|
---|
Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20249A7661998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License NPF-3 ML20249A7551998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 223 to License NPF-3 ML20216B9401998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License NPF-3 ML20216B8381998-04-14014 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 220 to License NPF-3 ML20202C6131998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License NPF-3 ML20199J9511998-01-30030 January 1998 SER Related to Exemption from Section Iii.O of App R,To 10CFR50,for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20203C1401997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License NPF-3 ML20203B2141997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License NPF-3 ML20203C2701997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0491997-02-11011 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License NPF-3 ML20128L3001996-10-0202 October 1996 SER Supporting Dbnp IPE Process of Identifying Most Likely Severe Accidents & Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20058M9591993-09-28028 September 1993 SE Accepting Licensee Response to GL 89-19, Request for Action Re Resolution of USI A-47, 'Safety Implication of Control Sys in LWR Nuclear Power Plants.' ML20057A3791993-08-20020 August 1993 SE Concluding That Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Insp Program Plan for Plant Has Unacceptable Exam Sample as Discussed in Encl Inel TER ML20056G4301993-08-18018 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Inservice Testing Program Requests for Relief.Licensee Made Changes to Subj Program to Include Exercising & fail-safe Testing of Auxiliary Feedwater Valves AF-6451 & AF-6452,in Response to TER Anomaly 8 ML20126A3051992-12-0808 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 176 to License NPF-3 ML20056B2721990-08-20020 August 1990 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief from ASME Code Repair Requirements for ASME Code 3 Piping ML20248H6371989-10-0303 October 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 139 to License NPF-3 ML20248D8271989-09-29029 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 890228 & 0630 Submittals Presenting Proposed Designs to Comply w/10CFR50.62 ATWS Rule Requirements ML20248E2771989-09-20020 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 138 to License NPF-3 ML20248B3801989-09-20020 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 137 to License NPF-3 ML20247E6901989-09-0505 September 1989 Safety Evaluation of Audit of Facility Design for Resolution of IE Bulletin 79-27 Re Loss of non-Class IE Instrumentation & Control Power Sys Bus During Operation.Preventive Maint & Testing Program Should Be Developed for Bus Power Sources ML20245K1871989-08-15015 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 136 to License NPF-3 ML20245F5791989-08-0404 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 134 to License NPF-3 ML20245H9531989-08-0404 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 135 to License NPF-3 ML20247J8731989-05-18018 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 133 to License NPF-3 ML20245G0371989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 131 to License NPF-3 ML20245F0631989-04-25025 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 132 to License NPF-3 ML20244D4031989-04-13013 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 130 to License NPF-3 ML20196D9601988-12-0808 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Util Response Concerning Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Reliability Study.Util Should Ensure That Sys Mods Do Not Result in Net Reduction in Sys Reliability ML20207K7911988-10-0404 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Operation in Cycle 6 W/O Removing Flaws in Cracked HPI Nozzle ML20207K1071988-09-19019 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 120 to License NPF-3 ML20207H9271988-08-24024 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 117 to License NPF-3 ML20207H3891988-08-19019 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 116 to License NPF-3 ML20207E3931988-08-0202 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 114 to License NPF-3 ML20207D5171988-08-0202 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 115 to License NPF-3 ML20150C4621988-03-0909 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 109 to License NPF-3 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K1231999-10-14014 October 1999 Revised Positions for DBNPS & PNPP QA Program ML20217D5441999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle1999-09-0303 September 1999
- on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle
ML20211R0811999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1999-003, :on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With
ML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20210Q8541999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20209E6231999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-013, :on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With1999-06-24024 June 1999
- on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With
ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20195F4871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20207E8011999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-981933, Design & Licensing Rept DBNPS Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project ML20207F4351999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504 ML20206M6341999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20205M2931999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1999-002, :on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With1999-03-0505 March 1999
- on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With
ML20207J1461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20199E2501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20205K5781998-12-31031 December 1998 Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss ML20206B0101998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for Fiscal Yr Ending 981231,encl ML20197J3441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-012, :on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With1998-11-17017 November 1998
- on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With
05000346/LER-1998-009, :on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With
05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With
ML20195D0001998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process 05000346/LER-1998-010, :on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with1998-10-26026 October 1998
- on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with
05000346/LER-1998-008, :on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With1998-10-0101 October 1998
- on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With
ML20154H5801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-007, :on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With1998-09-22022 September 1998
- on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With
ML20151W1611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Dbnps.With 05000346/LER-1998-006, :on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources1998-08-21021 August 1998
- on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources
ML20237E3171998-08-21021 August 1998 ISI Summary Rept of Eleventh Refueling Outage Activities for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20237B1681998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236U5011998-07-23023 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980624,Unit 1 Site Damaged by Tornado & High Winds.Alert Declared by DBNPS Staff,Dbnps Emergency Response Facilities Activiated & Special Insp Team Deployed to Site by Nrc,As Result of Event ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-004, :on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired1998-07-13013 July 1998
- on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired
05000346/LER-1998-005, :on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations1998-07-11011 July 1998
- on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations
ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236N7451998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-003, :on 980519,Mode 3 Entry Without Completion of Surveillance Requirement Occurred.Caused by Failure of I&C Technicians to Perform Each Sp as Written or Adherence. Revised Procedure1998-06-18018 June 1998
- on 980519,Mode 3 Entry Without Completion of Surveillance Requirement Occurred.Caused by Failure of I&C Technicians to Perform Each Sp as Written or Adherence. Revised Procedure
1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
.
'o.,
UNITED STATES
+
[
g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
-l w ASHING TON, D, C. 20655
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 120 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUM,INATING COMPANY DAVIS-BESSE nut' LEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO 1 DOCKET NO. 50-346
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated December 8,1987 Toledo Edison Company proposed a.'evision to the Dtvis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No.1. Technical Specifications (TS's). The proposed change would make Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2 c.3 consistent with the wording of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. and ANSI N45.4-1972.
Toledo Edison Company asserts that the surveillance requirement, as presently worded, is contrary to the provisions cf ANSI N45.4-1972, Appendix C, and is
~
not consistent with the NRC position r lating to the rate of gas injection or bleed-off from containment during testing. Toledo Edison Company fu;'ther asserts that with the present wording of the TS'S, if the initial Type A test leakege were zero, a valid supplemental test could not be performed to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J and ANSI N45.4-1972.
u.
2.0 DISCUSSION Every license issued under 10 CFR Par *, 50 is deemed to have certain conditions as part of the license whether specifically stated in the license on not (cf.
10 CFR 50.54). One of these conditions imposes the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 relating to primary containment leakage testing. Appendix J provides for pre-operational and periodic verification of leak-tight integrity of the primary reactor contair, ment.
Appendix J defines three types of tests to be conducted. This proposed amendment relates to the Type A tests, which are defined as tests intended to measure the primary containment overall integrated leakage rate (1) after the containment has been completed and is ready for operation, and (2) at periodic i
intervals thereafter.
8809200242 080919j 36 DR ADOCK 050 g
r
. Paragraph III. A.3.(b) of Appendix J specifies that the accuracy of type A tests shall be verified by a supplemental test, and an acceptable rethod for such tests is described in ANSI N45.4-1972, Appendix C.
Supplemental test results are acceptable if the difference between the supplemental test data leakage rate at the calculated peak pfes(or L ) (Lsure for the Design Basis Acciden and Type A test data is within 0.25 L is the maximum allowable t
(DBA),andL is the maximum allowable leakage rate at the reduced test t
pressure. )
The ANSI N45.4-1972 method involves the use of an adjustable orifice (microadjustable instrument flow control valve). The valve and suitable flow meter are installed at a convenient containment penetration.
In use, the leak orifice is adjusted to provide a flow during the test approximating (at test pressure conditions) the leakage rate specified for the containment vessel. The leak orifice 1:, to be selected to provide a flow of 75 to 125 percent of L,.
Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.2 c.3 of the TS presently specifies that the quantity of gas injected into or bled from the containment system during the supplemental test is to be enutvalent to at least 25 percent of the total measured leahge rate at the calculated peak pressure for the DBA, P,, (38 psig).
3.0 EVALVATION Toledo Edison Company has proposed to revise this paragraph to specify that the rate at which gas is injected into or bled from containment during the supplemental test is to La between 0.75 and 1.25 of L This changewouldthenmaketheTSrequirementconsistentwiththere$u.irements of ANSI /ANS 56.8-1981 ANSI N45.4-1972, and Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50.
The change also would allow conducting a supplemental test even if the medsured Containment leakage were zero, whereas under the present TS requirement, a valid supplemental test cannot be performed since no gas would be injected into or bled from containment.
The staff has reviewed the proposed change to TS paragraph 4.6.1.2 c.3 and finds the change acceptable on the basis that it eliminates an inconsistency between the station TS's and the Comission's regulations; furthermore, the change eliminates the potential for not being able to perfctm a valid test if the measured leakage is zero.
The staff also notes that Inspection Report No. 50-346/84-29(DRS),issuedby the NRC on February 8,1988, identified the discrepancy between the station TS's and Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 as an open item. This change should resolve that open item.
r---------
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment involves changes in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and a change to a surveillance requirement. The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves r.o significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of thi amendmeat.
5.0 CONCLUSION
The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: Albert W. De Agazio Dated: September 19. 1988 i
e l
l I
-