ML20210B375
| ML20210B375 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 02/03/1987 |
| From: | Domer J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702090143 | |
| Download: ML20210B375 (17) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 SN 157B Lookout Place FEB 031987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Attn: Document Control Desk Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. James Taylor 1
In the Matter of
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Docket Nos. 50-327 Tennessee Valley Authority
)
50-328 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - RESPONSE TO ITEMS FROM INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327,
-328/86-38 AND 50-327, ~328/86-45 In response to a request during the December 4, 1986 exit meeting of an NRC inspection of the Sequoyah Design Baseline and Verification Program (DB&VP),
i TVA is providing the requested information in enclosure 1 of this submittal.
Specifically, TVA was asked to respond to Observation 5.1 from IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, -328/86-38, which states:
Observation No. 5.1 - Walkdown Scope The NRC team noted that initial walkdown process does not address verification of the electrical aspects of the plant installation, such as correctness of wiring, condition of electrical items such as cables, trays, junction boxes, terminal blocks, fuses, etc., and application of separation criteria. For instruments, the walkdown scope ends at the root valves and does not address verification of the corroct tap connections. The team was informed that testing of the systems verifies some of the electrical attributes.
For verification of the remaining attributes, several other programa are in place. The team believes that cross reference to such 1
programs should be provided in the DBVP documentation. TVA rationale should be provided as to the acceptability of this approach.
In addition TVA was requested to respond to the following statement from IE l
Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, -328/86-45:
i
.TVA should clearly define their basis for concluding that the C/R database has accurately captured all licensing commitments, regulatory requirements, and other pertinent design information as applicable, e.g., NSSS/ vendor interface requirements, and that the i
appropriate comitments and requirements have been incorporated in the applicable design criteria.
8702090143 B70203 PDR ADOCK 05000327 G
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An Equal Opportunity Employer kkI
O O U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission FEB 031987 In addition to these two items, the discussion in enclosure 1 which addresses the commitment / requirement (C/R) database, also addresses observation 5.4 from IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327, -328/86-38:
Observation No. S.4 - Design Criteria During initial NRC review of the process for generation of the commitment / requirement data base, the team noticed that the existing i
program did not have provisions for independently verifying or assuring the accuracy of the design / licensing commitments input to the system.
The NRC will evaluate TVA's control and use of this date base information during future DB&VP inspections. provides a list of commitments contained in enclosure 1.
If you have any questions concerning this issue, please call Beth L. Hall, of the Sequoyah Site Licensing Staff, at 615/870-7459 To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
./
J. A. Domer, Assistant Director Nuclear Safety and Licensing Enclosures cc:
See page 2 l
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. B 031987 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission cc (Enclosures):
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
Mr. J. J. Holonich Sequoyah Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Mr. G. G. Zech, Director i
TVA Projects U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Sequoyah Resident Inspector Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 2600 Igou Ferry Road Soddy Daisy, Tennessee 37319
ENCLOSURE 1 RESPONSE TO OBSERVATION 5.1 FROM IE REPORT 50-327. -328/86-38
" Design Baseline Attributes" is a term used by the Design Baseline and Verification Program (DB&VP) for those items that are needed to verify that a modification does not degrade the ability of a system to perform its safety function (s).
This verification process is accomplished by reviewing the engineering modification for technical adequacy in accordance with design criteria. Thus, if a modificaticn was verified to comply with design criteria, the modification was deemed technically adequate and would not degrade the ability of the system to perform the safety function.
The actual methods of verifying adequacy of modifications have been j
multifold. Walkdowns of installation, review of workplans, review of design output, verification of existence of design output supporting calculations, review of design inputs, and review of testing of the modification are the methods used. The choice of what method (s) to use when verifying a certain facet of a modification was determined by program management.
NRC Observation 5.1 of IE Report 50-327 -328/86-38 requested TVA'to justify the method used to verify the following electrical and instrumentation and control (I&C) design facets of modifications:
electrical terminations, cables, cable trays, junction boxes, terminal blocks, fuses, separation criteria, root valves, and sense lines.
Following is a discussion of the specific method and the rationale used to justify the method selected to verify the items listed in the subject observation.
ELECTRICAL TERMINATIONS Electrical terminations are an important part of each modification, as electrical power and instrumentation must interface correctly for components to perform their safety functions. TVA performs the design engineering necessary for proper interface of components in the modification process.
This interface ensures that power is connected to the correct part of a component and that the I&C circuits are also connected correctly to give expected results.
TVA chose three methods to verify correct electrical terminations: walkdowns, review of workplans, and review of postmodification testing. Walkdowns ensure that the physical plant matches the design output by a direct comparison. The electrical terminations of the vital 120-V ac and vital 125-V de power distribution boards were verified by walkoowns for all power terminations on the boards.
Reviews of workplans involve a search for information within the workplan, such as second party verification inspection for any work performed under Quality Assurance (QA) supervision.
The particular item of interest is a form from Modification and Addition Instruction (M&AI)-7 that provides documentation of the installer and verifier for any modifications involving new cables.
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For modifications involving existin5 cables but different terminations, the workplan was reviewed and written instructions provided which tell the installer where and how to make terminations. These instructions contain a signoff point for both the installer and verifier. Thus, a completed implementation document, after verification, was used as a quality input in review of electrical terminations.
The third method of review is that of review of actual testing. This ensures operability and thus ensures the electrical interface is correct. Testing review, in accordance with SQEP-14, includes formal postmodification tests, which test an entire system or portion of a system for operability; functional tests, which test a modified component and are part of the modification workplan; and surveillance instructions (sis), which are periodic tests for proving continued operability of components required for safety per the technical specifications.
Concern was expressed that some components could not be truly functionally checked by testing or workplan review, An example of this type of component is a multistaged level switch contained in a tank where testing did not vary level in the tank but simulated level change without exercising the primary sensor. A review was conducted by Senior Instrument Engineers of electrical sensors within the system boundaries that are required as logic inputs to mitigate chapter 15 events.
Instrument maintenance personnel were also contacted as a further check on the DB&VP review. The review revealed that only the fuel oil level switches met the above criteria.
These switches are tested during periodic diesel tests for functionality.
The switches have not been modified since issuance of the operating license, and therefore no walkdown was required.
Of over 600 safety-related instruments in th'e system boundary, approximately 160 have logic inputs. The diesel fuel oil level switches represent 16 instruments. Since only one set of sensors could be found within the boundary of the DB&VP that could not be readily tested and the only terminations not walked down were not modified, TVA believes that the workplan review and test review are adequate to ensure functionality of all modified equipment.
The correctness and operability of the electrical interface is thus proved by any of the above methods. TVA chose a mult> method approach as a cross-check, since overlap exists. Every modification was verified by at least two of the methods. The testing effort will continue tirough the startup effort by utilizing the normal integrated functional tes* through the surveillance program during startup to verify that the in" v nents are electrically terminated correctly.
CABLES Cables / electrical wiring are an important part of each modification to ensure that electric power and instrumentation intelligence are communicated in a reliable manner.
In a design, many factors enter into cable selection. These include current and voltage requirements of the end component, environment through which the cable passes or terminates, the method used to route the cable from the distribution board to the end component (e.g., conduit, cable tray), material of the conductor and material of the insulation, and quality level (e.g.,
"1E", "non-lE").
These are covered in Sequoyah Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-ll.3.
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To ensure adequacy of cables, the DB&VP relied, in part, on work performed by the Environmental Qualification (EQ) program. This cross-reference is documented on the Design Review Checklist as part of the evaluation of Engineering Change Notices (ECNs).
The review obtained from the workplan the type cable pulled, then sought within the EQ program the environmental qualification of that particular cable. Cables under the EQ program have documentation proving that the design attributes for EQ considerations have been met.
Cables not covered by the EQ program were checked for quality level (e.g., "1E") in accordance with the general procurement specification.
TVA is presently engaged in an ampacity study, described in a submittal to NRC dated December 23, 1986, to prove the rest of the design attributes of Class lE cables at Sequoyah. This program will encompass modifications that involved cables that are included in the DB&VP. The DB&VP references this study via reference to calculations on the Design Review Checklist. With the combination of the DB&VP, EQ program, the quality level check, and the ampacity study, TVA believes that the issue of technical adequacy of electrical cables at Sequoyah is being addressed.
CABLE TRAYS The attribute required to be verified for cable trays is that of seismic support. The Civil Engineering Branch (CEB) has a separate Sequoyah restart program on cable tray support analysis, as described in a submittal to NRC dated November 5, 1986. This separate program includes walkdowns and calculations review. The results of this separate program are utilized within the DB&VP, documented on the Design Review Checklist, to prove technical adequacy of the modifications to cable trays.
JUNCTION BOXES AND TERMINAL BLOCKS i
Junction boxes, as passive enclosures, were reviewed to ensure that the wiring was protected by a physical barrice that would remain intact as designed.
l Terminal blocks, as in-line wiring points and integral parts of circuits, were reviewed to ensure that the circuit remained intact during a design basis event. The EQ program walked down and verified compliance with EQ design requirements for junction boxes and terminal blocks within harsh environments.
Junction box modifications do not involve circuit modifications and are therefore reviewed via workplan review. Terminal block modifications are circuit modifications and are reviewed, as explained in the electrical termination section, by both a workplan review and a test review. TVA believes that these are adequate methods to ensure technical adequacy of these components.
FUSES Modifications involving fuses were reviewed to ensure that the proper size fuse was installed for adequate circuit protection. TVA has implemented for Sequoyah a fuse verification program for class lE systems to verify that the proper fuse is called for on the drawings, is included in the procedures, and is installed in the field. This effort is described in the August 19, 1986 response to NRC-OIE Region II Inspection Report 50-327/86-19 and 50-328/86-19, i
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1 The methods used by the DB&VP to verify fuse modifications included reliance on the lE fuse program where applicable, workplan reviews, test reviews, and verification of_ existence of calculations to support fuse modifications. TVA believes that this overlap and reliance on the "1E fuse walkdown" within the j
lE fuse program, which supports the calculations referenced on the DB&VP Design Review Checklists, ensure technical adequacy of all fuse modifications.
i SEPARATION CRITERTA i
j Physical and electrical separation of wiring ensure that common failures will not affect redundant safety functions. The Sequoyah Design Criteria SQN-DC-V-12.2 is used as a basis of proper separation.
The attribute was verified by reviewing the workplans and final as-constructed drawings. This i
ensured that the wiring for redundant safety functions was not subject to common failures.
ROOT VALVES AND SENSE LINES j
Root valves and sense lines are important to each modification to ensure that instrumentation is monitoring the proper functions within a fluid process.
Root valves and associated instruments were "100 percent" walked down during the initial flow diagram walkdown.
The sense line connecting the root valve j
to the associated instrument was initially verified by a valve ID tag number comparison. The root valve on the process has the same ID number, except for l
an alphabetic suffix, as the instrument shutoff valve located close to the i
instrument. Thus, if the number of the root valve matched the instrument l
shutoff valve number, except for suffix, then a sense line was assumed to l
connect the two components. This numbering system, though used throughout Sequoyah, was not documented as a design output' requirement. The root valve tag numbers were recorded on the flow diagrams and on a separate valve ID tag drawing. The ID tag drawing correlated the root valve number with the
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instrument ID number.
The instrument shutoff valve number, however, is not j
recorded on design output drawings; and thus this information was collected for DB&VP purposes.
In order to ensure that the method of tag comparison used is a valid method of sense line verification, a sample of safety-related sense lines is being walked down.
Results of both methods will be compared, with discrepancies noted and resolved. The sample encompasses the sense lines classified as dormant. Dormant refers to those lines in which function cannot be verified during either normal operation or periodic testing.
A total of 621 l
instruments with sense lines are within the DB&VP boundary. Of the 621
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instruments, the walkdown covers 200 instruments. Also, of the 621 instruments, approximately 160 have a safety-related function other than pressure boundary retention. The walkdown group has both safety-related functions and pressure boundary retention functions. The large group size will give a high level of confidence that the sense lines are functionally l
continuous from their intended fluid process sensing point to their respective sensors. Additionally, the sample size lends validity to the previously l
completed tag comparison walkdowns.
This walkdown is part of the DB&VP and I
will be complete by February 20, 1987. TVA believes that the combination of walkdowns and comparisons will adequately verify adequacy of sense line function.
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE SON COMMITMENT /REOUIREMTNT (C/R)
DATABASE AND THE DESIGN BASIS DOCUMENT (DBD)
IN RESPONSE TO IE REPORT 50-327. -329 '86-45 P
-I.
OVERVIEW The design bases of a nuclear plant, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2, collectively comprise the design basis which is a necessary part of the design documentation required by NRC and ANSI Standards. The design basis is an important part of the plant design process to ensure that licensing commitments and technical requirements are maintained and are supported by appropriate calculations and analyses.
I To improve the design control process, TVA established the Design Basis Document (DBD) which is used to define, establish, and maintain the upper-tier design documentation requirements.
The DBD is a controlled manual that includes, as a minimum, those general design criteria for site, plant, structures, and systems which constitute the upper-tier plant-specific design input. The DBD includes detailed design criteria i
(DC), mechanical flow diagrams, functional control and logic diagrams, single line diagrams, the general arrangement drawings, and any additional design input documents that the project engineer deems are appropriate. A Division of Nuclear Engineering (DNE) procedure controls the preparation of the DBD for Sequoyah; and the project engineer is responsible for revising, reviewing, approving, and distributing the DBD.
The DBD will be controlled and maintained throughout the life of the plant, as required by DME Nuclear Engineering Procedure (NEP)-3.2.
Ultimately, the DBD's scope will encompass both safety-related and nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components. For restart (Phase I), only those safety-related systems or portions of systems required to mitigate FSAR chapter 15 accidents and provide for safe shutdown are included in the Restart DBD (RDBD).
TVA has undertaken an effort to assemble an up-to-date set of design criteria to be used in preparing the DBD for Sequoyah. A top-down approach is used to assemble the DC in which (1) commitments made in generic upper-tier design input documents; (2) commitments made in licensing documents; (3) design requirements needed to satisfy the plant safety analysis, such as NSSO/ vendor interface requirements; and (4) TVA j
policies are captured in either plant-specific design criteria or other design input documents. These commitment / requirements (C/Rs) are j
identified by senior engineers and managers who are familiar with the j
design evolution of the plant.
Procedures have been developed to control i
the process of systematically identifying the C/Rs, including both l
safety-related and nonsafety-related systems, structures, and components.
l As part of the approved procedures, the Design Basis C/R Tracking System l
has been created by TVA in order to automate and control the process of tracking these commitments and design requirements.
It also controls the a
process of implementing them in design criteria and other design input i
j documents which form the DBD for Sequoyah.
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Once the licensing commitments and design requirements are captured in the C/R database and sorted according to suitability for inclusion in j
design criteria, the discipline or branch determines which design criteria documents are necessary for the desired structures or systems.
The preparer of the design criteria uses the appropriate database sort (s) 4 of C/Rs to review the existing design criteria documents, revising them as required or writing new ones in order to include C/Rs that should be in the design criteria. Once these are included, along with any additional information as required to conform with criterion III of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, the design criteria and other design basis documentation are reviewed and issued in accordance with established I
procedures. When design criteria and other design basis documentation are issued, the supporting C/R database is updated to conform to the C/Rs reflected in these documents. The design criteria and other design basis documentation for Sequoyah are reviewed and approved by the respective branch to assess whether or not they address the pertinent C/Rs. This is documented for Phase I to ensure that each C/R was reviewed and properly assossed against the design criteria that are required for Sequoyah restart. The same process described above will be implemented in Phase II (postrestart) of the DB&VP program. This process will involve a complete re-review of the C/R database for inclusion in criteria'and I
other documents for the Phase II DBD. Additionally, the C/R database will be updated to remove duplicate C/Rs and identify the source documents that capture the remaining C/Rs. As previously committed, the 4
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Phase II scope and schedule will be transmitted to NRC by March 21, 1987.
j II.
METHODOLOGY The methodology used by TVA for developing the DBD has been generally described in section I and is delineated in attachment 1, pages 1 and 2.
The TVA methodology details are provided in this section. The following j
definitions of licensing C/Rs were used in the DBD development:
i LicensinR Commitment i
l An agreed upon action related to the design, construction, j
operation, or testing of a TVA nuclear plant communicated to an organization authorized to regulate TVA activities.
DesiRn Requirement Any technical requirement or internal TVA commitment which is l
essential for the safe or reliable operation of a nuclear plant.
TVA used these definitions to identify the C/R source documents. The source documents identified for the DBD included the following TVA l
licensing commitment documents:
1 i
1.
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) 2.
NRC Safety Evaluation Reports (including SER Supplements) i 3.
TVA responses to NRC-NRR Requests for Additional Information j
4.
10 CFR 50.55(e) Reports (final only) 5.
TVA responses to NRC-OIE Violations / Deviations / Infractions l
6.
TVA responses to NRC-OIE Bulletins 7.
TVA responses to NRC-NRR Ceneric Letters x
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TVA responses to NRC Confirmation of Action /Shcw Cause Letters 9.
Meeting Notes on TVA meetings with NRC, ACRS, AEC, or ASLB 10.
Licensee Event Reports 11.
TMI " Blue Book" and " Green Book" 12.
TVA Nuclear Performance Plan (revised volume 1) 13.
TVA Corporate Commitment Tracking System TVA contracted Impell Corporation to review the approximately 30,000 pages of licensing documentation that was retrieved from the above types of licensing commitment documents. TVA thoroughly. researched RIMS and the TVA Power Licensing files for licensing documents. A document control log was created by Impell to account for every licensing document retrieved by TVA and received by Impell. Those licensing documents that contained design-related C/Rs were sorted by engineering discipline branch and distributed to the applicable TVA engineering branch. The document control logs accompanied these distributions. The " Discipline Branch Charters" and the "Sequoyah Updated FSAR (UFSAR) Division of
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Responsibility" were used as guidance by Impell in assigning engineering-branch responsibility.
Impell identified approximately 1,600 licensing c[ - [, ^
documents that did not appear to contain design-related C/Rs; TVA 4
independently reviewed the;e 1,600 documents and concurred on all but 23 documents.
These 23 documents were distributed to the applicable
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engineering branch for review and nine additional C/Rs were documented, of which only one resulted in an addition to design criteria.
In addition to the licensing commitment cacuments previously listed,\\
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[E sources of design requirements such as contract files, system design s:g b
files, job books, etc., were researched by the discipline branches to s
ensure that all known Sequoyah design requirements that should be.
considered in the DBD were identified. These documents and the licensing commitment documents were then reviewed by a team of senior eng'ideers' and managers who were selected by their respective branch chiefs based on the following attributes:
Participated in original design and decisionmaking process of the plant.
Involved in and knowledgeable of major modification of the plant.
Familiar with and knowledgeable of broad background of TVA policies and procedures.
Knowledgeable of the historical evolution of the licensing documents and the plant safety analysis.
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Knowledgeable of a specific set of systems, structures, components,,
and/or general criteria topics.
Knowledgeable of design methods and procedures in effect at the time design took place.
Knawledgeable of organizational structures at the time of design so that proper consideration (based on authority or position) could be given to policy statements, commitments, and requirements.
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The senior people then completed training on the use of SQEP-18,
" Procedure for Identifying Commitments and Requirements as Source Information for Sequoyah Design Criteria Development." They reviewed the C/R source documents and identified C/Rs that should be considered for inclusion in the design criteria. They were instructed to limit the individual C/Rs to a single topic and to minimize the number of discipline branches involved.
For example, an enclosure to a TVA response to an NRC IE Bulletin may be a source document that addresses C/Rs for several Sequoyah systems, components, and general design criteria.
In order to prevent a specific design criteria preparer from looking through an entire C/R source document containing many different C/R topics, an individual C/R data sheet was completed on an individual topic / discipline, as possible.
Thus, there may have been several C/Rs
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and documented approximately 5,000 C/Rs on C/R data sheets (reference Oi -
attachment 2) which are database entry forms from SQEP-18 that relate the j.*
4 C/R to a menu of systems, structures, components, and general design i
subjects.
Each C/R was assigned a unique commitment number and a RIMS s
number for traceability.
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eng~TVA developed an "index" to the C/R data using a computerized relational database consisting of the information from the C/R data steists.
Otherwise,'each engineer might have to search through the entire TVA records management) system for licensing documents that needed to be
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referenced durin5 the preparation of the design criteria. TVA recognized that this would be;very inefficient and that the design criteria preparer might overlook some pertinent licensing commitments. TVA initiated the a
development of the C/R database with the intention of making an index to aid the design criteria preparer to access applicable Sequoyah design-related C/Rs. TVA made every effort to ensure that the C/R database was as complete and accurate as possible.
This included an extensive search through RIMS and the TVA Power Licensing Library files L
and a review of'the other design requirements that were previously
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discussed.
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The C/R data sheets were completed and/or reviewed by the senior people o'
and then input into the C/R database. Once all C/R data sheets were l
input, sorts of the C/R database were made for the general and system design criteria topics. These sorts were documented as Analysis I
-s Reports. These Analysis Reports identified the commitment numbers, RIMS numbers, the commitment source documents, and the commitment topics.
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They were then issued to the appropriate and experienced Lead Engineers
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and System Engineers for their use in developing the design criteria.
I The design criteria were prepared in accordanco with SQEP-29, " Procedure for Preparing the Design Basis Document for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant."
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Each of the C/R source documents referenced by the applicable Analysis ja Report (s) was reviewed and independently verified to ensure that all I
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, appropriate design basis information was included in the design
<^. ' criteria..The C/R number of any C/R addressed in the design criteria was recorded on a C/R database tracking sheet (attachment 2 to SQEP-29).
In addition to the information obtained from the C/R source documents, the design criteria preparer included additional information as required to meet the design input requirements of the Design Input Checklist (attachment 4 to SQEP-29).
Each of the design criteria and the associated design input was independently verified by a checker to ensure 4
l that the design criteria were properly prepared.
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III.
ENGINEERING ASSURANCE (EA) REVIEW The overall DBD program preparation, including the C/R process and design criteria, was independently reviewed by Engineering Assurance (EA) to ensure that each phase of the process was adequately implemented. Various EA action items identified during this review resulted in corrective actions which enhanced the quality of the DBD program.
EA intends to conduct periodic audits of the DBD, as part of the Sequoyah annual audits, to ensure that it is properly maintained.
The audit for the DBD has been included in the 1987 EA Audit Plan.
IV.
MAINTENANCE The methodology that will be used to maintain the C/R database updated and current is delineated in attachment 1, page 3.
DNE will develop procedural measures in Revision 2 of SQEP-18 for updating and maintaining the C/R database.
The Corporate Commitment Tracking System (CCTS) will be reviewed routinely to identify licensing commitments that need to be considered for inclusion in the DBD.
For those commitments identified, a C/R data sheet will be completed and included in the C/R database.
The system and general design criteria will be revised as required to include necessary design input and outstanding modification criteria.
Revision 2 of SQEP-18 will be issued by April 15, 1987.
V.
SUMMARY
TVA developed a C/R database as an aid and an enhancement to the preparation of design criteria. TVA surveyed the industry and found that it is a unique document with respect to its detail and purpose.
It represents a proactive approach by TVA to ensure that design requirements and licensing commitments are addressed in the Sequoyah DBD.
As design criteria and other design basis documents are issued, the supporting C/R database is updated to be consistent with the C/Rs reflected in the-DBD.
The design criteria and other design basis documents for Sequoyah are reviewed and approved by the responsible engineering branch to ensure that the pertinent C/Rs are addressed.
This is documented for Phase I to ensure that each C/R was reviewed and properly assessed against the design criteria that are required for Sequoyah restart. This same effort will be accomplished in Phase II.
Also, as previously discussed, the C/R database will be maintained throughout the plant life.
l The C/R database and the DBD were developed in accordance with QA approved procedures. TVA is confident that it has exceeoed industry norms and standards in this effort, and that the quality of the Sequoyah DBD reflects this effort.
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ENCLOSURE 2 NEW COMMITMENTS FOR SEQUOYAH UNIT 2 MADE WITHIN ENCLOSURE 1 1.
Complete DB&VP walkdown of a sample of safety-related sense lines by February 20, 1987.
2.
Sequoyah Engineering Procedure (SQEP)-18 " Procedure for Identifying Commitments and Requirements as Source Information for Sequoyah Or. sign Criteria Development," will be revised by April 15, 1987, to address maintenance of the C/R database.
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COMPILE D.C.= DESIGN CRITERIA IDENTIFY LICENSING HOLD COMMITMENT COMMITMENT NON-DESIGN SOURCE DOCUMENTS RELATED DOCUMENTS BY COMMITMENTS BRANCHES GENERATE ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTE
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C/R DATA C/R DATA SHEETS FOR SHEETS GENERATE SHEETS DESIGN C/R DATA REOMTS 37 SHEETS l
DISTRIBUTE LICENSING COMMITMENT DOCUMENTS 1r TO BRANCHES
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FOR SHEETS FOR LOAD C/R REJECT LICENSING DESIGN DATA SHEETS 4
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E IDENTIFY NSSS:
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DESIGN DISTRIBUTE C/R DATA PROJECT RATIFIES
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.t DOCUMENTS REOMTS ANALYSIS TO CHANGE t-REPORTS COMMITMENT j
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SHEET 1 OF 3 6 (page 1 of 3)
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D.C. PREPARERS D.C. PREPARERS D.C. PREPARERS D.C. CHEMERS INCORPORATE PERFORM ANALYSIS ORM C/Rs G ANY INTERFACE REPORTS G DESIGN INNT ADDITIONAL INFO REVIEW WITH SOURCE ERFICATION TO MEET APP B DISCIPLINES DOCUMENTS JL 1 r 1 r M
N CT D.C. PREPARERS APPROVES D.C. G ENGIEER OM cms TRANSMIT W/ C/R COLLECTS D.C. AM)
ADDRESSED IN FR]M LIST TO PROJECT ISSES TE DESIGN D.C.
SHEET i ENGIEER BASIS DOCUMENT 1 r 1r BR CHIEF BR CHIEF QlERIES BR CHIEF UPDATES THE TE C/R DATABASE l
EVALUATES BR CHIEF C/R DATABASE TO DETERMIE CAPTURE OF' TECWICAL REVIEW m
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TO INDICATE C/Rs THAT HAVE It0IVIDUAL 0F DESIGN BASIS IMPLEMENTING HAVE NOT BEEN C/Rs FOR D.C.
DOCUENT DOCUMENT ADDRESSED IN D.C.
ADEQUACY 1 r 1 r BR CHIEF BR N I
EVALUATES C/Rs ISES THAT HAVE NOT D.C.
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I DESIGN BASELINE BR CHIEF PROJECT CHANGES ENGIEER PROGRAM r
COMMITMENT EVISES DESIGN DESIGN BASIS OR D.C.
BASIS DOCUMENT DOCUMENT SEET 2 0F 3
. (page 2 of 3)
FROM sg PLANT NODIFICATION PACKAGE 1
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DESIGN CHANGE NOTICE DESIGN BASELINE PROGRAM b
MAINTENANCE SHEET 3 0F 3 (page 3 of 3)
g 6 is t r ~ i 8 C/R Data Shset h,f (1) C/R N2.
(2)
RIMS No.
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(3) Topic (120 spaces)
(4)
System No.
(5) TVA Should Change This Commitment? h
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(6) Structuro (7) Component
- 1. Aux Bldg.
- 1. Check Valves
- 2. Containment
- 15. Batteries / Chargers
- 3. Control Bldg.
- 2. Control Valves
- 16. Cables
- 3. Cranes
- 17. Circuit Breakers
- 4. Cooling Tower Lift P.S.
l 4 Dampers
- 18. Computers i
- 5. Diesel Gen. Bldg.
- 5. Ducts
- 19. Control Cabinets
- 6. ERCW P.S.
- 6. Fans
- 7. Intake P.S.
,20. Diesel Generators
- 7. Heaters i
8., Reactor Bldg.
8.' Heat Exchangers
- 22. Instruments
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- 21. Fuses
- 9. Turbine Bldg.
- 9. Isolation Valves j
- 10. Piping
- 23. Motor Control Centers __
- 24. Motors
- 11. Piping Supports
- 25. Penetrations
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- 10. Demineralizer Bldg.
- 12. Pumps
- 26. Relays
- 11. Hypochlorite Bldg.
- 13. Tanks
- 27. Switch gear
- 12. Water Treatment Bldg.
- 14. Turbines
- 28. Transformers
- 29. Air Compressor ~~~
- 37. Dryers
- 45. Process Control Cabs
- 30. Annuciators
- 38. Electrical Isolators
- 46. Reactor Fuel
- 31. Barriors
- 32. Cathode Ray Tubes
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- 39. Gates
- 47. Reactor Vessel
- 40. Generators
- 33. Chillers
- 48. Safety-Relief Valves. ~
- 41. Handswitches
- 34. Control Panels
- 49. Sense Lines
- 42. Logic Cabinets
- 35. Control Rods / Drive
- 50. S..am Generators
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- 43. Local Instru. Panels
- 51. Strainers
( 36. Doors l
- 44. Orifices
- 52. Traveling Screens
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A (8) Source of C/R (9) General Desikn Criteria Subjects
- 1. Accoss/ Egress
- 17. I&C
- 32. Power Generation
- 2. Anchorage
- 18. Installation
- 33. QA
- 3. Auxiliary Power
- 19. Insulation 34 Radiation
- 4. Classification
- 20. Lighting-
- 35. Radiation Waste
- 5. Communications
- 21. Maintenance
- 6. Containment
- 36. Refueling
- 22. Materials
- 37. Regulatory Compliance ~
- 7. Control / Instr. Power
- 23. Moch. Components
- 38. Seismic
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- 8. Design Basis Events
- 24. Misslies
- 39. Separation
- 9. Design of Structure
- 25. Noise
- 40. Single Failure
'10. Elec. Raceways
- 26. Operation
- 41. Site
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- 11. EQ
- 27. Penetrations
- 12. Firo
- 42. System Interactions
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- 28. Pipe Break l
- 13. Floods
- 43. Testing
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- 29. Piping Analysis
- 44. Tech. Spec's
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- 14. Hazards
- 30. Plant Discharges
- 45. Tornado
- 15. HVAC
- 16. Human Factors
- 31. Plant Security
- 46. Vibration
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- 47. Water Chemistry
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- 48. Appendix "R"
- 49. Aux Control
- 50. Instr. accuracies,
- 51. Main Control Room Setpoint
- 52. Station Blackout (10) Affected Systems (80 spaces)
- 11) Prepared by Date (12) Checked by Date
~ ggj Action Code (13) Approved by Date _
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