or seek monitoring may do so anyway.
Egg Direct Testimony of Stephen Cole et al. on behalf of Suffolk County Regarding LILCO's Reception Centers (April 13, 1987).
Hartgen Testimony at 19.
Second, even if the additional traffic demand analyzed in the Hartgen Testimony is considered to be evacuation shadow traffic, the testimony is not outside the scope of this proceeding.
This Board's December 11 Memorandum and Order, in accordance with ALAB 832, specifically stated that the effect of the location of the reception centers on the evacuation shadow phenomenon was within the scope of this hearing.
Thus, the Hartgen Testimony's analysis of additional traffic going to the __ _
reception centers, whether it be generated by the evacuation shadow phenomenon or monitoring-seeking behavior is within the scope of this hearing and thus admissible.
Third, an expert performing an analysis is entitled to use any data he reasonably believes are required in order to make his analyses complete.
To the extent those data are shown to be unwarranted or inaccurate, either through cross examination or contrary testimony, then the Board can give the testimony reduced weight.
However, it is inappropriate to exclude data which are necessary to conduct a complete analysis.
In short, LILCO's " evacuation shadow" complaint is nothing more than a smoke screen designed to eliminate any testimony conflicting with its analysis of traffic conditions based on an arbitrary assumption that no more than 30% of the EPZ population will arrive at the reception centers.
D.
Future Constructiqn LILCO also objects that the Hartgen testimony should be stricken because it addresses the issue of road construction.
This argument is groundless for two reasons.
First, the issue of road construction beyond the EPZ and its effect on travel to the reception centers has not been litigated before.
Earlier litigation addressed only repairs within the EPZ and whether they should be considered in assessing evacuation time estimates.
Partial Initial Decision ("PID"), 21 NRC 644, 798 (1985).
Here,..
the State is only responding to the issue of whether the evacuees will be able to arrive at the reception centers in a timely manner.
In addition, the need to account for road construction was specifically addressed in the testimony of Charles Kilduff on the use of the Nassau Coliseum as a reception center.
Such testimony was excluded by this Board, but on appeal, the Appeal Board specifically ruled that the Kilduff testimony should have been admitted.
ALAB 832, 23 NRC at 162.
Because testimony concerning road construction was included within the Kilduff testimony that
(
the Appeal Board ordered must be heard, the admission of the Hartgen Testimony testimony concerning road repair is clearly mandated by the ALAB 832.
III.
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS Based on the erroneous theories discussed above, LILCO has moved to strike various positions of the Hartgen Testimony.
The State hereby responds to LILCO's specific objections to the Hartgen Testimony in the order presented by LILCO:
A.
Hartaen Testimony at oaae 7. Lines 15-22 LILCO moves to strike this testimony because it refers to population growth, future traffic growth and possible road repairs.
Motion to Strike at 4.
For the reasons discussed in Sections II.B and II.D, LILCO's complaints are without merit.. _ _.
This testimony is simply sets forth Hartgen's opinion as to what a planner should consider and is therefore not objectionable.
Indeed, as discussed above, LILCO itself originally uses a projected population figure in planning and the State should be able to do the same.
Moreover, the issue of road repairs was specifically sanctioned when the Appeal Board directed the admission of the Kilduff Testimony which addressed road repairs.
Accordingly, this testimony on further growth and traffic repair is admissible.
B.
Hartaen Testimony at oaae 11. Lines 8-14 This testimony identifies flawed assumptions in the KLD analysis about (1) routes to the reception centers and (2) road capacities.
LILCO's argument that this testimony should be rejected because it concerns "the road network between the EPZ and the approaches to the reception centers" must be rejected for the reasons set forth in Section II.A above.
LILCO simply has no basis for limiting the State's legitimate testimony regarding the adequacy of the routes to the reception centers; a subject which is clearly an issue in this case.
C.
Hartcen Testimony at oaces 13-14 This testimony criticizes the KLD analysis for making unwarranted assumptions concerning the routes people will follow to LILCO's reception centers.
LILCO moves to strike this 4 -
i testimony on the ground that the issue of whether people will follow KLD's assigned routes has been previously litigated.
LILCO is wrong.
In the previous emergency planning proceeding, this Board heard a variety of issues concerning LILCO's evacuation time estimates.
Among those issues was whether the estimates would be accurate if people did not follow their assigned paths out of the EPZ.
LILCO offered as evidence a sensitivity analysis showing that evacuation times would not rise substantially if evacuees deviated from their routes.
Based largely on that evidence, the Board ruled that such deviations would not affect LILCO's evacuation time estimates.
PID, 21 NRC at 792-94.
The Board did not rule that such deviations would not occur or that route deviations might not, in another context, affect LILCO's emergency response.
Here the issue is different.
The KLD capacity analysis on which LILCO bases its testimony about the routes to the relocation centers assumes that all evacuees will adhere to their prescribed routes to the reception centers.
There is no LILCO i
sensitivity analysis demonstrating the effect of route deviation.
The Hartgen Testimony does, however, of fer such a sensitivity analysis and the results show that route deviation could lead to substantially greater congestion at some points.
Thus, under circumstances different from those litigated in the earlier proceeding (i.e., different roads, different destinations and different evidence) route deviation will contribute to traffic i _ _ _
I problems on the approaches to the reception centers.
This is exactly the issue admitted by this Board -- an issue which has not previously been litigated.
D.
Hartaen Testimony at oace 15, Lines 8 - 20 This testimony concerns LILCO's failure to calculate the capacity to key approaches to the reception centers sites.
LILCO seeks to exclude this testimony on the ground that it addresses major routes from the EPZ and thus is outuide the scope of the issue admitted by the Board.
For the reasons set forth in Section II.A. above, LILCO's argument must be rejected.
The absurdity of LILCO's position is particularly clear here, for the portion of the Hartgen Testimony at issue concerns the Long Island Expressway, which is a road that runs within 100 vards of the Roslyn reception center.
This testimony is clearly relevant to the issues identified by the Board.
Can LILCO seriously take the position that routes even 100 yards from the reception centers are not encompassed within the Board's Order?
Such a construction of the Board's Order would make a mockery of this proceeding.
E.
Hartaen Testimony at cace 17.
This testimony references the conclusion of County witness James H. Johnson that residents surrounding the reception centers will also evacuate in the event of a Shoreham accident.
LILCO...
moves to strike this testimony because it relies on the testimony of Dr. Johnson.
Such a position is absurd, for one expert is entitled to rely on other expert testimony in reaching his conclusions.
Egg Fed. R. Ev. 703.
Indeed, an expert is entitled to make whatever assumptions experts in that field customarily make to conduct a complete analysis.
Id.
The proper procedure for LILCO to follow, if it believes those assumptions are incorrect, is to challenge the assumptions through cross-examination of the witnesses (both of whom will be available at the hearing for that purpose) or'through the submission of I
contradicting evidence.
1 f
LILCO's Motion to Strike the second paragraph on page 17
/
because it discusses population growth should be rejected for the l
j reasons set forth in Section II.B. supra.
I F.
Hartaen Testimony at naae 19 j(
This pahy of the Hartgen testimgny discusses monitoring-seeking behavior and references,the' Cole et al. Testimony on this issue.
LILCdmovestostrikethis-testimonybecauseitis derivadidoof$heColeetal.Testimonyandbecauseitconcerns i
the " shadow phenomenon."
LILCOs effort to strike testimony i
concerning evacuation shadow is completely ill-founded-because
\\
the Hartgen Testimony here discusses monitoring seeking behavior.
I l
As discussed in Section II.C above, and as LILCO witnesses acknowledge ;'(331 County Response), the evacuation shadow and r
monitoring-seeking behavior are two separate behaviors.
Just as l,
l i
r l - _ _ _
. -... _,. _. _ ~
1 LILCO's Motion to Strike the Cole et al. Testimony is invalid, so too are its efforts to strike those parts of the Hartgen Testimony which use data consistent with the Cole et al.
Testimony.
In addition, LILCO is confusing the issue of weight with admissibility.
LILCO's motion is nothing more than an effort to exclude relevant evidence from the Board.
G.
Hartaen Teptimony at oace 20 LILCO. moves to strike the phrase "along the entire length of the EPZ" because it refers to evacuation routes which LILCO As set forth apparently feels are not close enough to the EPZ.
in Section II.A above, the evidence concerning routes to the reception centers is clearly relevant to the issues identified by the Board.
LILCO's argument must be rejected.
H.
Hartaen Testimony at oace 22 LILCO argues that this testimony should be excluded because it concerns " driver frustration."
This argument mischaracterizes the testimony which only discusses driver frustration in the context of why a " delay analysis" should be performed.
This issue has never been litigated before, and the testimony should therefore not be excluded.
LILCO's continued practice of seizing on buzz words and attempting to strike all testimony containing f
those words provides no basis for striking the testimony.
l f
I.
Hartcen Testimony at oaces 26-27 This testimony concerns future road construction.
LILCO moves to strike it on the grounds that this issue has been previously litigated.
For the reasons stated in Section II.D above, this Motion to Strike must be denied.
LILCO's argument that the State is attempting to impose a 40-mile EPZ on LILCO is also absurd for the reasons discussed in Section II.A above.
J.
Hartoen Testimony at caces 30-31
/
This testimony summarizes the State witnesses' concerns with the LILCO traffic testimony and analysis.
LILCO moves to strike it on the grounds that the Hartgen testimony concerns evacuation shadow, road repairs, route analysis and population projections.
As discussed above, Hartgen testimony on routes to the reception centers, monitoring seeking behavior, future growth and road construction have not been previously litigated and are relevant to the issues in this case.
K.
Hartoen Testimony at oaces 36-37 LILCO seeks to exclude this testimony because it contains assumptions concerning shadow phenomenon.
For the reasons discussed in Sections II.C and III.F above, LILCO's argument is without merit.
LILCO should seek to challenge Dr. Hartgen's analyses through cross-examination and not through an effort to exclude relevant evidence.
{.
L.
Hartoen Testimony at oaaes 39 and 41 LILCO moves to strike the Hartgen Testimony concerning scenarios DOT 4 and DOT 5 because they make " extravagant assumptions" about evacuation shadow traffic.
Egg LILCO Motion to Strike at 8.
This bald assertion of " extravagant assumptions" is totally unsupported.
If LILCO believes the assumptions in Dr.
Hartgen's analysis are " extravagant," it may seek to establish that point on cross-examination or through rebuttal testimony.
LILCO has not, however, articulated valid reasons to strike the testimony at issue.
For this reason and us more fully articulated in Section II.C above, this LILCO Motion to Strike inust be denied.
M.
LILCO Testimony at oaces 43-46 LILCO moves to strike this testimony, again on the ground that it involves DOT 4 and DOT 5 and therefore involves
" extravagant" assumptions about the evacuation shadow.
l Furthermore, LILCO argues that this testimony is offensive because it discusses future population growth.
For the reasons l
i f
stated in Sections II.C and III.L above, the Hartgen Testimony on DOT 4 and DOT 5 is clearly admissible.
Likewise, as set forth in Section II.B above, LILCO's complaint about testimony I
discussing population growth is unfounded and must be rejected.
l i
s.-
N.
Hartaen Testimony, oaces 48-50 and 52 Once again, LILCO moves to strike testimony concerning DOT 4 and DOT 5.
As stated above, such testimony is perfectly admissible and should not be excluded.
O.
Hartaen Testimony, oaces 60-63 LILCO moves to strike this testimony on the grounds that it relies on scenarios DOT 4 and DOT 5, which are offensive in LILCO's eyes because they include assumptions about traffic demand generated by the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
- Here, LILCO has simply gotten its facts wrong.
The site circulation analysis set forth at pages 60-63 of the Hartgen Testimony does not rely on DOT 4 and DOT 5, and does not in any fashion rely on assumptions about the evacuation shadow phenomenon.
This site i
circulation analysis is clearly relevant to the issue of how long monitoring will require and the issues of traffic congestion surrounding the site.
Thus, the Motion to Strike this portion of the Hartgen Testimony must be denied.
P.
Hartoen Testimony, oace 74 i
LILCO attempts to exclude the conclusion of the Hartgen testimony on the grounds that it attempts to relitigate the evacuation shadow phenomenon and further because it discusses traffic congestion beyond what LILCO perceives to be the
" approaches" to the rec-ption centers.
For the reasons set forth...
in Sections II.A and II.C above, this testimony is relevant to issues that are (1) identified by the Board and (2) have not been previously litigated.
Therefore, it should not be stricken.
Q.
Exhibits LILCO attempts to strike several exhibits to the Hartgen testimony on the same grounds that they move to exclude the testimony.
In particular, LILCO moves'to strike Exhibits 7 and 8 on the grounds that the concern construction projects.
Just as with the test of the Hartgen testimony, these two Exhibits should not be excluded because they concern road construction:
a subject included in the prior Kilduff Testimony, which was specifically admitted by the Appeals Board.
Egg Section II.D above.
LILCO also moves to exclude Exhibits18-21A, 23, 24 and 27 because they concern scenarios DOT 4 and DOT 5.
For the reasons set forth in Section II.C and III.L, LILCO's j
complaint is groundless.
Accordingly, Exhibits18-21a, 23, 24 l
and 27 should not be stricken.
Finally, LILCO moves to strike Exhibit 21B because it concerns future growth.
As set forth in Section II.B, population growth and its effects are clearly admissable.
4 1.
e CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, LILCO's Motion to Strike should be denied in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted, I
l 24,t
_ 0--
4 A _ em.,m 8
/
- __ _ s Richard J. ZahnlI ter Deputy Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorney for Governor Mario M.
Cuomo and the State of New York -
l
Y 000KETED April 30, 198WC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 MAY -1 N0:15 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety andLicensinoBobEf7f$f}fh(()N BRANCH
)
In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
)
(Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of the RESPONSE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK TO THE LILCO MOTION TO STRIKE TESTIMONY OF PAPILE ET AL. and THE STATE OF NEW YORK RESPONSE TO THE LILCO MOTION TO STRIKE THE TESTIMONY OF DAVID T. HARTGEN AND ROBERT C. MILLSPAUGH have been served on the following this 30th day of April, 1987 by United States mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.
Morton B. Margulies, Esq., Chairman
- Joel Blau, Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Director, Utility Intervention U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N.Y. Consumer Protection Board Washington, D.C.
20555 Suite 1020 Albany, New York 12210 Dr. Jerry R. Kline*
William R. Cumming, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Spence W.
Perry, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.,
Room 840 Washington, D.C.
20472 4
--y y
Mr. Frederick J. Shon*
Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Long Island Lighting Company Washington, D.C.
20555 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.**
Clerk Hunton and Williams
-Suffolk County Legislature Post Office Box 1535 Suffolk County Legislature 707 East Main Street Office Building.
Richmond, Virginia 23212 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L.
F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 "H" Street, N. W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mary M. Gundrum, Esq.
Hon. Michael'A. LoGrande New York State Department of Law Suffolk County Executive 120 Broadway, Third Floor H. Lee Dennison Building Room Number 3-116 Veterans Memorial Highway New York, New York 10271 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committee Suite "K" Post Office Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Lawrence C. Lanpher, Esq.*
Suffolk County Attorney Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.
Bldg. 158, North County Complex David T. Case, Esq.
Veterans Memorial Highway Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Hauppauge, New York 11788 1800 "M" Street, N. W.
Ninth Floor - South Lobby Washington, D. C.
20036-5891 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.*
New York State Energy Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
Agency Building 2 Washington, D. C.
20555 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 i
.,--.,_.n
David A.
Brownlee, Esq.
Mr. Stuart Diamond Kirkpatrick and Lockhart Business / Financial 1500 Oliver Building NEW YORK TIMES Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 229 West 43rd Street New York, New York 10036 Douglas J. Hynes, Councilman Town Board of Oyster Bay Town Hall Oyster Bay, New York 11771 LQ Q_L - a. -
s V
Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224
- Via Hand Delivery
- Via Federal Express April 30, 1987
_ _ _.