ML20209E846
| ML20209E846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 04/27/1987 |
| From: | Hickey P GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Smith I Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#287-3255 CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8704300134 | |
| Download: ML20209E846 (43) | |
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6PANCH 2Ap MAlb J. PATRICK HICKEY, P.C.
April 27, 1987 (zoa) m-osse HAND DELIVERED Ivan W.
Smith, Esquire Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel a
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 In the Matter of GPU Nuclear Corporation (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. @)
Docket No. 50-320; EA 84-137 Civ/)EM
Dear Judge Smith:
i Attached for your consideration are portions of last Friday's deposition of Robert Arnold.
This deposition is germane to the issue whether answers to GPUN's discovery requests con-cerning Parks' " mystery man" allegations should be compelled.
In GPUN's Response to NRC Staff's Motion for Protective Order (April 6, 1987), GPUN explained the relevance of the mystery man allega-tions to Parks' credibility and to the decision to suspend Parks.
We there observed: "There can be no doubt that the Staff will seek, when it deposes Arnold and Charles Sanford of Bechtel, to f
i probe the basis for the decision to suspend Parks.
GPUN's i
Response at 6.
While the subject was addressed'with Sanford to
]
some extent, it was pursued at great length with Mr. Arnold.
As the attached portions of the deposition demonstrate, the NRC Staff questioned Arnold on his knowledge of the accident and whether high pressure injection actuated and terminated (pp.
11-33) and on the relationship of the mystery man allegations to the decision to suspend Parks (pp. 191-97)..This suggests that the Staff now recognizes the mystery man allegations as an impor-j tant issue in this proceeding.
GPUN's requested discovery is equally justified.
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g SH Aw, PITTM AN, PoTTS & TROWBRIDGE A PARTNER 5Mep INCLUDING PmOFESS80NAL CORPORATIONS Letter to Ivan W. Smith, Esquire April 27, 1987 Page 2 A copy of this letter with attachments is being hand deliv-ered to the NRC Staff.
Sincerely,
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/M/
J. Patrick Hicke Counsel for GPUN Enclosure cc:
Service List (w/ attachments)
JPH:pr 1
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/
SERVICE LIST Ivan Smith, Esquire Administrative Law Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Docketing and Service Branch Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 George E. Johnson, Esquire Office of the General Counsel 9604 MNBB U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
UlN11ED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF:
DOCKET NO: 50-320 l
GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (Civil Penalty)
(Three Mile 2sland Nuclear Station, Unit No. 2)
DEPOSITION OF ROBERT C. ARNOLD LOCATION: Washington, D. C.
PAGES: 1 224 J
DATE:
FRIDAY, APRIL 24, 1987 l
ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
OfficialReporters 444 North CapitolStreet Washington, D.C. 20001 (202) 347-3700 NATIONWIDE COVERACE
i CR30690.0 1
DAV/COX/dnw UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
- - - - - - - -x In the Matter oft Docket No. 50-320 GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION (Civil Penalty)
(Three Mile Island Nuclear License No. DPR-73 Station, Unit No. 2)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DEPOSITION OF ROBERT C.
ARNOLD Washington, D. C.
Friday, April 24, 1987 Deposition of ROBERT C. ARNOLD, called for examination pursuant to notice, at the law offices of Shaw,,Pittman, Potts
& Trowbridge, 2300 N Street, N.W.,
Room 2A, at 9:40 a.m.
bufore DAVID L.
HOFFMAN, a Notary Public within and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:
J. PATRICK HICKEY, ESQ.
DAVID R. LEWIS, ESO.
Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037 l
On behalf of GPU Nuclear Corporation.
-- continued --
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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CR30690.0 2
DAV/COX/dnw APPEARANCES: (Continued)
NICHOLAS S. REYNOLDS, ESQ.
DANIEL F.
STENGER, ESG.
Bishop, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036 On behalf of the Deponent.
GEORGE E. JOHNSON, ESQ.
Office of the Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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A In terms of all of the legal structure being in 2
place, that's January '82.
In terms of from an operational 3
standpoint, it really was in place in the fall of 1980.
4 0
Where were you at the time of the accident, March 5
28, 1979?
6 A
I was in Parsippany, New Jersey.
7 0
When did you first learn of the accident?
8 A
I think the term " accident" can be ambiguous in 9
terms of what we mean by that.
But let me hopefully be 10 responsive by saying that I learned there had been a plant 11 upset, a reactor shutdown, or a plant upset including a,
12 reactor shutdown at 8 o' clock in the morning on March 28th.
13 0
And you were notified by phone?
14 A
Yes, sir.
15 0
By whom?
16 A
By a person, a man by the name of George 17 Troeffer.
18 0
Could you spell that?
19 A
I'll try.
T-r-o-e-f-f-e-r.
20 0
In March 1979, you were senior vice president, or 21 you were vice president for generation of GPU Service 22 Corporation.
You also held another title.
That title for 23 Met Ed came later.
24 A
That's correct.
25 0
That came later.
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A Yes, it came in August I believe of '79.
2 0
Were you responsible for operations at Three-Mile 3
Island in your capacity as vice president for Generation?
4 A
Of GPU Service Corporation?
5 0
Yes.
6 A
No, sir.
7 Q
What was your function at that time with respect 8
to the operation of Three-Mile Island, particularly unit 9
two?
10 A
I would identify it as having two aspects to it.
11 One was a carryover.
Well, let me go to the'other one 12 first.
As vice president, Generation of the Service a
13 Corporation, I was responsible for design, or more 14 correctly, the management of the design and construction 15 activities for the GPU system that were of a major nature.
16 I did not have responsibility for the operations 17 of the facilities, but for the design, construction and 18 startup parts of them.
19 In March 1979, we still had some post-commercial 20 operation punchlist type items to finish up that were being 21 done underneath a small project group that was in my 22 organization.
23 The second relationship I had is I served 24 effectively as corporate staff for policy development, 25 budget recommendations and overview of the generating 1
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facilities of the operating companies, what I'd call a 2
typical corporate staff type of function -- not a line -
3 function.
4 0
In the days and weeks and months that followed 5
March 28, 1979, how would you describe your involvement in 6
the events of the accident?
7 In other words, how did you become familiar with I
8 the sequence of events of the accident?
9 A
There were a number of methods by which that 1
i 10 happened, and I may leave out one or two but I'll try to 11 summarize them.
4 12 First of all, we established a task force to do a 13 post-incident review of the events before we really 14 understood the. extent of the accident.
j 15 That was later superseded by another task force 16 that was tasked with investigating certain aspects of the i
17 accident that I believe the company needed to have a better 18 understanding of than we were developing at that time.
19 I was involved with being briefed with results of 20 both of those task group efforts.
The Kemeny Commission 21 that was set up, I was a strong interface point at various 22 times with the activities of the Kemeny Commission in 23 coordinating their interaction with company people.
1 24 We had the NSAC investigation, which we supported i
i 25 with our people.
That's Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.
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was initially an EPRI organization that we supported, and I 2
was obtaining a lot of feedback from what they were learning 3
about the accident.
4 We had a couple of Congressional investigations, 5
the results of which I was familiar with.
6 0
What about the Rogovin Commission?
Did you have 7
interface with them?
8 A
Yes.
There was a Rogovin Special Inquiry Group.
9 There was the NRC's investigative group that resulted in 10 NUREG 0600, the report on the accident.
Then I guess there 11 were various other committee and technical group reviews,of 12 the accident sequence itself.
13 I think it's fair to say that I was familiar with 14 what was being developed by all of them.
And we can even 15 go, I guess, into the 1980-81-82 time period, when we had 16 the B&W lawsuit.
17 We also went back and covered the accident 18 sequence and associated events.
As I say, I probably left 19 out a couple.
20 0
By the time of the B&W lawsuit, which I believe 21 commenced in late 1982 -- is that correct?
22 A
The trial opened in November '82, I believe.
23 0
By that time, were you thoroughly familiar with 24 the sequence of events of the accident?
25 A
Maybe you could clarify for me what you are ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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including in your terminology of sequence of events.
2 0
Had you been involved, for example, in the 3
development of a document -- I think it was called The 4
Sequence of Events, GPU Sequence of Events?
5 A
If I know what document you're referring to and 6
if you have it with you, I'd be glad to cite it and verify 7
that I understand what you're talking about.
8 0
I don't have a copy of it.
I have a reference to 9
it, so it's not going to be that useful.
10 A
If I'm aware of the document you're referring to, 11 that document was basically developed under my direction 12 within the organization I was responsible for supervision 13 of.
I was generally familiar with it.
I don't think I 14 would claim to be familiar with it in detail, in all of its 15 details.
In some of its details, I was.
16 (Pause.)
17 0
You're familiar with the so-called Stier report, 18 entitled TMI-II Report, Management and Safety Allegations of 19 November 1983?
20 A
Yes, sir.
21 0
Could you identify for me a person with the name 22 D.E. Taylor?
23 A
David Taylor, to the best of my knowledge, is a 24 technical consultant who basically is self-employed.
25 0
Are you familiar with the report that's included l
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as Tab 35 in Appendix B of the TMI-2 report by Mr. Stier 2
that I just referenced, called Report on George Kunders 3
activities relative to HPI activation and control on 4
3/28/79.
5 MR. REYNOLDS:
May Mr. Arnold see the document?
6 (Handing document to witness.)
7 (Pause.)
8 THE WITNESS:
Mr. Johnson, I,
frankly, don't 9
remember this document specifically, although, from a very 10 quick and casual scanning of it, it would appear to me that 11 I'm familiar with most, if not all the information that's in 12 it.
13 BY MR. JOHNSON:
14 Q
Okay.
When did you first become aware that 15 George Kunder was duty officer on the morning of the 16 accident?
17 A
I don't have a specific recollection of when I I8 knew that.
19 Q
Would it have been the day of the accident, when 20 you received the reports initially?
Would you have become 21 aware that he was in the control room as duty officer that 22 day?
23 A
I was aware that he was in the control room on 24 that day sometime during mid-day, from my recollection.
25 Other testimony I've given, I do not recall that I realized ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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that he had been the duty of ficer for the 24-hour period 2
preceding that.
3 0
And you're describing when you first learned of 4
his involvement or his being at the site the day of the 5
accident you're talking about?
6 A
Right.
7 0
Did you later learn that he had come to the site 8
at approximately 4:50 in the morning?
9 A
Subject.to checking on the time, I did later 10 learn that he was the first off site person to come to the 11 plant as a result of the incident, yes.
12 0
By later, what time frame can you give us on 13 that?
14 A
I'm not sure of the time because I don't have any 15 recollection of it.
But I would think within the first one 16 to two weeks after the accident.
17 0
I have a picture here from volume one of Three-18 Mile Island, a report to the Commissioners and to the 19 public.
It's on page 45.
20 (Handing document to witness.)
21 BY MR. JOHNSON:
22 0
Is that you?
23 A
Yes, sir.
24 0
Do you know when that was taken?
25 A
I don't have a clear recollection of it, no.
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MR. HICKEY:
Can I ask for some kind of 2
indication of the relevance of this line of inquiry to the 3
issues in this litigation?
4 MR. JOHNSON:
I think it will become apparent.
5 MR. HICKEY:
You're going pretty far afield from 6
what was specified in the issues, specified in the order.
7 MR. JOHNSON:
I think we'll see that it's 8
relevant.
9 Could you read back the last answer, please?
10 (Whereupon, the reporter read the record as 11 requested.)
12 THE WITNESS:
Maybe I should. correct that answer.
13 I'm thinking about it.
I don't have any recollection as to 14 when that picture was taken.
15 BY MR. JOHNSON:
16 0
Okay.
Was Mr. Kunder the technical 17 superintendant for TMI-2?
18 A
At what time period, sir?
19 0
During the time of the accident?
20 A
That's my recollection of what his title is, yes, 21 sir.
22 0
You were aware that that was his position on the 23 day of the accident?
24 A
Yes, sir.
25 0
What were his responsibilities at the time on ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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that day as duty officer?
2 MR. HICKEY:
Are you using duty officer as 3
synonymous with technical superintendant?
4 MR. JOHNSON:
No.
I assume that there may have 5
been other functions that he had that he was not performing 6
on the day of the accident.
7 BY MR. JOHNSON:
8 O
Maybe you can clarify that for me.
Was one of 9
the functions of the technical superintendant for the unit, 10 too, to be duty officer on occasion?
11 A
I don't know if that was in the job description 12 for that position or not, but that was one of several 13 positions on the staff, to my understanding, that were 14 utilized on a rotating basis as duty officers.
15 Q
Okay.
And to the best of your knowledge, what 16 was his responsibility as duty officer that day?
17 A
I'd like my answer to be understood in a very 18 general sense, because I wasn't that close to operations.
19 But my expectations would be that he was the management 20 resource that was to be called upon by the shift supervisor 21 in the event of any difficulties at the plant that 22 management, other than the on shif t management, should be 23 informed of and should be in a position to provide 24 assistancca 25 0
Was it within his function as duty officer to ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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provide advice to the operators as to what courses of action 2
to take?
3 A
I think it's f air to say that part of his role 4
would be to advise the shift people, yes.
1 5
0 would that include advice as to manipulations of 6
controls?
4 7
A In a consultive type of role, but not in a 8
directive role.
9 0
would he have had to have been a licensed 10 operator to have actually manipulated the controls?
11 A
In general, yes.
There are provisions, I 12 believe, for someone to manipulate controls under the 13 direction of a licensed operator, under direct supervision.
14 But I think that's an exception that doesn't really pertain 15 here.
16 MR. REYNOLDS:
It's also calling for a legal 17 conclusion from the witness.
18 BY MR. JOHNSON:
19 0
Have you read the Rogovin report, volume one?
20 A
May I look at it, please?
21 (Handing document to witness.)
22 THE. WITNESS:
My recollection is that shortly 23 after its issuance, I read the section entitled Three-Mile 24 Island, an introduction narrative of the accident.
And the 25 section headed Conclusions and Recommendations.
I don't
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recall whether I read the two appendixes.
4 2
BY MR. JOHNSON:
3 0
Thank you.
Do you recall when you would have 4
read that?
5 A
Other than that I read it shortly af ter it became 6
a public document.
I'm not able to identify the date.
7 Q
It appears to have been issued in January 1980, 8
or shortly thereafter, based on this forward.
That prefaces 9
the document that's signed by Mr. Rogovin and Mr. Frampton, 10 January 1980.
So you would place it in the early 1980 time 11 frame?
12 A
Yes, sir.
13 0
Did you become aware of investigative interviews 14 or statements being given by various participants in the 15 control room during the weeks and months immediately after 16 the accident in 19797 17 A
I had some familiarity with information that was 18 being developed from those interviews that were being 19 conducted by the company people.
I don't recall that I had 20 information that was being developed by either NRC or the 21 Rogovin group when those interviews were public, such as 22 Congressional hearings that were held.
23 I think I was generally familiar with what was 24 said.
I don't recall that I did much in the reading of 25 actual transcripts of those in the '79 time period.
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Q Did you become aware contemporaneous to the 2
creation of the GPU sequence of events that we were 3
referring to, or prior to that time of statements given by 4
operator Zewe, is it?
5 A
Zewe.
6 0
Zewe, Frederick and Faust, concerning l
7 manipulation of controls for the reactor coolant pumps and 8
the high pressure injection system?
9 MR. REYNOLDS:
Do you understand the question?
10 THE WITNESS:
I believe I do.
My recollection is 11 that I was aware generally of what different people who were 12 in the control room at the time were providing in the way of 13 information as to what happened during the time period from 14 4 o' clock until perhaps 4 in the af ternoon or so, for 15 several hours, I think.
16 BY MR. JOHNSON:
17 0
Was it your understanding that Messrs. Zewe, a
18 Frederick and Faust had indicated in their statements that 19 the high pressure injection pumps had been turned on at the 20 time, approximately 5:40 a.m., March 28, 1979, at the time 21 the last of the reactor coolant pumps had been secured?
22 A
It's my recollection that I was aware that that 23 was there.
All account of events of that time in the weeks 24 after the accident.
l 25 Q
Approximately when did you learn that?
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A I think probably when I became specifically aware 2
of it, of the focus on it as opposed to maybe having been 3
told it.
But not focusing on it particularly, was in the 4
course of reviewing some of the documents that either 5
preceded the sequence of events or early drafts of the 6
sequence of events itself.
7 When the technical analysis that was being done 8
did not identify the high pressure injection pumps were 9
started at the time they were shutting down the last of the 10 reactor coolant pumps, and the operators were indicating 11 that they thought that had been done.
j 12 Q
And what were these technical reports that you j
13 were referring to?
14 A
Well, I'm not sure in which documents the 15 information initially was developed.
But we had two or 4
16 three specific technical issues, or collection of issues 17 being pursued by people underneath the two task forces I 18 identified.
19 In the course of doing that work, I think that 20 information may well have been developed, or it may have a
i 21 been developed just as the result of.i sequence of events.
1 l
22 Q
Can you place a time frame on the sequence of 4
i 23 events and those studies being undertaken?
24 A
The initial effort to understand what happened at 25 the time of the accident started the day of the accident.
I
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believe it was in June or July that I established --
2 probably late June or late July that I established what J
3 became known as the Keaton task force, which was the second 4
task force, that I referred to earlier.
5 O
This is 1979?
6 A
Yes.
The efforts of those groups resulted in a l
7 number of what I'll call technical reports.
I couldn't, 8
without going back and reviewing files and things, be more 9
specific than that at this time, I don't think.
10 0
When did you first learn that the technical 11 reports were at variance or suggested conclusions about the 12 initiation of the high pressure injection pumps at 13 approximately 5:40 a.m. on the day of the accident?
14 Was my question clear enough?
15 A
Well, if I understand your question, I think I 16 answered it already, sir.
I'll be glad to repeat the 17 answer, but I think I did answer it.
18 0
Could you repeat it?
I'm sorry.
I 19 A
I think I became aware of the discrepancy at the 20 time the sequence of events was being reviewed while in 21 draft form, or in conjunction with review of drafts, 22 technical reports that related to the same issues.
23 0
It's the when that I'm looking for.
I'm sorry.
24 That was 1979?
19817 i
25 A
tio.
It would have been I think in 1979.
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if you could identify it for me.
When we submitted the 2
sequence of events to the NRC, that would put a late date on 3
it.
4 (Pause.)
5 When we have,the opportunity, there's another 6
aspect to the answer that I'd like to provide.
7 Q
Maybe I can find that during a break.
Right now, 8
it doesn't seem worth taking the time.
But you have 9
something you'd like to add?
10 A
Yes.
A sequence of events was also developed by I
11 the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center.
My recollection is,that 12 the sequence of events developed by them, which were 13 finished, I think, in their initial report on it in late '79 14 or early '80, did not identify or did not support the 15 initiation of high pressure injection at full flow at the 16 time of the start of the reactor coolant pumps.
17 In other words, in their sequence of events put 18 together by NSAC, they did not identify, as I recall, when 19 that occurred.
I also would say that my recollection is 20 that they were basing their sequence of events completely on 21 the technical data they were able to develop.
22 They did it with the assistance of plant people.
23 But I don't think they used testimony that wasn't supported I
24 by the technical data.
25 0
Is it your understanding that at the GPU B&W ACE FEoERAt. REPORTERS, INC.
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trial, or in depositions prior thereto, that two of the 2
operators -- Mr. Zewe and Mr. Frederick -- revised their 3
initial view about the HPIs being turned on at the same time 4
the last reactor coolant pump was secured?
5 A
I became aware of that at sorte point.
I think it 6
was' subsequent to their testLaony, 7
0 Do you mean testimony during the trial?
8 A
Yes, sir.
9 Q
Were you at the trial?
l 10 A
I was one of the witnesses at the trial, but I 11 was not there other than at the time I was scheduled to,
12 testify.
13 O
So you weren't there on November 1st, when Mr.
14 Fiske gave his opening statement?
15 A
No, I was not there.
16 Q
Did you read his opening statement after it was 17 given?
18 A
I don't have a recollection of reading any of it 19 until much later, and then only extracts.
20 0
When did you become aware that as part of the 21 theory of the B&W lawsuit that B&W was contending that i i 22 because the high pressure injection panps had been turned 23 off at approximately 5:40 a.m. on the day of the accident, 24 which caused the core to be uncovered, that B&W couldn't be 25 responsible for the damage to the core?
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MR. REYNOLDS:
Do you understand the question,
~
2 Mr. Arnold?
3 THE WITNESS:
I was just going to ask if you'd 4
mind repeating it because it didn't go where I thought it i
5 was going, and I'm not sure I followed it?
6 (Pause.)
7 BY MR. JOHNSON:
8 Q
Let me just read from NUREG 0680.
It summarizes 9
the statement.
The statement itself is in the Stier report 10 as Tab 34.
Let me just read it from page 11-1 of NUREG 11 0680, sub-5.
12 In his opening statement at the trial on 13 November 1, 1982, R.B. Fiske, the attorney for B&W, 14 emphasized the GPU SOE.
What is SOE?
15 A
Sequence of events.
16 Q
Conclusion that HPI had been initiated at 0541.
17 Had it remained on, he argued, core damage would not have 18 occurred; thus, Fiske concluded that Met Ed was negligent by 19 turning off the HPI pumps.
20 Fiske further argued that the " mystery man",
l 21 quote / unquote, who turned the pumps off could not have been 22 a B&W employee.
Thus, B&W was not responsible for the core 23 damage.
24 Were you familiar with that line of reasoning 25 during the trial?
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A Yes, sir, I believe I was.
2 Q
Is it fair to say that the existence or not of 3
the mystery man had a substantial bearing on liability of 4
GPU for the accident?
5 A
Not in my opinion, but I don't think I'm 6
qualified to answer that question.
7 Q
Were you also aware of Mr. Faust's testimony --
8 well, it's my understanding that Mr. Faust did not testify 9
during the B&W GPU trial.
Did you understand at the time of 10 the trial that Mr. Frederick -- I'm sorry -- Mr. Faust still 11 held the position that the HPIs were turned on at the time 12 that the last reactor coolant pump had been secured on the 13 morning of the accident?
14 A
I don't believe I was aware of that.
If that's 15 the case, I think I guess I'd have to say I'm surprised, 16 based on what I thought was in the record subsequent to 17 that.
18 (Pause.)
19 Q
During your investigations or participation in 20 the various investigations during the aftermath of the 21 accident, did you become aware that Mr. George Kunder had a a
22 role in the securing of the reactor coolant pumps?
23 A
Yes, sir, I did know that.
I don't have a 24 specific time frame to associate with that, but I think in i
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accident, I was aware of that.
2 Q
Specifically, I'm referring to securing the 3
reactor coolant pumps at approximately 5:41 a.m. the day of 4
the accident.
5 A
Well, my memory isn't very fresh on it now.
I 6
was quite familiar, I believe, by mid-1979 with the timing 7
and the decision process on securing of all four of the 8
reactor coolant pumps on the morning of the accident.
9 0
Did you have a role in the settlement that was 10 reached with B&W in January 1983?
11 A
I don't think it would be accurate to say I had a 12 role in the conditions of the settlement.
I did have a role 13 in deciding how to implement the conditions of the 14 settlement.
15 MR. JOHNSON:
Let me take a five-minute break.
16 (Recess.)
17 MR. JOHNSON:
Why don't we go back on the record.
18 I want to finish up the last line of questions.
19 BY MR. JOHNSON:
20 Q
Mr. Arnold, did you say that you had read the 21 opening statement at any time of Mr. Fiske from the B&W 22 trial?
23 A
I believe what I said and what my recollection is 24 is that I had read excerpts from it, but I don't think I 25 ever read it in its entirety.
i j
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0 Did you read that portion of it that refers to 2
the statements of Mr. Zewe?
3 A
I don't recall.
If you could show me those, 4
perhaps it would refresh my memory.
5 0
Okay.
6 (Handing document to witness.)
7 BY MR. JOHNSON:
8 0
I'm showing you tab -- I think it's 38 -- from 9
the Stier report, appendix B, page 158 of the transcript.
10 A
For the record, it's tab 34.
11 0
Sorry.
12 (Pause.)
13 A
I understand that your question goes to his 14 comments about Mr. Zewe, which appear on page 158?
My 15 recollection is that I had read that part of Mr. Fiske's 16 opening statement at probably various times.
17 0
Within weeks to several months after the 18 statement was given?
Would that be a f air approximation of 19 when you did it?
20 A
Well, I don't have a recollection of it.
But my 21 guess is that it was probably during the summer of '83 at 22 least that I have read that.
Whether I had read it earlier 23 or closer to the time it was made or not, I can't recall.
24 I would also like to point out that there are 25 some statements made in that opening statement by Mr. Fiske ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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that I would disagree with as being accurate, based upon the 2
information I had in 1979.
3 O
Shortly after the statement was made on 4
November 1st, was a report of the statement relayed to you 5
in some way?
6 A
I think when one underscores in some way --
7 0
In what way?
How did you learn of it first?
8 A
My recollection is that, as GPU's attorneys were 9
working at how to respond in testimony to the claims made by 10 Mr. Fiske relative to their being a mystery man, that I had 11 some discussions with the attorney team as to who in the,GPU 12 staff might be able to assist.
And as testimony was being 13 prepared, it was contemporaneous with when some of my own 14 trial testimony preparation was done.
So I was in their 15 of.fices discussing with some of the attorneys and the staff 16 report they had the issue and what information was being 17 developed to deal with that item.
18 The impression I didn't want to leave is that I 19 was somehow the specific recipient of a report on that issue 20 immediately after it was made, or something like that.
That 21 was not the case.
l 22 0
But you became aware during those discussions you l
23 just referred to during trial preparation that Mr. Fiske was 24 relying on statements by Mr. Zewe concerning the initiation 25 of the HPIs during the morning of the accident?
j i
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'l A
I don't believe I'd characterize it that way.
I 2
became aware that he had made certain assertions in the 3
course of his opening argument relative to testimony.
4 Well, I wouldn't even call it testimony.
- Really, 5
relative to there having been a mystery man.
6 Q
Would it be a true statement to say that, at the 7
time of your preparation for the lawsuit, the B&W lawsuit, 8
that you and GPU and GPU's lawyers consistently took the 9
position that high pressure injection was not initiated 4
10 during the time we were just referring to -- 5:41 a.m. --
11 and, therefore, that there was not a mystery man to turn, 12 them off?
13 MR. HICKEY:
Taking the position is pretty 14 ambiguous.
Can you be any more specific about where this 15 position was taken which you're referring to?
16 BY MR. JOHNSON:
17 0
Was my question unclear?
18 A
Yes, sir, it was.
19 Q
Let me try to rephrase it.
Was it your position i
20 during your preparation for your testimony at the B&W trial 21 that the high pressure injection pumps were not initiated at 22 5:41 a.m.,
the day of the accident, and, therefore, that 23 there was not a mystery man to turn them off?.
24 MR. HICKEY:
His position meaning his belief?
I 25 MR. JOHNSON:
Yes.
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THE WITNESS:
To the best of my recollection, at 2
the time of the B&W lawsuit -- I think I'd like to first 3
make it clear that I was not preparing to give testimony in 4
that area.
And was not directly involved with the 5
development of the testimony or the planning for its 6
presentation.
7 To the extent that I was aware of the issue 8
though, my best recollection is that I did not have a firm 9
belief at the early stages when the issue first came up, 10 although I had always been doubtful that the operator's 11 recollection was correct.
12 That is, since it first became an issue, I had 13 serious doubts that their recollection was correct.
14 In the course of the trial, testimony and 15 preparation, I believe I was familiar with some of the 16 analyses that were being done to pursue the issue.
17 And I think it's probably accurate to say that by 18 the end of the trial, when settlement was reached, I was 19 convinced that the operators were incorrect in their 20 recollection back in April of 1979.
2 21 Q
And that there was no mystery man?
22 A
That's correct.
23 0
Mr. Arnold, did you in response to the notice of 24 deposition bring any documents with you?
25 A
No, sir, I did not.
4 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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Parkc' conduct, and I directed the action be taken that I 2
fcit was a minimum that we could take to protect the project 3
progreca from that, and still do the minimum damage to Parks' 4
cituation.
5; Q
Can you identify any other information that you 6
relied upon, apart from the three things that I would cay 7
that I will enumerate, that you have stated, the text of the 8
prccc relcace, the text of the affidavit, and the reactions 9
that you heard at that March 23 morning aceting.
Ic therc 10 anything clac you relied on?
11 A
I don't believe co.
12 Q
Just take a minute and think about it and acc if 13 you can think about anything cloc.
14 A
I don't have any recollection of anything cloc, 15 nor do I have a recollection of having tcatified otherwise.
16 Q
That's finc.
I would like to direct your 17 attention to pagcc 36 and 37 of the Parks affidavit, which 18 deals with the myctcry man.
Ic there anything in there that 19 you knew to be falac at the time you made your decision to 20 bar Mr. Parka from the citc?
21 A
Since, in matter of fact, therc's no cuch thing ac 22 certainty, I gucca I would have to cay no.
But in terms of 23 being confident within the -- what is normally characterized 24 as " knew," ycc.
There arc ctatementa in there that I wac 25 completely confident on that day werc dead wrong, ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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Q Could you point me to onc?
2 A
Sure.
The first centence says "on acveral 3
occasionc Joe - " cxcuse ac first centence of the last 4
paragraph on page 36, statcc "on acveral occasions, Joc 5
Chwactyk and chift cupervicor Bernic Smith identified Kunder 6
as the myctcry man."
7 I knew that Joc Chwastyk and Bernic Smith werc 8
among thoce that were interviewed extcncively following the 9
TMI-2 accident.
I was familiar generally with the content of 10 their testimony, and I think that to the extent there was an) 11 anomalica in their tectimony relative to what others might 12 have been testifying to, I was familiar with it.
I was 13 abcolutcly' confident that Chwantyk and Scrnic Smith had never 14 identified Ccorge Kunder ao being conconc who had shut off 15 the high preocure injection pumps chortly after 5:41 a.m. on 16 March 28, 1979.
17 Q
How about another onc?
i 18 A
Ycc.
If you go on to the next centence, he licts 19 a number of pcopic that had knowledge that Chwantyk or Smith 20 had identified Kunder as a man who chut down the safety 21 injection pumps.
He includcc in that Bubba Marchall, Ron 22 Warren and Lcc Rogcrc.
Bubba Marcha11 and Ron Warren were 23 also among thoac that were intervicwed extcncively following 24 the TMI-2 accident, and like Chwactyk and Smith, I was 25 confident that'they did not have any cuch knowledge.
Lcc ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS. INC.
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Rogers was also onc that I wac complctcly confident had no 2
such knowledge of Ccorge Kunder being the one who had chut 3
down the high precourc injection pumps becaucc Lcc Rogcrc was 4
an employce of Babcock & Wilcox, if he had any information 5
that would have supported his position in the lawsuit, I am 6
sure he would have donc co and I am confident that he never 7
cuggcated that wac the cacc.
8 Q
Anything cloc, sir?
9 A
Thocc were the pcopic that I was familiar with 10 their knowledge of the TMI-2 accident.
Others on the list 11 cither weren't here or would have had nothing but the 12 accondary information, anyway.
13 Q
Okay.
14 A
I think there is another aspect, though, that in 15 important relative to thic recitation on the bottom of page 16 36.
That io to say that peoplc like Chwastyk and Smith, 17 Warren, Marchall and Rogerc, knew that and didn't identify it 18 in the cource of all the intervicws and cworn tcctimony they 19 gave, I think is a terribic thing to say about those pcopic.
20 What it says is that they had knowledge about the accident, 21 which I will completely agree with, I think the way Parka 22 characterizcc carly in hic affidavit, ac the worst near 23 dicacter in the hictory of nuclear power as of that time.
24 And to cuggcat that thocc pcopic knew comething like that 25 about the accident and didn't identify that when they werc ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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giving sworn tcotimony, is to make a terrible accucation 2
againct those pcopic, I believe.
3 I believe that othere would take the came 4
interpretation of it.
5 Q
Can you point to any statements in the Parka 6
affidavit which you believe that Mr. Parks knowingly -- would 7
chow that Mr. Parks knowingly made a falac statcment there?
8 A
I think I can, although that wacn't the issue I 9
was trying to make a judgment about on March 13, but I think 10 I can anyway.
11 Q
In making your decision you didn't try to reach a 12 conclucion as to whether he knowingly made a faloc statement?-
13 A
No.
I did make a judgment ac to whether hc chould 14 have known differently, but I did not reach a conclusion as 15 to whether there was deliberatenccc on his part or grocc 16 negligence or just indifference or irresponsibility or what 17 was the rencon, ao to speak, or the explanation for why it is 18 incorrect.
19 Q
His motivoc?
20 A
Ycc.
I did not make a judgment on that.
I think 21 that what I know today, I can certainly identify where he, ir '
22 fact, knew differently.
But that wacn't baced on information 23 I had at that time.
24 Q
Would you point me to one or two examplco that you 25 know -- that you think you know based on what you know now?
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A I think we can take page 36 and 37, where you are 2
talking about the Ccorge Kunder and the myctory man.
I think 3
all of the tcctimony that was developed since that chows that 4
he had to have been -- he had to have known those people were 5
not claiming Ccorge Kunder was the myctcry man.
In fact, I 6
think that thingo that have come to light in the discovery 7
period in preparation for this show ampic cupport that even 8
he recognizca he didn't have a basic for it.
He makcc a 9
ctatement relative to the February 22 or 23 aceting, for 10 cxampic.
Let's acc where that'ic.
11 Q
It's in the 20c.
12 MR. HICKEY:
21 or 22.
Bottom of 21, I think, 13 maybc.
14 BY MR..TOHNSON:
15 Q
Ycc.
Bottom of 21 in the February 22 aceting and 16 continuca on to page 22.
17
\\
He statcc at the bottom page 21, the last full 18 centtrec, "the aceting accompliched nothing."
He wac at the 19 mccting.
He c1carly should have known that a great deal was 20 accomplished by the meeting and in fact it led directly to 21 the mccting the ncxt day of February 23.
22 Q
I am corry, I didn't follow you.
Where docc it 23 cay that?
24 A
Bottom of page 21, last complete centence.
25 Q
Pardon mc?
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A Makcc a flat statement, "the aceting accompliched 2
nothing."
That's wrong.
He had to know it was wrong at the 3
time.
4 Q
Can I just ack you to tell me, you made a 5
ctatement about the pagcc 36 and 37, and a general reference 6
to information that you have 1carned since discovery and 7
clocwhere.
Would you give ac an exampic of one of thecc 8
pieces of information which chows that Mr. Parka knew that 9
any of this information was falac?
10 A
There's a document that I undcratand, it's my 11 undcratanding that Mr. Parka drafted, that appearc to be, to 12 me at 1cact that appears to be a draft letter to the editor, 13 in which he talks about the incue of chutting down of pumpc, 14 and he is talking there about reactor coolant pumpc.
15 He cubacquently, in, I believe, a draft affidavit 16 that he providcc to OI in November of
'83, trica to, in 17 cffect, explain away all of this with what I just find 18 completely unpercuacive in torac of him having a basic for 19 the kind of allegation he made in the affidavit.
20 Q
I am at a loca as to the first document you were 21 referring to.
Ic it a document that we produced in diccovery 22 or that you produced in discovery?
23 A
I believe it's one that you produced in 24 discovery.
25 Q
Could you identify it a littic more specifically ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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co that I could undcratand what it ic?
2 MR. HICKEY:
I think it's the one that is the 3
cubject of your objections to our discovery attempt to learn 4
what the cource of the document wac.
It's the subject of 5
your motion for a protcetive order.
It's one of the threc 6
documents that you caid was not sufficiently relevant to this 7
proceeding.
8 MR. JOHNSON:
I cco.
It's the onc from an 9
anonymous whistle blowcr?
10 MR. HICKEY:
That'n'how it's dcccribed.
11 MR. JOHNSON:
Okay.
I just wanted to know what 12 you were referring to.
Okay.
13 BY MR. JOHNSON:
14 Q
When did you contact Bcchtcl with this information 15 about your decision about Mr. Parks being barred from the 16 citc?
17 A
I know the term " barred" hac come up, and I don't 18 have a real quibbic with the effcet of it.
It was the came 19 ac if I had caid I was going to bar him from the cite, but it 20 wasn't that kind of harch, I gucca I would say, terminology 21 that was used.
I believe I identified to the management 22 people of Bechtcl that were at the Dupont Plaza Hotel, that I l
23 juct considered it inappropriate to try to continue to have 24 him in his precent accignment and would like them to find 25 come other use for him, and, because, I didn't want to try to i
j
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