ML20209J026
| ML20209J026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 07/11/1986 |
| From: | Delgeorge L COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| 1862K, NUDOCS 8609160119 | |
| Download: ML20209J026 (6) | |
Text
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72 West Adrms Street, Chic *go, Illinoit V
Address Reply to: Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690-0767 July 11, 1986 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2 Response to Inspection Report Nos.
50-373/86-018 and 50-374/86-017 3
NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374 Reference (a):
C. E. Norelius letter to Cordell Reed dated June 11, 1986.
Dear Mr. Keppler:
This letter is in response to the inspection conducted by Messrs.
M. Jordan, J. Bjorgen, R. Kopriva, and R. DeFayette of this office from i
April 15 through May 9, 1986, of activities at LaSalle County Station Units 1 and 2.
Reference (a) indicated that certain activities appeared to be in noncompliance with NRC requirements. The Commonwealth Edison Company's response to the three items of noncompliance identified in the Notice of Violation is provided in the enclosure, Attachment A.
i In addition, the cover letter requested that we address the general issue of personnel error rate reduction and the steps being taken in l
anticipation of the scheduled Unit 2 fall refueling outage. Because of the j
problems which occurred during the Unit 1 outage, the training for fuel handlers is being expanded. This training, which is repeated prior to each refueling outage, in the past covered primarily the mechanical aspects of the refueling equipment. Ne are adding to this training, coverage of communications, administrative requirements, and the importance of attention to detail. This session will also include full discussions of fuel handling problems which have occurred.
If, due to the length of the outage, a significant period of time passes between the training and the start of core loading, applicable portions of the training may be repeated.
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Mr. J. G. Keppler July 11, 1986 On a broader scope, the station is continuing the plant improvement efforts described in the Cordell Reed letter to J. G. Keppler dated February 4, 1986 transmitting our response to the NRC 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter which have already been effective in significantly decreasing the number of personnel error related Licensee Event Reports. These efforts have included Delian " team building" training for operations and maintenance personnel, improvements in station procedures and material conditions, and " Expectation" meetings with all personnel and with first line supervisors to emphasize the importance of individual responsibilities. Additional steps include: 1)
Weekly meetings are being held in which Department Heads discuss with their departments items of current interest. Personnel Error events will be discussed at these meetings to instill in the working level personnel a sense of the importance of error free work.
- 2) Efforts are being made to increase supervisory involvement in work activities.
In support of these efforts additional " Expectations" meetings are planned to reemphasize to ist line supervision their responsibility and accountability for the performance of their work crew.
I We expect these efforts to continue the long term downward trend in personnel errors at LaSalle.
l If you have any further questions regarding this matter, please direct them to this office.
Very truly yours, b
AssistantVice-Preside [nt L. O. DelGeorge im Attachments cc: NRC Resident Inspector - LSCS i
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ATTACHMENT A ITEM OF VIOLATION:
IR 373/86018-01 Technical Specification 6.2.A.8 requires that detailed written procedur s be prepared, approved, and adhered to for the recommended procedures in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2 which includes Equipment Control (e.g. locking and tagging) procedures. The licensee's equipment out of service procedure, lap 900-4, Paragraph 3a, requires that all personnel protection cards and all necessary out of service cards must be removed before energizing, operating, or changing the position of components for a test.
Contrary to the above, a member of the licensee's technical staff operated the charging water supply valve to the scram accumulator of Control Rod 22-51 on Unit 1 on May 7, 1986 with an equipment out of service tag still attached.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The valve which was operated with the Out-of-Service tag had been authorized to be returned to service. The individual who operated the valve is not a member of the work group which normally performs this function but did move the valve with the consent of the operator. The individual realized the error after the valve movement was complete.
The outage was permanently cleared and the valve returned to service.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION It is believed that this was an isolated occurrence. The individual, in i
an interview, stated that he was familiar with the requirements of the procedure. He has subsequently informed the other members of his working group of this event, the requirements of the out-of-service procedure and the importance of following the equipment out-of-service program.
l DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE Full compliance has been achieved.
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.. ITEM OF VIOLATION: IR 373/86018-04 Technical Specification 6.2.A requires that written procedures including applicable checkoff lists covering various operations of the facility shall be prepared, approved, and adhered to.
Fuel loading procedure LFP 100-1 requires that steps on the Nuclear Component Transfer List must be performed in the exact order listed.
Contrary to the above on May 2, 1986, the-licensee failed to adhere to the fuel loading procedure and inserted a wrong fuel bundle into the reactor.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED Core alterations were suspended. The Nuclear Component Transfer List (NCTL) was revised to include the necessary steps to place fuel assembly LJ9628 in the core correctly, and these moves were executed upon resuming core alterations.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER NONCOMPLIANCE 1)
The root cause of the violation is personnel error in that the Fuel Handling Foreman failed to instruct the bridge operator to skip a bundle since step 931 had been deleted.
2)
Training on this occurrence is being provided to all fuel handling personnel stressing the importance of proper communications and attention to detail.
3)
The Fuel Handling Foreman involved in this event has been counselled concerning his responsibilities during refueling operations. Topics stressed included adequate and proper communications with the bridge operator and the advisability of continuing fuel load operations under inadequate viewing conditions.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE j
Full compliance has been achieved.
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e 4 ITEN OF VIOLATION: IR-373/86018-03A, 03B, 03C Technical Specification 3.9.2 requires that during refueling operations at least two Source Range Monitor (SRM) channels must be~ operable and inserted to their normal operating level. One of the SRM detectors must be located in the quadrant where core alterations are being performed and the other required SRM detector must be located in an adjacent quadrant.
Contrary to the above, on April 25, 1986, a fuel bundle was inserted into quadrant A of the core while the quadrant A SRM detector was not inserted to its normal operating level.
Contributing to this violation were two procedural violations:
a.
Refueling procedure LAP 1600-2 requires that communications to operating personnel must be clear and concise; must be given in such a manner that they are understandable; and must be verified by having the operator repeat back verbal instructions. This was not done by either the communicator on the refuel floor or the NSO in the control room, b.
Refuel procedure LFP 400-1 requires that when transferring a fuel assembly from the fuel pool to the core, personnel on the refuel platform are to notify the control room when moving over the core.
This was not done.
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AND RESULTS ACHIEVED The 'A' SRM was reinserted and the readings observed after loading the fuel bundle were verified to be not appreciably different from the readings observed prior to loading the fuel bundle.
All Puel Handlers, Puel Handling Foremen, NSO's and Nuclear Engineers associated with fuel handling activities were trained on this event and proper communications procedures for moving fuel prior to again participating in fuel load activities.
A communications directive on proper communications required for fuel loading activities has been posted at the Unit NSO desk and on the Refuel Bridge.
Control Room and Refuel Bridge communicators are now required to use speaker phones for refuel activity communications. This mode of communications allows closer monitoring of communications by all personnel involved in fuel handling activities.
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, CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID FURTHER VIOLATION The following corrective actions are in progress to help prevent recurrence of this incident.
The LaSalle Station refuel procedures are being revised to include proper communications requirements.
The problems identified in this event and the corrective actions taken are being reviewed with all Fuel Handlers, Stationmen upgraded to Fuel Handlers, NSO's, Station Control Room Engineers (SCRE's), Shift Engineers, and Nuclear Engineers.
All operating shift personnel are being trained on this event and the importance of proper communications techniques at tailgate sessions held by the Shift Supervisors.
A Station policy statement is being developed to provide guidelines for proper Station communications. The statement will also provide requirements for training and enforcement of the policy statement.
DATE OF FULL COMPLIANCE Full compliance has been achieved. The station policy statement should be completed and issued prior to November 1, 1986.
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