ML20209C771
| ML20209C771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/29/1987 |
| From: | Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Vermont Yankee |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209C775 | List: |
| References | |
| DPR-28-A-098 NUDOCS 8702040337 | |
| Download: ML20209C771 (13) | |
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UNITED STATES O
8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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.,I WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION DOCKET N0. 50-271 l
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 98 License No. DPR-28 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Comission (the Comission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (the licensee) dated November 2,1984 as supplemented March 14, 1986, and the application dated December 29, 1981, comply with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the-Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and l
E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 i
of the Comission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, l
and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-28 is hereby amended to read as follows:
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8702040337 870129 PDR ADOCK 0500 1
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(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications, contained in Appendix A, as, revised through Amendment No. 98, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.-
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION A
g Daniel R. Muller, Project Director BWR Project Directorate #2 Division of BWR Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: January 29, 1987 e
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O ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0. 98 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-28 DOCKET NO. 50-271 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages._ The revised areas are indicated by marginal lines.
Pages 34a 1
49a 49b 49d*
60a 60c*
61 66 67 67a*
tage added i
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t VYNPS 8
3.2 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION 4.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS
.4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENT SYSTEMS Specification (cont'd)
Specification (cont'd) e i
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I.
Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation I.
Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation 1
j During reactor power operation, the The Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation Recirculation Pump Trip Instrumentation shall shall be functionally tested and calibrated be operative in accordance w+th Table 3.2.1.
in accordance with Table 4.2.1.
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J.
Control Room Toxic Cas Monitoring J.
Control Room Toxic Cas Monitoring Whenever the Control Room is required to be The Toxic Cas Monitoring System manned, the Toxic Cas Monitoring System shall Instrumentation shall be calibrated in be operable in accordance with Table 3.2.7.
accordance with Table 4.2.7.
K.
Degraded Crid Protective System K.
Degraded Grid Protective System During reactor power operation, the emergency bus undervoltage instrumentation shall be The emergency bus undervoltage operative in accordance with Table 3.2.8.
instrumentation shall be functionally tested and calibrated in accordance with Table 4.2.8.
Amendment No. 38, ph, 98 34a i
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Og VYNPS TABLE 3.2.6
.P.OST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION (continued)
Minimum Number of' Operable Instrument Instrument Channels Parameter Type of Indication Range i
1/ valve Safety Valve Position From Meter 21-2-1A/B Closed - Open Acoustic Monitor (Note 5) a 2
Containment Hydrogen /0xygen Meter SR-VG-6A 0-30% hydrogen Monitor (Note 1)
Meter SR-VG-6B 0-25% oxygen 2
Containment High-Range Radiation Me.ter RM-16-19-1A/B 1 R/hr-107 R/hr Monitor (Note 6) j 1
Stack Noble Gas Effluent (Note 7)
Meter RM-17-155 0.1 - 107 mR/hr i
Amendment No. (3, 99, gg, 98 49, 4
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VYNPS TABLE 3.2.6
, POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION (continued) i TABLE 3.2.6 NOTES
Note 1 - From and after the date that a parameter is reduced to one indication, operation is permissible for 30 days.
If a parameter is not indicated in the Control Room, continued operation is permissible during the next seven days.
If indication cannot be restored within the next six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
i Note 2 - Control rod position and neutron monitor instruments are considered to be redundant to each other.
Note 3 - From and after the date that this parameter is reduced to one indication in the Control Room, continued reactor operation is permissible during the next 30 days.
If both channels are inoperable and indication cannot be restored in six hours, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
i Note 4 - From and after the date that safety / relief valve position from pressure switches is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety / relief valve position can be determined from Recorder #2-166 (thermocouple. 0-600 F) and Meter #16-19-48 (torus water temperature, 60-1800F).
If both indications are not available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
I Note 5 - From and after the date that safety valve position from the acoustic monitor is unavailable, reactor operation may continue provided safety valve position can be determined from Recorder #2-166 (thermocouple.
0-6000F) and Meter #16-19-29A or B (containment pressure 0-275 psia)..If both indications are not I
available, the reactor shall be in a hot shutdown condition in six hours and in a cold shutdown condition in the following 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.
1 Note 6 - Within 30 days following the loss of one indication, or seven days following the loss of both indications, restore the inoperable channel (s) to an operable status or a special report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.7 must be prepared and submitted within the subsequent 14 days, outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability, and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to operable status.
Note 7 - From and after the date that this parameter is unavailable by Control Room indication and cannot be restored within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, continued reactor operation is permissible for the next 30 days provided that local sampling capacity is available.
If the Control Room indication cannot be restoged within 30 days, the reactor shall be in hot shutdown within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
Amendment No. O, 44, 98 49b
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r TABLE 3.2.8 Emergency Bus Undervoltage Instrumentation Minimum Number of Operable Instruments Parameter Trip Setting Required Action 2 per bus Degraded Bus Voltage - Voltage 3,700 volts 140 volts Note 1 (27/32, 27/3W 27/42, 27/4W) 2 per bus Degraded Bus Voltage - Time Delay 10 seconds 1 1 second Note 2 (62/3W, 62/32, 62/4W, 62/42)
TABLE 3.2.7 NOTES 1.
If the minimum number of operable instrument channels are not available, the inoperable channel shall be tripped using test jacks or other permanently installed circuits within one hour.
2.
If the minimum number of operable instrument channels are not available, reactor power operation is permissible for only 7 successive days unless the system is sooner made operable.
49d 6
d.
VYNPS TABLE 4.2.6 CALIBRATION REQUI"REMENTS POST-ACCIDENT INSTRUMENTATION (Cont)
Parameter Calibration Instrument Check Centainment Hydrogen /0xygen Monitor Once/ Operating Cycle Once each day Centainment High-Range Radiation Monitor Once/ Operating Cycle Once each day Stack Noble Gas Effluent Every Operating Cycle Once each day (a Functional Test to be performed quarterly)
Amendment No. yy, 98 60a 6
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VYNPS TABLE 4.2 NOTES i
i 1.
Initially once per month; thereaf ter, a longer interval as determined by test results on this type of instrumentation.
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2.
During each refueling outage, simulated automatic actuation which opens all pilot valves shall be performed such that each trip system logic can be verified independent of its redundant counterpart.
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3.
Trip system logic calibration shall include only time delay relays and timers necessary for proper functioning of the trip system.
l 4.
This intrumentation is excepted from functional test definition. The functional test will consist of injecting a simulated electrical signal into the measurement channel, i
5.
Check control rod position indication while performing the surveillance requirement of Section 3.3.
j 6.
Functional tests, calibrations and instrument checks are not required when these instruments are not to be.
operable or tripped.
4 Functional tests shall be performed before each startup with a required frequency not to i
exceed once per week.
Calibration shall be performed prior to or during each startup or controlled shutdown with a required frequency not to exceed once per week.
day during those periods when instruments are required to be operable. Instrument checks shall be performed at least once p I
7.
This instrumentation is excepted from the functional test definitions and shall be calibrated using simulated n
electrical signals once every three months.
8.
Functional tests and calibrations are not required when systems are not required to be operable.
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i 9.
The thermocouples associated with safety / relief valves and safety valve posi' tion, that may be used for backup position indication, shall be verified to be operable every operating cycle.
i 10.
Separate functional tests are not required for this instrumentation.
The calibration and integrated ECCS tests
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which are performed once per operating cycle will adequately demonstrate proper equipment operation.
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Amendment No. /d, 98 61 l
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VYNPS 3.2 (Continued) i standby gas treatment system operation so that none of the activity released during the refueling accident leave the Reactor Building via the normal ventilation stack but that all activi,ty is processed by the standby gas treatment system. Trip settings for the monitors in the ventilation duc[ are based upon initiation of the
, normal ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment system operation pt a radiation level equivalent to the maximum release rate of 0.08/E r-Ci/sec given in Specification 3.8.C.I.a.g The monitoring system in the plant a
stack represents a backup to this system to limit gross radioactivity releases to the environs.
The purpose of isolating the mechanical vacuum pump line is to limit relpase of radioactivity from the main condenser. During an accident, fission products would be transported from the reactor through the mair. steam line to the main condenser. The fission product radioactivity would be pensed by the main steam line radiation monitors which initiate isolation.
r, Post-accident instrumentation parameters for Containment Pressure Torus < Water Level, Containment Hydrogen /0xygen Monitor, and Containmeat High-Range Radiation Monitor, are redundant, environmentally and seismically qualified instruments providad to enhance the operators' abi[ity to follow the course of an event.
The purpose of each of these instruments la to provide detection and measurement capability during and following an accident as required by NUREG-0737 by ensuring continuous on-scale indication of the following:
containment pressure in the O to 275 psia range; torus water level in the O to 25 foot range (i.e., the bottom to 5 feet above the normal water level of the torus pool); containment hydrogen /oxpgen concentrations (0 to 301 hydrogen and O to 25% oxygen); and containment radiation in the 1 R/hr to 10 R/hr; ga==ma.
The Control Room Toxic Gas Monitor assures that the Control Room operators, wherever required to bejin the Control Room, will be adequately protected against the effects of an accidental release of toxic gases and that the plant can be safely operated or shut down under design basis accident conditions.
3 i
The Degraded Crid Protective System has been installed to assure that safety-related electrical equipment will not be subjected to sustained degraded voltage.
This system incorporates voltage relays on 4160 Volt Emergency Buses 3 and 4 which are set to actuate at the minimum voltage required to prevent damage of safety-related equipment.
S If Degraded Grid conditions exist for 10 seconds, either relay will actuate an alarm to alert operators of this condition.
Based upon an assessment of these conditions the operator may choose to manually disconnect the off-site power.
In addition, if an ESF signal is initiated in conjunction with low voltage below the relay setpoint for 10 seconds, the off-site power will be automatically disconnected.
Amendment No. /M, 98 66
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VYNPS 4.2 PROTECTIVE INSTRUMENTATION i
The protective instrumentation systems covered by this Spe,cification are listed in Table 4.2.
Most of these i
protective systems are composed of two or more independent and redundant subsystems which are combined in a i
dual-channel arrangement. Each of these subsystems contains an arrangement of electrical relays which operate to initiate the required system protective action.
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The relays in a subsystem are actuated by a number of means, including manually-operated switches, j
process-operated switches (sensors), bistable devices operated by analog sensor signals, timers, limit switches, I
and other relays.
In most cases, final subsystem relay actuation is obtained by satisfying the logic conditions
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established by a number of these relay contacts in a logic array. When a subsystem is actuated, the final subsystem relay (s) can operate protective equipment, such as valves and pumps, and can perform other protective actions, such as tripping the main turbine generator unit.
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With the dual-channel arrangement of these subsystems, the single failure of a ready circuit can be tolerated because the redundant subsystem or system (in the case of high pressure coolant injection) will then initiate j
the necessary protective action.
If a failure in one of these circuits occurs in such a way that an action is j
taken, the operator is immediately alerted to the failure.
If the failure occurs and causes no action, it could then remain undetected, causing a loss of the redundancy in the dual-channel arrangement. Losses in redundancy of this nature are found by periodically testing the relay circuits in the subsystems to assure that they are operating properly.
It has been the practice in boiling water reactor plants to functionally test protective instrumentation sensors
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and sensor relays on-line on a monthly frequency. Since logic circuit tests result in the actuation of plant equipment, testing of this nature was done while the plant was shutdown for refueling.
In this way, the testing of equipment would not jeopardize plant operation.
l months, which is too long a period to allow an undetected failure to exist.However, a refueling interval could be as long as i
This specification is a periodic testing program which is based upon the overall on-line testing of protective instrumentation systems, including logic. circuits as well as sensor circuits.
Table 4.2 outlined the test, calibration, and logic system functional test schedule for the protective instrumentation systems.
The testing of a subsystem includes a functional test of each relay wherever practicable.
The testing of each relay includes all circuitry necessary to make the relay operate, and also the proper functioning of the relay contacts.
Functional testing of the inaccessible temperature switches associated with the isolation systems is accomplished remotely by application of a heat source to individual switches.
All subsystems are functionally tested, calibrated, and operated in their entirety if practicable.
Certain exceptions are necessary because the actuation of certain relays would jeopardize plant operation or present an operational hardship.
Amendment No. 22, id, 98 67
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VYNPS 4.2 (Continued)
For example, certain relays trip recirculation system discharge valves, and the actuation of these relays would cause a ',evere plant transient.
In cases of this nature, the devices in the relay circuit will be tested, but s
the relay will only be actuated during a refueling outage. The number of relays in this category is very small compared to the total number of identical relays being tested on-line.
Amendment No. 22, //. 98 67a 6