ML20209E652
| ML20209E652 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 04/24/1987 |
| From: | Farrar D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | Lieberman J NRC OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT (OE) |
| References | |
| 2944K, EA-87-016, EA-87-16, NUDOCS 8704300091 | |
| Download: ML20209E652 (6) | |
Text
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) Conunonwealth Edloon
, One First Nabonal Plaza. Chicago, Illinois 5
\\ ,,/ Address Reply to: Post Omco Box 767
%/ Chicago,lilinois 60690 0767 April 24, 1987 Mr. James Lieberman, Director Office of Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Byron Station Unit 1 Enforcement Action 87-16 NRC Docket No. 50-454 Reference (a): Letter of March 26, 1987 from A. Bert Davis to James J. O'Connor
Dear Mr. Lieberman:
Reference (a) transmitted a Notice of Violation and proposed Imposition of Civil penalty for a failure to obtain prior NRC approval of a change to the Final Safety Analysis Report for Byron Unit 1.
Although you determined that as a matter of safety the violation would normally be categorized only at Severity Level IV, in this case based on your belief that a section manager exhibited careless disregard for regulatory compliance the event was categorized at Severity Level III and a $50,000 civil penalty was proposed.
Edison disagrees with your analysis of the circumstances which led to this event and continues to believe that those circumstances more reasonably show that it was the result of a good faith misunderstanding which the section manager relied on to determine compliance with regulatory requirements.
In particular, although you have correctly identified each of the individual circumstances involved in that event, your juxtaposition of those circumstances without further elaboration of the corresponding details creates an impression contrary to Edison's understanding of the cause of this event. However, recognizing both that reasonable minds can differ and that there is nothing new to be said on this issue, Edison has enclosed a check for
$50,000.
Attachment A of this letter contains Edison's response to the Notice of Violation.
Very ruly yours, 8704300091 860424 i
PDR ADOCK 05000454
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O PDR Dennis L. Farrar Director of Nuclear Licensing Attachment SUBSCRIBED AND i
to cc: Regional Administrator befo e me, his
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s ATTACHMENT A RESPONSE TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION Notice Of Violation Byron Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Operating License No. NPF-37, Section 2.C.(3), required that the licensee conduct the post-fuel-loading initial test program as described in Chapter 14 of the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), as amended, without making any major program modification unless such modification had prior NRC approval.
Major program modifications as defined in this license section included changes to the acceptance criteria for a safety-related test.
Contrary to the above, on January 31, 1985, the licensee implemented a major program modification to the post-fuel-loading initial test program without prior NRC approval.
The Project Engineering Section Manager approved the results of Start-up Test 2.63.32, " Reactor Coolant Flow Coastdown," a safety-related test, based on an acceptance criterion different from that in FSAR Chapter 14 dated June 1984.
The results of that test did not satisfy the approved acceptance criterion in FSAR Chapter 14.
The licensee had not requested, nor had the NRC approved, a change of that acceptance criterion.
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1 This violation occurred because of careless disregard for the operating license requirements.
This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
Civil Penalty -- $50,000.
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(1)
Admission Or Denial Of The Alleaed Violation Commonwealth _ Edison Company (" Edison") acknowledges, in retrospect, that Start-Up Test 2.63.32 " Reactor Coolant Flow-Coastdown" should not have been approved until new FSAR acceptance criteria were submitted for prior NRC approval.
Indeed, when
. Edison clearly understood that new criteria had been utilized by Westinghouse in the review of the test, Edison promptly informed NRC and submitted a change to the FSAR acceptance criteria.
However, this understanding of the acceptance criteria was developed over several weeks, during which Edison repeatedly sought and received Westinghouse confirmation that the flow coastdown test results met the FSAR acceptance criterion.
Consequently, Edison does not agree that this violation occurred because of careless disregard for the operating license requirements and submits that it was the result of an error, in spite of a well-intentioned review effort, resulting from miscommunication between Edison and one of its contractors.
As a result of this miscommunication, Edison reasonably believed that approval of the flow coastdown test results was appropriate under i i
the FSAR acceptance criterion that was then in effect.
- However, since the circumstances of this test approval have already been fully explored with NRC, Edison does not believe that further articulation of Edison's position is likely to alter NRC's view of the matter, and Edison will pay the proposed civil penalty.
(2)
Reasons For The Violation Edison has determined that this violation was the result of a good faith error caused by a miscommunication and misunder-standing of information conveyed to Edison Project Engineering by Westinghouse.
Edison repeatedly sought and received Westinghouse confirmation that the flow coastdown test results met the FSAR acceptance criterion.
Based on the information received from Westinghouse, Edison Project Engineering reasonably believed the license condition was met at the time the test results were approved.
The inquiries and analysis which led Edison Project Engineering to conclude that the test results were acceptable was set out in detail in a memorandum which was made available to NRC at the time of the approval.
Edison was later informed by Westinghouse that the test results did not meet the applicable FSAR acceptance criterion and that there had been a misunderstanding between Edison and Westinghouse in earlier discussions of the test results.
The efforts undertaken by Edison Project Engineering in reviewing the test results and in communicating with Westinghouse demonstrate that the operating license requirements were carefully considered, r ',
not carelessly disregarded, at the time of approval of the test results.
(3)
Corrective Actions Taken And Results Achieved When Edison was informed by Westinghouse that the test results had been incorrectly approved, it promptly informed the NRC and performed a 50.59 evaluation to justify continued operation.
Shortly thereafter, Edison submitted a change to the FSAR acceptance criterion and met with Region III officials to discuss the acceptability of the test results.
The FSAR change has been approved by the NRC, and the test results have been accepted.
(4)
Corrective Actions To Prevent Recurrence Edison believes that this violation represents an iso-lated occurrence in the start-up testing program.
This belief is based in part on the fact that the circumstances of this start-up test were unusual in that Edison was relying on Westinghouse analysis and reviews to a greater extent than has been generally necessary for most other start-up tests.
In addition, a second level of Project Engineering review of test results was initiated shortly after this error was discovered and was continued for each subsequent start-up test until confidence was regained in the test review process.
No similar problems were found during the period of that review.
Also, Westinghouse did a retrospective audit of the reviews previously made of 10 pre-op test results packages
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,s each for Byron 2 and Braidwood 1 and that audit confirmed the engineering evaluations of those tests were sound.
To further assure that the problem does not recur, Edison has formally instituted a second 100% Project Engineering Department review of executed test results.
To prevent a recurrence of the miscommunication which occurred between Edison and its contractor, Edison has also required an in-house oversight review by Westinghouse and Sargent & Lundy (whichever is applicable for a given system) to improve communication and assure compliance with technical and licensing requirements.
In addition, all reviews of test results are now provided to Edison's Department of Nuclear Safety for an assessment of regulatory compliance.
(5)
Date When Full Comoliance Will Be Achieved Full compliance has been achieved.
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