ML20209H316
| ML20209H316 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/31/1985 |
| From: | Bishop R, Opeka J CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO. |
| To: | Zwolinski J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209H320 | List: |
| References | |
| B11829, NUDOCS 8511110070 | |
| Download: ML20209H316 (3) | |
Text
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CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY B E R L I N. CONNECTICUT P o box 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270 TELEPHONE October 31,1985 Docket No. 50-213 Bil829 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn Mr. John A. Zwolinski, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:
Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Proposed Technical Specifications Containment Integrity - PASS Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) hereby proposes to amend its Operating License, DPR-61, by incorporating the attached proposed changes into the Haddam Neck Plant Technical Specifications.
This proposed revision to Technical Specifications 1.8, Containment Integrity (definition) and new Table 3.11-2, Non-automatic Containment Isolation Valves, allows for surveillance testing of normally closed, non-automatic containment isolation valves that are part of the Post-Accident Sampling System (PA*S). The purpose of this proposed Technical Specification is to allow testing of normally closed isolation valves in the PASS during operation modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure operability.
Attachment I provides the proposed Technical Specification revision which allows surveillance testing of PASS during operational modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. This proposed change is consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications which allows opening isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control. It is our intent to perform monthly surveillance tests, which will involve taking a containment air sample and at the same time testing the operability of the isolation valves identified in Table 3.11-2.
CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed revision pursuant to 10CFR50.59.
Our review evaluated the impact of performing the proposed surveillance test on containment integrity during operating modes I, 2, 3, and 4.
The following points summarize the significant conclusions of our review.
Performance of the surveillance test causes insignificant increase in o
the potential for a radiological release.
For an unmonitored radiological release to occur during the performance of the test the following conditions would have to occur at the same time.
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. A Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) must occur during one of the a.
12 (twelve), 45 minute periods within a year during which PASS atmospheric samples are being taken.
b.
Control roor, operators must fail to shut the atmospheric loop sample containment isolation valve, by ignoring a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) and specific procedures to shut the valves upon such a signal. Alternatively, the valves must fall to isolate despite physical redundancy in the valves and electrical redundancy. - The valves fall safe such that they fail closed upon de-energization and they can also be remote manually closed from the control room within 60 seconds of a CIAS. This is significant because the dose consequence analysis for Haddam Neck Plant involves no fuel failure for the first 60 seconds of the accident.
Since the closure time is less than 60 seconds, they are assumed to be isolated prior to any potential release from containment.
Hence, there is no calculated increase in the LOCA dose.
A PASS containment atmospheric sampling line must break open.
c.
It should be noted that all the tubing and components in these lines have been seismically analyzed and supported. Additionally, all tubing in these lines has been purchased having as a prerequisite certified material test reports.'
Performance of the surveillance test in no way creates the potential for o
new type of accident not considered in our design basis since operation of the PASS does not have a direct or indirect effect on reactor operation or associated safety-related systems.
If an accident did occur during the performance of the surveillance o
test, the design of the PASS, as well as existing procedures, are adequate to prevent any increase in the consequences of the accident.
This conclusion is based upon factors including system integrity, isolation capability and unambiguous isolation valve indication in the control room.
CYAPCO has reviewed the proposed revision in accordance with 10CFR50.92, and has concluded that it does not involve a significant hazards consideration.
The basis for this conclusion is that the criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised, a conclusion which is supported by our determinations made pursuant to 10CFR50.59. Additionally, the Commission has provided guidance concerning the application of the standards in 10CFR50.92 by providing certain examples (48FR14870 April 6,1983). Example (vi) of examples not likely to involve a significant hazards consideration most closely envelopes the proposed revision. The proposed revision involves a modest relaxation in the operability requirements to the existing Technical Specifications, but is within acceptable criteria as defined in Standard Technical Specifications, the applicable document analogous to the Standard Review Plan discussed in example (vi). The safety benefits of testing the PASS once a month to assure operation far outweighs the risks associated with opening the containment isolation valves under the conditions summarized above.
. The Connecticut Yankee Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved the attached proposed revision and has concurred with the above determinations.
In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), CYAPCO is providing the State of Connecticut a copy of this proposed amendment.
Pursuant to requirements of 10CFR170.12(c), enclosed with this amendment
- request is the application fee of $150.00.
We trust you find this information satisfactory.
Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY hFG-
- 3. F. Opeka Senior Vice President L
i l
By: R. W.31 shop ' ]
Secretary cc:
Mr. Kevin McCarthy Director, Radiation Control Unit Department of Environmental Protection Hartford, Connecticut 06116 STATE OF CONNECTICUT )
) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD
)
Then personally appeared before me R. W. Bishop, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Secretary of Cannecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company, a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
A/Lb JHll/
14pary Public I
fay Ccmmission Expires fAarch 31,1988