ML20209G282
| ML20209G282 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1986 |
| From: | Wright L AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209G260 | List: |
| References | |
| LRP, NUDOCS 8609120414 | |
| Download: ML20209G282 (6) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00LKETED NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION USNRC BEFORE THE PRESIDING BOARD 16 SD) 11 R2:19 0FFICE OF 3EL <t i AdY DOCKETmd & SE9VKf.
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BRANCs In the Matter of
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INQUIRY INTO THREE MILE ISLAND
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Docket No. LRP UNIT 2 LEAK RATE DATA
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FALSIFICATION
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF LYNN O. WRIGHT My name is Lynn Owen Wright.
I reside in Williamsport, Pennsylvania.
I am currently self-employed as a gift shop owner.
Prior to joining Metropolitan Edison Company (Met Ed),
I spent three years at Juniata College and worked as a laborer at the Harrisburg Steel Company.
I began my employment with Met Ed in 1972 at the Crawford Generating Station.
In 1974, I entered the Auxiliary Operator training program at Unit 1.
In 1975, I began the control room operator (CRO) training program for Unit 2, and received my CRO license in the fall of 1977.
I worked as a CRO until April or May of 1983, at which time I went to the Quality Assurance Department as an Operations Monitor.
I left Met Ed in January 1984 to open my business.
During 1978-1979, I was assigned primarily to the "D"
$bN lO T
b shift, with Gregory Hitz as Shift Supervisor, Adam Miller as Shift Foreman, and Mark Coleman and Dennis Olson as my fellow CRO's.
On each shift, one CRO would be designated as the primary plant operator, another CRO as the secondary plant operator and the third CRO as the surveillance operator.
The primary plant operator was responsible for maintaining the CRO log and monitoring conditions in the primary plant.
The secondary plant operator supervised the activities of the secondary plant auxiliary operators.
The primary responsibility of the third shift member was to conduct surveillance tests.
Each CRO was usually aware of the activities of the other two CRO's.
The CRO's on my shift received the bulk of their instructions from the shift foreman, Adam Miller.
There was very little discussion of leak rate testing with management personnel, such as George Kunder, Joe Logan, Gary Miller or Jim Seelinger.
I do not recall any meetings with the Operations Supervisor, Jim Floyd, concerning leak rate problems with the plant.
Nor do I recall any such meetings with Mike Ross, the Operations Superintendent.
During 1978-1979, I realized that the plant had to be in a steady state condition while a leak rate test was being conducted.
Due to the frequent occurrence of plant variables such as feedwater oscillations, the plant was often unstable during the performance of leak rate tests -- thus making it k
very difficult to obtain a valid leak rate test result.
As a consequence of this plant instability, I did not have much faith in the leak rate test as a reliable indicator of plant leakage.
Our experience demonstrated that the more accurate means of determining plant leakage involved examining a variety of indicators in conjunction, including pressurizer level, makeup tank level and sump pump starts.
We thus came to regard performance of the leak rate test as merely fulfilling the administrative requirement to obtain one satisfactory leak rate test result within a 72-hour period.
A leak rate test result was considered satisfactory if it showed unidentified leakage of less than one gallon per minute (gpm).
I did not consider a negative leak rate test result to be satisfactory, however.
It was the accepted practice on my shift to retain satisfactory leak rate test results and to discard leak rate tests showing unidentified leakage in excess of 1 gpm or showing negative leakage.
To my knowledge, this practice was not originated by any particular individual.
I do not recall ever being warned by anyone to discard unsatisfactory leak rate test results so that the NRC would not discover them.
Prior to the post-accident investigation, I was aware of no rule at Unit 2 that required that we retain unsatisfactory leak rate test results.
There was a short period of time, however, during.
w which we were instructed to retain both satisfactory and unsatisfactory leak rate test results.
This directive may have been issued in respor.se to the Licensee Event Report (LER) dated November 1, 1978, although I cannot be absolutely sure of that relationship, because I have no independent recollection of either the LER itself or the events leading up to it.
Within a short period of time, we resumed our original practice of discarding unsatisfactory leak rate test results.
My recollection is that we had continual problems in obtaining satisfactory leak rate test results.
On the other hand, I do not recall unidentified leakage ever becoming so severe as to necessitate entering the action statement.
I also do not remember ever filing an exception or deficiency for an unsatisfactory leak rate test result, nor do I recall any requirement to do so.
As far as I knew, the problems we experienced in obtaining a satisfactory leak rate test result were sometimes attributable to flaws in the computer program that was used to conduct leak rate tests.
I do not recall any Unit 2 rule that required that the start and stop times of leak rate tests be logged.
Nor do I recall ever being told about such a rule during 1978-1979.
Moreover, no one ever instructed me to refrain from logging the start and stop times of leak rate tests so as to conceal how many tests were actually run.
There were occasions when I added water to the makeup.- -.
tank during a leak rate test.
My purpose in such cases was to bring the makeup tank back up to its original level so as to minimize instrument error, and it was never designed to falsify test results.
I believed that by establishing the same level in the makeup tank at the end of the test as was present at the start of the test, I would enhance the accuracy of leak rate test results.
I never made under-recorded or unrecorded water additions to the makeup tank during a leak rate test so as to falsify the test result.
Nor am I aware of any other Unit 2 operator (including my fellow CRO's Mark Coleman and Dennis Olson) ever engaging in such falsifications.
During 1978-1979, I was aware that when the batch controller was malfunctioning, the amount of a water addition as registered on the makeup tank strip chart could exceed the amount that I had dialed into the batch controller.
- However, neither I, nor to my knowledge either Mark Coleman or Dennis Olson, ever took advantage of this phenomenon to manipulate leak rate test results.
Both I,
and to my knowledge Mr.
Coleman and Mr. Olson, made a practice of entering into the computer the amount of the water addition as read from the makeup tank strip chart -- thereby avoiding any discrepancy.
Prior to the post-accident investigation, I was not aware of any Unit 2 rule that prohibited the addition of hydrogen during a leak rate test.
Rather, I believed that maintaining constant hydrogen pressure during a leak rate test i - - - -
e I
was essential to the accuracy of the test.
For these reasons, it is likely that I added hydrogen to the makeup tank during certain leak rate tests.
In all cases, I logged the hydrogen additions that I made.
During 1978-1979, I was not aware of anyone who added hydrogen during a leak rate test in an effort to falsify the test result.
I remember various periods of time prior to the accident when an outside contractor came to Unit 2 to repair one or both of the level transmitters.
However, I do not recall one particular level transmitter malfunctioning more than the other.
During 1978-1979, I was not aware of any operator switching level transmitters during a leak rate test f
so as to manipulate the test result.
Although I am no longer employed in the nuclear industry, I wish to convey my recollections to the Presiding Board in the interest of the Unit 2 operators with whom I worked prior to the accident.
During that time period, neither I nor any operator that I was aware of falsified leak rate test results.
In addition, I recall no instruction from any supervisor to deliberately manipulate a leak rate test. --
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