ML20206U743

Informs of Plans to Perform Programmatic Review of EQ for Electrical Equipment Re EQ Tap & Submits Listed Elements Defined Under Action Item 3

ML20206U743
Person / Time
Issue date:	05/10/1993
From:	Virgilio M Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Thadani A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20206U672	List: ML20206U667 ML20206U675 ML20206U680 ML20206U687 ML20206U694 ML20206U699 ML20206U705 ML20206U711 ML20206U717 ML20206U724 ML20206U729 ML20206U733 ML20206U743
References
FOIA-99-82 TAC-M85648, NUDOCS 9902170330
Download: ML20206U743 (12)

Text

~

4

.* 1.' i.j,,

UNITED STATES

. JlJb ', i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/-

.e.i..mi e.. n e.-nm mn, May 10, 1993 MfMORANDUM FOR:

Ashok C. Ihadani. Associate.0lrector for Inspection and Technical:Assasiment

,v.

FROM:

Martin J. Virgilio.' Acting Otractor.

Division of Systems. Safety and Analysir SUBJICI REVIEW Of Tile flRE PROTECTION REASSESSMENT REPORT (E0-TAP ACT10N ITEM 3.b) (TAC M85643) i as diu u sed in the staff's invironmental Qualification Task Action Plan (E0-IfP) oi ;one 16. 1993, we are performing a programmati.: review of 10 for "lectru al equipment.

Our efforts in this regard are specit.cally defined unoer ^> t ion item 3 of the f 0-TAP, whicn includes the following elements.

f I

.i. a Revtew ticense Renewal Background Informatson 1

l 1b Review Itre Protection Reassessment Report f1irit noinions from Others (Regions. C0 fxperts) 1 1,1 Review Existing L0 Program Recutrements i.e ReviewNRCAudit/ Inspection.Pracjices 3f Review ticensee implementation. Practices o

finalize Review Results i

Jur onjnctive in completing items 3.a through 3.f (above) is to identify potential (0 issues and concerns that may deserve further staf f consideration.

portant to recognize that this part of our programmatic review is not l

ti is ntend"1 to resolve or to otherwise address any of the (Q issues that are identit:ed.

After items 3.a through~3.f of the'EQ-TAP have been completed, l

all of the E0 issues will be consolidated and'spectfically addressed in the i

.tatf-final report under item 3.g. " finalize Review Results." which will l

include recommendations as appropriate.

Our final report is scheduled to be completed by August 30. 1994.

l We h un row completed the review associated with item 3.b of the [0 1AP.

"Rovio. 'tro Protertion Reassesimont Report." and our evaluation is enclosed l

ter or nf ormat inn.

the potential issues that were identified durinq our

{

iovinw wiii ne assomnied anu,iddrest.ed in our final iecort along wnth any

,. g j f

w n,. v. :.

f i

003047 W~ 3 I

9902170330 990211

b I

2-NY 108 '19%

(.ther potential issuet that are ident{fied Al We C0s9 ete the res4(ning iteet l

of the 101 AP progranvratic review (i.e.. Items 3.c through 3.f).

Please me if you should have any questions regarding the enclosed evaluat ion.

conta('

f YrelnalSlontd

Martin J. Virglito Acting Director Division of Systems Safety and Analysk r

I r*( l o

,n n P'vtow of tho fire P r o t. r i t on P.e a s s e s '.mrin t j

I pos.'

(( 0 I t.P ^< t i on Itom 3.b) l I

()l$lk hilG4:

f I

Central ffle l

SPil> i;, f11e W R o, a..

]

I i M i e.u s a

tM(fr,.en fiHolab,e !

JI41on (f rat '. n i

ADom. -

Iherli mr. Ill8 JWerm -

ill(.B P 5 h e m,e ki, POLR

{

Ali l.

ioni.

M' $ fi x,_'.

l ai s

/.qq a,,,,1.

R i 5 A b s.'s A i Klb f t.:.o r t a[5 l

,.l o r.

SP5ft

i.

J\\

l 1

r

/

x.

i

/

1); DS S A 8

-+.h t !?

s l

.h a t.

MVtrgilto 1 '.$ I 1

3l

/94 I

)

• 1,,

'J

' ' }fil. IAIUM if)IAP30) r mm e,

--w er

'~--r=

2-MAy.10, 1994

(

nther potential issues that are identified as we complete the remaining items t

of t he (0-1 AP o' norammat te review (l.c., items 3.c through 3. f).

Please l

contait me if,ou should have any questions regarding the enclosad evaluation.

}k, N (<

N Martin J. Virgilio. Acting Director l

Division of Systems Safety and Analysis inclosure:

Pev'0w of t he itre Prnt er 11nn i cauns sment j

Poport (l0 ' P Act ton item 3.b) l

/

1 l

i i

{

1 i

i i

I i

i l

1 i

I J

f 1

i

Inclosure prviEW of lH[ FIRE PROTECTION REAS$CSSMENT REPORT (TAC 110. MB5648) 1.0

!Nu:0 DUCTION

.2.

As discur.ed in the [nvironmental Qualification Task Action Plan (E0-!AP) of thn st af f Is performing a roassossment of the NRC environmental luno 16. 1993, Action item 3 of inalit u ation (LO) reouirements for electrical equipmont.

the i.Q ;?.0 lists those actions that pertain to the programmatic review of [0, which int iude:

3.i Review license Honewal Background Information 3D Review I tre Protection Reassessment Report i '. t r i t Optninns from Others (Regions. [0 Experts) isisting L0 program Requirements wvie.

t44 Audit' Inspection Practices 1

. vow Doview 1itensee implementation Practices 3y finalize Review Results thl'. pa. t icular ovaluation is intended to address CO TAP Action Itom 3.b.

lire Protection Reassessment Report." Since the C0 Rule and the fire

" Review Hulo share f.triking similaritics in the way they were developed and Protc<t'"n is likely that raany of the potential issues and concerns that i

implemented, it n..tifico dortnq the st.aff's ronssessment of fire protection are also were appi n a:

.o to 10.

Therefore, the specific ob,Jocttvo of this review is to ident'f. rotential [0 issues and concerns by reviewing the findings of the r ce or 'nction Reassnssment Report. Ultimately, all of the issues and owntifled during the E0 programmatic rovinw will be l

aru t.r, inat are

.onsolilated and discussed in the final report (E0-TAP Action item 3.4).

T herM n, ", t h i r, evaluation does not include specific recommendations for furthnr.taff actions.

.. 0 N.f KGROUND INIORMAl10N t o 1 sue, t hat were raised in a report by t he Of f ice nf t he

n w.eneral 1ated August 12. 1992, the staff completed a programmatir mp<'

i N P C

r. u n i r."ne n t f.

in the area of firn protection, the staff **,

.ov ".

.n :.r".>*. '? riated inbruary 27. 1993. Identified a number of weaknesses and made nc.ommondations for programmatic improvements, in view of the y, n r >

• that u re identified relative to the NRC fire protection program.

weakne. c '. encludeo ' hat other programs such as E0 should also bn reviewed.

'nn cecif v all.y 'arqcted because the development of [0 requirements was

0...

verv. milar to the uovelopmnnt of fire protection roquirements, and both of subjective and controversial in nature.

fhe....i." u were very

a.

H vl!w or 101 sir [ PR0lf(.110N REASSESSMENT REPORT

' ^

the firo Protection Reassessment R'oport (FPRR) to identify Ibn 'aff w iewori

.. u e <. that av pe appitrante in 10.

In annaral, sinco the two issuos are so similar.

.sa.h issue t hat was identified during the the fire protection was alsn assumed to be appilCable to (0, Or,1y those issues l

re a ' s e s sme n ' *tudy 1 hat were pec t f Ic al1y ortentod 1o ftre and could not'bo applled to (0 (such

,f manuai itre fighting effectiveness) were eliminated.

Table 3.1

.is aarauac, nf the issues that were identified during the fire

i.,i s omp h ' e list m) protertion assessment study, and Table 3.2 indicates how these issues were v:ewen i

<ev, ne f0 in part tcular, those issues that are " lined out" in to fire protection only and Could not (10 (0statJd in tablo 1. ? c.- specitir t e r a.-

of I

Table 3.1 POTENTIAL ISSUES f

ident :t ation and resolution of " risk-significant" fire scenarios

. Adron.o, of the iIVf methodology I

A u e:*ato l t., c,f a.tngle exposure fire causing damage in both trains 2

I if

...tety.rniatou routpment l

l 4

Adeca.< < of manual 'tre fighting effectiveness

'i 5

f apatolity of fire brigade to extinguish a " worst tase" fire 6.

f.apa lity t o man the fire brigado and thutdown the plant f rom outside

'ho,entrol room simultaneously tu tent uto I i t, of the ftre briqade responoing to a fire outside the I

p'ar

...n octen area e

A d c o...u., of ' cal innt ol cacaollity for ventilatinn syttoms/damocrs 1

o.,. - tir i n :ote not if tratinn and resoonse prorodures 1

r.

.,te o, o y i.'

-ci.i n i l i t, ni ftre uarrior elements

.'.a r a u n f of 'tre barr'er/ ftro seal negative pressure Qualification l

'l ;,

methecology j 17. Accer' ability of fire seal systems containing air passages 13 turn:tanility of penetration seal fire tests that were not conducted g

-..atinnaiiv.rornuni/od testino laboratory n.- 4

,.4

.pm.,,,

er r uit t ;et erminat ion (rr Cl.149 rn* ' t ro fiarr t er',

rc*ratir.n from enntrnl systems interactinns I

j' 15

' q r a,,,

f :

?he thermal damage threshold currently assigned in h;.

Acret'4Dtiiif ot licht of the Sandia test results

[

..lv,

. tral <anin*.

n

Table 3.1 POTENTIAL ISSUES (cont.)

I I 17. It'ect of fire barriers and cable coatings on ampacity Adeauacy of equipment protection from -fire _'iuppression system 18.

artuations vulnerabilities due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines 19.

20. Vulnerabilities due to seismic / fire interactions

21. Iffocts of fire and smoke on plant equipment 22 Adequacy of sprinkler installations A(teptability of using foam and deluge nozzles in high fire hazard 23.

.u o a s Acceptability of not requiring shutdown systems to satisfy seismic, 24 single failure, or other criteria

! 25 A r nntatiti tt, of not postulating plant accidents, natural phenomena, i

l a n <t non-fire related failures concurrent with fire events 26 A.1eouacy of fire safe shutdown capability and procedures 27 Ar r eptability of A0Ts f or safe shutdown / Appendix R equipment I

iteptability of surveillance test requirements for alternate shutdown 28.

nanels i 29. Adequacy of pre-1979 Technical Specifications for active fire barriers

10. ^1equacy of Technical Specifications in addressing upgraded fire f

arriers

• ceptability of nperability requirements for safe shutdown / Appendix R j 3)

M uipment during shutdown and outage conditions

32. Aiceptability of safe shutdown equipment on the shutdown unit nnt toing available to support the operating unit at multi unit sites

33. Adecuacy of in place detector testing I

.decuacy of fire damper testing 24.

of licensee OA programs for fire protection n

'je uacy of NPC 'tre protection revtew and inspectton programs

? 36

. ouat <

'. Inou ac y of trainino/oualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers

[ 37 d 38

.ieauatv and centistency of previously issued exemotions l i

f i

i

Table 3.1 POTENTIAL !$5UES,,

(cont.).

39. Adenaacy of the exemption process

40. Differentiate safety-significance between issues Adecuacy of Fire Hazards Analyses and fire analyses (i.e.

50.59 41.

reviews) performed by licensees 42.

Adecuacy nf NRC reporting reautrements for fire events l 43-Acco:.tability of using fire watches in lieu of other features Acr"ntaDility of using engineering evaluations and techniques as an fl 44.

alt-enative to deterministic recuirements De' me "maroin of safety" reoutrements for fire protection f

i 45.

of_GL 89-13 in addressino fire pump operability concerns 46.

Ailn o,ac y Acceptabili ty,,of, fire risk ' assessment ~ uncertainty 47

48. Acenotabt11ty of cabinet fire spread mechantims

49. Reransider the need for further research t

l 4

w

,p {'*h '

$ h, e 4

e Table 3.2 ISSUE DISPOSITION Identification and resolution of

• risk-significant" (4+c EQ scenarios 2.

4*ov+ey-o f ' ' ' !'!C -- t hdcl gy 3.

Ae & oubi' ty ' : ;!ng!: :xperr; r: :::: b; d:-:g' 1: b::,' tr:!n; n W 4:ty - 'a&ed-equ+ pee *+

2 4

4eoue j r,f-*am;;'-44r: f4ght in; cf f::t 'v n ::

5. Gaeati'it e f re brig:d 10 :t ingu f :h- : "u:r;t 00::" re i

i 6.

4,ipab:ty :o-+ar, ih:

r brig:d: :nd :he+d;;;, ;S: pl:ni 'rowt-s4de th: e h ! rocr Of-"'i necutly s

m.. es.. u, t, t, i.,.,.,, c, i u,,. t r,_..

L..1,,

J.

....-..Ja...,-

4.

t, r _ _..

..., 1.,s

. o, e

...r 9,ir+-*e-pent + ::fe.reet 4

4eovac y ^ ' ' r : ' c o ra 01 ::::b i ' ! !y_ f: r ve ". t i l : t i n '.y ; t ::; /dompees 8.

of 'i-- M4 ade--r.ct!' tecti:n :nd re:p:n:: precedure:

9 9.

4eos;:::,

10. Peliabilit y of (4++ E0 barrier elements 11 MetuaeWh+-4**e4 ri f'r^ :: 1 n:g:tiv: pr::'ur: :::::! ' ' t ;;t o o

== Redn!^gy l 12.

a.. coub+4 +t y n G-Gw-5:0' 'y;:::: ::nt:i 'n; ;i p::':qe*

13. Acceptability nf pen trr. tion :::1 r: EQ tests that were not 1

corducted by a Nationally recognized testing laboratory t

i 14 4emat y-*! 'he r--:Or ty det:r 't:1!:n for C! 'M re: # re hacewes

15. Moouacy of protection f rom control systems interactions 16.

. 4 epwb : 1ety O' i5: Wer= I d**ag: ;',r::h:1d ::rr nt1y :w4<yned-+o a <*4ea t--<-ab4 r ; :

'!ght

' 'h: Ondi: t::t re:g't:

17. Effect of fire barriers and cable coatings on ::p::ity EQ

18. Meauacy of equipment protection from fire suppression system attuations voinerabilities due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines r

19.

20. /olnerabilit ies due to seismic /f4+eEQ interactions

?!

oct, of 'tre and smoke on plant aculpment Y

b]

rg7 7

7 y5 5-

Table 3.2 l

ISSUE DISPOSITION 4

(cont.)

23. Aeeet4eb444+y Effect of using foam and: deluge nozzles 4n-M h-f4n 9

harac4-* **s on E0

24. Acccotability of not requiring" shutdown systems to satisfy seismic, l

' male fei!*ee-or other EQ criteria Aeeent+t444t.y-ef not p:'tu!: ting -1:nt :::!d:nt;,

tur:? phenomenar

25. emWn  : relat d f:!!ure: : nturr:nt alth "r: Ovent' l

26. Adecuacy of (4+e safe shutdown capability and prc:: duce + with regard to EO

27. 47 tab +441 - V "h ' - ' ' f: Aet-dewn#ppend!: " c au ; peeM

28. Aeeee44h44-H y ^ ' ',arve i'!:n:: 10;t re uir;; nt', f;r :ltern:t: 'hutd wr paw k

29. Ade9 scy of-pr 1070 ' F-ic:1 D::i'! :t'On: for ::tive "re bor-icre 30.

Adem,*ey-of-behn e t :1 Ep :t'!::ti:n: '

addec'::ng-up9eeded f're bece+ees

31. Au+f4+b41'ty of oper:b;ty r; Quirt;;nt; f r ::f ;hutdown/ Appendix a

equ+ pre-i due+on-+bu44c= :nd ut:g: cendit! n:

l

32. Aeeent+b4I'ty of 00f: :hutd v. 04ulpment On the 'hutdOWG unit not-l be+ g-cvailab!: i: 'upperi iS Oper: ting urii at mlii unii 'ite:

33. Adecuaey-of-H>!::.0- det:0t0r t ;t 'n; I

d,34 - Ademaey-c4 feiemoc r t -' i i ng i

35. Adequacy of licensee OA programs for 'tr: pret::tica EQ 1

36. Adcouacy of NRC 44+e-oeotection E0 review and inspection programs

37. Adecuacy of training /aualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers

38. Adeauacy and consistency of pr:vicu',1y i::ved ::=ptice* exceptions that were allowed to EQ requirements

, 39 Adewacy nf the exemption process 40.

Diffnrentiate safety-significance between issues

41. Adecoacy of E4 M atted' 'n:ly',0; :nd "re EQ analyses (i.e., 50.59 rev ows) performeo by licensees

42. Adcouacy of fiRC reporting requirements for f'r; v nt', EQ-related problems

! 43. Au+nt+tnM4e4+4*g " r. :t che' '

' i ^u o f e t h r ' :tsees i

1

.s.

. h T a bl e t.3 ; 2'

!$5UE. DISPOSITION.

' (cont't)' "~'

' 'M~

Acceptability of using engineering evaluations.and techniques as an 44 alternative to deterministic requirements i

/

45. Define " margin of safety" recuirements for M r: pr:t:: tion E0 46.

Adeewet-c' CL 30 13 'n -;ddr:::in

70 P RP P07 b!'I!7 200 0TE

47. Acceptability of

r

-!:L ::::::::nt EQTnie[hB61ogy uncertainty

48. Accepub ' t y ' :: binet r: :;re:d :: h:ri:::

i

49. Reconsider the need for further research Y

p g._

=,

s.

I I

f4 i

i I

i 4

l l

(

t l

1 l

j l

4.0 ONCLU510NS Bec ause the E0 Rule and the rire Protection Rule are nuite similar in the way it would be reasonable to they were established and imposed on the industry, assume that the issues that were identified during the staff's programmatic of fire protection may also be applicable to E0.

Therefore. the staff j

review revtewed the issues that were identified during the programmatic reassessment of f:<e protection and, unless the issue was specific to fire protection only, restated in terms of EQ.

The potential issues that resulted from this it 4.

effort are Itsted in Table 4 and will be addressed in the staff's. final report on E0 (E0-TAP Action item 3 9).

TABLE 4 POTENTIAL EQ ISSUES

'1

dentification and resolution of " risk-significant* C0 scenarios

?.

Weliability of E0 barrier elements Acceptability of E0 tests that were not conducted by a Nationally I

3 recoonized testing laboratory adequacy of protection from control systems interactions

! A.

> 5.

if fect of f tre barrters and cable coatings on f 0 t

6 Adecuacy of routpment protection from fire suppression system actuations

~

Vulnerabilittes due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines,_

l 5

Julnerabilities due to seismic /E0 interactions 4

I,

ficcis of fire ano smoke on plant ecutpment

[910. Effect of using foam and deluge nozzles on F0 acceptability of not recuiring shutdown systems to satisfy seismic or 11 other [0 criteria

12. Adecuacy of safe shutdown capability with regard to f0 i

" 13 Adecuacy of licensee 0A programs for E0 14 Adecuacy of f4RC E0 review and inspection programs

.idecuacy of training /aualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers Adecuacy and ( cn;istency of exceptions that were allowed to EQ 16 recuirements i

I?

Adecuacy of the exemption process g 'E Dif f erent t at e 5.af ety-stanificance between issues t

8

i TABLE 4 POTENTIAL EQ ISSUES (cont.)

1 Adecuacy of_E0 analysesi(i'.e., 50.59' reviews) performed by licensees

.a - l 19.

. ~..

Adecuacy of NRC reporting'reQtlirementt'for.EO-related problems 20.

Accepta'sility of using engineering evaluations and techniques as an 21.

alternative to deterministic raoutrements 22 Define "marain of safety" recuirements for E0 23 Acceptability of E0 methodology uncertainty 24 Reconsider the need for'further research Pru ipal Contributor:

J. latum (SPLB) w t

4

,E s

9

-