ML20207T600
| ML20207T600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer  |
| Issue date: | 03/11/1987 |
| From: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207T569 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-395-85-26, EA-85-101, NUDOCS 8703240171 | |
| Download: ML20207T600 (3) | |
Text
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6 NOTICE OF VIOLATION South Carolina Electric and Gas Company Docket No. 50-395 Summer Unit 1 License No. NPF-12 EA 85-101 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 3-7, 1985, violations of NRC fire protection requirements were identified.
In accordance with the " General
. Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1986), the violations are set forth below:
A.
0perating License NPF-12, Section 2.C.(18) requires that the licensee maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the approved fire protection plan, as amended through Amendment No. 33 to the Final Safety Analysis Report, and maintain the fire protection program set forth in Appendix R to 10 CFR Part.50 with certain exceptions.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R Section III.G.1 requires that fire protection features shall be provided for structures, systems, and components important i
to safe shutdown. These features shall be capable of limiting fire damage so that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station (s) is free of fire damage.
Sections III.G.2 and III.G.3 specify four alternatives that may be implemented outside of primary containment to assure that one redundant train of equipment, cabling and associated circuits necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage. The alternatives are:
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated circuits by a three-hour rated fire barrier.
Separation of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated circuits by a horizontal distance of 20 feet with no intervening combustibles and fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area.
Enclosure of redundant trains of equipment, cabling and associated circuits by a one-hour rated fire barrier with fire detection and automatic fire suppression systems installed in the area.
Installation of alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the equipment, cabling and associated circuits under consideration, and installation of fire detection and fixed fire suppression systems in the area under consideration.
Contrary to the above requirements, at the time of the inspection, fire protection features were not provided for certain redundant trains of equipment and/or cabling located in the same fire area outside the primary B703240171 870311 PDR ADOCK 05000395 G
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i containment and-necessary to achieve aAd maintain hot shutdown conditions-
.such that one train would remain free of fire' damage. Specifically, regarding the chilled water system, component cooling water system, and reactor instrumentation, none.of the alternatives provided by-
. Section -III.G.2'and III.G.3 were implemented, and Section. III.G.I.a
- wa s ' viol ated.
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1.
Cable tray 3088, on. elevation'412'-0" of the intermediate building, which contains Train "A" control power cabling for the chemical volume and control system (CVCS), was located in the same fire area outside the primary containment as cable: trays 4149,.3128, 2058, and 1025 and conduit VUC-28, which contains Train "B" power. cabling for the chilled water system and component cooling. water system. These cables were not protected in accordance with the requirements of Appendix-R.Section III.G.2 or III.G.3. Therefore, a postulated fire.in this area could render both redundant trains of charging pumps inoperable by causing fire damage to the Train "A" CVCS charging pump cabling and cabling for the chilled water supply _to the Train "B" bearings for the Train "B" CVCS charging pump which would result in i
the inoperability of that pump.
l 2.-
.In the control building's north cable chase, elevation 435'-0", cabling F
for one redundant source range nuclear instrumentation channel was l
not provided fire! protection features which meet the requirements of e
Section III~.G.2. or III.G.3. All three redundant channels could have l
been rendered inoperable for a postulated fire in this area.
B.-
Technical Specification 3.7.10 requires at all times that with one or more 3
of the required fire rated assemblies (walls, floor / ceilings, cable tray i:
enclosures and other fire barriers) and or sealing devices inoperable, b
within one hour either, establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected assembly, or verify the operability of the fire C
detectors:on at least one side of the inoperable assembly and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.. If the inoperable fire rated assembly is not restored within 7 days, other reporting requirements must also be met.
' Contrary to the above, as of June 7,1985,- required fire barriers were rendered inoperable and actions were not taken to establish a continuous or hourly fire watch for the following examples:
1 1.
A 6-inch ~by 30-foot open floor penetration located at the north end of the switchgear room allowed two fire areas (switchgear room IB-20 and intermediate building IB-25.6) to communicate, thus making the i;
fire barrier inoperable. Actions were not taken as required by TS 3.7.10.
2.
The required li-hour fire barrier enclosure provided for conduit raceway VUL 34B in intermediate building fire area IB-23.2 was partially missing and, thus the fire barrier was inoperable. Actions y
were not taken as required by TS 3.7.10.
Collectively, these violations have been categorized as a Severity Level III i
problem (SupplementI).
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PursuantJto 10 CFR 2.201, should South Carolina Electric and Gas Company wish to deny or add amplifying remarks to the violations, a written statement of denial is required to be submitted to this office within thirty l days of the date of this Notice. South Carolina Electric and Gas Company's corrective dCtions for the violations already have been examined by the NRC.. For this-reason, the other requirements of 10 CFR 2.201 are considered to have been met.
FOR THE-NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ~
J. Nelson Grace Regional Administrator Dated at Atlanta, Georgia this // day of March 1987 4
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