ML20207C037

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Approves 861126 Proposal Re Flushing of Pressurizer Spray Line Contingent Upon Review of Associated Procedures Subj to Tech Spec 6.8.2.Pressurizer Spray Line Flush Program Will Not Cause Inadvertent Criticality
ML20207C037
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/22/1986
From: Travers W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Standerfer F
GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
References
CON-NRC-TMI-86-117 NUDOCS 8612300023
Download: ML20207C037 (2)


Text

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DISTRIBUTION:

DN 50-320 NRC PDR LOCAL PDR DCS TMI Site r/f TMI HQ r/f December 22, 1986 MMasnik NRC/TMI 86-117 WDTravers FMiraglia TMoslak JThomas Docket No. 50-320 RCook CCowgill LChandler J'

Mr. F. R. Star;derfer M-Town Office Vice President / Director, TiiI-2 ACRS GPU Nuclear Corporation I&E.

P. O. Box 480 Service List

!!1ddletown, PA 17057

Dear fir. Standcrfer:

Subject:

Ex-Vessel Defueling Safety Analysis

References:

(a) Letter 4410-86-L-0191, F. Standerfer to W. Travers, Ex-Vessel Defueling Safety Analysis, dated November 26, 1986 (b) Letter liRC/Till 85-055, W. Travers to F. Standerfer, Defueling Water Cleanup Systen, dated August C,198S Reference (a) subaitted, for NRC staff review and approval, your proposal for defueling of the pressurizer spray line. The proposed process involves supplying filtered borated flushing water frca the Defueling llater Cleanup Systen (DUCS) train 'B' via a hose to the pressurizer spray line.

Fuel debris in the spray line and bypass line will be flushed into the pressurizer vessel or the RCS cold leg loop 2A for future renoval. We have reviewed your safety analysis and have evaluated the proposed activities for potential adverse safety consequences due to inadvertent criticality, RCS boron dilution, and spills of radioactive liquids.

The acount of fissile ruterial expected to be contained in the pressurizer spray line is small (less than 0.1 kg) when compared to the fissile naterial which nay already exist in the pressurizer vessel or the RCS cold leg. This total quantity in either location is much less than the 70 kg needed to achieve a critical mass.

In addition, the presence of barated water in the pressurizer provides additional margins of safety to assure subcriticality.

Using highly borated water froa the DWCS to flush the systea will have a tendency to increase the baron concentration in the pressurizer vessel as well as induce a aixing action. The staff has concluded that if the RCS chcaistry is naintained within the previously apprcved limits and the DUCS is operated within the constraints specified in reference (b), there is reasonable assurance that the pressurizer spray line flush prograa will not cause an inadvertent criticality.

8612300023 861222 PDR ADOCK 05000 20 P

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"Mr.; F. R. Standerfer Deceuber 22. 1986 Dilution of the boron concentration in the RCS could result if the process hose was inadvertently connected to.a non-borated water source. The staff has deternined that the implementation of appropriate adainistrative and t

procedural controls over connection of process hoses and aligning of valves will. provide adequate protection against inadvertent boron dilution in the RCS.

The effects of liquid spills due to pipe or hose breaks were previously.

evaluated. Ue have concluded that the potential for and consequences of such line breaks in the pressurizer spray line flush progran are bounded by the analyses previously approved by reference (b).

I!e concur with your enalysis that the proposed activities do not pose a risk

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to the health and safety of the public or the. occupational work force, nor do they exceed the scope of activities and associated environnental inpacts considcred in the staff's Programatic Environmental Inpact Stattnent. The proposal does not present the possibility of any accident not previously cralyzed nor does it change the consequences of, or liklihood of any previously analyzed accident. flargins of safety as previously analyzed are not reduced.

!!c therefore approve your proposal for flushing of the prcssurizer spray line.

as described in reference (a). This approval is contingent upon our review of the associated procedures subject to Technical Specification 6.8.2.

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Sincerely, ORIGINAL. SIGNED BY:

Mil!!am D. Travers tiillian D. Travers Director Tf11-2 Cleanup Project Directorate cc:

T. F. Dernitt R. E. Rogan S. Levin J. E. Frew J. J. Byrne A. M.11111er Service DistribJtion List (see attached)

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