ML20207J846
| ML20207J846 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 01/05/1987 |
| From: | Butler W Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207J851 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#187-2136 OL, NUDOCS 8701080617 | |
| Download: ML20207J846 (12) | |
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7590-01 UHlTED STATES NUCLEAR PEGULATOPY COMMISSION PPILADELPHIA ELECTRIC CCMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-352 tgj'CEOFCONSIDERATIONOFISSUANCEOFAMENDMENTTO FACILITY CFERATING LICENSE AND FF.0 POSED NO SIGNIFICANT PA?ARDS CONSIDERATICP PETERMIPATION AND OPECRTUNITY FOR HEARING The U.S. Nuclear Peculatory Conrission (the Comission) is considering issterce of an an.enoment to Fecility 0 prating License No. NPF-39 issued to Philade,lrhia Electric Company for cperation of the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1, located in Montgon.ery County. Pennsylvania.
The proposed amendmer.t would change the Technical Specifications (TS) and would satisfy a conditior, to the facility operating license in accordarce with the licensee's epplication for an'endr'ent dated November 17, 1986 as amended on December 22, 1986. The proposed chances would revise Technical Specification (TS) 3/4.2.3 "Mininum Critical Power Ratio," TS Table 3.3.6-2, " Control Red Block Instrunentation Setpoints," and TS d.4.1.1.2, " Reactor Coolant System-Surveillance Recuirements." License Ccndition 2.C(13), " Operation With Partial Feedwater Heatinc at Fnd-of-Cycle" would be satisfied since the besis for the condition, nanely that the applicable safety analyses te permit orcration with partial feedwater heating (PFH) had not been performed, has been satisfied by
- l the submittal of such analysis by the licensee. The reason for these changes 6
is to permit operation of the unit with PFH and increased core ficw (ICF) in i!
order to extend the fuel cycle and provide incrr.ased operational flexibility. The i
proposed increase in core flow up to 105 percent of rated flow and the proposed i
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decrease in feedwater temperature by up to 60'F tend to decrease the percentage of voiding in the cociant in the reactor core. This results in increased moderatcr density with an attendant increase in reactivity and herce power icvel. The ability to thus ircrease pcher level above that which the reactor weeld otherwise he capable of without PFH and ICF late in the fuel cycle is desirable to offset the reducticn in power production late in the fuel cycle due te depleticr of fissicrable material. While continuing in teet all safety ar.alysis acceptance criteria, the propnsed changes will result in operations at r. relatively higher powcr level for several months and will also providt an estincted one to two weeks extension of full power cycle length. This amerdrent does not involve ar increase above the currently licensed power level.
The proposed changes consist of the followir.g:
The n:initur. critical power ratio (PCPR) limits in TS 3/4.2.3 wculd be a.
revised by the addition of specified PCPR limits for operation with ICF and PFH as shewn on TS pages 3/4 2-8, Ea, 9, Figure 3.2.3-la and Figure 3.2.3-Ib.
lhe additional limits for operation with ICF and PFP ensures that abnormal operattoral transients initiated when operating with ICF and PFH do not result in violation of the safety limit MCPR. The safety limit MCPR is orchanged fron, the value previously provided in the Final Safety Ar.alysis Report (FSAR).
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The addition of a "high flow clamped" trip setpoint ilmit of 106 percent and allowable value of 109 percent of rated flow for the rod block monitor upscale alarm in TS Table 3.3.6-2 ensures that the rod blocks currently ircluded in the TS cannot be exceeded. This is the same requirement that has been in effect since iritial plant operation.
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Changing the control red block instrument setpoints for the reactor coclant system recirculation flow upscale trip setpoint from 108 to 111 percent of rated flow and tbc allowable value from 111 to 114 percent of rated flow in TS lat.le 3.3.6-2 er.sures that the indication and alarm functions for this parameter will be provic'ed to the operators at a sufficiently greater value than the 105 percent upt.er limit cr. flow to allcw for hardware uncerthirties and storal noise, lhis parameter serves an ir.dication ar.d alarm function orly to the plant crerator and is not directly invcived in plant trotective actions and safety analyses, d.
Char.gtng the recirculation pump motor-generator set scoop tube mechanical oversrced stop setpoint from 105 to 109 percent and the electrical overspeed stcp setpoint frem 102.5 to 107 percent cf rated ccre flow in TS 4.4.1.1.?
provides adeouate margin to allow the recirculation pump to crerate up to 105 percent of rated flow, e.
An addition to the list of referrr.ces on page B 3/4 2-5 has been made to reflect the analysis report provided in support of the an.endnent application.
A cFenge to index page xi has been made to reflect the additional table and figure for the MCPR 1Imits.
The licensee proposes to make these changes to the TS to extend the Cycle 1 operating time by several months by operating at reduced thermal pm.er with commensurate feedwater temperature ar.d stean pressure conditinns.
Continued cperation is possible because reduced steam voids, reduced fuel temperature and reduced equilibriar xenon yield reactivity gains which compensate for reactivity losses' due to depletion of fissionable raterial near the end of the fuel cycle. ' The amendment does not involve an increase above the currently licensed power level.
. i Before issuance of the proposed license ameno'rr.ent, the Ccr.n.ission will have made findings required by the Atreic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Cormiission't regulations.
The Ccumissian has made a prcposed deterr.ination that the amer.dnent request involves no significar.t hazards consideration. Under the Conrnission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that cperation cf the facility in accordance with the proposed amendeent would not (1) involve a sionificant ircrease in the probability or consequences of ar. accident pr:viously evaluated; or (2) crc 6te the possibility of a new or different kind cf accident from any accident rreviously evaluated; er (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The licenste has provided analyscs of sigrificant hazards censiderations in its recuest for a license amendment. The licensee has concluded with appropriate bases, that the proposed atendnent satisfies the stendards in 10 CFR 50.92 and, therefore, irvolves no significant tazards considerations.
The MFC staf f has rade a preliminary review of the licensee's subtrittals.
The staff's evaluation of tbc proposed changes is prcvided oelow.
Standard 1 - Involve a sionificant increase in the probability or consequences of an accider.t previously evaluated.
The ar.ticipated operational occurrences (A00s) and accidents that have the potential for being impacted by the proposed changes are generator load rejection with steam bypass failure (LRNBP), f'ecdwater controller failure to l
merimum demand (FWCF), FWCF without bypass, FWCF without bypass and recircu-lation pump trip, MSIV closure with flux scram, rod withdrawal error, fuel loading error, rod drop accident, LOCA and ATWS, All these ACOs and accidents
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5-have been reassessed to deternine the consequences resulting from the prcposed changes. The results of these assessments show that the censequences are within the appropriate accepter.ce criteria discussed below.
Standard Revier Plan (SPP) 15.1.2 requires that ir. crease in fcedwater.
flew events % evaluated and SRP 15.2.1-15.2.5 requires that loss of load ard closure of PSIVs be evaluated considering the potenti61 for fuel damage or excessive reactor system pressure. The acceptance criteria are that the critical power ratio must remain above the FCPR safety limit ano that syster pressure should be mainteined below 110 percent of the desigr value. The results. of the FWCF and the FWCF without bypass or recirculation pump trip analyset indicate ti ie MCPP rcraains above the safety limit value of 106 ar.d that systte pressure is well belce the limit of 1375 psig. The results of the LMSP and the PSIV closure, which is tFe limiting overpressure transient, indicate that PCPR remains above the safety limit value of 1.06 and that peak vessel pressure cces not excerd 1273 psig, thus maintaining a 102 psig margin-to the limit of 1375 psig.
The rod withdrawal error transient was evaluated. As sho.<n in TS Table 3.3.6-2 the control rod block monitor upscale trip setpoint is a function of flow rate. P, and would increase to a value of 106 percent at rated flow con-ditions. Operating with ICF, withcut other compensations, would allow this setpcint to ir: crease beyord 106 percent. Therefore the licensee has limited or " clipped" the trip setpnint to a maximum value of 106 percent. Thus the results of this transient are unchanged.
SRP 15.4.7 specifies that the worst case fuel loadirg error be determined and that the effect on reactor power distribution be dctermined. The results O
of the analysis considering ICF arr' PHF indicate that this does not becore the limiting MCPR event nor does it reduce overall MCFR margin.
SRP 15.6.5 specifies the acceptance criteria for loss-of-ccolant accidents.
Results of anelyses of the effects of ICF and PFH on peak cladding temperature (PCT) shcw that'it increases by less than 10*F for the limiting break and that tFe previously establisFed maximum average p!arar linear heat gener6 tion rates (MAPLFGPs) are erplicable for ICF and PHF operations.
The results of analysis of effects of ICF and PFH on anticipated transients without scran (ITWS) show that perforurce is within design allcweble limits for overpressure prntection, ccre and fuel performance, containntet performance ar.d stability and that, furthermore, these results are bcunded by the results cf previously perforocc' enalyses.
The results of analysis of effects of ICF and PFH on containrient performance show that the contairr.ent parareters are beended by the results previously rercrted in the FSAR except for the drywell deck downward differential pressure, the pool swell loads, the condensaticr oscillation and chugging loads which are bourAed by the previously established design values.
TFerefore, since all A00's and accidents which rey have been impacted by the proposed changes Faye been andlyzed and found to be ecceptable, the pro-posed changes will not significantly increase the prcbability cr consequerces of any accident previously evaluated.
Standard 2 - Create the possibility of a rew or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
Operation with ICF ar.d PFH does not involve ary equipment design cherces.
It effectively provides for norr.al plant operation in en increased crea of
the power-flow crerating r:ap. While the events previously analyzed may be inititted from new operating conditions, no new path is created that could lead to a new or different kind of accident. With the incorporation of the new MCPR, rod block and recirculation pump speed limits, ortration is kept within equipment desian and reculatory limits. The licensee concluded, and staff agrees, that the propcsed changes do not create the possibility of a new or differer.t kind of accident fror any accident previously evaluated.
Standard 3 - Involve a Significant Peduction In a Margin of Safety The purpose of the revised MCPP liraits for operation with ICF ana FFH is to ensure that A0("s initiated during ICF and PFH operations do not result in violation of the l'.CPR safety limit.
In the analyses of A00s the revised MCPR limits have been sbcwn to be su'ftcient to accomplish this eb,iective and thus preserve a margin to sefety equivalent to that previously established.
As discussed above, the chanaes concerning the rod withdrawal error transient ersure that the margin is unchanged for this ever.t.
The control rtd block instrument setrnints for the recirculation finw trip
- etpoint are for the purpose of providing indication and alarns to the operator er.d thus have not been relied upon to establish the margin to design or safety limits. Mcwever, since the core flow would be increased by five percert and this trip setpoirt would be increased by only three percent, the difference between the intended flownate and the trip setpcint would be reduced thus enhancing its function as an indication and alarm of unintended high flow operation.
The recirculation pump motor-generator set mechanical and electrical overspeed stop setpoints have been increased f rom 105 to 109 percent and from
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102.5 to 107 percent respectively. These setpcints will ensure that the set trips eith; r on the mechanical or the electrical stnps at either 107 or 109 percent of rated speed. The ef'ect on plant design transients with a maximum core flow runout to 107 percent and 109 percent has.been considered. Whereas the enre ficw rate would be increased by five percent the r.echanical ar.d electrical overspeed stops are only teing increased by 4 and 4.5 percent, respectively, thus snhancing the function of the stops to prevent unintended hicF flew operation.
The effects on the MCPR limits fer flows up to 109 percent has also been considered.
The results of operation with ICF and PFH on t'^ mechanical loads on reacter internals and fuel assemblies, the flow induced vibration of reactor interrials and on the feedwater nozzle and sparger fatigue useage,fectors were also cor.sidered and found not to involve significant reductions in the margin of safety associ6ted with these parameters.
Therefore, the operation of the facility in accordance with the prcposed changes will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
.Acccrdingly, the Commission proposes tc determire that the preposed chances to the facility operating' license and to the Technical Specifications to allow plant operations with increased core flow ar.d partial fredwater Feating does not involve significant hazards considerations.
The Commission is seeking public consents on this proposed determination.
Any contents received within 30 days after the date of publication cf this notice will be considered in making any final determination. The Commission will not normally make a final determination unless it receives a request for a hearing.
2 Written cerments shculd be addressed to the Rules and Precedures Branch, Division of Rules and Pecords, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comndssion, Washington, D.C.
20555, and shculd cite the publication date and page nun,ber of thir FEDERAL REGISTER notice. Copies of comments rceelved rray be exarrared at the FFC ' ublic Docurrent Room,1717 H Street, FW, Washington, D.C.
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By February 9,1987
, the licensee ir:ay file a reauest for a hearing with respect to issuance of the amendraent to the subject facility operating license er.c any person vbose interest may be affected by this proceed 4no and who wittes to participate as e r6rty in the proceeding rust file a written petition for itave to intervene. Request for a hearing and petitions for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the Cornr.ission's " Rules of Practice for Dorrestic Licensino Proceedings" in 10 CFR Part 2.
If a request for a heaving or petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the Comnission or an Atorde Safety ar.d Licensirig Peard, designated by the Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensina Beard Panel, will rule on the reouest and/or petitier: ard the Secretary or the designated Aten,ic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of hearing or an appropriate crder.
As reoutred by 10 CFR 92.714, a petition for leave to ir,tervene shall set forth with particblarity the interert of the petitioner in tbc proceeding, and how that ir.terest rnay be affected by the results of the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the following factors:
(1) the nature of the petitioner's right under the Act to he nade a party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of the petitior:er's property, financiel, or other interest y
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in the proceeding; ar.d (3) the possible effett of any order which may be entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition should also icer.tify the specific aspect (s) of the subject rr.atter of the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person who has filed a petition for leave to ir.tervene or h+o has been admitted as a party riay amero the petition withnut reauesting leave of the Boerd up to fifteen (15) days prior to the first prehearing ccr.ference scheduled ir. the proceedir.g. but such an annded petition must satisfy the specificity requiremerts described above.
Not later then fifteen (15) days prior to the first preharine conference scFcduled in the proceeoir.g, a petitioner shall file a supplenent to the petition te interver.e which must include a list of the contentions which are sought to he litigettd in the matter, and the bcses for each contentinn set forth with reasonable specificity.
Contentiens shall be limited to matters within the scope of the arrendment under consideration. A pttitioner who ' ails tc file such a sucplemer.t which satit.fies these requirements with respect to at least one contc:ntion will r.ot be penritted to participate as a party.
Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, subject to any limitationi in the order grantino leave to intervene, and have the oppcrtunity to participate fully in the conduct of the hearing, including the opportunity to preser.t evidence and cross-examirie witnesses.
If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final determination on the issue of ne significart hazards consideration. The final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is hold.
U the final determination is that the amendment request involves no significant hazards censideration, the Comnission may issue the amendment and
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make it effective, notwithstar. ding the request for a hearing. Any hearing teld would take place after issuance of the arrendnent.
Normally, the Connission will not issue the crendment until the expiratior,of tre 30-day notice period. However, sFould circtn: stances change during the notice pr:riod such thet failure to act in a tirrely way would result in derating or shutdown of the facility, the Connission may isst.e the license anendmert before the expiratior, cf the 30-day notice period, provided that its final detern.ination is that the an.erdnent invc1ves no significant hazards consideration.
The fir:al determination will consider all public ard State ccuents received.
Should the Conwission take this action, it vill publish a notice of issuance and provide fcr cpportunity for a hearing after issuance.
The Connission exrocts that the need to take this action will occur very infrecuently.
I request 'cr e hearfr,g or a petiticr. for leave to intervene rust be filed with the Secretary o? the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission, Washington, D.C.
20555, Attn: Decketing and Service Branch, or reay be delivered
.to the Comission's Public Docurent Room,1717 H Street, NW Washington, D.C.,
by the above date. Where petitions are filed during the last ten (10) days of the notice period, it is requested that the petitioner prcrnptly se inform the Comission by a toll-free tclephone call to Western l'nfon at (800) 325-6000 (in liissouri (800) 342-6700). The Western Unfor rperator should be given Datagram Identificetion Number 3737 and the following message addressed to l
Malter R. Butler, Director, BWR Prcject Directorate No. 4, Divisior, of BWR Licensing: petitioner's nan:e and telephone nuniber; date petition was mailed; plant name; and publication date and page number of this FEDERAL REGISTER notice.
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A copy of the petition shculd also be sent to the Gffice of the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornnission, Vashington, D.C.
20555, and to Conner and Vetterhahn, IN7 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.
20026, attorney for the licensee.
Nontir.ely filints of petitions for leave to intervene, emended petitions, wir.lemental petitions er.d/or requests for hearing will not be entertained absent a determinatien by the Cornr.ission, the presidir.9 cfficer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licer. sing Bo6rd, that the retition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(1)-(v) and2.714(d).
For further details with respect to this action, see the application for arterdraent detec Movember 17, 1986, as ar..cnded on Decer.ber 22,19E6, which is availt.ble for public inspection at the Corrission's Public Document Room,1717 H Street, M', Washington, D.C. 20555, and at the Pottsotwn Dublic Library, 500 Hich Street, Fettstown, Fernsylvania 19464.
Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 5th day of January, 1987.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGilLATORY C0 WISSION Ualter R. Butler, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 4 Divisinn of BWR Licensing