ML20207E010

Submits Description of Addl Fire Area for Which Deviation from Separation Criteria of Cmeb 9.5-1 Required,Per Fire Hazard Analysis Changes Included in Amend 28 to FSAR

ML20207E010
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	12/19/1986
From:	Bailey J GEORGIA POWER CO., SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES, INC.
To:	Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
GN-1253, NUDOCS 8701020036
Download: ML20207E010 (6)

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Fbst Office Box 282 :

Waynesboro Georgia 30830 3

Te6ephone 404 554 9961 404 724 8114

' Southern Company Services,Inc.

R>st Offee Box 2625.

Birmingham, Alabama 35202 Telephone 205 870-6011 Vogtle Proj.ect s

December 19,.1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X3BL01 Attention: Mr. B. J. Youngblood Log:

GN-1253 PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing A U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

20555

'NRC DCCKET NUMBERS 50-424 AND 50-425

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CONSTRUCTION PERMIT NUMBERS CPPR-108 AND CPPR-109 V0GTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PIANT - UNITS 1 AND 2 OPEN ITEM 7:

FIRE PROTECTION

Dear Mr. Denton:

In addition to the Fire Hazards Analysis (VEGP FSAR Appendix 9A) changes included in Amendment 28 to the FSAR, we have identified an additional fire area for which a deviation from the separation criteria of CMEB 9.5-1 is required.. The following is a description of the requested deviation:

NEW DEVIATION FOR FIRE AREA 1-AB-D-B (FSAR Appendix 9A) 7.

Separation by distance without full area suppression:

Fire area 1-AB-LD-B is a large fire area which encompasses many levels of the central portion of the auxiliary building and the fuel handling building. PT-11742 (Train B NSCW cooling tower bypass interlock pressure transmitter) is located in the southeast corner of fire zone 12 on level D.

The instrument cable associated with this device is routed in conduit in the same general lo' cation (southeast corner) on levels D, C and B before it exits the fire ares. This same fire area also contains Train A safe shutdown components including the instrument cable for PT-11741 (device which is redundant to PT-11742).

PT-11742 and its associated instrument cable are located such that at least 70 horizontal feet of separation distance exists between them and any Train A safe shutdown component including the PT-11741 cable (routed on level C) in this fire area. While no fire suppression system is provided to protect these devices the separation distance along with the location of the device and the circuit (shielded from most of the area by the fire barrier for stair number 3) provide assurance that a single fire in this fire area could not easily preclude the ability to achieve safe shutdown. The combustible loadings on these three levels (fire zones 12, 24 and 40 for levels D, C and B respectively) are* low and each fire zone is provided with a fire detection system that would alert the plant fire brigade to ensure limiting of the damage caused by the fire.

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6 Director of Nuclear!Reac' tor Regulation Filet X3BLO1~

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December 19,.1986

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e e1 SThe.threeLattached' sketches illustrate the approximate locations of"the 33

_ subject cables. _ Levels C and D contain both train A and B safe shutdown

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.. cables while level B contains only the subject train'A cable. The only

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significant in-situ' intervening combustible material is the non-safety F

,related cable-. tray illustrated on the sketches.- While the presence of the

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non-safety-related. cable--constitutes' intervening combustibles, the very (long separation distance end. the presence of the detection system J -

mitigates'against possible' damage.to both safe shutdown trains prior to sfire brigade response and control of any potential fire.

) Modification ofthe plant to. provide a 3-h rated fire barrier or the

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addition of.an automatic fire suppression' system in the vicinity of

.PT-11742 and its' associated electrical. cable.in this fire area would not

.significantly increase.the level of protection provided by the existing design.

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' Additional Infornation1 In Addition _to this new deviation the following items are noted for l

information J

1.: JWe have conducted a review of the VEGP fire area boundaries and have

' determined that some fire areas can be merged. This is of particular

-interest to 'us in that it would eliminate the need for penetration seals and fire dampers thereby simplifying our construction activities. When

. parsing fire areas to allow fire barrier derating the following acceptance teria were usedt

. Merging of the fire areas does not jeopardize the ability to achieve o

safe shutdown. Both fire areas being merged have equipment and cables associated'with the same safe shutdown train or at least one of the fire areas does not have any safe shutdown equipment or cables.

o Merging'of the fire' areas does not result in subjecting safety-related equipment and cables to any previously unconsidered significant fire

- hazards.

The fire area boundary changes (merging of fire area or portion of one area'into another) are presently being documented as FSAR changes (Appendix 9A fire hazards analysis update) in accordance with project

. procedures and will be included in a future FSAR Amendment. The final fire area boundary configuration will be in accordance with the guidelines of BTP CMEB 9.5-1, as already clarified in FSAR Appendix 9B.

Your SER for fire protection may be impacted in that the previously requested deviation regarding the absence of a fire damper in the rated fire barrier separating fire areas 1-AB-LD-PC and 1-AB-LD-B will no longer be required (FSAR Appendix 9A pages 9A.1.2.-21 and 9A.1.11-13 as updated by Amendment 28) i,

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(Director of; Nuclear Reactor Regulation File: X3BLO1

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g, c2.1,In finalisation of the fire event safe and alternate shutdown evaluation a verification effort has recently been completed to ensure that the analysis reflects the as-built plant configuration. This effort included 7

physical plant walkdowns to verify safe # shutdown raceway locations as tracked by' the computer program which provides the electrical circuit

'information used.in the analysis. This verification effort also reviewed

the lapset on the analysis resulting from design changes (circuit modifications and circuit and equipment relocations) which have occurred since.the last computerised circuit evaluation prior to impicnentation of the " Fire Hasards Analysis Impset Checklist" program (program al'.ows

. identification of analysis impacts prior to implementation of the change). This verification effort has identified changes in the raceway wrapping requirements;(3 short conduit runs and two junction boxes added

.to the listing) and some' additions and deletions of potential spurious actuation concerns in a number of plant fire areas.

The plant modifications to wrap the newly defined raceway and the procedural changes to address the revised spurious actuation concerns are l

being' implemented expeditiously..

We wish to' esphasise that these latter two items do not constitute a change in

-our. commitments nor do they constitute a request for additional deviation.

These items will require FSAR changes (Appendix 9A fire hazards analysis Lupdate) which are being processed in accordance with project procedures and twill.be included in a future FSAR Amendment.

Should you require additional information, please let me know.

- Since rely,

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f.A. Bailey J

Project Licensing Manager i

JAB /caa Enclosure sc

.R. E. Conway NRC Regional Administrator

.R. A. Thomas NRC Resident Inspector J. E. Joiner, Esquire D. Feig B. W. Churchill, Esquire R. W. McManus M. A. Miller L. T. Gucwa B. Jones, Esquire

0. Batum G. Bockhold, Jr.

Vogtle Project File l

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