ML20207G789
| ML20207G789 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/21/1999 |
| From: | Paperiello C NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Fitzgerald J ENERGY, DEPT. OF |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9906140075 | |
| Download: ML20207G789 (2) | |
Text
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1-g May 21, 1999 Mr.~ Joseph E. Fitzgerald, Jr.
Task Force Chair External Regulation Pilot Program U.S. Department of Energy -
Washington, DC 20585
Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:
We have completed our review of the May 1999." Revised Final Draft Report" for the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) pilot project that we received on May 7,1999.
~ As indicated in my letter to you, dated Apnl 2,1999, regarding the reports for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) pilot
. projects, the staff must obtain Commission agreement before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
. Commission (NRC) can concur in this pilot project report. Although the REDC report presents NRC views more accurately than did the LBNL and RBOF reports, the report is not balanced in its presentation of these views and gives the clear impression that there is little net benefit to external regulation of the U.S. Department of Ener9y (DOE). Accordingly, these areas of difference between DOE and NRC prevent the staff from seeking Commission agreement at this time.
The REDC report appears to minimize the advantages of external regulation, such as allowin'g DOE to: (1) focus on its primary mission; (2) eliminate the inherent conflict of interest arising from self-regulation; (3) produce a safety culture comparable to the commercialindustry; (4) be consistent with domestic and international safety management practices; (5) enhance its credibility by an open process; and (6) improving public confidence in DOE. The DOE Working Group identified these advantages of external regulation in 1996, and NRC continues to believe that they would be provided to DOE by external regulation. The report also inflates the costs of external regulation by providing cost estimates that are based on the incorrect assumption that NRC would act contrary to how it has stated it would act, as in the example of the requirement l
for a Criticality Accident Alarm System. We believe that the effect of minimizing these advantages, while providing inflated cost estimates,,is to unfairly downplay the net benefits of l
external regulation.
i Based on our shared experience in the licensing of DOE's TMI-2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation, we remain confident that external regulation can be accomplished in a way that achieves its anticipated advantage while avoiding unnecessary regulatory burden. We I f
forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely, 9906140075990h PDR ORg EUS orig)inalsignedByCall.Y pNi$ello, Director Wd
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 May 21, 1999 i
Mr. Joseph E. Fitzgerald, Jr.
s Task Force Chair
- External Regulation Pilot Program
. U.S. Department of Energy.
Washington, DC 20585
Dear Mr. Fitzgerald:
Weliave completed our review of the May 1999 " Revised Final Draft Report" for the Radiochemical Engineering Development Center (REDC) pilot project that we received on May 7,1999.
As indicated in my letter to you, dated April 2,1999, regarding the reports for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF) pilot projects, the staff must obtain Commission agreement before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
- Commission (NRC) can concur in this pilot project rsport. A'though the REDC report presents NRC views more accurately than did the LBNL and RBOF reports, the report is not balanced in its presentation of these views and gives the clear impression that there is little net benefit to 1
external regulation of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). According!y, these areas of i
difference between DOE and NRC prevent the staff from seeking Commission agreement at this time.
The REDC report appears to minimize the advantages of external regulation, such as allowing DOE to: (1) focus on its primary mission; (2) eliminate the inherent conflict of interest arising from self-regulation; (3) produce a safety culture comparable to the commercial industry; (4) be consistent with domestic and international safety management practices; (5) enhance its credibility by an open process; and (6) improving public confidence in DOE. The DOE Working Group identified these advantages of external regulation in 1996, and NRC continues to believe i
that they would be provided to DOE by external regulation. The report also inflates the costs of extemal regulation by providing cost estimates tnat are based on the incorrect assumption that NRC would act contrary to how it has stated it would act, as in the example of the requirement for a Criticality Accident Alarm System. We believe that the effect of minimizing these advantages, while providing inflated cost estimates, is to unfairly downplay the net benefits of extemal regulation.
Based on our shared experience in the licensing of DOE's TMI-2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage installation, wo remain confident that external regulation can be accomplished in a way that achieves its anticipated advantage while avoiding unnecessary regulatory burden. We look forward to working with you in the future.
Sincerely, Carl aperiello, Director Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards l
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