ML20207B771
| ML20207B771 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/12/1986 |
| From: | Heltemes C NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20207B778 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8612290092 | |
| Download: ML20207B771 (35) | |
Text
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[an ae%y'o UNITED STATES o NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l WASMNGTON, D. C. 20565
/ December 12, 1986 MEMORANDUM FOR: Victor Stello, Jr. i Executive Director for Operations FROM: C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director 0ffice for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
RESOLUTION OF INDUSTRY COMMENTS ON INCIDENT INVESTIGATION TEAM (IIT) PROCEDURES In early August 1986, the subject procedures were provided to all Owners' Groups, INPO, and NSAC for review and comment. The industry responses have been reviewed and a number of the procedures have been modified to incorporate the comments. The principal industry coments are in the following areas:
p 1. Broad Threshold Level and Rapid Response Time for IITs bM 2. Lack of Review of the IIT Report by the Licensee
- 3. Need for Interview Transcripts and Desirability of Release Before Report Completion
- 4. Desirability of Industry Participation on IITs
- 5. Potential for Excessive Quarantining of Equipment Each of these items is addressed in detail in Enclosure 1. In addition, because of the importance and interest in obtaining industry participation in future IITs, the draft procedure in this regard is provided in Enclosure 2.
In addition to revisions to the procedure manual as a result of the industry review, changes were also made to reflect updated guidance in the following two areas:
Referral of Information to Other Offices - The procedure was revised ;
Eased on comments from the EDO, OIA, and 01. Note that referrals to OIA are made by memoranda addressed to both OIA and EDO (see page 2-34 of ,
j Enclosure 4).
1
(
\
8612290092 861212 PDR ORG NEXD PDR
Victor Stello, Jr. ,
/ i i, / CotAfentiality, Subpoena Power, and Power to Administer Oath - The
'" proiedures have been upgraded to include guidance cn when the IIT may use these powers (see page 2-12).
Enclosure 3 contains our resolution of all coments received from industry on the IIT procedures.
In preparation for the regional workshops to begin in January 1987, I plan to send the revised procedures cor.tained in Enclosure 4 and the resolution of industry coments in Enclosure 3 to all licensees on December 24, 1986. By copy of this memorandum to other NRC offices, I am requesting that any significant coments be provided to me no later than December 22, 1986.
Please let me know if I can provide any additional information or assistance.
C. Jr. , Director Of for Ana sis and Evaluation o Operational Data
Enclosures:
p( ) As stated L/ cc w/ enclosures:
J. Roe, D/EDO T. Rehm, A0/ED0 J. Sniezek, DEDROGR H. Denton, NRR J. Davis, NMSS 2, Taylor, IE E. Beckjord, RES
! S. Connelly, OIA l J. Fouchard, OPA B. Hayes, 01 W. Parler, OGC l J. Liebeman, OGC l Regional Administrators i
i i
\
---=____ -
7
~ ~
DEC 12 M Ms
- Confidentiality, Subpoena Power, and Power to Administer Oath - The procedures have been upgraded to include guidance on when the IIT may use these powers (see page 2-12).
Enclosure 3 contains our resolution of all comments received from industry on the_IIT procedures.
In preparation for the regional workshops to begin in January 1987, I plan to send the revised procedures contained in Enclosure 4 and the resolutien of industry comments in Enclosure 3 to all licensees on December 24, 1986. By copy of this memorandum to other NRC offices, I am requesting that any significant comments be provided to me no later than December 22, 1986.
-Please let me know if I can provide any additional information or essistance.
onumeswedW c.L m b-C. J. Heltemes, Jr., Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
J. Roe, D/EDO T. Rehm, A0/EDO J. Sniezek, DEDR0GR H. Denton, NRR J. Davis, NMSS J. Taylor, IE E. Beckjord, RES S. Connelly, OIA J. Fouchard, OPA B. Hayes, 0I W. Parler, OGC J. Liebeman, 0GC '
Regional Administrators Distribution:
DCS M F. Hebden AE00(~CF ) (CF) C. Heltemes IIS CF IIS SF R. Freeman W. Lanning
')FC :IIS :C :DD/AEOD :D : : :
_____:... ________: _______:__Q'.,_____:./AE0 _____:____________:____________:___________
l
'!AME :RF : :FHebdon :CH emes : : :
'~JATE :12/ s/86 :12//A/86 :12/it/86 :12/tb46 _ : : :
0FFICIAL RECORD COPY L
/ \ Enclosure 1
(/ - Resolutien of Significant Issues ;
.a I. Broad Threshold Level and Rapid Response Time for IITs The industry is concerned that the scope of events that can initiate an ;
- IIT response is.too broad, and having the goal of having an IIT respond to an event within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, could lead to hasty judgments due-to the lack of available information.
- Our view is that the overriding criterion for activating an IIT is the safety significance of the event as it relates to ensuring the public health and safety. The decision to send an IIT is made by the EDO based -
- on recommendations by senior NRC management using the criteria in the procedures. Past events that resulted in an IIT response have involved a combination of the characteristics presented in the procedures. The purpose of describing event characteristics is to provide guidance to the decision making process; however, this guidance is balanced with sound engineering and managerial judgment as it relates to the potential safety significance of the event.
- A perspective on the threshold (and the NRC's decision making process) is
. provided by noting that to date in 1986, there have been no IITs, although ,
g] more than 3000 reportable events have occurred.
Additionally, we readily acknowledge that there may be occasions when the NRC will over react or under react to an event. This may occur l because of a lack of definitive and accurate information. However, should it become clear this has happened, the response will be appropriately modified in accordance with the procedures (as it was at Rancho Seco when "
- the AIT was upgraded to an IIT).
- 2. Lack of Review of the IIT Report by the Licensee
- The industry wants an opportunity to review the report and respond to the ,
team's conclusions prior to the public meeting of the Comission. Licensees' l believe that such a review could enhance the technical accuracy of the report and allow utilities to be responsive to press inquiries following the Commission meeting. J
)
The IIT procedures are consistent with the gerieral NRC policy which '
prohibits the release of draft inspection and investigation reports, such I as the IIT report, except as required by safety or security concerns. The IIT procedures specify that the'IIT report will not be publicly distributed until the day of the Commission meeting, and that a copy of the advanced report will be fomarded to the licensee at the same time that the report ..
is fomarded to the Public Document Rooms (PDRs). Thus, a courtesy copy ;
of the report will be available to the affected licensee before the Commission briefing.
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,( j We believe that a fonnal review by the ifcensee and the staff to the'IIT v report would be desirable. Accordingly, the procedures have been revised to indicate that the EDO will transmit a copy of the completed (i.e.,
advance copy) report to the licensee and the staff for review and connent when it is available. The procedures indicate that the licensee's and staff's responses will be considered by the EDO before he defines and assigns followup actions to NRC offices. Additionally, if these responses are'available in a timely manner. They could be considered by the team leader before the report is actually published as a NUREG.
- 3. Need Interview Transcripts and Availability Before Report Completion Licensees were concerned that a transcript could be used for enforcement purposes against an individual although the individual has not been
.informad of his/her civil rights prior to the start of each interview.
As noted elsewherc, transcripts serve as an important method of developing an accurate and clear factual record. In response to Comments 23 and 41 (Enclosure 3), we reflected the position that an IIT investigation is a '
serious matter. In this activity, as in other activities, individuals knowingly providing false information to the government may be subjected to. legal sanctions. However, that would be true whether cr not the interview is transcribed. Miranda rights are not provided by the IIT since there is no allegation of criminal activity. Further, if the interview started with a definition of legal rights, the interview would h
d take on the appearance of a legal hearing (which it is not) rather than focusing on factual information.
Licensees were also concerned because they could not have access to transcripts of personal interviews during the investigation. .
The procedures reflect the position that in order for the NRC to provide the transcripts to the licensee, the documents must also be available to the public; e.g...placed in the PDRs. Although this policy may cause licensee's to repeat this phase of the event investigation, most licensees agree that to publicly release the transcripts before the team's findings -
and conclusions are compiled could result in unfair and inappropriate use of the transcripts in the absence of a comprehensive understanding of all related and relevant information. Further, premature release of tran-scripts could stifle truly open discussions, fact finding, and unduly influence subsequent personal interviews. This policy of non-release until completion of the team's report ensures the release of accurate information regarding the investigation, and helps preclude false impres-sions and misleading information from being connunicated to the public.
- 4. Desirability of Industry Participation on IITs l A' number of questions were raised in this general area which arc ~
presented below together with our suggested approach.
- a. Which of the industry orgarizations (INPO, NSAC, Owners' Groups) should be invited to participate on an IIT?
i n
q l
(f Response:
We propose that the Owners' Group for the'affected utility and either
- INPO or NSAC be invited to participate. ;
- b. Should industryibservers be allowerf or only full-time participants?
Response: -
In response.'to Comnent 26 (Enclosure 3), we reflect the position that the industry representative must meet the same three criteria as NRC members to be considered for participation (i.e., technical expertise, independence and a full-time participant) and that " observer" status did not meet the purpose for industry participation, i.e., an integration and balancing of outside expertise, experience, and knowledge into all aspects and phases of the investigation.
Industry participation may hinge upon a question of legal liability for non-NRC members. The ongoing lawsuit, SCE vs. G.A. Technologies, Torrey Pines Division, demonstrates the practicality of the concern.
One of the Davis Besse IIT members has been interviewed by counsel and all members may be deposed. We have discussed the liability question with OGC, INPO, and the Owners' Groups and are helping to resolve the matter. But, at this time, the liability of industry participants remains an open issue that probably needs to be settled
^}y before an outside organization will actually provide a full-time team member.
- c. ~ Is a statement of confidentiality needed from non-NRC IIT members?
Response
Generally a signed agreement between NRC and its consultants or contractors exists to ensure that proprietary or security information is protected. We are studying whether a signed agreement is really necessary or whether the team leader, through whom all documents
' pass, can provide the necessary control of proprietary and safeguards infomation, i.e., assure only that IIT members with a definite need to know have access to the infomation.
- 5. Potential for Excessive Quarantining of Equipment Although industry has this general concern, a reading of the revised procedures will reflect that their concern has been fully addressed in the .
procedures. The applicable procedures specify that only the equipment that actually failed (or suspected of failure or malfunction) during the '
event and had an impact on the sequence of events needs to be quarantined.
Thus, the procedure should render this a non-issue.
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- n. Enclosure 2 f
V ): Guidance for Industry Participation in IITs 4
~
(To be. inserted in appropriate procedure)
. 1.7 Participation by Industry Oroanizations
~
When an IIT is activated, industry representatives will be informed and their
. participation will be requested. Their participation brings both an indepen-
- dent perspective to the. investigation and expert knowledge of plant hardware and practices in numerous areas. In addition, industry participation helps
- licensees-to have innediate access to facts regarding the safety implications of-the incident, and as a result to aid in the feedback of information and, in
- the self-initiation of potential preventative and/or corrective actions. Such
- participation should also help expedite the event investigation and the
- 1dentification of the generic applicability of significant issues. Industry participation is consistent with and fully supportive of the Incident Investigation Program objectives.
- After the EDO detemines that an IIT response is warranted, the Director, AE0D will infom the various industry groups * (INPO or NSAC, and the Owner::' Group for-the affected plant) regarding the IIT and invite their participation with -
the IIT in the investigation. The Director, AEOD may indicate the desired
~
A .. technical have in expertise that would order to ensure a rangebeofdesirable foron disciplines thethe industry IIT. Therepresentative industry to Q contact has the responsibility to select the industry individual in accordance .
with the same criteria that the NRC representatives are selected, i.e.,
(1) specific technical expertise, (2) no previous significant involvement with the affected plant or utility's activities or with other significant issues associated directly related to the cause, course or consequences of the event, and (3) full-time participant for the duration of the IIT activities.
- The industry representatives and the NRC members qualifications will be reviewed by the EDO or upon his direction, the Director, AEOD to ensure that all team members are suitably qualified and meet the selection criteria. The EDO approves the IIT members on a case-by-case basis, i.e., each is reviewed and approved individually.
After the EDO spproves the composition of the IIT, all members will be advised of the location and time for the first IIT organizational meeting. The IIT leader will assign and organize the various investigative activities to the team members. All representatives should be relieved of other duties until the investigation is completed and the investigation report is issued, or they are released from the IIT. The EDO may relieve from the IIT any personnel who do not remain with the investigation until the completion of the report, or for other reasons he deems appropriate.
The Incident Investigation Staff will maintain the list of industry contacts to be notified.
4 t + - _ _.. . _ , _ . . . _.. .,, . ._.
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(y)2.15IndustryParticipationintheInvestigation m./
Industry representatives may participate as full-time members of the IIT. In these cases, they will have. responsibilities and privileges equal to other team members.
2.19 Collection 'of Information All information obtained.by team members will be brought to the attention of
' the IIT leader. Representatives may communicate verified factual event-related information to nuclear industry organizations in coordination with the team leader. This information should be transmitted only for purposes of preven-tion, remedial action, or other similar reasons to ensure public health and safety. The representatives will keep the IIT leader apprised of all informa-tion pertinent to the event. Common sense and good judgment must predominate in this matter. Contacts with news media will be made in accordance with Section 2.12. (See Procedure 2) 2.25 Report Preparation and Presentation Each team member will participate in a complete review of the team's investiga-
~tive report for. technical accuracy and adequacy of the scope of the investiga-tion in his/her particular area of technical expertise. The IIT leader will
-obtain each team member's concurrence on the report signifying that the team member has reviewed the report and that any differences of professional opinion
'(\aveeitherbeenresolvedordocumentedinanappendixtothereport.
h Courtesy
( ,,/ copies of the IIT final report will be provided to the participating team members.
s P
. - ~ . . - - . - - . - - - - - - _ . - - . - - - - . - - - - - - - - - -
- -l
. /' 1 . Enclosure.3
( /f Resolution of Industry Coments
SUBJECT:
RESOLUTION OF INDUSTRY C0petENTS ON THE. DRAFT INCIDENT INVESTIGATION
' PROCEDURES
REFERENCES:
- 1. - Letter from'P. W. Lyon, INPO, to C. J. Heltemes, Jr., NRC,
Subject:
Review of Incident Investigation Procedures, dated September 15,~1986.
- 2. Letter from L. D. Butterfield, WOG, to C. J. Heltemes, Jr.,
NRC,
Subject:
Westinghouse Owners' Group (WOG) Coments on Incident Investigation Procedures, dated September 30, 1986.
- 3. Letter from T. A. Pickens, BWROG, to C. J. Heltemes, Jr.,
NRC,
Subject:
BWROG Comments on Draft Incident Investigation Manual, dated November 26, 1986.
- 4. . Letter from J. H. Taylor, B&W, to C. J. Heltemes, Jr., NRC,
Subject:
Incident Investigation Procedures, dated October 21, 1986.
-f 5 5. Letter from J. K. Gasper, CEOG, to C. J. Heltemes, Jr.,
t ). .NRC,
Subject:
' C-E Owners' Group Coments on NRC Incident
'V Investigation Manual, dated December 2, 1986.
In early August 1986, a draft of the subject IIT procedures was provided to all the Owners' Group';, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the
, Nuclear Safety An: lysis Center (NSAC) for comment. Due to prior comitments.
NSAC has indicated they will be unable to fomally respond; however, they will be prepared to discuss any concerns regarding the IIT procedures in a future l meeting with the Incident Investigation Staff (IIS) to be scheduled when a l_ regional workshop is held in their vicinity.
L We have resolved all of the comments that we have received and have revised
! a number of the IIT procedures accordingly. The resolution of each comment is i explained as follows.*
I Coment 1 We agree that it would be desirable to have INP0 or industry participation on IITs, either as observers or members, to increase the IITs expertise and broaden its perspective. We feel that this can best be accomplished by select-ing INPO or industry participants with the necessary expertise to provide input j to the IIT, particularly during the onsite phase of the investigation. The
- Note: Editorial coments have been resolved but are not specifically
' addressed in the enclosure.
__[
c.,
[ 1evel of participation by INPO or the industry should be developed through
(-} further discussions, in an effort to achieve mutual agreement as to their role in the various aspects of investigations. (Ref. 1)
Respense.
~
. Working meetings between industry representatives and the Incident Investiga-tion Staff (IIS) are planned to develop guidance for industry participation in .
IITs. The NRC objective is to have team members from outside organizations !'
participate fully in .the IIT activities. Such team members would need to have
' the same qualifications as NRC members, i.e., specific technical expertise, independence such as no current involvement with the plant or utility, ano organizational freedom to participate fully for the full duration of the team's activities.-
Coment 2 Item 1 on page-1-2 states the " personnel overexposure" is one of the types of
. events'for which an IIT should be considered. However, the next clarifying sentence says that the " potential offsite consequences" should be given primary attention. There is some inconsistency between these statements. (Ref. 1)
Response
. . . Personnel overexposure can occur as a result of an event involving a loss of control of radioactive materials and could involve facility personnel and/or p)membersofthepublic.
t This characteristic is primarily applicable to non-k reactor-type events.
Coment 3 Item _6 on page 1-3 includes some examples that are not as well known or consid-ered as severe as the other examples. Recommend the last two examples (1980 San Onofre loss of saltwater cooling and 1985 Troian failure of auxiliary feedwater) be deleted so the importance of this category is not diluted. (Ref.
1)
Response
The examples were deleted as suggested.
Comment 4 Recommend Item 8 on page 1-3 be deleted from the list. This type of event should initially warrant an AIT, and then if necessary, be upgraded to an IIT when additional information is obtained to make such a determination. (Ref.1)
Response ,
No change made because this item provides the criterion for a response to a significant operational event in order to fulfill the agency's mission to protect the health and safety of the general public.
u
' W4 l
~$
r manual and electrical; logic diagrams should be added to the list on page
'1-25. -(Ref. 1)
- Response T The' list'containing background information for IIT briefing has been revised to include appropriate vendor manuals, electrical logic diagrams and preliminary written ~ statements (if available) as suggested.- ,
Comnent 6 Written statements should be prepared by each individual involved in the event, that outlines his involvement. The statements should be taken as soon as possible after the event, should be done-independently, and will form the basis for much of the initial interview with the individual. (Ref.1)
Response ,
l Because an IIT response is usually within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after the event, and because the operators are the first to be interviewed, the necessity to obtain indepen-dent written statements from operators does not appear to be warranted. In
. _ .^
general, obtaining operator written statements is usually left to the licensee
- and the statements made available to the IIT when it arrives onsite.
b Comnent 7 On page 2-3, recommend the second sentence of item 6 be changed to say "The secretary should act as custodian for the transcripts." (Ref. 1)
Response
No change made because the original statement is more definitive.
Connent 8 One page 2-10, second paragraph, reword as follows: ,
If the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) is developing a Significant -
Event Report (SER) on the event, they will attempt to assure that the SER is not inconsistent with the facts of the event as understood by the IIT. This t .Will be accomplished by INP0 providing a draft of the SER to the licensee prior to issuance. The licensee will coordinate review of the SER with the IIT, and will assure any inconsistencies are made known to INP0 so they can be resolved prior to issuance of the SER by INP0. (Ref. 1)
R_esponse The procedure has been reworded as suggested.
')
,~
f )
, Comment'9'
'On page 2-13 . recommend the outline of the report be developed before leaving
.the site. (Ref. 1)
~, Response The procedure has been revised to include the statement "...before leaving the site...."
Comment'10 ,
Recommend .the licensee review the technical portions of the report (all except
.the findings / conclusions sections) for accuracy before it is issued as a NUREG.
"(Ref.-1)
Response
NRC policy is that the. licensee is to be given a copy of the advance report
' when the report is made publicly available. The procedure has been revised to o indicate that the EDO will forward a courtesy copy of the report to the affected
' licensee before the Commission meeting and, at the same time a copy of the advanced report will be forwarded to the Public Document Room (PDR).
7 /
- ( mx-response:by.-) In addition, the procedure has been revised to provide for a forral r licensees and staff to the IIT report. The ED0 will transmit the report to-the licensee and the staff for review and connent after issuance of the team's report. The licensee's and staff's responses will be considered by the EDO before he defines follow-up actions to NRC offices.
Comment-11 On page'2-29.. operator written statements should be included. (Ref. 1)
Response
See response to Comment 5. -
Conment 12.
On pages 2-31 through 2-41, it is not clear that this function (referral of investigation information to NRC offices) is consistent with the scope and purpose of the IIT. Specifically, page 2-1 says that "The scope of the inves-tigation does not include assessing violations of NRC rules and require-
'ments..." In addition, some of the guidance on pages 2-32 and 2-33 is fairly subjective. (Ref. 1)
Response
O The rulesscope of IIT investigations and regulations. does However, there may be not include instances assessing during an investigation violations of N where the team uncovers a situation, while not in the scope or charter of the investigation, that warrants follow-up action by other NRC offices or other
- . g,
('") organizations. Similarly, there are other activities associated with the IIT process that do not necessarily invc,1ve the IIT. These include selected licen-1see actions' associated with the ever t, and NRC staff activities associated with normal event follow-up such as authorization for restart, plant inspections, corrective actions or possible enforcement items. These items are expected to be defined and implemented through the normal organizational structure and procedures. See NRC Manual Chapter 0513.
~ Comment 13 One page 3-2, item 5, the lead IIT spokesman should also be responsible for l
. controlling the interviewers to assure they do not lead the interviewee or ,
pursue areas that are beyond the scope of his knowledge. (Ref.1) ;
l
- . Response The procedure has been revised to include controlling the interview as part of the responsibilities of the lead spokesperson.
- Cournt 14 In general, the formality of the interview process (official transcripts that
- will be entered into the public document room) will probably have a tendency of stifle truly open discussion and fact finding. This may also constitute some
,3 infringement on an individual's right to privacy. (Ref. 1)
Response
While there may be some perceived concerns about the fonnality of transcribing interviews, past experience has shown that transcribed interviews are important to develop a clear, factual record of what occurred during the event and do not stifle the exchange of infonnation. Normally, privacy issues will not be involved in the interview. The interview process is discussed with each
-interviewee at the beginning of each interview to allay qualms or answer any questions.
Comment 15 On page 4-9, item 10. " discrepancies" should be more clearly defined. Does this mean a condition other than what might have been expected while doing troubleshooting? Does it include previously identified possible causes of failure? (Ref.1)
' Response The procedure has been revised to state that discrepancies are conditions other j than what might have been expected based on the developed hypothesis (ses) for the probable cause of the equipment malfunction. ;
Comment 16 On pages 4-11 through 4-39, we assume that inclusion of these examples in the procedure means they are considered acceptable. (Ref. 1) l
l l
_f~y N Response These examples are actual action plans which ware found acceptable by previous '
IITs.- i Comment'17 L0n'page 5-3, item 15, reconmend expanding on exactly what_the " precursors
-section" should include. Should all similar events at the plant, at similar plants, or within the industry be included? (Ref. 1)
Response
-The precursors section, in general, should pertain to all events similar to the event being investigated by the,IIT that could have happened at that plant.
-The procedure has been revised to clarify the meaning of this section.
Consent 18 On pcge 5-7, reconnend adding a review of the technical portions of the report for accuracy by the licensee, sometime in the day 33-41 time frame (see Comment 10). (Ref. 1)
Response
. f' See response to Conment 10.
- (v .
Comment Q .
On page 5-16, recommend electrical distribution symbols be included (transform-ers, breakers, batteries,etc.). (Ref. 1)
Response
The procedure has been revised as suggested.
Conment 20 The WOG feels that the scope of events that can initiate an IIT is too broad. )
It not only spans a wide spectrum of safety levels but also includes non-safety ~
related public policy concerns. This spectrum of events is inconsistent with the stated criterion that the threshold for activating an IIT is intended to be high and limited to events having significant safety implications. Thus, we suggest that the number of operational events warranting an IIT should be reduced in accordance with that principle. (Ref. 2) i l
Response
H The overriding criterion for activating an IIT is the safety significance of l the event as it relates to ensuring the public health and safety. Historical-ly, events that resulted in an IIT response have involved a combination of the characteristics presented in the procedures. The purpose of describing event l
l
)
~
_y_
m characteristics is'to provide guidance to the decision making process; h'owever,
,' this guidance is balanced with sound engineering and managerial judgment as it '
N ' relates to the potential safety significance of the event.
The decision to send an IIT is a decision made by the EDO based on recomenda-tions by senior NRC management using the criteria in the procedures. If after an IIT is activated the event does not warrant an IIT, the investigatory response will be changed or cancelled. For events where an AIT is sent, as part of its charter,'the AIT reconnends if the safety significance of the event warrants. upgrading the NRC's response to an IIT.
- A perspective on the threshold (and the NRC's decision making process) is
.provided by noting that to date in 1986, there have been no IITs, although more than 3000 reportable events have occurred.
Comnent 21' The. procedures provide a good framework with which to operate Incident Investi-
'gation Teams and provide very specific instructions for NRC IIT members.
. However, utility interfaces are not well defined. Specifically, we feel that
.the utility. involvement in the IIT activation process, maintenance of plant safety and concurrence with quarantined equipment decisions should be strength-ened. (Ref. 2)
Response
V The procedures have been revised to more clearly define the utility's role in l the above areas. As a matter of practice, the Regional Administrator coordinates with utility senior management concerning the IIT activation process, particularly the Confirmation of Action Letter. (See response to Comment 71.) The Quarantined Equipment Procedure was revised to clarify the licensee's responsibility for plant safety, maintenance of the quarantined equipment list, and participation in quarantined equipment decisions.
Comnent 22
- The scope of the ' investigation should be clearly defined to include only the detemination of the root cause of the event, the extent of damage and remedial actions necessary for restart of the unit. Secondary findings not directly L contributory to the cause of the event or to plant recovery, should not impact a restart decision. Questions that arise, for example, concerning basic design philosophy should be pursued through the Backfit procedure as a separate issue.
Also, the scope of the IIT should not be limited to root causes that are i ~a ttributable to design and/or equipment. (Ref. 2)
- Response l-
' As defined in NRC Manual Chapter 0513 - NRC Incident Investigation Program, the investigation performed by an IIT emphasizes fact-finding and detennination of probable cause(s) for a significant operational event. The scope of the investigation is sufficient to ensure that the event is clearly understood, the Orelevantfactsandcircumstancesareidentifiedandcollected,andtheprobable
.g.
1 p
j cause(s) and contributing cause(s) are identified and substantiated by the
.Hm; restart ) evidence associated with the event.
i See response to Comment 12 concerning the coment.
Comment 23
~
The .use of transcripts, dur'ing interviews is of concern to the WOG. The threat to the interviewee, perceived or actual, of enforcement actions as a result of IIT investigations could have a detrimental effect on the usefulness of IITs.
(Ref. 2)
Response
See response to Comment 14. An IIT investigation is a serious matter. In this activity, as in other activities, individuals knowingly providing false informa-tion to the government may be subjected to legal sanctions. However, that .
would be true whether or not the interview is transcribed. As noted elsewhere, J transcripts serve as an important method of developing an accurate and clear
. factual record. Miranda rights are not provided by the IIT since there is no allegation _ of criminal activity. Further, if the interview started with a .
definition of legal rights, the interview would take on the appearance of a legal hearing (which it is not) rather than focusing on factual information.
Comment 24 The procedures do not clearly explain the expected role of the various organi-v zations that are likely to be on site after an incident (e.g., IIT, Regional Response Team, Utility, etc.) and, they are not clear on the scope and respon-
. sibilities for each of these organizations. For example, as the safety of the
.. plant is ultimately the responsibility of the utility, the utility's role should be more clearly delineated with regard to hands-on troubleshooting.
(Ref. 2)
Response
The licensee has the ultimate responsibility to maintain the safety of the plant. In general, for events warranting in IIT response, the IIT will be
. activated as soon as practical after the safety significance of the operational
' event is determined and will begin its investigation as soon as practicable after the facility has been placed in a ,afe, secure, and stable condition. If there is an NRC incident response, the investigation will begin after it is
- deactivated. This is defined in the NRC Manual Chapter 0513 and has been included in the procedures.
The Quarantined Equipment Procedure was revised to clarify the licensee's responsibilities with regard to decisions affecting quarantined equipment.
Comment 25 ,
The WOG agrees that the nuclear industry should participate in IITs, though in
' a role of an observer rather than an integrated team member. This participa-g tion would allow better use of the findings of the IIT in preventing further
s 9-ll \
V incidents' by providing finnediate access to the Owners Groups of.the information on the incident- for their use in responding to the event and conducting appli-cability evaluations. The nuclear industry should always be given the opportu-nity to. participate in the~IIT. (Ref. 2)
Response
The NRC will invite industry participation as IIT members and the EDO will approve each member after the candidate meets the three criteria for partic-
-1pation, e.g., spec 1 Tic"Eechnical expertise, independence, and full-time ,
participation. We believe that NRC and industry will benefit from the IIT ,
. process when the industry representative is a full-time participant in the .
investigation just like the other team members. " Observer" status does not permit the full integration of technical expertise, knowledge and experience that is provided by a full-time member. The NRC objective for industry parti-cipants on the IITs cannot be fully satisfied by " observers."
See response to Comnent 1.
Comment 26 Page 1-2, Selection and Scope of Events for IIT Response, the examples given to clarify the characteristics of significant events should be made an integral
_. part of the definition in order to prevent the overly general and broad defini-
.f'N tions.from being excerpted without accompanying clari'ication. (Ref.2)
-(
V) Response See response to Comment 20.
- Cormnent 27 It appears there is a direct tie between IIT team activation and an NRC order to permit re-start. It should be clarified that an IIT investigation and issuance of a report is not necessarily required for a plant to restart. It appears there may be an intent to tie IIT activation and a CAL to keep a plant shut-down. The procedure should make it clear that these are not necessarily tied together and that a plant can re-start during an IIT investigation. (Ref.
2)
Response
The interpretation is correct. MC-0513 states that the plant is to remain shutdown "...until concurrence is received from the NRC to restart." This concurrence will be given when a determination is made that the plant can safely resume operations, and it is not required that the IIT's report be i issued as a prerequisite. The procedures have been revised to indicate that it is not required that the team's report be issued as a prerequisite for
, plant restart.
73
( )Connent 28 ,
LJ !
Page 1-6: Move the discussion on the comparison between AIT and IIT to the introduction and add more detail on the purpose of an AIT as compared with an IIT. (Ref.2)
Response
The procedure has been revised to clarify the AIT objectives. The objectives of the AIT initiative is to: (1) augment regional personr.el with additional personnel from headquarters or other regions for onsite fact-finding investiga-tions of certain events; (2) connunicate the facts surrounding the events
' investigated-to regional and headquarters management; (3) identify and com-municate any generic safety concerns related to the events investigated to regional and headquarters management; and (4) document the findings and con-clusions of the onsite investigation.
Comment 29 Page.1-8: What is the purpose for transcribing interviews with utility employ-
.ees? WOG is concerned that these interviews will be.used in enforcement actions against individuals. (Ref. 2)
. Response i sSee response to Comment 14. The purpose of the transcript is to develop a
[Q reasonably complete and accurate record asEnforcement to what happened.
ections against individuals are extremely rare, and would normally be taken only after the completion of a separate and independent investigation.
Comnent 30 Page 1-18: paragraph (2) should emphasize that equipment necessary to maintain plant safety must not be quarantined and, limit potential equipment quarantine to equipment that did not function as it was designed. Equipment that was i called upon to perform and, in fact, did perform as designed should not be quarantined.
The Confirmatory Action Letter should state that the licensees can take any -
action involving quarantined equipment deemed necessary to achieve or maintain safe plant conditions, prevent further equipment degradation, or conduct testing)or (Ref. 2 inspection activities required by plant Technical Specifications.
Response
The generic Confimatory Action Letter and the Show Cause Order have been revised to include wording similar to those which appear on page 4-1 of the
- IIT procedures. s Comment 31 i
Page 1-22: The Show Cause Order should state that the licensee can take any action involving quarantined equipment deemed necessary to achieve or maintain
T,.
)-safe plant conditions, prevent further equiprent degradation, or conduct '
N(,/ m _
testing)or
~ (Ref. 2 inspection activities required by plant Technical Specifications.
. Response We agree with the comment. See response to Comnent 30.
Comment 32 -
Page 2-4, Item #4: The NRC should develop a standing check list identifying those support facilities and administrative items expected to be provided by a licensee in an IIT fnvestigation. This item should address space requirements inside and outside security, telephone requirements, general administrative support, tour guides, etc. (Ref. 2)
Response-The region is expected to provide most of the administrative support for the IIT. Depending upon regional resources, the licensee may be reouested to provide some administrative items such as meeting rooms, escorts and technical staff assistance, and reproduction facilities. The licensee is under no obligs-tion to supply any additional administrative support than is normally expected -
during any NRC inspection.
/7 Comrent 33 Page 2-5. Item #6: The requirement for posting the IIT is unnecessary and redundant with other NRC requirements. The right of any employee to talk with NRC is already posted in various locations at plant sites. (Ref. 2) '
Response
3 i The purpose of notifying plant staff that an IIT investigation is being con-ducted is to ensure that all relevart information is obtained from all plant personnel and this information is promptly communicated to the team leader rather than to other NRC personnel, i Connent 34 l 1
Page 2-6, Item #7: "
... equipment related to the event." should be changed to l
... equipment significantly involved in the event that failed to perform it's l intended function." (Ref. 2)
Response
l The procedure has been revised as suggested.
Comment 35 l
Page 2-6, Item #9: To require that an action plan be available before any work l can proceed is overly restrictive. Work on quarantined equipment should be permitted given concurrence of the IIT leader. (Ref. 2) {
l l
h .
7 k j Response Establishing troubleshooting action plans for quarantined equipment is neces-sary in order to provide a systematic and controlled process to ascertain the probable causes of the conditions observed and equipment malfunctions. It is important that the troubleshooting activity on the equipment does not inadver-tently result in loss of information necessary to identify and/or confirm postulated causes of equipment malfunctions. Action plans ensure that the troubleshooting is systematic, controlled and well-documented, and that ade-quate records on the "as-found" condition of malfunctioned equipment Ore
. maintained.' Past experience has demonstrated.that allowing work on equipment to be-performed prior to the establishment of an action plan can result in valuable information being lost. Please note that the team leader has the authority to release equipment from the quarantined equipment list at any time.
Comment 36 Pege 2-7, Plant Tour of Eouipment and Systems, Item #3: This statement con-
- flicts with age 1-4 which indicates that IIT will obtain photographic servic-es . - (Ref. 2 Respor.se
. Although the IIT can obtain photographic services, in previous investigations o some licensees preferred to provide this service. Thus, as a matter of proto-col, the IIT usually gives the licensee an opportunity to provide this service.
(u} However, The licensee is under no obligation to provide photographic service for IIT investigations. The procedure has been revised to clarify this point.
Comment 37 Page 2-8, Item 2 (on QEL): change " troubleshooting" to " work" te be consistent with previous items and also identify that the team leader can allow work to be performed on equipment before the action plan is approved. (Ref. 2) c Response The procedure has been reworded to be consistent with previous items; however, work cannot be perfonned on quarantined equipment prior to the establishment of an action plan except as specifically approved by the IIT team leader.
I Comment 38 Page 2-8: Press inquiry could be a significant issue and needs more attention.
Assurance should be obtained that the NRC and the licensee do not have separate press conferences or provide press releases that provide conflicting informa-l tion. (Ref. 2)
! Response l
The procedure has been revised to indicate that the Regional Public Affairs Q Officer, IIT leader, and the licensee should coordinate press conferences and responses to press inquiries to prevent the release of conflicting infonnation.
V Comnent 39 Page 2-10: .Regarding INPO Significant Event Reports, the procedure indicates that INPO will coordinate their findings with NRC. The procedure then indi-2- cates that.this review will be coordinated by the licensee. This is internally 7 inconsistent. .WDG feels that INPO should coordinate this review, not the 111censee. (Ref.2)
Response.
See response to Comment 8.
Comment 40 Page 2-22, Item #16: This item should not be all inclusive. The archival requirement should not apply to records and documents that deal with safeguards
- inforination that is the responsibility of the licensee. (Ref.2)
- - Response No changes are deemed necessary because this issue is already addressed in the procedure on page 2-20.
Comnent 41 h
IIT Procedure 3. Guidelines for Conducting Interviews
- This procedure provides a viable interview process; however, the WOG feels that the use of sketches, diagrams and photographs should be minimized so that interviewees do not become confused with trying to describe the incident using visual aides that may not be meaningful to that individual's thought processes. '
Should the person being interviewed propose to introduce materials, he should be discouraged at this juncture and encouraged to write his own memorandum with respect to the sketch, diagram.or photograph and to submit it through his established channels.
Because infor1 nation gained in an interview could be used against an individual in assessing a civil penalty, specific individual civil rights information must be provided prior to the start of the interview. The WOG suggests detailed guidance be given in this area to personnel conducting interviews in regard to appraising individual interviewees of their rights. (Ref. 2)
- Response Explanatory sketches, diagrams or photographs when combined with a narrative statement may be valuable supplements to the interviewee's statement. We agree that they are not a substitute for a narrative statement. The interviewee may t use any visual aides or other documents which he/she feels is useful to explain-ing some aspect of the event. Also see response to Comments 14 and 23.
See respanse to Consnent 23.
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- v. Comment 42
.Page 3-1, third _ paragraph: Same Comnent as 29 above.
. Response l
See response to Commient 9.
Comment 43 Page 3-2,-Item 4: It is suggested that the interview not be conducted with the entirs IIT team. It should be recognized that this is a very stressful time m forLthe person interviewed.' An interview with the entire team will give the u appearance of an inquisition and may result in extreme pressure on the individ-uals being in'.erviewed. (Ref. 2)
. Response We recognize there is a potential impact on the interviewee as a result of having the entire IIT team present at the interview; however, past experience indicates that there are cases where the benefit (e.g., everyone hears the whole story first hand) of conducting interviews with the entire team present outweighs the potential impact on the interv1ewee if the interview is conductea properly. - The procedure has oeen revised to state that the selection of IIT
- (7 members that will actively participate as interviewers during an interview
\ should be minimized, and based on tcam nember assignments and appropriate technical expertise.
Cent 4_4_
.Page 3-3 -Item 9- The licensee is entitled to provide counsel from the Corpo-
. rate Legal Department. Strike the work "normally." (Ref. 2) .
Response
The interviewee is entitled at his request to have personal counsel during the interview. The licensee may provide this representative if requested by the interviewee. Howevar, if it appears that the presence of a company attorne/
during an interview may involve a conflict of interest or could influence the degree to which the interviewee is willing to identify and discuss the facts relevant to the event, the interview may be suspended and other action taken.
Connent 45 Page 4-1: The licensee should maintain the Quarantined Equipment List (QEL). ,
The licensee and the NRC rhould agree on what equipment should be quarantined i but the licensee is responsible for the equir:nent, not the NRC. (Ref. 2)
Response
The QEL is complied by the licensee and is reviewed and approved by the IIT.
The licensee and the IIT should coordinate on the scope of the QEL. The
- 15 -
J I'(n ).'the equipment
- procedures wereard clarified is responsible to indicate for decisionsthat the licensee has responsibility affecting quarantined for equipment.
_om C ne t 46 Page 4-2,. Item #4: -The Shift Supervisor should be responsible for access to fquarantined equipment, not the licensing engineer. (Ref. 2) ,
i
Response
The procedure has been revised to state that a licensee-designated individual as being responsible for access to quarantined eq'uipment.
i
-Comment 47 Page 4-6: ' Apprr,priate document control provisions should be included on the
'1 QEL _(e.g., tevision number and date). (Ref. 2)
Response
The example has been revised to include revision number and date.
Comment 48 Responsibilities 01 the IIT team leader should be more specific. Since the IIT
- . tecm leader approves deviations to the quarantine list, the te;m leader must be V on call 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day so as to not adversely affect plant safety. (Ref. 2) s
Response
! As stated on page 4-1, at any time _, the licensee can take action involving quarantined equipment it deems recessary to: (1) achieve or maintain safe plant conditions; (2) prevent further equipment degradation; or (3) test or inspect as required by the plant's Technical Specifications. To the maximum degree possible, these actions should be coordinated with the team leader in advance er noti #ication made as soon as practical. .
Coment 49 Is _the NRC or the licensee responsible for " hands-on" troubleshooting? (Ref.
2)
Response
The licensee is responsible for " hands-on" troubleshooting. The IIT or in most
- cases the Region, will monitor the troubleshooting activities. -
1 Comment 50 .
The IIT should be responsible for safeguarding and returning strip charts, logs and other documents to the utility. (Ref. 2)
\
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.- 16.-
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Response
. Th[IIT. ii responsible for safeguarding all documents obtained during the investigation. It is expected the IIT w1TT obtain copies of each document for its own personal use and retention during the investigation. i i
Comment'51' )
1
-The licensee should be allowed to have their own stenographers at interviews 1 and meetings so that the licensee can have the same benefit from the meetings I and interviews as the NRC. (Ref. 2)
' Response The NRC provides resources for stenographic services, and there is no need for
.the licensee to do so. The licensee may review transcripts of groap meetings at any time during .the IIT investigation. Additionally, interviewees may review his or her transcript at any time and after the IIT report is issued, l all transcripts are made available to the licensee and the public. l 1
-NRC's established policy is to release the transcripts to the licensee at the j time.the IIT report is placed in the public document rooms. After considerable !
discussions between licensees and NRC counsels, this policy was developed to bast serve the needs of both the IIT and the affected licensee. The transcripts p are used in the team's investigation in a systematic and detailed evaluation of h)( what occurred during the event. Until the team completes its. deliberations, the release of the transcripts is premature and could result in misleading use and statements taken out of context since a comprehensive understanding of all related and relevant information has not been achieved. This could lead to the IIT spending time to respond to inquiries rather than conducting its investigation.
This policy er.sures that the team leader is the only source of information regarding the investigation, and precludes false impressions and inaccurate
. information from being comunicated to the public. Further, premature release of the transcripts could stifle truly open discussion and fact finding, and lead to many inquiries during the investigation that the timeliness and thoronhness of the investigation could be severely impacted.
Connent 52 The pctential for deployment of an IIT before enough information is available (or sufficiently understood) to justify the action. The impact, in terns of both resources and public relations, of IIT deployment is significant upon the subject utility and can inhibit or even prevent constructive utility response to the incident. Certainly, response of an IIT "within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of the event" could lead to hasty judgments, efforts to respond that might turn out to be unnecessary and potential situations (which we believe that the regulatory agency would want to avoid) in which it would be necessary to downgrade an IIT to an AIT or some other lesser effort. (Ref.3)
(
~
y , . _ _ -. -
-l _ _
- r. .s j IResponse b
- See response to Comnent 20. ,
Coment 53
~
The potential for excessive quarantining of equipment is a concern. While yo"r procedures appear to' reflect concerns previously expressed in this area, we
'wish to reiterate those concerns. -(Ref. 3)
Response
lThe procedures developed and the training'of potential IIT members addresses this concern by emphasizing that only equipment that failed or malfunctioned
-during the event and had an impact on the sequence of events should be quarantined. .
i Comment 54 Procedures or guidelines are needed for (Ref. 3):
-(a) Review of the incident investigation report.
(b)-- Granting permission to licensee to begin implementation of corrective actions.
G.
(c) Determination that licensee can restart the plant.
-Response (a) See response to Coment 10.
(b) Corrective actions are addressed in the quarantine procedure on page 4-5.
(c) See response to Comment 27.
Comment 55
" Events" numbers 8 and 9 lack the specificity of the other examples listed. It would be appropriate to include these in the section (p. 1-5) regarding aug-mented inspection team (AIT) response with the AIT having the responsibility -
for providing an input to the detennination that deployment of an IIT is
' appropriate. (Ref. 3)
Response
See response to Coments 4 and 20. We agree, news media coverage alone does not warrant an IIT response. Characteristic 9 will be deleted as suggested. '
. The responsibilities of the AIT with regard to providing recomendations to upgrade the investigation to an IIT is contained in Appendix B of the proce-dures.
,w.--e-- , ,-% ., ,,.,,,--,..---,,,-,,,,-..----...w--
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gement'56 ,,
m-For those events that do not clearly warrant deployment of an IIT (see Coment 55 above), the AIT should be assigned responsibility for advising Office Directors and the Regional Administrator on whether or not IIT deployment is appropriate. (Ref. 3)
Response
This point is' already addressed in the AIT procedures (Appendix B).
Comment 57 Regarding IIT " response'tkNe after event," it is believed that the establish-ment of'an IIT within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> could lead to " false alarms" and situations wherein it would be desirable to downgrade to an AIT. Such a situation would be detrimental to both the NRC and licensee. A longer period, e.g., 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, would enable all parties (including an AIT) to make a better-informed recomen-
-dation. (Ref. 3)
- Response See response to Coment 20.
Coment 58 p)" Items requiring licensee assistance" should include provision of a list of t,
V' equipment that failed or is suspected to have failed. (Ref. 3)
Response
We agree. This item is included in the Confirmation of Action Letter.
Comment 59
! Some utilities may not be able to provide adequate photography services.
l Consideration should be given to assigning this responsibility to the NRC in l the same fashion as currently stipulated for the provision of on-site steno-graphic services. (Ref. 3)
Response -
! See response to Comment 36.
Comment 60 The preliminary list of hiled equipment suspected of perfoming abnormally during the event should be developed by the licensee prior to the entrance ^
meeting and presented to the NRC at the meeting. (Ref. 2)
Respen._se
( See response to Coment 58.
l l
~
73
) Coment 61.
y-
- At least one utility or other industry professional person should be included in each IIT. The qualifications of and selection criteria for industry person-nel should.be the same as specified in "IIT Membership" (p. 1-3, IIT Procedure
- 1) and " Team Composition and Qualifications" (NRC Appendix 0513. Part 2, Draft). This participation would not only bring the indeperdent perspective and expertise mentioned, but would also help to avoid potential conflicts with
" parallel investigations" (discussed on pp. 2-9 and 2-10).
It is suggested that the appropriate owner's group could be responsible for maintaining a group of qualified personnel for participation in IIT deploy-meints, perhaps from personnel already assigned to the associated regulatory response groups (RRGS). (Ref. 3)
Response
'We endorse this recommendation. See response to Coment 1.
Coment 62 A " discrepancy" which would warrant cessation of trcuble-shooting should be clearly defined. (Ref. 3)
Response
(O) See response to Coment 15.
Comment 63 Same as above (p. 4-9, item 10). (Ref.3) l Response See response to Coment 15.
Coment 64 The opening portion of the Incident Investigation Manual could be improved by starting with a discussion of the purpose of the program, rather than simply telking about the purpose of the document. It would be helpful to include some brief background similar to that contained in SECY 85-208. Inasmuch as suc-cessful investigations require cooperative efforts, this introduction should also try to set the tone for the investigation and to promote cooperative actions. (Ref.4)
Response
We agree. The Incident Investigation Manual will contain a preface describing i the purpose of the Incident Investigation Program (IIP) and the Manual.
,m
( 3Coment 65 v-
' -It is recommended that Incident Investigation Team activities and enforcement related activities be completely divorced. Where the IIP procedures refer to enforcement actions, the need for legal counsel, etc. there is an implicit barrier to 'open comunication. It should be clear that all parties can benefit by complete, thorough., efficient investigations. By focusing the incident
~
investigation activities on technical facts and eliminating all implication of fault finding or penalties, the investigations will likely be conducted more efficiently and effectively. (Ref. 4)
Response
The focus ~ of an IIT is on technical issues. However, it should be clear that the IIT report could be reviewed during enforcement activities. However, enforcement-related activities are essentially separate from the IIT process.
See response to Coment 12. ,
Coments 66 and 67 We understand that the procedures have been developed for trial use and com-ment, but the duration of the trail period is not stated. It may be appropri-ate to explicitly state that the trial use period will be for the next x_
events to which the IIP is applied.
We also understand that after the trail use period, the final document will only constitute a guideline and by emphasizing that point, some potential hangups on minor coments could be avoided. (Ref. 4)
Response
Currently, the IIT procedures have been issued for trial use and coment.
After the procedures have been reviewed and discussed in regional workshops, the procedures will be issued in final form. This is expected to occur in early 1987. These procedures, however, will continue to be revised and refined based upon experience.
Comment 68 !
Page 1-2: This'information is very important, but emphasis should be given to l the importance of the statement, "...and substantially reduce the safety j
- margins that insure public health and safety." The importance of this emphasis I
!: is clearer when looking at items such as paragraphs 2 and 4 on this page in
! isolation. In other words, slightly exceeding the design basis of a facility or slightly exceeding a safety limit in the technical specifications in and of themselves does not constitute the basis for an IIT. (Ref. 4)
Response
See response to Coment 20.
- O
a ,
1
~
1 g
Page 1-3: 1 It is suggested that Item 9 be deleted. A loc of media attention 1should not be the cause of initiating an IIT. (Ref.4)
Response
~ fee responses:to Comments 4, 20, and 55.
- Conment 70 Page 1-4: Item 4 on the top of this page gives guidance as to the types of people to be_ included on the IIT. While not imposing any specific limits, it
.should also provide guidance to limit the number of people to something retson-
-able. _(Ref. 4)
Response
Because the size and composition of the team is highly dependent upon the type
! '" of event, it is difficult to set limits on the number of personnel for an IIT.
It is expected that most IITs will be composed of five to seven team members.
Comment 71 Page 1-5: The first time contact between the NRC and the licensee is mentioned in the manual is in Item 6 on this page. That contact is in the fom of a
.j Confimatory Action Letter. It would appear that the first contact between the N two organizations regarding activation of an IIT should be a timely telephone call. (Ref. 4)
' Response Past experience shows that the region and site management have considerable t dialogue concerning the event before an IIT is activated. Generally, after the Regional Administrator obtains a good understanding of the event, he recomends to the EDO that the event warrants response by an IIT. (The Regional Administrator niay decide that a response by an AIT is more appropriate.) For events which the EDO agrees that an IIT is warranted, the Regional Admin-istrator notifies the affected licensee that an IIT response to the event has been initiated by the EDO. The Regional Administrator then follows up the telephone call with a Confimation of Action Letter (CAL) confiming the licensee's statement of intent and action as discussed between the licensee and i Regional Administrator.
Coment 72 Page 1-5: Industry participation should be defined and permitted based on a decision by the utility experiencing the event. (Ref. 4) i Response See respor::z to Comment 1.
1 t
Y f, '} Comment 73 Page 2-9: Consideration should be given to designating ahead of time which
~
-industry representatives will be contacted. Because they are already in exister.ce, perhaps the industry representative could be the RRG Chaiman for each respective Owners' Group. (Ref. 4)
Response '
See response to Comment 1 and the draft procedure covering industry participa- ;
tion (Section1.7).
Comment 74 Page 2-9, Parallel Investigations: Parallel investigations are inevitable, but in the-interest of efficiency, duplication and conflict should be minimized.
However, it does not seem appropriate that the first action taken by the team leader when a delay is encountered is to report to the Director of AE0D. In the spirit of cooperation, attempts should be made to resolve the problem at the lowest possible. level. (Ref. 4)
Response
We agree. The team leader should try to resolve the problem at the lowest
.possible level and if attempts fail or the situation is nct resolved to the p satisfaction of the team leader, the team leader should then contact the
'I 1 Director of AEOD. The procedure has been revised to clarify this point.
V Comment 75 Page.2-10: The agreement between INP0 and the NRC should work both ways. In -
other words INP0 has agreed to allow the NRC to review SERs prior tc release.
The NRC should allow INP0 to review the IIT report prior to release. This would not only increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the actions caused
'by the final reports, but also would increase the cooperative nature of the investigations. (Ref. 4)
Response
See response to Connent 10.
Comment 76 Page 2-21: The IIT should be instructed to leave a copy of their final biblio-graphy in the possession of the licensee. (Ref.4)
Response
The IIT can leave a copy of the bibliography for the licensee if requested; however, because a great deal of infomation is still being collected after the onsite investigation, the bibliography is continually being updated until the At that tima a copy of the final bibliogra-O day the final report is released.
phy can be sent to the licensee for information if requested.
. . p( _ ) Comment 77s
~
v
- Page 3-2: . The opening statement provided in Item 7 should include mention of the right to have an additional person, of the interviewee's designation, present during the interview. The present manual write-up provides this
-information in Item 8, but it would be better if it were moved up. (Ref. 4)
Response
-The opening statement has been revised as suggested.
Comment 78 SECY 65-208. page 4: Consistent with the general coments above, it is ruonner.ded that no further consideration be given to providing subpoena power to the IIT. (Ref.4)
Response
Subpoena power will be handled through the nonnal organizational structure if required. The procedures contain guidance for the IIT team leader on who to contact if a situation arlses potentially requiring the need for a subpcena. ,
. Connent 79 Q Page 1-3: Characteristic 8 of operational events which should be considered
-qj for an IIT response as currently worded is very general and subject to interpretation. It is suggested that this wording be made more specific or that the characteristic be deleted.
Characteristic 9 does not appear to be of similar relevance as the others. It is suggested that it be deleted. (Ref. 5)
~
Response
See responses to Connents 4, 20, and 55.
Connent 80 The activating process procedure should include immediate notification of the licensee whose facility will be receiving the IIT. (Ref. 5)
Response
~
See response to Comment 71.
Comnent 81 On Table 1, the comparison of IITs and AITs includes estimates for the number of both IITs and AITs per year. These estimates should be deleted. They do O not minimumaddtargets.
any useful (Ref. 5) information to the table and they could becom
- - - --,m. - - _._e___,_, . _ . . , . _ , , _ _ . _ , - _ , _ _ _ , _ _ , , . . . . . , _ _ - . . - . _ , . - , , , . , , - . , -, _ - . , - . , _ . - . _ _ . _ . . , . . - , , - . , _ . , , .
['jResponse a ..
~
f ~ .!The ' statements have been deleted as suggested.
Comment 82 Thenlicensee should be. notified immediately of any upgrading or downgrading of '
any regulatory response. (Ref. 5)
Response
This is already stated in the second paratroph on~page 1-10.
Comnent 83 '
The generic Confirmatory Action Letter should include wording similar to those which appear on page-4-1 to as to make it clear that the licensee can take action involving quarantined equipment which is deemed necessary for these stated reasons. .(Ref. 5)
' Response
'See response to Comment 30.
Comment 84 The comment above' on the generic Confinnato Action Letter applies to the
' v - sample Order to Show cause as well. (Ref.
Response
See response to Comment 30.
Connent 85 The definition of equipment to be included on the QEL should be clarified to limit the scope to equipment that did not function as it was designed. Equip-ment that performed as designed during the event should not ce quarantined.
(Ref. 5) 1 Response .
See responses to Comments 34 and 53.
Consent 86 On page 4-4, the meaning of the word discrepancies needs clarification. (Ref.
5)- _...
Response
See response to Comment 15.
l
.l i
a-,.
J -r
~
y h~.-q\] Comment 87 w] -
. Licensees have in place ~a-process for. approval of maintenance work orders.
This. approval process should be sufficient. (Ref. 5) i Responsa-
'See response to Coinnent 35. -Past experience has dennonstrated that nomal maintenance work orders established for treubleshooting work do not always ensure that valuable'information for deterwir.ing the probable cause(s) of equipment failure is presarved.
Comments By NRC Staff
- =
2 Comment 38 Cor.cerning confidentiality, '
- a. Who is authorized to grant or deny?
-b.. How does the IIT obtain authority to grant?
- c. When ar.d under what conditions should it be granted or denied?
c Response
~'
Section 2.21 was added to Procedure 2 to address confidentiality during the conduct of investigation. The EDO, Regional Adminiscrators, Director of AE0D, i and those specifically delegated by them may grant confidentiality. In cases
. -where the IIT-leader believes that needed information will only be obtained by providing assurcnce that the NRC will not identify the individual (i.e., source of the information) the team leader should contact the Director of AE0D, who
-will coordinate the situation with the EDO, OGC and others in order to obtain a delegation of. authority to the team leader to grant confidentiality.
Confidentiality is not to be granted as a routine matter. Rather, confiden- '
tiality will be granted only when necessary to acquire information related to
-the Comission's responsibilities or where warranted by special circumstances.
. It will ordinarily not be granted when the individual is willing to provide the information without being given confidentiality.
If an explicit request for confidentiality is made, information will be sought !
from the individual to make a determination as to whether the grant of confi-dentiality is warranted in the particular circumstances at hand. The following information will be solicited from the individual to assist in making this determination.
- 1. Has the individual provided the information to anyone else, i.e., is the information already widely known with the individual as the source?
- O
P PN 1 ).
- 2. Is the'NRC already knowledgeable of the information, thereby obviating the need for a particular confidential source, i.e., why subject the NRC~ to the terms of a Confidentiality Agreement unless necessary?
c3. Does the individual have a past record which would weigh either in favor of or against granting confidentiality in this instance, i.e., has the
-individual abused grants of confidentiality in the past?
^
~4. Is the information which the individual offers to provide within the jurisdiction of the NRC, i.e., should he/she be referred to another iagency?
1
-5. Why does the individual desire confidential source status, i.e., what would be the consequences to the individual if his/her identity were revealed?
Depending on the infomation gatherod by the authorized NRC employee, a deter-mination will be made as to whether granting confidential source status would be in the best interest of the agency.
Comment 89
.- a . Who is authorized to issue subpaenas and administer oaths?
/N .
.i b. How does the IIT obtain authority to administer oaths and issue subpoenas?
- c. When and under what conditions should subpoenas and oaths be considered?
Response
Section 2.22 was added to Procedure 2 to address subpoena power and power to J administer oath and affimation.
At the staff level, the EDO and the Regional Administrator are authorized to lssue subpoenas and administer oaths.
l During an IIT investigation, should the situation occur where the administering l of an oath s.ay be needed, the team leader should contact the Director of AE00, i who will coordinate the situation with the EDO, OGC, and Regionti Administrator, l and, if appropriate, obtain a delegation of authority to administer oath and l
affirmation to the team leader. The authority to issue subpoenas is not l further delegabic.
In general, oaths are administered to ensure that individuals interviewed !
i properly recognize the gravity of the situation. The point at which an oath is ;
administered depends upon the circumstances surrounding the interview. i t
. Subpoena power is available to the NRC to assist it in gathering infomation I which is related to the agency's public health and safety mission. Most l investigations conducted by the NRC are accomplished without the need for a compulsory process because most interviews and information are given voluntarily.
Consequently, wher.ever infomation is considered vital to the investigation and
< x the individual refuses to either testify or to provide documentary evidence, (b ) the'use of a subpoena will be seriously considered, Comment 90
, _ Can " draft" documents or other material prepared by the team be released to the
. licensee? . '-
Responsa The EDO issued policy guidance to the staff concerning the release of draft .
materials. - (See memorandum dated December 3,1984.) In general, NRC policy l prohibits the release of draft inspection and investigation reports, such as IIT. reports, except as required by safety or security concerr.s. Other material which may be available to or used on IITs such as preliminary notifications, press releases, and' sequence of events may be released provided the material is appropriately marked " preliminary" and has the team leader's approval.
Connent 91 How does the IIT refer allegations, potential wrongdoings or safeguards information to other organizations for follow-up and depositions?
' Response
- Section 2.20 of Procedure 2 has been added to address referral of infonnation
(( to'other NRC offices.
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e
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