ML20207P252

Special Rept 86-6:on 871210 & 16,fire Barriers Degraded Due to Impairment of Floor Hatch & Two Wall Penetrations Beyond 7 Days.Caused by Inoperable Hatch Remaining Open to Run Cable for Work.Weld Cable Removed & Hatch Returned to Svc

ML20207P252
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/09/1987
From:	Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
86-6, NUDOCS 8701150305
Download: ML20207P252 (3)

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O PSIEG Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station January 9, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 REPORT 86-6 SPECIAL REPORT This Special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the impairment of certain fire barrier penetrations for greater than seven (7) days. Since the penetrations were impaired for greater than seven (7) days, this report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Sincerely yours, 8701150305 870109 J. .Z ko, Jr.

PDR ADOCK 05000272 G eral Manager-S PDR Salem Operations RKH pc Distribution i I The Energy People

.,,..,ni

SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER'86-6 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1

'Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 98938 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

c Fire Barriers Inoperable For Greater Than Seven (7) Days - Welding Cable Run Through Floor Hatch - Air Hose Run Through Wall Penetrations Event Date(s): 12/10/86 & 12/16/86 Report.Date: 01/98/87 This report was initiated by Incident Reports Nos.86-452, 86-456,86-457 4

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Unit 1: Mode 1 - Reactor-Power Level 199% - Unit Load 1130 MWe Unit 2: Mode 5 - Cold Shutdown DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

4 This Special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the

degradation of fire barriers due to a floor hatch and two wall

penetrations being impaired for greater than seven (7) days. This l report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement

, 3.7.11.a.

l Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetration barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries,

. protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a

continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected i

penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration (s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (30) days outlining the action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s)

, to functional status."

l The Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 (with Action Statement) is nearly identical to Unit 2's.

e .

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-6 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detecti and extinguishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passiv element in the facility fire protection program and are subject periodic inspections.

The inoperable fire barrier penetrations and hatch, constitute breaches of the associated fire barriers; however, appropriate actions were taken to comply with the requirements of Technict Specification 3.7.11. A one hour roving fire watch has been'j effect since the onset of the Unit 2 outage and the detectors vicinity of the fire barriers have been operable for the durat impairment.

This action provides adequate assurance that a fire will'be:r:

detected and extinguished; thus, alleviating the possibility fire affecting adjacent portions of the facility. These occu therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of-t public. However, because the fire barriers were not returned functional status within seven (7) days, as specified by Tech Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this report is-being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specifice 6.9.2.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The welding cable was removed and the hatch returned to funct status on December 12, 1986.

The air hose was removed and the fire barrier penetrations rc to a functional status on December 20, 1986.

In both cases these were planned evolutions and the requirem the Action Statement were met. No further corrective action deemed necessary.

As stated in the Description of Occurrence section, on Octob 1986 an hourly fire watch patrol was established to patrol t Auxiliary Building and Service Building for the duration of current Unit 2 refueling outage. This practice was initiate the last Unit 1 refueling outage (earlier this year). Due t extensive work involved during a refueling outage, PSE&G har determined it to be prudent to establish a one hour roving for the duration of refueling outages and extend it as nece-Gener Ma ager -

Salem Operations RKHipc SORC Mtg.87-002

5

. e UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-6 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

The only differences are Unit 1 Technical Specification uses the terms " functional" and "non-functional" whereas Unit 2 Technical Specification uses the terms " OPERABLE" and " inoperable",

respectively.

On December 10, 1986, a metal floor hatch remained open beyond the seven days allowed by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.lla. The hatch is located in the floor of the 122' elevation of the Unit No. 1 Auxiliary Building on the west side and allows passage between the 122' and 100' elevations. The hatch had remained open due to a welding cable being run through it for work on the containment fan coil units. On December 12, 1986, the welding was completed, the cable was removed and the hatch was restored to operable status.

On December 16, 1986, two wall penetrations remained open beyond the seven days allowed by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.lla. One wall penetration is located on the 84' elevation of the Unit No. 1 Auxiliary Building in the wall to the Unit No. 1 Switchgear Room. The other wall penetration is located on the 64' elevation of the Unit No. 1 Switchgear Room to the Unit No. 2 Switchgear Room. Both penetrations are mechanical fire plugs located in conduits which allow passage of hoses or cables through the respective fire barriers. An air hose was run through these penetrations to power paint removal tools and paint spraying tools during the repainting of the Switchgear Rooms. During the course of the job the penetrations with the hose were sealed with simkit, however because the air hose is not a fire barrier the penetrations were considered to be impaired. On December 20, 1986, the air hose was removed anc the penetrations restored to operable status.

On October 2, 1986 a one hour roving fire watch was established in support of the initiation of the Unit 2 third refueling outage. The areas included in the patrol include Zones 1 and 2. These Zones comprise the entire Auxiliary Building (both Units) and the entire Service Building. The fire watch patrol checks fire doors and penetrations in these areas. The patrol continued for the duration of the outage and has been extended as necessary in support of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a requirements.

l APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The hatch remained open and inoperable to run a welding cable for work on the containment fan coil units. On December 12, 1986, the welding was completed and the hatch was restored to operable status.

The air hose was run to power paint removal tools and paint spraying tools in support of a job to repaint the Switchgear Rooms. On December 20, 1986, the hose was removed and the penetration fire barriers returned to a functional status.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

O ,D UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-6 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) t

! This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passive 3

element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections.

The inoperable fire barrier penetrations and hatch, constituted breaches of the associated fire barriers; however, appropriate actions were ta' ten to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11. A one hour roving fire watch has been in l effect since the onset of the Unit 2 outage and the detectors in the vicinity of the fire barriers have been operable for the duration of impairment.

This action provides adequate assurance that a fire will be readily detected and extinguished; thus, alleviating the possibility of a fire affecting adjacent portions of the facility. These occurrences therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. However, because the fire barriers were not returned to a functional status within seven (7) days, as specified by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The welding cable was removed and the hatch returned to functional status on December 12, 1986.

The air hose was removed and the fire barrier penetrations returned to a functional status on December 29, 1986.

In both cases these were planned evolutions and the requirements of the Action Statement were met. No further corrective action is deemed necessary.

As stated in the Description of Occurrence section, on October 2, 1986 an hourly fire watch patrol was established to patrol the Auxiliary Building and Service Building for the duration of the current Unit 2 refueling outage. This practice was initiated as of the last Unit 1 refueling outage (earlier this year). Due to the extensive work involved during a refueling outage, PSE&G has determined it to be prudent to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the duration of refueling outages and extend it as necessary.

Gener Ma ager -

Salem Operations RKH pc SORC Mtg.87-902