ML20207D559

Special Rept 86-5:on 861120,two Fire Penetrations,One Fire Door & Two Fire Penetration Floor Hatches Remained Opened Beyond 7 Days Allowed by Tech Spec.Caused by Extended Cleanup Activities.One Hour Fire Watch Established

ML20207D559
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	12/24/1986
From:	Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
86-5, NUDOCS 8612310066
Download: ML20207D559 (4)

Text

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O PSEG Public Service Elecaic and Gas Company P.O. Box E Har. cocks Bridge, New Jersev 08038 Salem Generating Station December 24, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555  !

Dear Sir SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO DPR-79 DOCKET NO. 50-272 l UNIT NO. 1 l REPORT 86-5 l SPECIAL REPORT This Special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the impairment of certain fire doors for greater than seven (7) days.

Since the doors were impaired for greater than seven (7) days, this l

report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.ll.a.

I Sincerely yours, J. . pko, Jr.

G eral Manager-Salem Operations RKH:pc Distribution 8612310066 861224 $

PDR ADOCK 05000272 f7 S PDR p

The Energy People i I i

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SPECIAL' REPORT NUMBER 86-5 3- .

PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 1 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock 's Bridge, New Jersey 98938 KpBNTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Fire Barriers Inoperable For Greater Than Seven (7) Days -

Event Date(s): 11/28/86 Report Date: 12/24/86 ,

This report was initiated by Incident Reports Nos.86-369, 86-378,

86-371, 86-398,86-391 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Unit 1: Mode 1 - Reactor Power Level 1994 - Unit Load 1130 MWe Unit 2: Mode 5 - Cold Shutdown.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

i This special Report describes the circumstances surrounding the degradation of fire barriers due to a fire door and certain penetrations being impaired for greater than seven (7) days. This 4

report is being submitted for informational purposes in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a.

Technical Specification 3.7.11 states:

"All fire penetrations (including cable penetrEtion barriers, fire doors and fire dampers), in fire zone boundaries, protecting safety related areas shall be functional."

Action Statement 3.7.11.a states:

"With one (1) or more of the above required fire barrier penetrations non-functional, within one hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one (1) side of the affected '

penetration, or verify the OPERABILITY of fire detectors on at least one side of the non-functional fire barrier and establish an hourly fire watch patrol. Restore the non-functional fire barrier penetration (s) to functional status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next (38) days outlining the

') action taken, the cause of the non-functional penetration and plans and schedule for restoring the fire barrier penetration (s) to functional status."

4 The Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.7.11 (with Action Statement) is nearly identical to Unit 2's. The only differences are Unit 1 4

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UNIT l'SPBCIAL REPORT 86-5 # ..

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

Technical Specification uses the terms " functional" and "non-functional" whereas . Unit 2 Technical Specification uses the terms " OPERABLE" and " inoperable", respectively.

On. November 29, 1986, two fire penetrations, one fire door, and two fire. penetration floor hatches remained open beyond the seven days allowed by Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11a. One penetration is a mechanical fire plug located in a conduit on the 100' elevation of the Unit No.1 Auxiliary Building. The conduit allows passage of hoses or cables between the. Unit No. 1 Auxiliary Building and the Radioactive Waste Handling Area. The other.

penetration is a mechanical fire plug located in a conduit on the 122' elevation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. The conduit allows

passage of hoses or cables between the Unit'No. 1 and Unit No. 2 i Auxiliary Buildings. The fire door (No. 129-2), is located on the j 100' elevation of the Unit No. 2 Auxiliary Building at the west end

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and allows passage from the Auxiliary Building to the Solid Radwaste i' Area. The fire penetration floor hatches are located between the 100' and 122' elevation of the Unit No.1 Auxiliary Building and the 4 ,

84' and 180' elevation of the Unit-No. 2 Auxiliary Building i respectively. The penetrations and door remained open'due.to hoses  !

j being.run through them for dechromating and cleaning the Unit No. 2

Component Cooling Water System in support of outage related work. i The Unit No. 2 Component Cooling System dechromating and cleanup was (

. completed on December 4, 1986. The hoses were removed and the  !

hatches, mechanical fire plugs and fire door 128-2 were restored to i operable status.

j On October 2, 1986 a one hour roving fire watch was established in support of the initiation of the Unit 2 third refueling outage. The areas included in the patrol include Zones 1 and 2. These Zones i 3

comprise the entire Auxiliary Building (both Units) and the entire  !

Service Building. The fire watch patrol checks fire doors and  ;

. penetrations in these areas. The patrol will be continued for the l duration of the outage or extended as necessary in support of i Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a requirements. l l APFARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

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The mechanical fire plugs, hatches, and fire door 120-2 remained open

} and inoperable to run hoses for dechromating and cleaning the Unit i No. 2 Component Cooling System in support of outage related work. 1 j Originally, the cleanup was planned to last less than seven days,  !

j however, as the operation began, some contaminants were detected, and i

! the cleanup was extended to ensure the Component Cooling System was  ;

l clean prior to rechromating. I i  !

{ The mechanical fire plugs, hatches, and fire door 128-2 were restored  !

{ to operable status on December 4, 1986.

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ANALYSIS OP. OCCURRENCE: i l The functional integrity of the penetration fire barriers ensures i that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to

! adjacent portions of the facility.

UNIT 1 SPECIAL REPORT 86-5 . ..

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

This design feature minimizes the possibility of a single fire rapidly involving several areas of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. The penetration fire barriers are a passive element in the facility fire protection program and are subject to periodic inspections. The inoperable fire doors constitute a breach of the associated fire barriers; however, appropriate actions were taken to comply with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.11.

A one hour roving fire watch has been in effect since the onset of the Unit 2 outage and the detectors in the vicinity of the fire barriers have been operable for the duration of impairment. This action provides adequate assurance that a fire will be readily detected and extinguished; thus, alleviating the possibility of a fire affecting adjacent portions of the facility. This occurrence therefore involved no undue risk to the health or safety of the public. However, because the fire barriers were not returned to a functional status within seven (7) days, as specified by Technical ,

Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a, this report is being i submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The door, hatches, and mechanical fire plugs remained open greater l' than seven days to run hoses for chemically cleaning the Unit 2 Component Cooling System in support of the outage. They were returned to a functional status on December 4, 1986, upon completion of the cleaning operation. No further corrective action is deemed j nect.csary.

As stated in the Description of Occurrence section, on October 2, 1986 an hourly fire watch patrol was established to patrol the

Auxiliary Building and Service Building for the duration of the i current Unit 2 refueling outage. This practice was initiated as of the last Unit 1 refueling outage (earlier this year). Due to the extensive work involved during a refueling outage, PSE&G has determined it to be prudent to establish a one hour roving fire watch for the duration of refueling outages.

l Gene 1 nager -

Sal 'm Operations I

i RKH:pc SORC Mtg.86-104 ,

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