ML20209E521

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Audit for Mark I Containment Long-Term Program - Structural Analysis for Operating Reactors,Monticello Nuclear Generating Station, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20209E521
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 06/21/1985
From: Le A
CALSPAN CORP.
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML112991396 List:
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130 TER-C5506-326, NUDOCS 8506250382
Download: ML20209E521 (45)


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{{#Wiki_filter:* , TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT NRC DOCKET NO. 50-263 FRC PROJECT C5506

6. NRC TAC NO. - FRC ASSIGNMENT 12 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81 130 FRC TASK 326 5

AUDIT FOR MARK I CONTAINMENT IDNG-TERM PROGRAM - STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS FOR OPERATING REACTORS NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY

     ,                              MONTICELLO NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT
   ]                                            TER-C5506-326 Prepared for
      !     Nuclear Regulatory Commission                              FRC Group Leader: V. N. Con Washington, D.C. 20555                                     NRC Lead Engineer:              H. Shaw 7

June 21, 1935 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency inereof, or any of their i employees. nakes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibhity iw-any third party's use, or the rerufts of such use, of any information, appa-ratus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. Prepared by: Reviewed by: Approved by; cAk & Principal Author k G'oup r Ar kn Le#ader

                                                                                      /7/CJ-r--

Department recht l Date: E-20-PS Date; bl1Il?(

                                                                /

Date: 6 ~ 21 W i L

                                                                       ' FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DIVISION OF ARVIN/CALSPAN 20tn a sacs $7 seers.pstaostema,ma mo:
          $ 5 C b E o 3 6 2_.

m . _ . . _ _ _ _ . ._ . .. . - _ _ _ __

TER-C5506-326 CONTENTS 4 Section Title Page 6. 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 AUDIT FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

     ,       3     CONCLUSIONS.                 .        . .  .    .           .   .     .   .       . .     .  .           5 4     REFERENCES .                 .        . .  .    .           .   .     .   .       . .    .   .           6
~"

APPENDIX A - AUDIT DETAILS

   .o APPENDIX B - TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE USE OF THE CMDOF 7                                    PROGRAM IN THE MARK I TORUS ATTACHED
PIPING ANALYSIS l'

i-L i 9 O

  "T 3

l l l l r l l l 111

4 TER-C5506-326 l i l FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report was prepared by Franklin Research Center - n. under a contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Countission (Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Operating Reactors) for technical assistance in support of NRC operating reactor licensing actions. The

   ,       technical evaluation was conducted in accordance with criteria established by a       the NRC.

7 a 3 L.! u

     +

1 J l J l . I v

1. TER-C5506-326

1. INTRODUCTION The capability of the boiling water reactor (BWR) Mark I containment suppression chamber to withstand hydrodynamic loads was not considered in the original design of the structures. The resolution of this issue was divided k into a short-term program and a long-term program.

I' Based on the results of the short-term program, which verified that each l Mark I containment would maintain its integrity and functional capability when

    ,    cubjected to the loads induced by a design-basis loss-of-coolant accident 4     (LOCA), the NRC staff granted an exemption relating to the structural factor
   -     cf safety requirements of 10CFR50, 55(a).

1 5 The objective of the long term program was to restore the margins of m cafety in the Mark I containment structures to the originally intended u margins. The results of the long-term program are contained in NUREG-0661

     ,    [1], which describes the generic hydrodynamic load definition and structural ceceptance criteria consistent with the requirements of the applicable codes and standardt The objective of % is report is to present the results of an audit of the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant plant-unique analysis (PUA) report with regard to structural s.nalysis. The audit was performed using a moderately
  ]

detailed audit procedure developed earlier [2] and attached to this report as App 2ndix A. The key items of the audit procedure are obtained from " Mark I

    ^

Containment Program Etructural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide" [5], which meets the criteria of Reference 1. { e 4 l l l l

4 TER-C5506-326

2. AUDIT FINDINGS l

l A detailed presentation of the audit for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant is provided in Appendix A, which contains information with regard to several key items outlined in the audit procedure [2]. Based on this detailed

h.

audit, it was concluded earlier that certain items in the Monticello PUA

 ;['         report [4] indicated noncompliance with the requirements of the criteria [3]          !

tI l and that several aspects of the analysis required further information. The ' required information was determined to be similar to that of the Duane Arnold

      }J plant. Therefore, the responses obtained from the Duane Arnold plant were
, used as a basis for the evaluation of the Monticello plant.

5 During the course of reviewing the analytical techniques for stress r, calculations of the torus attached piping systems, Franklin Research Center 2 (FRC) staff raised concerns regarding the verification of the computer program _ CMDOF -(Coupling of Multiple Degrees of Freedom), which was used by the NUTECH

t. , technical staff to qualify the Mark I torus attached piping systems in a number of nuclear power plants. Meetings were held with NUTECH technical staff and representatives of affected utilities to discuss and resolve
.J concerns associated with this program.       In accordance with an FRC request for
     ]"     additional study to verify the program, the Monticello plant used some in plant safety relief valve tests performed in 1980 for verification purposes, and the results of this study were found acceptable. Appendix B of a

this report provides the background and assessments relating to this program

r- The Licensee has responded [8] to all the items contained in the request for i

lt additional informations a brief review of each response is provided below. i l l Item 1 Provide calculations demonstrating conformance to the 10% rule of ' Section 3.1.1 of the plant-unique analysis (PUA) report [4] for small l bore piping systems in the Monticello plant that were exempted from I analysis because of the 10% rule. l Response 1 In response to this item, the Licensee provided a summary of the method for applying the 10% rule that exempted some small bore pipes from analysis; the method is listed below: l __ __ ._ _. _ __- _ -

                                                                            -  -  . ~ _

, TER-C5506-326 o At the small bore piping attachment point, the stresses in the large bore piping due to combined Furk I loads were calculated. o The large bore piping stress combinations for Levels B, C, and D were compared against 10% of the respective allowables. Stress intensification factor values were also included where applicab2e. t L. o Any small bore piping connected to large bore piping that met the 10% rule at the attachment point was then exempted from further Mark I -1 evaluation.

   ,     The Licensee also provided a table showing the distance from the' torus along r

J each large bore line to the point at which the los rule comes into effect. The Licensee's response indicates that sufficient calculations have been made j to ensure compliance with the 10% rule of Section 6.2d of the criteria [3].

   ]     Item 2    With reference to Table 5.2-2 of the PUA report (4], provide and justify the reasons for not considering load cases which include loads such as pool swell and safe shutdown earthquake.

1 I Response 2 I J The Licensee indicated that load combinations involving pool swell and safe shu'tdown earthquake (SSE) are primarily service level C load combina-n

  ]      tions, for which allowable stresses are significantly higher than for service level B. The Licensee also stated that comparison of pool swell and SSE loads j

1 against condensation oscillation (CO), chugging, and safety relief valve (SRV) '1~ loads showed that the service level B load combinations involving CO, 7 chugging, and SRV completely bound the service level C load combinations involving pool swell and SSE. The Licensee's response is technically adequate. , Item 3: With respect to Section 5.2.1 of the PUA report (4), provide and justify the reasons for considering the reduction factor of 1.87 to be the representative value for SRV discharge loads for all TAP lines when this reduction factor was determined using test results (9) for the Monticello RCIC line only. l l Response 3 l In this response, the Licensee asserted that the reduction factor was only used for selected systems and components. For piping, the reduction l

                                                                                                     -  ~ .       -- .. - - -             -. -- ..-

TER-C5506-326 i factor for SRV discharge loads was selectively used only for the RCIC turbine exhaust system of the torus attached piping for which the test results are cvailable. For penetration, the 1.87 reduction factor was used for both the RCIC and HPCI turbine exhaust penetrations because of the geometric cimilarities of their internal piping and structures. The Licensee's response 6. is satisfactory.

     . Item 4: Tables 3.5-1, 3.5-2, and 5.5-4 of the PUA report [4] indicate that the calculated values of certain stresses are equal to the respective
   '                               allowables. Indicate conservatisms in the analysis to show that i                              these calculated values would not be exceeded if the concerns expressed in Items 2 and 3 really have a significant effect on the                                    I
   'I*                             results or if a different analytical approach were to be used.

Response 4 3 _i In this response, the Licensee asserted that the small margins to code q cllowables do not require additional justification as there is conservatism in 5 the calculated stress results. The following sources of conservatism were

..         given: the code allowable limits provide adequate factors of safety loads
   ]       cre conservatively defined based on test recults; and conservative load combinations are used, in which peak response are assumed to occur simultaneously. The Licensee's response is satisfactory.

6 I,. i Item 5: The computer code CMODF has been used in the torus attached piping f analysis for all plants that used NUIECH as their contractor. With regard to the code provide the following'informations r a. Theoretical background of CMODF computer program

b. Program verification
c. Applicability of the computer program to the torus attached piping analysis.

Response 5 The Licensee's response has resolved these concerns. (A technical report addressing these concerns is provided in Appendix B of this TER.) l

4 TER-C5506-326 3

3. CONCLUSIONS Based on the audit of the Monticello plant-unique analysis report, it was concluded earlier that certain aspects required additional information. Based on the Licensee's responses to the request for additional information for the Duane Arnold plant, which is applicable to the Monticello plant [6, 7), and the Licensee's response to the request for additional information for the Monticello plant [8], it is concluded that the Licensee's structural analyses 3 with regard to major plant modifications and the torus-attached piping conform 3 to the criteria requirements. With reference to the verification of the computer program CICOF used to qualify the torus attached piping systems, the g results of a verification study for the Monticello in-plant safety relief valve tests performed by NtFFECH technical staff were found acceptable as 3 documented in Appendix B of this report. The Licensee's approach to the i 1

cvaluation of piping fatigue conforms to the approach recommended by the Mark [ I owner's Group, which has been accepted by the NRC. The evaluation criteria cf the containment vacuum breaker modifications are not addressed in Reference 3 and are therefore outside the scope of this TER: however, this issue will l 1 still be examined as part of the Mark I Long-Term Program, l 1 O t i 1

TER-C5506-326

4. REFERENCES
1. NUREG-0661
             " Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I Containment Long-Term Program Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-7" Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation USNRC h             July 1980
2. Technical Evaluation Report Audit Procedure for Mark I Containment Long-Term Program - Structural Analysis
  '          Franklin Research Center, Philadelphia, PA June 1982, TER-C5506-308 3    3. MEDO-24583-1 j           " Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide" General Electric Co., San Jose, CA l           October 1979
4. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
    ;        Plant Unique Analysis Report j           volumes 1,2,3,4,5,6 Northern States Power Company November 1982 I
 "    5. P. M. Kasik
             " Mark I Piping Fatigue," Presentation at the NRC Meeting, Bethesda, MD l           September 10, 1982
 .1
6. R. W. McGauphy (Iowa Electric Light and Power Company)

'l Letter with Attachments to H. Denton (NRC) Subject Response to NRC Request for Additional Information on the Mark I Containment Long-Term Program June 20, 1983 7 R. W. McGauphy (Iowa Electric Light and Power Company) Letter to H. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Clarifications Regarding the Duane Arnold Energy Center PUAR September 17, 1984

8. D. Musolf (Northern States Power Company)

Letter with Attachments to NRC

Subject:

Submittal of Responses to Questions on the Monticello Mark I Containment Long-Term Program Plant Unique Analysis Report September 4, 1984

9. NUTECH Monticello Submerged Structure Test Results NSP-49-010, Revision 1 September 1981
                                .          n               . . . , - , - . - -      ,  - - - , - - , - - - , - - - --

a l l

g APPENDIX A AUDIT DETAILS a

i a l i

     .5 t                                                                                                                              i a
       ,b
        =                                                                                                                                      1 I

I i 1 FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER DM510N OF ARVIN/CALSPAN 20th & RACE STREETS, PHILADELPHIA PA 19103 l l

TER-C5506-326

1. INTRODUCTION The key items used to evaluate the Licensee's general compliance with the requirements of NUREG-0661 (1) and cpecific compliance with the requirements of " Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique
r. Analysis Application Guide" [2] are contained in Table 2-1. This audit procedure is applicable to all Mark I containments, except the Brunswick containments, which have a concrete torus, m For each requirement listed in Table 2-1, several options are possible.
  ;     Ideally, the requirement is met by the Licensee, but if the requirement is not met, an alternative approach could have been used. This alternative approach j     will be reviewed and compared with the audit requirement. An explanation of why the approach was found conservative or unconservative will be provided. A
  ~I column indicating " Additional Information Required" will be used when the information provided by the Licensee is inadequate to make an assessment.

A few remarks concerning Tables 2-1 and 2-2 will facilitate tneir future 4 use:

  'I                                                                                                        ;

o A summary of the audit as detailed in Table 2-1 is provided in Table 2-2, highlighting ma]or cencerns. When deviations are identified,

  .               reference to appropriate notes are listed in Table 2-1.

3 o Notes will be used extensively in both tables under the various columns when the actual audits are conducteo, to provide a reference l l that explains the reasons behind the decision. Where the criterion is T satisfied, a check mark will be used to indicate compliance.

 ] _-

o When a particular requirement is not met, the specific reasons for

.)                noncompliance will be given.
          ,,         -  , - -  <      --     ,      -,           ,,,,.---,-n     -
           &                                                         NRC Contract N r. N RC-03-81 130
           ' 00bd Frankhn Research Center                            FRC Project No. C5506                                 p g, A De of The FranWm inamne                           FRC Assignment No. /2 20th and Race Seem. Phda . Pa 19103(2154 448-1000   FRC Task No.         JLOG                             Q Plant Name        MOA/.Y/ CE' /--O Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of MarkiContainment Long-Term Program Criteria             Licensee Uses section             n'Yitems considered                             Addtl. Alternate Approach No.12)                   O' "                                 Not   Info.                     NA         Remarks Met Met   Reqd. Consor. Unconser-wative    vettve 1.2    All structural elements of the vent system and suppres-
   .                sion chamber must be I.               considered in the review.
     ~

2he following pressure a retaining elements (and their supports) must be 7 considered in the review: o 2brus shell with associ- /

    ,                    ated penetrations, l                 reinforcing rings, and support attachments o Torus shell supports to                      /

the containment structure

       ,            o Vents between the drywell                    /

j and the vent ring header (including penetrations 7 therein) ij l o Region of drywell local / , g to vent penetrations o Bellows between vents and V i torus shell (internal or external to torus) o Vent ring header and the / downcomers attached to it o Vent ring header supports / to the torus i o Vacuum breaker valves JEE T///.f (O N # 6 4 ^' ateached to vent penetra- d'#M /7A' J M E N tions within the torus (where applicable)

                                                                              /

pgSO2 v54 [B7

                                                                         ,                                 Vjitt///// M EMr40 o vacuum breaker piping                                                                vA' LY5Aff/F/WM SEE"                          A Rdi- Od/T###    8 systems, including vacuum breaker valves attached porg                           7/ff.rcO/ # 4/ C j                           7g/S y4~A to torus shell penetra-

NRC Contract N3. NRCAM1 130 p!d Page uut Frauhn Research Center FRC Project No. CS506 A Devoon of The Frank!m Innnva, FRC Assignment No. AJ 2 20th and Race Seests. Phde . Pe 19103 12154 448 1000 FRC Task No. J46 d Plant Name NO//?/CBA/-O l Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long Term Program Licensee uses Section Key it s Idered Criteria Addtl. Alternate Approach Not Info. NA Remarks No.12] Met Met Reed. Consor.

                                                                                        ,ettye Unconser-vetive
     }
t. .

1.2 (Cont.) tions and to vent penetrations external to the torus (where applicable) , L o Piping systems, including 8 88 7~8 /8 #O 4#/

   -                    pumps and valves internal                              ##                            NA S STEA/

to the torus, atta2ed to O ppfp/ /52)[6J the torus shell and/or

 ~

vent penetrations o All main steam system safety relief valve (SRV) piping o Applicable portions of SEE _ c f, ,, the following piping NO7E

   -                    systems:                                                 3 1                      - Active contairument
   -                     system piping systems (e.g., emergency core
     -                   cooling system (EC 3 ) and other piping required to maintain core cooling af ter loss-of-coolant accident (IDCA) )
                           - Piping systems which provide a drywell-to-wetwell pressure dif-forential (to alleviate pool swell effects)
                           - Other piping system.;,

including vent drains o Supports of piping systems JEE 7 N E.S E (O'Jf4" O E mentioned in previous iten NW //A rg a f 5- // o Vent header deflectors / RCSCL reb [f] l l including associated haidware

j

p. . NRC Contract ND. NRC4M1 130 FRC Project No. C5506 UWU Frenidin Research Center Page A theen of The Frankhn lamame FRC Assignment No. M 20th and Race Seeen. Phale . Pa. 19103(219 443 t000 FRC Task No. J.30 g ,

Ftant Neme MoA/7~/t'EZ 1.O Tablo 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark i Containment Long-Term Program Criteria Licensee Uses i Section Keyitems Considerd Addtl. Attornate Approach I No. (2)

  • A# Not Info. NA Remarks Met Wet Reed Consor. Unconser-vettve vative e.

1.2 (Cont. ) j 'i o Internal structural V elements (e.g. , monorails, catwalks, their supports) whose failure might impair the containment function 1.3 a. The structural / _' acceptance criteria for existing Mark I containment systems

  • are contained in the American Society of Mechanical Enginetrs
       ;                  (ASIE) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code, Section i                 III, Division 1 (1977 i

Edition) , with addenda through the . Summer 1977 Addenda _ [3] to be referred nerein as the Code. The alternatives to this criteria provided in Reference 2 are also ac"ceptatrie. i

b. When complete appli- y cation of the criteria (item 1.3a) results '

in hardships or . unusual difficulties l without a compensa-ting increase in level of quality and safety, other structural acceptance criteria may be used after approval by the Nuclear

                      ,   angulatory Commission.
                                                                                                                           )

l NRC Contract ND. NRC 03-81 130

         @hl Franklin Rewarch Center L

FRC Project ido. C5506 p g, FRC Assignment No. /4 A Dwoon of The Frankhn Inuwvie 20ih and Race Seeets. Phda . Pa 19103 (21W 4481000 FRC Task No. J.2G g l Plant Name Nov77CE/40 ( Tabl]21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of MarkiContainment Long Term Program Critena Licensee Uses Section Keyitems nsidered Addtl. Alternate Approach No. [2] Not Info. NA Remarks Met Met Conser- Unconser-ReQd. vettve vative L 2.1 a. Identify the code / ' or other classification of the structural element

   .,              b. Prepare specific dimensional boundary a                     definition for the specific Mark I contain-ment systems (lbtes a                      welds connecting piping to a nozzle are piping
  "                       welds, not Class MC l                   welds) 2.2      Guidelines for classification cf structural elements and bounhry definition are as follows:

a (Refer to Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 for non-piping and 9 piping structural elements,

 'b                 respectively, and to item 5 in this table for row
  ]                 designations used for 4               defining limits of boundaries)                                                                                            l I.
a. Torus shell (Ibw 1) -
                                                                   /

The torus membrane in combination with reinforcing rings, penetration elements l within the NE-3334 [3] limit of reinforce-  ; ment normal to the torus shell, and attachment welds to the inner or outer surface of the above , , members but not to I nozzles, is a Class MC [3] vessel. I

l l M,. NRL' Contract ND. NRC43 81 130 Ul"btl Frankhn Research Center FRC Project No. C5506 p,0, FRC Assignment No. /aC A Demeen of The FranWniinamme 20th and Race Sweets Phda.. Pa 1910312154 448-1000 FRC Task No. Pian Name 8.CG Mogric'E4 4 0 g Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Critetta of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Section Keyitems Considered Criteria Addtl. Alte te op ch ) No. [2] in the Audit Not Info. NA Remarks Met Met Reqd. Conser- Unconser-vettve votive , b~ 2.2 (Cont.)

b. Torus shell supports /

(Inw 1) - subsection NF

       ..                     [3] support structures
         !                    between the torus shell 5                      and the building structure, exclusive
,     't                      of the attachment welds j                       to the torus shell; welded or mechanical
q. attachments to the building atructures

) (excluding embedments); , ., and seismic constraints between the torus shell l? , and the building I structure are Class MC i .4 [3) supports.

      .i
c. External vents and /
   %                          went-to-torus bellows j                       (Bow 1) - The external vents (between the attachment weld to the j                    drywell and the attachment weld to the bellows) including:

vent penetrations I' within the NE-3334 [3] limit of reinforcement normal to the vent, internal or external l attachment welds to the external vent but not to nozzles, and the vent-to-torus bellows l (including attachment l welds to the torus - ! shell and to the external vents) are Class MC [3] vessels. I _.

NRC Contract N3. N RC-03-81 130 M- . M Frankhn Research Center FRC Project N3. C5506 p; ) i A Dwmon ad N Frankhn inzwus. FRC Assignment No. /J 2Drh and Race Soests. Phila . Pe. 19103 (215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. J66 NOA/77CC4L 0 7 ) Plant Name Tabl32-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of MarkiContainment Long-Term Program CrHe Lkensee Uses Section Keyltoms Considered dt!. Attornate Approach No. [2]* In the Audit Not - NA Remarks Met Met Reed. Conser yettve Unconsor-i votive 2.2 (Cont. )

d. Drywell-vent connection /

region (Ibw 1) - Vent welded connections to

    .                      the drywell (the drywell a                       and the drywell region of interest for this
    '}                      program is up to the
      !                     ME-3334 [3] limit of reinforce ment on the 4

drywell . hell) are i Class MC [3] vessels.

e. -Internal vents (Rows 2 /

f and 3) - Are the

  !-                        continuation of the

! vents internal to the { torus shell from the lL . vent-bellows welds and

includes the

% cylindrical shell, the J closure head, penetrations in the

    -                        cylindrical shell or closure head within the NE-3334 [3] limit of
      ~

reinforcement normal to . O. the vent, and attachment j' welds to inner or outer ! surface of the vent but not to nozzles.

f. Vent ring header (Rows /

4 and 5) and downconers (Row 6) - Vent ring header including the l downconers and internal ! or external attachment ( welds to the ring i header and the ! attachment welds to the I downconers are Class MC [3] vessels.

NRC Contract N3. NRC-03 81130

  • LO' Franklin Research Center TRC ProNet N3. C5506 peg 3 A Denman d The Frankhn inwnt, FRC Assignment No. M 20th and Rue Senats. Phde.. Pa 19103 (214 448 1000 FRC Task No. 34G [

Plant Name MOA/ 7~/ CC L L C Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Criteria Licensee Uses Section Keyiterns Considered Addtt. Alternate Approach No. [2] #* ^" Not info. NA Remarks Met Met Reqd. Conser- Unconser-vative vative 2.2 (Cont.)

  '                                                               /
                          - The portion of the
 'I                     downconer within the NE-3334 [3] limit of reinforcement normal to j                    the vent ring header and portion of the vent 7                    ring header within j                    ME-3334 limit of reinforcement are considered under k)w 5.
g. Vent ring header g/
                        ' supports (Row 7)          -
 .I                      Subsection NF [3]

I: supports, exclusive of the attachment welds to 3 the vent ring header j and to the torus shell, are Class MC [3] 7 supports.

h. Essential (libws M[NMM
   ,                     10 and 11) and                                     ##                           NM BSE//
   -{                    non-essential (Rows 12 and 13) piping

[ MffS.' r54 [g,7 _ systems - A piping jf system or a portion of it is essential if the system is necessary to assure the integrity of the reactor coolant l pressure boundary, i the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a shutdown ) condition, or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of j l

D.- NRC Contract NS. N RC 03-41-130 FRC Project No. C5506 Page UUUU Frank!m Research Center A Dwoon of Th FrenWin inmeuse FRC Asaignment No. / 2, 20th and Race Sneen Phde , Pa 19103(2151 448 1000 FRC Task No. 36G Cj Plant Name M o N 77C EL.'.O Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark iContainment Long-Term Program CHter a Licensee uses Section Keyitems Considered Addtl. Alternate Approach No. [2] in the Audit

  • NA Remarks Met Met Reqd. Conser Unconser.

vative vetive A-2.2 (Cont. ) , accidents whicts k' cc,uld result in patential off site

   ~.'                    e:tposures comparable to the guideline exposure of 10CFR100 [4). Piping should be considered
     !                    essential if it performs a safety-n                       related role at a later
     ;                    time during the event combination being
         -                considered or during F                        any subsequent event i-                       combination.
 '                  i. Active and inactive                                    JEE                          MJ &#N"

{' component (nows 10-13) - Active A&7E HA S BfD' n 4 REJC4 V.5'O Z 67 r component is a pump

or valve in an
   ~

essential piping system wnich is i required to perform a mecflanical motion during the course of accomplianing a ( system safety function. 3 Cbntainment vacuum Sf3- ~~ g# ~ breakers (Row 2) -

                                                                             //p)2-Vacuum breakers valves                                /

mounted on the vent internal to the torus or on piping associated with the torus are Class 2 [3] components. , i L______

l l NRC Contract N3. NRC OM1 130 , FRC Project No. C5506 p i Ib T Fran'k im Research Center A De of The Franham inawuse FRC AssI0nment No. /4 FRC Task Ns. J-O G /C 20th and Race Saeets Phde . Pa 19103(215# 448 1000 Plant Name Art:W7/C/~42 O Table 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses section Keyitems no ered Criterna Adott. Attornate ADoroach m tne Not Info- NA Remarks 4o. [2] Met Met Reqd. @ nsef. Unconsor. vstive

I vative I

2.2 (Cont. )

k. Esternal piping and 8. M- 7///8 CCNCOX supports (Rows 10-13): A/d72 Nd.f BEEA/
                           - No Class 1 piping                                 G                           g.gggj g g g 7
                           - Piping external to and penetrating the q                      torus or the external i                   vents, including the
    ~

attacnment weld to the

    ,                     torus or vent nossle is class 2 (3) piping. The
other terminal end of such external piping should be determined TJ based on its function and isolation capability.
   ,                        - Subsection NF (3) support for such

! external piping 3 j including welded or mechanical attachment to structure; excluding any

     !                    attachment welds to the i                    piping or other pressure retaining component are Class 2 [3] supports.
1. Internal piping and /

supports (Rows 10-13) - Are Class 2 or Class 3 piping and i Class 2 or Class 3 component supports.

m. Internal structures W I
(Raw 8) - Non-safety-i related elements which l are not pressure I

retaining, exclusive of attachment welds to any pressure retaining I

! NRC Contract No. NRC 0341 130 p*I IU-UU Franklin Research Center FRC Project No. C5506 Page A Divoon al. The Frankhn Insewute FRC Anal 0nment No. /c2s 20th and Nce Sweets. Phde . Pa 19103(2151 448-1000 FRC Task No. 86G // Flant Name .McAs s') CEA..! Q Tabb 21. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Critoria of Mark i Containment Long-Term Program Crtteria Licensee Uses ! Section Key ttoms Considered Addtl. Alternate Approach No.12) #' ^" Not Info. NA Remarks Met Met Consor. Unconser-Reed. i wative vetive

 .F 2.2    (Cont.)

E i member (e.g. , monorails. ladders, catwalks, and their supports).

n. Vent deflectors (Aow 9)  !
                            - Vent header flow
    -'                      deflectors and associated hardware (not including attachment welds to Class MC vessels) are internal e                        s tructure s.

3.2 Icad terminology used - , should be based on Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the unit or the Icad Definition Report ,,[ (LDR) [5). In case of .J conflict, the IDR loads sha.ll be used. 3.3 Consideration of all load / conoinations defined in

 !                    Section 3 of the LDR [5]

l' shall be provided. 4.3 a. No reevaluation for / l limits cet for design pressure and design temperature values is l needed for present structural elements. l ( b. Design limit / l requirements used for initial ccnstruction following normal practice with respect to load definition and allowable stress shall be used for systems or L- m

NRC Contract N3. NRC 03-81 130 f.4 UNllFranklin Research Center FRC Project N3. C5506 Page A De of The Feankhn Instrute FRC Assignment No. /2 20th and Race Sweets. Phda . Pa 19103 (21M 448-1000 FRC Task No. J.86 /g Plant Name Mo A/r/ CEL LQ l Table 2-1. Audit Procedure forStructural Acceptance Critoria of Mark 1 Containment Long-Term Program Criteria u.en.eeu.e. section Keyitems sieered Addtl. Alternate Approach No. [2] Not Inf0- NA Romams Wet Met Reqd. Consor. Urtconser-vettve vative 4.3 (Cont.)

.fi                       portions of systems that are replaced and for new systems.
    .i    4.4      Service Limits and                                                                       See definition Design Procedures shall                                                                  for Service
   '!              ne based on the                                                                          Limits in y            B&PV Code, Section III,                                                                  Section 4 of Division 1 including                                                                     Reference 2.

rs addenda up to Summer 1977 Addenda [3], specifically:

.,                 a. Class MC                          .       /
 ,                        containment L                        vessels: Article

{ y5 g. czp *g4 A// a b. Linear-type ygg yf)J~ BfDJ component (C1 ass 2 gg ,gggJ

   ':                     and 3) support -
   ,[                     with three modifications to r,                     the Codes t
                            - For bolted connections, the requirements of l(*

l Service Limits A and B shall be applied to Service Limits C and D without increase in the allowables above those applicable to . Service Invels A and B; l - NF-3231.1 (a) i [3] is for primary l plus secondary stress range; I'

N RC Contrar.t N3. NRC43-81 130 lio Frankhn Research Center FRC Projec'. N2. CS506 p,p FRC Assig1 ment No. 43 A Dwoon of The FrenWwi tnsenwe 20th and flace Sesets. Phda . Pa 19103 (21H 4481000 FRC Task No. 8 06 j',p Ptant Name N.2A/7/ CEd.d. O Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program t.lconsee Uses Section Keyitems Considered CrHod8 Addtl. Alternate ADDrosch in the Audit Not NA Remarks No. [2] - Conser Unconser-Met Met ReQd. vettye vative 'r - All increases in allowable stress permitted by Subsection

l NF [3] are limited by Appendix XVII-2110(b)

[3] when buckling is a consideration.

c. Class 2 and 3 piping, SEE 7pf co4cc4/.'

fy/Af B E S / 5 pumps, valves, and NO7E internal structures O gygg,,'yG[g] (also Class MC) 5.3 The components, component / loadings, and service level 3 . assignments for Class MC

]y                       [3] components and internal structures shall be as r-                     defined in Table 5-1 of Asforence 2.
  .,           5.4       The components, component                       /

loadings, and service level

  .f
  "                      assignments for Class 2 and Class 3 piping systems 3*                     shall be def2.ned in Table 5-2 of Deference 2.

ll* 5.5 The definition of operability is the ability to perform required mechanical motion and functionality is the ability to pass rated flow.

a. J2EE Active components shall be proven A/07E Ma -

operable. Active g components shall be considered operable if Service Limits A or B or more conservative limits (if the original design criteria required it) are met.

NRC Contract Nc. NRC4341-130 00 r,.nurin as.e.,cs canie, FRC Proi.ct No. Csso. ps,e A Divmon of The Frankhn insnrus, FRC Assignment No. /J., 20h and Race 5=eets. Phde . Pe 19103(2151 448 1000 FRC Tasn No. yG /4 p i o r W / C. E l Z 0 Plant Name Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark 1 Containment Long Term Program Criteria Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered ^* *#**'**Ch Ng ND'III inthe Audit Not nio. Remarks Met Met Reqd. Conser- Unconser. votive vative

t. 5.5 (Cont.)
b. Piping components shall d'EE 77fA." CO+'fE&/

l be proven functional in No74 /r'A S h.5-'EN e manner consistent 4 with the original R5. COL VE& [s] design criteria.

   ,.        6.1          Analysis       guidelines provided       herein shall
   --'                    apply to       all structural elements       identified in
   '                      item 1.2       of this table,
a. ' All loadings defined in / See Section 3.3 subsection 3.2 of of this table.
 ;                        Reference 2 shall be considered.
{ D. A summary technical #EE 7,(,,gy 3,ggryjg report on the analysis NOTI./

E M E .'s' the NRC U M V50 4 6.2 The following general

   ]                guidelines shall be applied
       .            to all structural elements analyzed:
a. Perform analysis /

according to guideline defined herein for all loads defined in LDR [5). (Fbr loads considered in original design, but not redefined by LDR, previous analyses or new analyses may be used.)

b. Only limiting load /

connination events need be considered.

NRC Contract N3. NRC4H1 130 h. MU Frankhn Research Center FRC Project No.CS508 p g. FRC Assignment No. /.2 A Deveen of N FrenWm inemuse FRC Task No. J.2,6 /g 20* and Race 5= eses. PNie . Pa 19103 ftlk eaa-loco Ptent Name A TA'7/C [HO Table 71. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Crtteria of Mark i Containment Long-Term Program Ucensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered CrHe4 Adott. Alternate Approach No.[2] In the Audit Not Info. NA Remarks Umw-Met Met Reed. 6.2 (cont. )

c. Fatigue offects of all SE rg/r MN.'E&

operational cycles N#E gA f fu gp shall be considered. 6 gg,g,q pegg[g] .

d. No further evaluation of structural elements for which ocabined effect of loads defined
  • in IAR [5] produces stresses less than 10%

of allowable is required. Calculations . demons trating . I conformance with the 1- 10% rule shall be provided. u

e. Dampirq values used in V dynamic analyses shall be in accordance with
      ,                 NRC Regulatory Gaide
1. 61 [6 ] .

I 6.3 Structural responses for M loads resulting from the combination of two dynamic phenomena shall be obtained in the following manner s

a. Absolute sum of stress /

components, or

b. Cumulative distribution /

function method if absolute sum of stress components does not satisfy the acceptance criteria. 6.4 Torus analysis shall consist of: l

NRC Contrcct N3. NRC CM1 130 f FRC Project No. C5506 Page

             . . Frankhn Research Center A Devoon of The FranWm lasneute FRC Assignment No. /c3 20th and Race Streets. PMa . Pa 19103 (215) 448 1000      FRC Task No.         f J f-A ,';2/. 7/.'*E".' .'.O
                                                                                                                                        /6 Plant Name Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Licensee Uses
                 "                Keyitems Considered                       Criteria  Addtl. Attornate Aporoach
         ,NO.[2]                       In the Audit                              Not   Info.                           NA       Remarks Met Met           Conser. Unconsor.

t Road. votive vative

  #~

6.4 (Cont.)

a. Tinite element analysis SEE 7NS~55 C'#'IA#S for bydrodynamie loads NE NM /'E BEEe>

(time history analysis) 6., 7) /PESC 4 VEO[9 2 and normal and other Q d)

   .                          loads (static analysis) making up the load 1                          combinations shall be j                          performed for the most highly loaded segment m                          of the torus, including the shell, ring, girders, and support.

[ b. Evaluation'of overall *

                                                                            /

I' offects of seismic and other nonsymmetric i loads shall be provided J using beam models (of at least 180' of the 1 7 torus ircluding columns Q and seismic restraints) by use of either 3 dynamic load factors or t i time history analysis.

c. Provide a non-linear '/

l [ time history analysis, using a spring mass model of torus and support if net tensile forces are produced in columns due to upward phase of loading.

d. Bijlaard formulas shall #EE be used in analyzing MFE - O-each torus nozzle for J2, effect of reactions produced by attached piping. If Bijlaard formulas are not

M NRC Crntract N3. NRC-0341 130 FRC Project No. C5506 Page di Frankhn Research Center A Division of The Frankl.n Insties, FRC Assignment No. /O 20th and Rue Streets Phu . Pa 19103121h 448 tono FRC Task No. j2.e 6 /[ Plant Name M O// 7/' C f L / C Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark 1Containraent Long Term Program Criterta Licensee Uses Section Keyitems Considered Addtl. Attornate Approach No. [2] in the Audit Not Info. NA Remarks Met Met Conser- Unconser-Road. vative vative 6.4 (Cont.) a-l applicable for any i nozzle, finite element analysis shall be

     '                    performed.

6.5 In analysis of the vent system (including vent {j t penetration in drywell, vent pipes, ring header, downconers and their intersections, vent column supports, vent-torus bell ws, vacuum breaker r penetration, and the vent > b deflector s) , the following  ! guidelines shall be

  ,j               followed:
a. Finite element model JEE mg aw&/

7 shall represent the A/N N A / 2 .f 8 A./ j most highly loaded Portion of ring header b MM'VS4 M] ,, shell in the "non-vent"

     }                    bay with the downconers
 ~

a tta ched . ( b. Finite element analysis shall be performed to

                                                                /

evaluate local effects in the ring header shell and downcomer intersections. Use time history analysis for pool swell transient and equivalent static analysis for downconer lateral loads.

            &                                                          NRC Contract No. NRC 03-81 130 dlt Frankhn Research Center                               FRC Project No. C5'06                             Page A D- cd The Frankhn insatute                        FRC Assignment No. /cd 20th and Race Sewes. Phda . Pa 191031215e 4481000   FRC Task No.        JO6>                          /g Plant Neme       M2, i " /CE.l./_O Tabl]2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark l Containment Long-Term Program Criteria            Uconsee Uses Section              Keyitems Considered                            Addtl. Alternate Approach No. [2]                   In the Audit                         Not   Info.

Met Met Reqd. Conser. Unconser. g L 6.5 (cont.)

        --            C. Evaluation of overall                   !

effects of seismic and r-other nonsymmetrical loads shall be provided using beam models (of at least 180* of the

    ,;                       vent system including vent pipes, ring header and column supports) by
   '~

the use of either dynamic load f actors or time history analysis.

  !>                                                                                                     /  V.C4 '.T .CEF;E:R*

l d. Use beam models in g pgj gijf;, y analysis of vont deflectors. pp_ .. j ,,,gj

e. Consider appropriate superposition of r reactions from the vent J deflectors and ring headers in evaluating F. the vent support lI columns for pool swell.
        . 6.6      a. Analysis of torus                       /

I[r ?, internals shall include the catwalks with supports, monorails, and miscellaneous internal piping,

b. It shall be based on /

hand calculations or simple beam models and dynamic load factors  ; and equivalent static analysis. l

NRC Contract N2. NRC 0361 130 l, Franklin Research Center FRC Project No. CS506 Page l A Dwoon of The FreeMe inanuse FRC Assignment No. /.8, 20th and Race Seeen. Phile . Pa 19103(2153448 1000 FRC Task No. .886 / ~C. Piant Name A.sO/./7/C E.:' .' D Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark 1 Containment Long-To m Program i i Criteria Licensee Uses Section Keyitems na ered Addtl. Alternate Approach No. [2] I" ** Not InfC. NA Remarks Met Met Reed. Consor. Unconser-wative vetive .s. 6.6 (Cont.) 88E yy/s cO4,_v ce ]' c. It shall consider Service Ievel D or E *E NMJ' 64EA ' when specified by the // 85fE/'E' A'E70 structural acceptance TNE #4WIE4VMW J criteria using a K f 7//. j f T E I C # simplified nonlinear '" W 5 # # # # #

  '                                                                                                               4 t.2 4 4 (E A / 8 / A/ M M analyais technique J                         (e.g. , Bigg 's Me thod) .

9 6.7 Analysis of the torus attached piping shall be Performed as follows: r'

 ~.                  a. Designate in the                                    ofEE                       -

7NAf M'MA'

 '                          summary technical                                  NOTE                               f:rA .f 4E/ / /

report submitted all g. N'EECAC h[

    ')   -

Piping systems as

    >                      essential or non-essential for each load combination.

l

b. Analytical model shall SEE j" ~

m represent piping and # 0 75

    }                       supports from torus to                               e2, first rigid anchor (or where effe:::t of torus h                         motion is insignificant) .
c. Use response spectrum * ? T.f No -

or time history ,M7[ analysis for dynamic A effect of torus motion at the attachment point, except for i piping systems less than 6" in diameter, , for which equivalent static analysis (using appropriate j amplification factor) may be performed.

i NRC ContrCct ND. NRCM-130 ubU Fr:nklin Research Ccnter FRC Project N3. C5506 Pag 3 A Divoon of The Frankim Insinut, FRC Assignment No. /e6 20th and Race Sweets. Phde . Ps 19103 (215) 448 1000 FRC Task No. JJ7,f; QQ Plant Name AlON7/CE.' ' O Table 2-1. Audit Procedure for Structural Acceptance Criteria of Mark iContainment Long Term Program Cdte a Licensee Uses Secten Keyitems Considered dtl. Attornate Approach N212) in the Audit ' NA Remarks Met Met Reed. Consor. unconser-vative vative i

n.  !

6.7 (Cont.) l u-lI d. Ef fact of anchor 86 TN8 # displacement due to ##M NAf 8 #EM -

  ,                      torus motion may be                                  O                                    # E' S O J F E d [ 8 ,7 neglected from Equation 9 of NC or ND-3652.2 [3]

if considered in Equations 10 and 11 of J NC or alD-3652.3 [3] .

'1        6.8    Safety relief valve discharge piping shall be analyzed as follows:

r, . [ a. Analyze each discharge /

                       .line.
b. Model shall represent U piping and supports,
  '                      from nossle at main steam line to discharge d                      in suppression pool, and include discharge 1                       device and its supports.
c. For discharge thrust  !

loads, use time history (- analysis, y i d. Use spectrum analysis / or dynamic load factors for other dynamic loads. e 0

                                                                                                  - . - - - .              ~ _ , .   , _

l lj ll l

                                        !       i
                                                                                                                      ;                               j    ]i )       i
                                                      .               UO         ". lLf  i;~ '[     ,'                  L    T     J     ,. g j                         i                      g h
                                                      .        .         .f            .e         .d             .c        .b               3                                       l i

T pt tpP ea oep i ( oat bc V wunorya ( wita tcV tV oen dV oe ctB aoe vR oe t"aV h nei tT ho orp1 tieb a b E,UF r na ht d esc hotc wn t rl ng e er e l k a e tt hsn tpi ee t at u enau r scu tt nt eul r so ti re'ts

                                                                                                           "" dnt          u tnnr ag eu                            2-h a

n n k pn o rrtokeu h c bs c ,s t s reo cr a g enoremm e wehm eri or n w i'n u a r S 2 d Rn h alvs u r ,s - a ni ass e m as t utns i s c dy p e v b

                                      'r aidb pt       r tn og         en rg       lh eb no ef n"eb
                                                                                                        )
                                                                                                           " vt e

is lh de eath nnie t r u c A u a c e R e s o r s ptnsaie phte r s tle t 'ew il tdol t u d S w e nsuvt lothlna lioa uh h olt rd ne nl s nl r t i e a 3 a ,a a h lme i evck in k se ae w ar 'te g s a S e r u ,s w c ctplele c ve a ta t( e ty ' n s l u h l o ev ,s E . l anelsur sd td su ts ben l e p a ip d ater bhn letv he er ae cr o ie rnn ut iw oe nl

                                                                                                           " r "nhit        tp rp p

prt oeh i l e m m a m n%C P h d e e n at nsin i ettetni

                ) o r n tg     p e
                                             )  tpl a    l ls h

ea sev

                                                                               )    re        sl           'ge         uo cr ri              e              r       .

e r aea oev u nn ' tna n y r dc nc P%t i dn l 'nd tt fs t f a

    /  htl         utt cvn                      rne           p          d          at            o        'er         us                os                        o ceeu           sirhag                       ues           p       t             ls            c           ay      r                  ro                        r       1 9

r drd ni oaec nt du st r o ot oa a "eedw et ec S t 1 0 r h l o ii r vtan

olg si o

u m a t s ie t rn d t "rl l na gt u c 3 ( 2 n n o e t u 1 15 t s d a r 4 l 4 8 A - c 1 0 V  ! c

                                       /
                                                      !.       /         /                        /                                         /  ##     g          p e

t a 0 0 F V s1 M," c n P FFN RR R V # V / e l a n CC C C 1

                                                                                                                                                      $'          r i

t N a AP C sr oo t n e sjn V V  ! 1 t s r i a m e i get n crat y  ! o mNt c - F " V y 3

                                                                                                                                               <i       A f

M a e n.oNo t C. n r k A N y V y V y d al y s i i C o f

                                                                                                                                                                        /

oMNCR s y V v V V y sH R e q n t ai n , g8 0 3-1 V w u m 1 i 3 i3 r e e 0 - V V V V V W y V lI m e n t L M/ n o t s g n / V V V V V y W l T O e r 7 m 5OMVV AA o g P r 4 ,5rp4V/C r a SS J/ ' R e m . y/7 / A/ m SJ a r 744M / k s HE9E

                           /

f '7 A .

                               /9 h7 EGM                                                                                                                                                         .

f I \<

l NRC Contract N 3. NRC-43-41 130 FRC Project No. CS$06 Page 00J Franklin Research Center 4%m%3 , FRC Asal0nment No. /d , i anth and Race se o. Phan.. Pa. 19:03(2151 44s 1000 FRC Task No. Jo26 .24 l Plant Name Alwy/cE: O Table 2-2. Audit Surnmary for Structural Acceptance Crtteria of Mark i Containment Long-Term Program Re N I N nts Analysis Rguirements Structursl Element .II '5 3 Remarks _ dl1

                                                                                       /

fildid!!llli

    ,                    k. All main steam system safety                       /

.j relief valve (SRV) piping 1 y y V V V

                                                                                /     V     V
1. Applicable portions of the 7 following piping systems:
       .i (1)      Active containment 7                                system piping systems d                                      (e.g. , emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
     ,                                  suction piping and other piping required to maintain core

_ cooling after

               ;                        loss of-coolant accident (IDCA))

(2) Piping systems which ,

       -                                provide a drywell-to-wetwell pressure dif-7                                  forential (to alleviate j                                pool swell effects)

(3) Other piping systems, ml - including vent drains

c. Supporth of piping systems I / V V #

{_, mentioned in previous item

n. Vent header deflectors p/ V V V' V # # #

l including associated nardware V "

s. Internal structural y V V V olements (e.g. , monorails, catwalks, their supports) t: hose failure might impair the containment function

TER-C5506-326 Table 2-3. Non-Piping Structural Elements STRUCTURAL ELEMENT ROW External Class MC Torus, Bellows, 1 C-External Vent Pipe, Drywell (at Vent), Attachment Welds, Torus Supports, Seismic Restraints

   ,3                 Internals Vent Pipe
      ,              General.and                            2 Attachment Welds u
.,                   At Penetration                         3 (e.g. , Header)

Vent Ring Header r-

  , , ,              General and                            4 Attachment Welds I              At Penetrations                        5 (e.g., Downconers) 1 Downcomers General and                            6 Ij                  Attachment Welds Internals Supports                     7
'I
y. Internals Structures l

General 8 Vent Deflector 9 l l i _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - - . . -

s . TER-C5506-326 Table 2-4. Piping Structural Elements STRUCTURAL ELEMENT ROW Essential Piping Systems With IBA/DBA 10 With SBA 11 Nonessential Piping Systems With IBA/DBA 12 y With SBA 13 L M L f l. p+e d t J q

   ,e I
      .                                                                     l e                                                                          ,

l 4

TER-C5506-326 NOTES RELATED TO TABLES 2-1 AND 2-2 Note 1: The Licensee has not provided information on the analysis of the vacuum breaker piping systems and the vacuum breaker valves attached to vent penetrations within the torus, and has not indicated that theep are Class 2 components. Note 2: The T.icensee has not provided information on the analysis of torus

e. attached piping systems.
   '        Note 3: The Licensee has not provided information on the analysis of active

-l containment system piping systems, piping systems which provice a drywell-to-wetwell pressure differential, and other internal piping 3 systems. Note 4: The Licensee has not provided information indicating whether the

     ,,              piping and its supports have been classified as Class 2 or Class 3 piping, or essential or non-essential piping systems, and whether a La                 pump or valve associated with the piping is an active or inactive component, and is considered operable.

q

   ,l       Note 5: For the case of piping fatigue analysis, the NRC staff has requested the conclusions of a study presented at the NRC meeting (7] to be
                  ~

documented and submitted for NRC approval. If these conclusions are acceptable to the NRC, each PUA report would be required to indicate that the fatigue usage factors for the SRV piping systems and the torus attached piping are sufficiently small that a plant-unique

       +

fatigue analysis of these piping systems is not warrantea. i j Note 6: Tables 2-2.4-1 and 3-2.4-1 [8] indicate that the natural frequency of

    ]                the suppression chamber ano that of the vent system are very close to j               _each other for the first mode. The Licensee should provide more details of tne calculation for the spring stiffness [K)SC in Figure r;                 3-2.4-1 and should show that the coupling effects between the vent I             system and the suppression chamber have been properly accounted for in the analysis.

f Note 7: Tables 2-2.5-6 and 2-2.5-7 of Reference 8 indicate that the calculated values of certain stresses are very close to or equal to the respective allowables. The Licensee should indicate the conservatisms in the analysis to show that these calculateo values would not be exceeded if a different analytical approach were to be used. Note 8: Nith reference to Figures 2-2.4-1 and 2-2.4-2 of Reference 8, the ! Licensee has not provided justifications and/or reasons for modeling the torus reinforcing ring as beam elements connected to the torus

                    . shell by offset rigid links. Also, the Licensee should discuss the conservatisms, if any, used in the above-mentioned approach in comparison to the modeling of the reinforcing ring as plate elements.

l l l

l TER-C5506-326 Note 9: The Licensee has not providea information on the results of the analysis of the reinforcing ring which has been analyzed separately for submerged structure loads. Note 10: The Licensee has not indicated whether all linear type component supports meet the criteria requirements as specified in Section 4.4 of Reference 2.

 ; a.        Note 11: With reference to Section 4.2.5 of the PUAAG [2], Level E Service Limits permit subsequent qualification of the component, despite the postulated failure, if it can be shown by a consequence analysis that no impairment of any Mark I safety function will result. It appears that a possible violation of the intent of the Level E Service Limits
      ,               may be indicated in Table 4-2.5-1 [8] . Here, a Level E Service stress limit which exceeds the Level D Service stress limit anc equals the ultimate strength of the materials is shown for the monorail, l ._'

7 P

      ..)

a

  '7 i

I i i l l 4

TER-C5506-326

3. REFERENCES FOR APPENDIX A
1. NUREG-0661
                  " Safety Evaluation Report, Mark I Containment Long-Term Program Resolution of Generic Technical Activity A-7" Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation USNRC July 1980
2. NEDO-24583-1
       .         " Mark I Containment Program Structural Acceptance Criteria Plant Unique Analysis Application Guide"
    '            General Electric Co., San Jose, CA
    ;            October 1979
3. American Society of Mechanical Engineers
  ,    ,         Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Division 1
                 " Nuclear Power Plant Components" New York: 1977 Edition and Addenda up to Summer 1977
4. Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

{' 5. NEDO-21888 Revision 2

 ;l;             " Mark I Containment Program Loaa Definition Report" General Electric Co., San Jose, CA November 1981 1

1

6. NRC
    ,            " Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants"
      }          Regulatory Guide 1.61 8          October 1973
7. P. M. Kasik
    '!           " Mark I Piping Fatigue," Presentation at the NRC meeting, Sethesca, MD September 10, 1982
    ,       8. Northern States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Plant Unique Analysis Repcrt VoAumes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 NPS-74-103, Revision 1 November 1982 l                                                         t

1 O APPENDIX B h. TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE USE OF THE CMDOF PROGRAM IN THE MARK I TORUS ATTACHED PIPING ANALYSIS l a b 7

    .2 k   $

s 6, . l l l FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER OfVISION OF ARVIN/ CAL 5 PAN 20th & RACE STREETS. PHILADELPHIA.PA 19103

i i ,; A

<m TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE USE OF THE CMDOF PROGRAM IN THE MARK I TORUS ATTACHED PIPING ANALYSIS 7  .

4 3 r1 BY V. N. Con

/, ' .                                                                                                    A. A. Okaily L

t i a

       ]                                                                                           FRANKLIN RESEARCH CENTER                                 ,

i PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19103 I tm April 1985 1 iT i i t

1. Background Information The purpose of this report is to provide assessments and to document activities associated with the computer program CMDOF (Coupling of Multiple Degrees of Freedom) which was used by the NUTECH technical staff to qualify the Mark I torus attached piping systems in s number of nuclear power plants.

This program was originally developed by Dr. K. P. Kennedy [1] of Structural Mechanics Associates and modified by NUTECH technical staff te establish the ~' stress level of the torus attached piping under various hydrodynamic loading

  '[      conditions associated with the Mark I structural asaluation program. In the course of re'riawing the analytical procedures for stress calculations of the
  ,       torue attached piping systems, Franklin Research center (FRC) staff raised J       concerns associated with the verification of this program, which will be summarised in the next section of this report. A meeting was held with the j       NUTECH technical staff and a number of affected utilities on August 9 and 10, 1984 to discuss a number of technical issues related to this program. As a 1

7 result of this meeting, a number of action items were requested from the affected utilities, to which the NUTECH technical staff responded [2]. The reviews of NUTECH responses indicated that the main concern, which is the validation of the program, remained unresolved. A report was ; hen prepared

  ]      cnd submitted to the NRC by FRC [3] to provide the review status of this
  'd progran and highlight areas of concern associated with the use of this program.
  ]i A subsequent meeting was held on January 4, 1985 with the NUTECH L'     technical staff, Dr. R. P. Kennedy of Structural Mechanics Associates, and 6

representatives of the Mark I ovrer group and a number of utility companies. 3 In this meeting, Dr. Kennedy provided an overview of the technical background

,-      cf this program. It was also learned that the Bechtel Power Corporation ettempted to verify the program by comparing the results obtained by the program with those obtained from a combined torus / piping model. However, due to numerical instabilities of the combined torus / piping model, this attempt was not successful. At the end of this meeting, it was obvious that FRC's i

concerns were not resolved and the affected licensees expressed their cpposition to perform further investigations regarding the program C-1

l t verification. However, it was learned later that the Monticello plant I selected some in-plant test data (SRV in-plant test data) to verify the program. The results of this study were submitted for review [4]. FRC review of this latest document is given in Section 4 of this report. -l 2. Technical Background of the CMDOF Program The standard practice for perforring dynamic analysis of the torus and

a-j attached piping systems is to perform independent uncoupled dynamic analysis i of the torus and of the attached piping. First, the torus model is developed L

i

        'and a dynamic analysis of the torus subjected to the postulated hydrodynamic

,7 load is performed using this uncoupled model. The response time history at

  "      the penetration point of the attached piping is obtained. Then this response j  g      time history is used in conjunction with the uncoupled dynamic model of the A     attached piping to calculate piping responses. This approach is known as an I

uncoupled analysis because the dynamic model of the torus and the attached , 7 l j piping are never directly coupled. It has been recognized that this approach  ! j result,s in a conservative estimate of the piping responses.

  ]               The other acceptable approach is to carry out a coupled analysis in which the torus and associated piping are combined in a single coupled model. The model is fairly complicated and also results in high computational cost, i         especially when a significant number of loading time histories have to be
   !     considered. Therefore, this coupled analysis does not represent an attractive

, alternative. In fact, none of the Mark I facility resorts to this approach. The CMDOF program was developed to take into account the coupling effects { j ! without carrying out the coupled analysis described above. Essentially, this

  ,I     program is used to modify the response time history obtained from the V                                                                                                                              ,

uncoupled torus model at the penetration point of the attached piping and this l modified time history is then used to obtain the piping response of the I uncoupled piping model. In order to use this program, the modal response characteristics of the torus and attached piping have to be established first , by applying an unit force at the attachment location. These modal response ( characteristics along with the uncoupled response time history of the torus at the penetration point will be input into the CMDOF program, which will produce C-2 ,

                     - .      .      - - -        .- ~ .    -              .-.                - - . - - - .

a modified response time history to be used in obtaining the piping response. This program, in principle, is supposed to remove the conservatism associated with the uncoupled analysis.

3. Concerns Associated with the CM)OF Program I Based on the review of pipe stresses obtained via this program and other information relating to this program, FRC staff raised a number of questions in connection with the validation of this program [3]. A program of this nature requires a substantial validation effort in order to use it in a production mode. Also, this program is relatively new and the originator of

] 1 the program cautioned:

                      "It has been carefully prograssed and checked against a number of test cases by comparing its results for coupled response with those obtained from coupled structure and equipment analyses. However, it has not been used to date (April, 1980) by other than the authors. It is not a production program which can be used as a " black box". Users should independently verify their own use of the program and understand its basis and applicability before using it in a production mode." [1]                    <

FN:'s concerns are briefly summarized below o The verification problems provided were extremely simple compared

  ~

with the problem of the torus and attached piping. Basically, the

      ;                    verification problem consists of a spring-mass system with a fes j                        degrees of freedom.
  ]                  o     The parameters (mass and stiffness) given in the verification
    ;                      problems did not resemble a wide range of values (mass and stiffness)

," encountered in the actual problem. j b Based on some study by NUTECH [4], it was observed that the CMDOF 1 2 could reduce the input loading to the attached piping by as much as 3

    ,                      or 4 times when compared with a standard uncoupled analysis.

o Calculated stresses of the affected piping systems in a number of t plants in some cases were closed or equal to the stress allowables.  ! I j 4. Review of CM)OF Verification ! i In-plant SRV tests performed at the Monticello plant in 1980 were used as o basis for verification of the CMDOF program. Test data from five tests were selected for comparison. Specifically, data from strain gauges located on the i l l C-3

O RCIC turbine exhaust line (RS3-8 in-HE) approximately 1 foot and 20 feet from the torus penetration, as shown in Figure 1, were used for comparison. The tests were conducted by actuating one safety relief valve under cold pipe and normal water leg conditions with a reactor power level of 80s. Plots of I strain time histories were recorded during each test and were compared directly with the predicted values obtained by the CMODF program. ! With regard to load development,'two programs (GE computer codes RVFORO4 ! Cs and QBUBSO3) were used to develop the SRV torus shell pressure time histories correspondlng to the test case conditions (i.e., cold pipe, normal water leg, reactor at 80% rated power). With respect to the torus and piping structural 7 models, the Licensee indicated that these models were developed to reflect the 2 as-tested condition. .] The C EOF program was used in conjunction with the modal characteristics J of the torus and attached piping to obtain the modified responses at the 7 attachment location to the test SRV loadings. Displacement, velocity, and 2 acceleration responses were developed at all piping degrees of freedom coupled to the torus. From these responses, a modal superposition was employed in _, conjunction with transfer junction methodology to obtain stress time histories ,; , at the strain gauge locations of interest for comparison with the test results. t )_;t The Monticello SRV test strain gauge data (converted to stress) were >3 compared with the predicted stresses obtained by the ChDOF program. The

j responses on the time domain and frequency domain (by Fourier transformation) at strain gauge locations were compared with those obtained by the analysis.
  't
   )
    !    In addition, the maximu6 stress valM r were used in the comparison. The results indicated that a facter of conservatism is excess of 3 was observed in I

the analysis. W Based on FRC's review of various stress time histories and the maximum I stress level of the test data and analysis, it is observed that there is conservatism associated with the analytical procedures. This conservatism + could be attributed to the following sourcess methodology by which loads were generated, low damping values used in the analysis, possible nonlinearity , resulting from pipe supports. The comparison between the test and predicted i 4 I C-4 i

                        ~.,,.,e- ,--y-.       . -   a.   ,,  .m . . , . . , m,,-. - -s   - , - - , ...,.,.n . - , - .   ,m,,v.- ,,.-n   -n,-_.n-..

f

                                                 ~

TORWS SWEl-L PENETRAvicN at tst i A A l pipiws, Moost. emuTwusD ' V vo NWp ', AM y

    ,                                         ' eve'/Arn.)                                                                              <

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                                                                                     %H g-c      g                    ,

ase > p S. " ! 'll

 .2                                        % ,5                      ~1"2 Y (Typ.)

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                                                                                                                                             \,

fuso t(e 27 STRAIN 6AU6E% 6(s.Sl . 4 fN. ACES EG. %PAGO SE.C.TI C M A-A SECTioN 3-6 Figure 1. Strain Gauge Locations on IICIC Turbine Exhaust Line C-5

values indicated that there is conservatism associated with the analytical procedures, which provides a basis for alleviating the concerns related to some calculated stress values presented in the Licensee's original submittals. REFERENCES

1. Kennedy, R. P. and Kincaid, R. H., "CMDOF - A Computer Program to Couple O the Response of Structures and Supported Equipment for Multiple Degrees of Coupling Using the Results from Uncoupled Structure and Equipment Analysis," SMA 12101.03, Structural Mechanics Associates, Inc., Newport
 -            Beach, California, November 1980 7        2. R. W. McGaughy (Iowa Electric Light and Power Company)
 ,            Letter with Attachments to H. Denton (NRC)

Subject:

Clarifications Regarding the Duane Arnold Energy Center Plant 3 Unique Analysis Report, Mark I Containment Program, NG-84-3937 September 17, 1984

 ,        3. Con, V. N.,  " Review of the Computer Code CMDOF (Coupling of Multiple i         Degrees of Freedom," Franklin Research Center, October 1984
4. D. Musolf (Northern States Power Company)

{ Letter with Attachments to H. Denton (NN:) subject: Additional Information Related to Computer Program CMDOF February 25, 1985 l J J

    ,i 9

i C-6

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