ML20207L885

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Suffolk County Response to Lilco Motion Re Pending Discovery Matters & Order of Proceeding Under Dec 11 Order.* Util Motion Unfounded.Depositions Can Be Completed by 870130 W/O Prejudice to Parties.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20207L885
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 01/05/1987
From: Letsche K
KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#187-2105 OL-5, NUDOCS 8701130017
Download: ML20207L885 (23)


Text

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DOCKETED USMPC Januarv 5, 1987

'87 JMi -d F 4 **6 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Board

)

In the Matter of

)

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

)

(EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

)

Unit 1)

)

)

SUFFOLK COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO LILCO'S MOTION REGARDING PENDING DISCOVERY MATTERS AND ORDER OF PROCEEDING UNDER DECEMBER 11 ORDER I.

Introduction On December 23, 1986, LILCO filed a Motion Regarding Pending Discovery Matters and Order of Proceeding Under December 11 Order

(" Motion").1 In requesting this Board to address a number of vague complaints regarding discovery and scheduling, LILCO's Motion contains much hyperbole and sanctimonious accusations which, even if true (which they are not), are profoundly petty and not deserving of response.

For the most part, LILCO's complaints revolve around a central theme:

that this proceeding is not moving quickly enough to suit LILCO and that the Governments are somehow to blame.

1 LILCO's Motion was accompanied by a letter from counsel, raising essentially the same issues as the."otion.

l 8701130017 B70105

{DR ADOCK 0500 2

503

Thus, LILCO's Motion is replete with attacks on the Governments for their purportedly:

" tear [ing] at the structure and schedule set in place by the Board" (Motion, at 8-9); engaging in

" arrogant contumacy" (Motion, at 11); causing " feckless discussions" among the parties (Motion, at 11); and failing to disclose, in correspondence with the Board, the " texture of discovery to date" (Motion, at 9) -- to name only a few of the Governments' alleged sins.

LILCO also proposes certain procedural changes designed to prejudice the Governments and give LILCO lopsided advantage.

LILCO's Motion is largely unfounded and unbecoming.

The County will not be drawn into the sort of ad hominem mud-slinging which the Board condemned in earlier phases of this proceeding.

Accordingly, the County will respond only to the substantive content of LILCO's Motion to the extent it can be discerned.2 Stripped of its hysteria, there is little substance to LILCO's Motion.

The facts, which LILCO has omitted or distorted, do not support LILCO's verbal assaults on the Governments.

On the contrary, given the numerous and complex issues involved in this case, the numerous witnesses identified by bqth sides, j

delays prompted by FEMA's discovery position, and the fact that l

l the holiday season has coincided with discovery, this proceeding is progressing well.

Indeed, the deposition schedule has been, L

and continues to be filled with at least one, and usually twa 2

Indecipherable allegations such as the County's supposed failure to disclose the " texture of discovery" can only be answered after LILCO explains what it meant in the first place. l

depositions-every business day.

For their part, the Governments are working to move discovery along as quickly as possible, consistent with the requirement that all parties receive due process.

LILCO cannot reasonably expect more.

II.

The Governments Do Not Object To LILCO's Proposed Changes To The Board's December 11 Order As Long As They Are Implemented In A Way That Will Not Be Preiudicial To The Governments Before launching its attack on the Governments, LILCO raises a few issues which go to post-discovery procedure.

Principally, LILCO seeks reversal of this Board's December 11, 1986 Order

(" Order") as it applies to (a) the method for pre-filing testimony and (b) the submission of summary disposition motions.

Motion, at 4-8.

A.

Summary Disposition Motions LILCO first requests the Board to build time for summary disposition motions into the schedule, arguing that the current schedule " effectively deprives" LILCO of its right to take advantage of that procedure.

Motion, at 5-6.

The County is sensitive to LILCO's right to due process and does not object in principle to LILCO's request.

However, LILCO's proposal for implementing its request is unworkable.

In effect, LILCO proposes that the parties begin to prepare all testimony as though it were to be filed on February 2nd.

However, if another party files summary disposition motions on or before February 2nd, testimony on those contested issues would -

not be filed or litigated at that time.

Rather, those issues would be held in abeyance until the summary disposition motions were decided.

Motion, at 5-6, 8.

The flaws in LILCO's proposal are obvious.

First, given the realities of the current discovery schedule (which is discussed in more detail below) it is simply unrealistic to schedule the filing of anything -- motions or testimony -- as early as February 2.

Given the large number of depositions left to be taken, the current January 21 discove'ry cutoff date cannot realistically be met.

This is not due to lack of effort by any of the parties.

However, for reasons explained more fully in Part III of this Response, at least 9 additional days (i.e.,

until January 30) are required to accommodate all remaining depositions.3 This would leave only 3 days between the end of discovery and the filing deadline for the preparation of testimony and summary disposition motions.

But, even if the Board refused to extend discovery by only 9 days and maintained the January 21 cutoff date, testimony and/or motions for summary depositions simply cannot be drafted and filed in the 12 days between January 21 and February 2.4 3

Given the need to extend the discovery schedule slightly, the February 17 trial date is also unrealisEItvs.,See below for a proposed revised schedule.

4 As LILCO recognized, Motion, at 6 n.

3, no parti can even begin preparing summary disposition motions until discovery is substantially complete.

Likewise, with depositions scheduled daily, the parties cannot devote their attention to drafting testimony before the end of discovery.

Given the number and complexity of the issues, as well as the number of witnesses, drafting testimony and summary disposition motions in only 12 (or

3) days is not possible.

Second, LILCO's proposal does not make sense given the practical realities involved in allocating the resources available to devote to preparation of this case.

Testimony does not simply appear out of thin air on the day it is to be filed.

Rather, it takes substantial time for each party's experts, witnesses, and counsel to analyze the information gleaned from discovery and then to draft and revise testimony.

Under LILCO's proposal, the parties could spend substantial time preparing testimony which may never be filed, if a motion for summary disposition on that issue is filed before the testimony is due.

This procedure is unfair and prejudicial to all parties, who have only limited resources, and, as a scheduling proposal, makes no sense.

Third, LILCO proposes that the Board and parties deal simultaneously with issues as to which summary disposition motions are filed and thoae which will go to trial.

Thus, LILCO proposes that although the filing of testimony on an issue should be delayed if a summary disposition motion is filed on that issue, nonetheless all testimony on issues not subject to motions should be filed on the same day as summary disposition motions, and the parties and Board should proceed to hearing on these issues, even while responding to, and ruling upon, pending summary disposition motions.

This proposal is also unworkable, given the constraints of time and resources.

It is simply not feasible or practical to expect the parties or the Board, to be able to prepare for trial, and present and cross examine i

witnesses in Long Island, at the same time they are responding to, and ruling upon, pending summary disposition motions, and then, presumably, preparing additional testimony for issues as to which summary disposition is denied.

In order to accommodate LILCO's due process concerns and, at the same time, avoid the potential waste which LILCO's proposal entails, the County suggests the following schedule for summary disposition motions:

Date Event 14 days after the completion All summary disposi-of discovery tion motions due 20 days later Responses 10 days later5 Replies 14 days after. decision on Testimony filed on all motions matters not disposed of by motion and all other issues B.

Testimony Filina LILCO suggests that all parties file testimony simul-taneously, rather than LILCO filing its testimony first, as the Order now requires.

Motion, at 7.6 The County does not object 5

The proposed times for filing responses and replies are in accordance with 10 CFR S 2.749.

6 The County notes, however, a certain irony in LILCO's complaint that the Board's proposal for LILCO to file first "is inconsistent with the practice in this proceeding of simultaneous filings of testimony by all parties.

Motion, at 7.

Only one day after making this statement, LILCO filed a proposed schedule for hearing issues in the OL-3 proceeding pertaining to reception center issues which called for the Governments to file testimony first, followed two weeks later by LILCO. 1

to this suggestion if the time now allotted for preparing testimony is extended.

An extension is required because the Board's current schedule calls for only 12 days between the end of discovery and the Board's designated testimony-filing date for LILCO.

If the County is going to be expected to file all its testimony simultaneously with LILCO more than 12 days following the end of discovery will be necessary to prepare the County's testimony.

There are too many issues and too many witnesses for discovery to be analyzed by consultants and witnesses, and for testimony and all admitted contentions to be drafted in a mere 12 days.

Clearly, in light of the existing rigorous deposition schedule, and the fact that the bulk of the discovery in this case is by deposition, it is simply not possible to begin meaningful testimony preparation prior to the end ot discovery.

The schedule outlined above will provide sufficient time for preparing motions for summary disposition and then testimony on issues not dealt with by summary disposition motion.

III. The Governments Have Properly and Appropriately Participated in Discovery LILCO's hyperbolic accusations are concentrated in Part II of its Motion, in which it accuses the Governments of deliberately frustrating discovery.

LILCO first complains that "Intervenors have simply refused to engage in meaningful discussions concerning discovery.

with LILCO."

Motion, at 9.

LILCO offers no specifics whatsoever to support this charge and the County is absolutely at a loss to understand what LILCO

means.7 Contrary to LILCO's assertions, the parties have engaged in innumerable telephone calls, personal meetings and/or correspondence in an attempt to establish a workable discovery schedule that accommodates the schedules of many busy witnesses and consultants, and the logistical difficulties of taking I

depositions in New York and Washington.

For the most part, this procedure has worked well.

Indeed, it has led to the establishment of a very tight deposition schedule with not a moment of idle time.

A copy of the deposition schedule developed by the parties in mid-December is attached as Appendix A hereto.

It has since been revised somewhat by adding even more witnesses, thus making the schedule even more rigorous.

Between January 5 and January 21 at least one deposition, and usually two, are scheduled for every working day.

Unfortunately, however, even this schedule cannot accommodate all the witnesses identified by the parties, thus necessitating the scheduling of the depositions of some witnesses after January 21.

The County has proposed a continuation of the same type of tight,.no-nonsence

.eduling for these witnesses, however, and barring any additional late 7

LILCO's assertion that the Governments have communicated with LILCO soleiv by letters to the Board of December 18 and 22 is particularly outlandish.

Given the countless telephone calls, meetings and correspondence between the parties in December to discuss, establish, and implement a very demanding deposition schedule, the inaccuracy of this statement is nothing short of amazing.

_g_

i

designations of witnesses by LILCO (agg note 13 below), expects that discovery can be completed 9 days later (i.e., by January 30).

Thus, in response to LILCO's complaint that the Governments have not sufficiently communicated with LILCO about discovery, the Govern:Ents can only say that there has been sufficient communication to establish a back-breaking deposition schedule that, so far, has been implemented, apparently, to everyone's satisfaction.

LILCO also complains that the Governments have " jammed discovery by large-scale last-minute witness designations" because the Governments identified 13 witnesses between Thanksgiving and the December 24 deadline (or 10 witnesses

.between December 3 and December 24).

Motion, at 9-10.

This complaint is incomprehensible.

At the conference of counsel before the Board on December 4, 1986, it was counsel for LILCO who ultimately suggested that witness identification be completed only shortly before

{

Christmas.8 It is thus surprising that LILCO now complains that witnesses have been identified in conformity with the procedure it itself suggested.

What is most surprising, however, is LILCO's audacity in complaining about the County's so-called "last-minute" designation of witnesses.

The day after filing its Motion, LILCO informed the Board of its intention to designate 8

Transcript of Conference of Counsel, December 4, 1986, at 83.

Counsel for LILCO suggested a cutoff date of December 22; the Board settled on a December 24 cutoff. _

. additional witnesses after the December 24 cutoff date.9 Five days later, in a supplemental discovery response, LILCO I

identified 2 additional witnesses and announced its intention to identify another "within the next few days."10 This is just one more example of LILCO's complaining about an allegedly " improper" practice by the Governments and then doing the same thing itself.ll The implication in LILCO's Motion that the Governments have been improperly " hiding" their witnesses until the last minute is simply untrue.12 The County's counsel have consistently i

9 Letter from Donald P.

Irwin to the Board, December 24, 1986.

10 LILCO's Supplemental Responses To Suffolk County's First Set Of Interrogatories And Request For Production Of Documents (Dec.

29, 1986), at 2.

Additionally, LILCO informed the parties of its intention to designate further witnesses "as are necessary to i

respond to matters disclosed through discovery or to the late designation of witnesses by Suffolk County."

Id.

11 In light of LILCO's announced intention to designate wit-nesses out of time, LILCO's protests of the County's December 22 letter notifying LILCO that two unnamed (but described) addi-tional witnesses may be identified after the December 24 cutoff ring particularly hollow.

LILCO, however, is undaunted by the inconsistency of-its position.

In any event, the Board should

~

take note that the County now intends to identify only one (not two) additional witness, to testify concerning Contentions Ex 38 and 39, and will disclose the name of that person when the governmental contracting process has been completed.

12 In its December 23, 1986 letter to this Board, LILCO alleges j

that the Governments "have on various occasions contacted poten-tial witnesses.

. months before disclosing their identities Letter at 2.

This is misleading and unfair.

The County's counsel have consistently notified LILCO regarding the identity of all potential witnesses immediately after those witnesses have been approved by the County.

Of course, such witnesses were contacted prior to such approval and prior to decisions by counsel to seek approval of their use as witnesses, to determine whether they are available and whether their expertise would be useful.

This is perfectly proper -- and a far (footnote continued)

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_ _ _.__ _.. ____, _ _...._ __.,. _ ~__ _

identified witnesses as soon as possible after those witnesses have been approved by the County.13 Moreover, as LILCO tacitly admits in its Motion at 9 n.9, many witnesses were identified weeks before the designated cut-off date.

Other County witnesses were identified as early as November 14th.

Rather than evidencing discovery problems, this evidences just how well the process has been working.

LILCO's principal complaint in Part II of its Motion is that despite the determined efforts of all parties, all depositions cannot be completed by January 21.

That is a simple fact.

LILCO may not like it, but it is an unavoidable result of the size of this case, the types of affirmative cases the parties intend to present, and the realities of the calendar.

Contrary to LILCO's baseless allegations, the fact that all noticed depositions cannot be completed by January 21 is not due to intransig7nce, foot-dragging, or any other inappropriate behavior on the part of the Governments.

Indeed, the deposition schedule has not one unused moment in it.

The fact is that there are more witnesses than there is time to depose them between now and January 21.14 l

Assuming that LILCO does not designate more witnesses, approxi-(footnote continued from previous page) i cry from the arguably improper behavior which LILCO strongly implies was engaged in by the Governments.

13 The need to obtain County approval before actually revealing l

the names of the County's witnesses was previously discussed in detail at the December 4th conferences of counsel before this Board.

Egg Dec. 4 at 60-61, 84-85.

14 The Board was advised of this fact in a letter to the Board from Karla J. Letsche dated December 18, 1986. _ _ _ _ _ _

mately 11 witnesses still remain to be scheduled.

The only practical way these depositions can be taken is by expanding the schedule by only 9 days to January 30.

This is not a significant extension, but is absolutely required if the Governments are to receive due process.

Failing to face this reality, LILCO's Motion offers certain l

proposals apparently designed to squeeze all remaining deposi-tions into the time remaining between now and January 21.

None of these proposals, however, is workable.

First, LILCO makes the vague recommendation that the Board somehow " ration" the remaining time between now and January 21 between the parties.

Motion, at 11.

LILCO offers no explanation of what it proposes by this suggestion, and the Governments have no idea how such " rationing" could be done by the Board.

This proposal must be rejected.

The Governments have a right to conduct discovery and depose the LILCO and FEMA witnesses they

~have noticed for deposition.

Any attempt to " ration" or limit that right would deprive the Governments of due process.

As was evident in the previous reception center proceeding, such attempts to limit proper discovery lead only to time-consuming remands, which are in no one's interest.

Second, LILCO proposes that the parties begin " double-tracking" depositions.

Motion, at 11.

This proposal is absurd.

Does LILCO truly believe that the parties are equipped to take fgyr depositions a day, rather than tw2?

There is a limit to the rigors which a discovery schedule can properly impose on the i

parties and their counsel, and the current schedule has reached that point.

The Governments' resources are already stretched to the limit, in preparing for and attending two depositions a day, while also responding to motions and appeals in this and other proceedings pending before the Margulies Board, the Appeal Board, and the Commission.

Double-tracking to eliminate a need for a nine-day extension in the discovery schedule makes no sense.

Furthermore, as explained at the December 4 conference of counsel, counsel for the State of New York cannot be present at two depositions at once.

Dec. 4 Tr. 88-89.

Double-tracking will mean that the State will be denied its right to be present at, and participate in, all depositions.

Finally, LILCO proposes that some time can be saved if the Governments were forced to depose the designated FEMA trial witnesses as a panel, rather than individually as currently scheduled.

Motion, at 10-11.

LILCO misleads the Board by i

implying that such panel depositions were customary in earlier proceedings.

Motion, at 10.

This is untrue.

While FEMA's witnesses were once previously deposed as a panel, depositions of l

FEMA witnesses -- as with almost all other witnesses in this proceeding -- have customarily been taken individually.

The need for such individual depositions is plain.

First, the FEMA I

l witnesses have different areas of expertise and observed different aspects of the Exercise.

Accordingly, counsel for the Governments will be posing different questions to each FEMA witness whether they are deposed in a panel or not.

Thus,

l LILCO's assumption that time will be saved by deposing the FEMA witnesses as a panel is unfounded.

It will take just as much time.

Furthermore, the Governments have a right to discover the facts and opinions known to each individual FEMA witness without coaching or counseling from other FEMA witnesses.

This right is lost when witnesses are deposed as a panel.

The FEMA witnesses are key in this proceeding.

Proposals to limit the Governments' right to legitimate discovery efforts relating to the opinions of and facts known by these witnesses are without basis and must be rejected.

In short, LILCO's proposals for compressing all remaining

. discovery into the time available between.now and January 21 is fraught with the danger of denying the Governments their right to due process.15 The Governments' proposal -- a 9-day extension provides a simple solution to the problem.

IV.

The Governments Have Responded To LILCO's Recuests For Admissions In Part III of its Motion, LILCO complains that the Governmerts have not responded to LILCO's 278-page request for 15 It is also noteworthy that LILCO itself caused the loss of a full day of depositions by withdrawing two of its witnesses from depositions scheduled on December 29.

LILCO had previously in-formed the County that the two witnesses were available on that date when it requested that some depositions be scheduled between Christmas and New Years.

In an effort to accommodate LILCO's request, the County scheduled the depositions on the date sug-gested by LILCO and was fully prepared to go forward with the depositions Nevertheless, on December 22, LILCO announced that the witnesses were no longer available on December 29.

Thus, no depositions were conducted on that date. - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

t admissions 16 which focused on the accuracy of a so-called "timeline" purporting to cover all the events which took place during the Exercise.

Once again, LILCO has failed to get the facts straight.

Contrary to LILCO's assertions, the Governments responded to LILCO's request for admission on December 22, 1986.17 In their Response, the Governments stated, in essence, that they could neither admit nor deny the accuracy of the almost 3,000 entries in LILCO's Request for Admissions timeline and they also explained why.

In addition, the Governments indicated their willingness to stipulate to the accuracy and authenticity of certain Exercise documents and other matters.

Response, at 2.

If LILCO is now dissatisfied with the Governments' Response, it may file a motion to compel -- a procedural vehicle it has not hesitated to use in the past.

There is no such motion before the Board at this time.

l 16 LILCO's First Request for Admissions and Third Set of Interrogatories Directed to Suffolk County, New York State and the Town of Southampton (December 1, 1986).

17 Response of Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southampton to LILCO's First Request for Admissions and Third Set of Interrogatories (December 22, 1986)

(" Response").

The County acknowledges that its Response out of time.

As explained in the Governments' Response, however, this was due to the Government's discussions with LILCO in an attempt to agree upon a stipulation regarding certain times and documents.

The Governments filed a short Notice on December 15, 1986, informing

- the Board and parties of the pendency of the negotiations, which might have obviated the need for any response.

Unfortunately, as of December 22, the negotiations had not yet been fruitful, so the Governments filed their Response...

. - -. ~....

F V.

Issues Recardina the FEMA Mction To Bifurcate In Part IV of the Motion, LILCO raises various points regarding FEMA's request to bifurcate the proceedings.18 The Governments have:already addressed that FEMA request.

VI.

Conclusion Despite LILCO's complaints, the fact that discovery in this case is proceeding according to a rigorous and demanding schedule.

Unless LILCO identifies more new witnesses, deposi-tions can be completed by January 30 without prejudice to any party.

And, with the schedule modifications set forth in Part II.A hereof, summary disposition motions, as well as pre-filed testimony and a hea:

, can also be accommodated in a meaningful manner that does not result in the wasteful or unnecessary use of resources or prejudice to any party.

The County will be prepared to discuss that schedule more fully at the January 6, 1987 conference of counsel.

4 Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 l

i 18 FEMA Motion To Bifurcate Proceedings And Request Early Concideration Of Contentions EX 19 (December 19, 1986)... -.

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- r

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.aCLo

'Karla J. Letydhe Christopher M. McMurray P. Matthew Sutko Kirkpartrick & Lockhart 1800 M Street, N.W.

South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C.

20036-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County l :

a.

00LKETED ustec Januarv 5, 1987

'87 JAN -8 P4 :45 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFF!CE 1 00CnLim ~

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Boardb Z'

)

In the Matter of

)

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

)

Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

)

(EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

)

Unit 1)

)

)

i CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY'S RESPONSE TO LILCO'S MOTION REGARDING PENDING DISCOVERY MATTERS AND ORDER OF PROCEEDING UNDER DECEMBER 11 ORDER have been served on the fol-lowing this 5th day of January, 1987 by U.S. mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.

John H. Frye, III, Chairman

  • Dr. Oscar H. Paris
  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Washington, D.C.

20555 i

Mr. Frederick J. Shon*

Spence W.

Perry, Esq.*

l Atomic Safety and Licensing Board William R. Cumming, Esq.

i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C.

20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.,

Room 840 Washington, D.C.

20472 l

-..-.r.-

.m.

Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.

Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.*

General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Long Island Lighting Company Washington, D.C.

20555 175 East Old Country Road Hicksville, New York 11801 Mr. Willia.4 Rogers W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.*

Clerk Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O.

Box 1535 Suffolk County Legislature 707 East Main Street Office Building Richmond, Virginia 23212 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

195 East Main Street 1717 H C:reet, N.W.

Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C.

20555 MHB Technical Associates Hon. Peter Cohalan 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suffolk County Executive Suite K H.

Lee Dennison Building San Jose, California 95125 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.

Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.*

Suffolk County Attorney Special Counsel to the Governor Bldg. 158 North County Complex Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 Veterans Memorial Highway State Capitol Hauppauge, New York 11788 Albany, New York 12224 David A.

Brownlee, Esq.

Mr. Philip McIntire Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Federal Emergency Management 1500 Oliver Building Agency Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 C

By Telecopy Kafla J. Letscp'e KIhKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.

South Lobby - Suite 900 Washington, D.C.

20036-5891

0N KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART SOUTH LOBBY FTH floor mm 1800 M STREET. N.W.

53 sTAft sTasar WASHINGTON, D.C. 200%5891 22 1428 marwyr r AVENL5 MIAla. Pl. 33138 N 00D 776M (309 3744112 TE12X 44030F 10.DC 12 1500 OUVER BUllDINO TEL500PER 004 W100 FITT38URCH. PA 15222-5379 NL S. MILI.ER (4:4 3554500 (204 7749022 December 22, 1986 John H. Frye, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In her December 18 letter to you, Karla Letsche of this firm promised to keep the Board informed as to the progress and scheduling of depositions.

This letter is intended to summarize the present statug of the depositions which have been scheduled, and to set forth at least Suffolk County's present intentions with respect to those depositions not yet scheduled.

As noted by Ms. Letsche in her letter, it is simply not pos-sible to complete all depositions by January 21, and the follow-ing schedule assumes that depositions will have to be extended until at least January 26.

Even then, should LILCO wish to depose County witnesses Saegert and Zook, who have been identi-fled only today, and/or other persons who may yet be identified as witnesses for the County, it will be necessary to extend the time for depositions even further.

l l

As to Suffolk County witnesses, LILCO has recently agreed to depose the following three witnesses on the following schedule:

L. Colwell 12/30/86 10:00 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., DC F. Rowan 1/6/87 11:00 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., DC E. Loftus 1/16/87 9:00 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., DC

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART John H. Frye, Chairman Dr. Oscar H.

Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Page 2 December 22, 1986 In addition, by copy of this letter to all counsel, the County hereby notices its intent to depose the following LILCO and FEMA witnesses (including those non-FEMA personnel who attended the February 13 Exercise at FEMA's request to assist in the Exer-cise's evaluation) according to the schedule set forth below (the three County witnesses designated above are included in this schedule in order to make clear the entire deposition schedule):

D. Behr/LILCO 12/29/86 9:00 a.m.

Long Island J. Kessler/LILCO 12/29/86 1:30 p.m.

Long Island L. Colwell/SC 12/30/86 (see above)

C. Daverio/LILCO 1/5/87 9:00 a.m.

Long Island F. Rowan /SC 1/6/87 (see above)

J. Weismantle/LILCO 1/7/87 9:00 a.m.

Long Island E. Lieberman/LILCO 1/7/87 1:30 p.m.

Long Island W. Wilm/LILCO 1/8/87 9:00 a.m.

Long Island D. Mileti/LILCO 1/8/87 1:30 p.m.

Long Island B. McCaffrey/LILCO 1/9/87 9:00 a.m.

Long Island E. Robinson /LILCO 1/9/87 1:30 p.m.

Long Island R. Kowieski/ FEMA 1/12/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash.,

D.C.

P. McIntire/ FEMA 1/13/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

T. Baldwin/ FEMA 1/14/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

J. Keller/ FEMA 1/15/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

KIRKPATRICK 66 LOCKHART John H. Frye, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Page 3 December 22, 1986 l

E. Loftus/SC 1/16/87 (see above)

I. Husar/ FEMA 1/20/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

R. Donovan / FEMA 1/20/87 1:30 p.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

E. Pursell/LILCO 1/21/87 9:30 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

H. Fish / FEMA 1/22/87 9:00 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

P. Giardina/ FEMA 1/22/87 1:30 p.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

D. Harris /SC 1/23/87 9:30 a.m.

Long Island M. Mayer/SC 1/23/87 1:30 p.m.

Long Island R. Bernacki/ FEMA 1/26/87 9:00 a.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

C. Malina/ FEMA 1/26/87 1:30 p.m.

1800 M Street Wash., D.C.

With respect to the above witnesses, we are today serving formal notices of depositions for all FEMA witnesses and the four Exercise evaluators who work for agencies other than FEMA --

i.e., Messrs. Fish, Bernacki and Giardina and Ms. Malina.

In addition, we intend to serve these four individuals with the subpoenas issued by the Board on December 17.

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART John H. Frye, Chairman Dr. Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Page 4 December 22, 1986 We will continue to keep the Board informed with respect to deposition scheduling and other discovery-related matters.

Sincerely, Michael S. Miller cc:

Donald P.

Irwin, Esq. (by telecopy)

Kathy E.B. McCleskey, Esq.

Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq. (by telecopy)

William R. Cumming, Esq. (by telecopy)

Fabian G. Palomino,.Esq. (by telecopy)

Richard J.

Zahnleuter, Esq.

Stephen B. Latham, Esq. (by telecopy) r l

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