ML20206U743

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Informs of Plans to Perform Programmatic Review of EQ for Electrical Equipment Re EQ Tap & Submits Listed Elements Defined Under Action Item 3
ML20206U743
Person / Time
Issue date: 05/10/1993
From: Virgilio M
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Thadani A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20206U672 List:
References
FOIA-99-82 TAC-M85648, NUDOCS 9902170330
Download: ML20206U743 (12)
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  • 1.' i.j,, UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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/- .e.i..mi e.. n e .-nm mn, May 10, 1993 MfMORANDUM FOR: Ashok C. Ihadani. Associate.0lrector for Inspection and Technical:Assasiment

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FROM: Martin J. Virgilio.' Acting Otractor.

Division of Systems. Safety and Analysir SUBJICI REVIEW Of Tile flRE PROTECTION REASSESSMENT REPORT (E0-TAP

< ACT10N ITEM 3.b) (TAC M85643) i

as diu u sed in the staff's invironmental Qualification Task Action Plan (E0- -

! IfP) oi ;one 16. 1993, we are performing a programmati.: review of 10 for "lectru al equipment. Our efforts in this regard are specit.cally defined unoer ^> t ion item 3 of the f 0-TAP, whicn includes the following elements. .

f I .i . a Revtew ticense Renewal Background Informatson 1

l 1b Review Itre Protection Reassessment Report

. f1irit noinions from Others (Regions. C0 fxperts) 1 Review Existing L0 Program Recutrements l 1 ,1

! i.e ReviewNRCAudit/ Inspection.Pracjices

! 3f Review ticensee implementation. Practices o finalize Review Results i

Jur onjnctive in completing items 3.a through 3.f (above) is to identify

! potential (0 issues and concerns that may deserve further staf f consideration.

l ti is portant to recognize that this part of our programmatic review is not

! ntend"1 to resolve or to otherwise address any of the (Q issues that are

identit
ed. After items 3.a through~3.f of the'EQ-TAP have been completed, l

all of the E0 issues will be consolidated and'spectfically addressed in the i .tatf- final report under item 3.g. " finalize Review Results." which will l include recommendations as appropriate. Our final report is scheduled to be completed by August 30. 1994. l l We h un row completed the review associated with item 3.b of the [0 1AP.

"Rovio. 'tro Protertion Reassesimont Report." and our evaluation is enclosed l ter or nf ormat inn. the potential issues that were identified durinq our

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iovinw wiii ne assomnied anu ,iddrest.ed in our final iecort along wnth any

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(.ther potential issuet that are ident{fied Al We C0s9l ete the res4(ning iteet of the 101 AP progranvratic review (i.e.. Items 3.c through 3.f). Please conta(' me if you should have any questions regarding the enclosed evaluat ion.

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' Martin J. Virglito Acting Director Division of Systems Safety and Analysk r

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potential issues that are identified as we complete the remaining items of t he (0-1 AP o' norammat te review (l .c. , items 3.c through 3. f) . Please l contait me if ,ou should have any questions regarding the enclosad evaluation.

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Martin J. Virgilio. Acting Director l

' Division of Systems Safety and Analysis _

inclosure: '

Pev'0w of t he itre j Prnt er 11nn i cauns sment Poport (l0 ' P Act ton item 3.b) l l

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Inclosure prviEW of lH[ FIRE PROTECTION REAS$CSSMENT REPORT (TAC 110. MB5648) 1.0 !Nu:0 DUCTION ,

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As discur.ed in the [nvironmental Qualification Task Action Plan (E0-!AP) of luno 16. 1993, thn st af f Is performing a roassossment of the NRC environmental inalit u ation (LO) reouirements for electrical equipmont. Action item 3 of the i.Q ;?.0 lists those actions that pertain to the programmatic review of [0, which int iude:

3 .i Review license Honewal Background Information 3D Review I tre Protection Reassessment Report

, i '. t r i t Optninns from Others (Regions. [0 Experts) wvie. isisting L0 program Requirements

. vow t44 Audit' Inspection Practices 1

. Doview 1itensee implementation Practices 3y finalize Review Results thl'. pa. t icular ovaluation is intended to address CO TAP Action Itom 3.b.

" Review lire Protection Reassessment Report." Since the C0 Rule and the fire Protc<t'"n Hulo share f.triking similaritics in the way they were developed and implemented, it is likely that raany of the potential issues and concerns that i

were n..tifico dortnq the st.aff's ronssessment of fire protection are also appi n a: .o to 10. Therefore, the specific ob,Jocttvo of this review is to ident'f. rotential [0 issues and concerns by reviewing the findings of the r ce or 'nction Reassnssment Report. Ultimately, all of the issues and l aru t.r, inat are owntifled during the E0 programmatic rovinw will be

.onsolilated and discussed in the final report (E0-TAP Action item 3.4).

T herM n, ", t h i r, evaluation does not include specific recommendations for furthnr .taff actions.

. . 0 N.f KGROUND INIORMAl10N

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w t o 1 sue , t hat were raised in a report by t he Of f ice nf t he mp<' i .eneral 1ated August 12. 1992, the staff completed a programmatir in the area of firn protection, the staff **,

.ov ". NPC r. u n i r ."ne n t f.

.n :.r".>*. '? riated inbruary 27. 1993. Identified a number of weaknesses and made y, n r >

  • nc.ommondations for programmatic improvements, in view of the weakne . c '. that u re identified relative to the NRC fire protection program.

'nn ' , ' encludeo ' hat other programs such as E0 should also bn reviewed.

0... cecif v all.y 'arqcted because the development of [0 requirements was verv . milar to the uovelopmnnt of fire protection roquirements, and both of fhe... .i." u were very subjective and controversial in nature.

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H vl!w or 101 sir [ PR0lf(.110N REASSESSMENT REPORT Ibn 'aff w iewori the firo Protection Reassessment R'oport (FPRR) to identify

. . u e <. that av pe appitrante in 10. In annaral, sinco the two issuos are so similar. .sa.h issue t hat was identified during the the fire protection re a ' s e s sme n ' *tudy .

was alsn assumed to be appilCable to (0, Or,1y those issues l 1 hat were pec t f Ic al1y ortentod 1o ftre and could not'bo applled to (0 (such

.is aarauac, ,f manuai itre fighting effectiveness) were eliminated. Table 3.1

i. ,i s omp h ' e list m) nf the issues that were identified during the fire ,

protertion assessment study, and Table 3.2 indicates how these issues were v:ewen i <ev, ne f0 in part tcular, those issues that are " lined out" in tablo 1. ? c .- specitir to fire protection only and Could not (10 (0statJd in t e r a.- of I

Table 3.1 POTENTIAL ISSUES f . ident :t ation and resolution of " risk-significant" fire scenarios

. Adron.o , of the iIVf methodology I 2 A u e:*ato l t., c,f a .tngle exposure fire causing damage in both trains I if ...tety.rniatou routpment l

l 4 Adeca .< < of manual 'tre fighting effectiveness

'i 5 f apatolity of fire brigade to extinguish a " worst tase" fire

6. f.apa lity t o man the fire brigado and thutdown the plant f rom outside

'ho ,entrol room simultaneously

! tu tent uto I i t , of the ftre briqade responoing to a fire outside the I p'ar e ...n octen area A d c o . . .u. , of ' cal innt ol cacaollity for ventilatinn syttoms/damocrs 1

1 r. .,te o , o y o . , . - tir i n :ote not if tratinn and resoonse prorodures i .' -ci .i n i l i t , ni ftre uarrior elements

.'.a r a u n f of 'tre barr'er/ ftro seal negative pressure Qualification l

'l ; , methecology j 17. Accer' ability of fire seal systems containing air passages

, 13 turn:tanility of penetration seal fire tests that were not conducted n .- -. 4 .atinnaiiv.rornuni/od testino laboratory g

,.4 .pm.,,, ,' er r uit t ;et erminat ion (rr Cl.149 rn* ' t ro fiarr t er',

rc*ratir.n from enntrnl systems interactinns j' 15 ' q r a , ,, f :

I h;. Acret'4Dtiiif ot ?he thermal damage threshold currently assigned in

[

..lv, . tral <anin*. n licht of the Sandia test results

Table 3.1 POTENTIAL ISSUES (cont.)

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17. It'ect of fire barriers and cable coatings on ampacity
18. Adeauacy of equipment protection from -fire _'iuppression system artuations
19. vulnerabilities due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines
20. Vulnerabilities due to seismic / fire interactions
21. Iffocts of fire and smoke on plant equipment 22 Adequacy of sprinkler installations
23. A(teptability of using foam and deluge nozzles in high fire hazard

.u o a s 24 Acceptability of not requiring shutdown systems to satisfy seismic, single failure, or other criteria i

! 25 A r nntatiti tt, of not postulating plant accidents, natural phenomena, l a n <t non-fire related failures concurrent with fire events 26 A.1eouacy of fire safe shutdown capability and procedures I

27 Ar r eptability of A0Ts f or safe shutdown / Appendix R equipment

28. iteptability of surveillance test requirements for alternate shutdown

! nanels i

29. Adequacy of pre-1979 Technical Specifications for active fire barriers
10. ^1equacy of Technical Specifications in addressing upgraded fire f
arriers j 3)
  • ceptability of nperability requirements for safe shutdown / Appendix R

" M uipment during shutdown and outage conditions

32. Aiceptability of safe shutdown equipment on the shutdown unit nnt toing available to support the operating unit at multi unit sites
33. Adecuacy of in place detector testing I
24. .decuacy of fire damper testing n 'je uacy of licensee OA programs for fire protection

? 36 . ouat < of NPC 'tre protection revtew and inspectton programs

'. Inou ac y of trainino/oualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers

[ 37

.ieauatv and centistency of previously issued exemotions d 38 l

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Table 3.1 POTENTIAL !$5UES,,

(cont.).
39. Adenaacy of the exemption process
40. Differentiate safety-significance between issues 50.59
41. Adecuacy of Fire Hazards Analyses and fire analyses (i.e.

reviews) performed by licensees

42. Adecuacy nf NRC reporting reautrements for fire events Acco:.tability of using fire watches in lieu of other features l 43-Acr"ntaDility of using engineering evaluations and techniques as an fl 44.

f alt-enative to deterministic recuirements De' me "maroin of safety" reoutrements for fire protection i 45.

46. Ailn o,ac y of_GL 89-13 in addressino fire pump operability concerns 47 Acceptabili ty,,of, fire risk ' assessment ~ uncertainty ,,
48. Acenotabt11ty of cabinet fire spread mechantims
49. Reransider the need for further research t

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  • 4 Table 3.2 ISSUE DISPOSITION Identification and resolution of
  • risk-significant" (4+c EQ scenarios
2. 4*ov+ey-o f ' ' ' !'!C -- t hdcl gy
3. Ae & oubi' ty ' : ;!ng!: :xperr; r: :::: b; d:-:g' 1: b::,' tr:!n; n W 4:ty - 'a&ed-equ+ pee *+

2 _ ,,

4 4eoue j r,f-*am;;'-44r
f4ght in; cf f::t 'v n ::
5. Gaeati'it e f re brig:d 10 :t ingu f :h- : "u:r;t 00::" re i 4,ipab:ty :o-+ar, ih: r brig:d: :nd :he+d;;;, ;S: pl:ni 'rowt-s4de i

6.

th: e h ! rocr Of-"'i necutly s

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94 ,ir+-*e-pent + ::fe.reet

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8. 4eovac y ^ ' ' r : ' c o ra 01 ::::b i ' ! !y_ f: r ve ". t i l : t i n
9. 4eos;:::, of 'i-- M4 ade--r.ct!' 9 tecti:n :nd re:p:n:: precedure:
10. Peliabilit y of (4++ E0 barrier elements 11 MetuaeWh+-4**e4 ri f'r^ :: 1 n:g:tiv: pr::'ur: :::::! ' ' t ;;t o o

== Redn!^gy l 12. a. . coub+4 +t y n G-Gw- 5:0' 'y;:::: ::nt:i 'n; ;i p::':qe*

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13. Acceptability nf pen trr. tion :::1 r: EQ tests that were not corducted by a Nationally recognized testing laboratory t

i 14 4emat y-*! 'he r--:Or ty det:r 't:1!:n for C! 'M re: # re hacewes

15. Moouacy of protection f rom control systems interactions 16.

. 4 epwb : 1ety O' i5: Wer= I d**ag: ;',r::h:1d ::rr nt1y :w4<yned-+o a <*4ea t--<-ab4 r ; : '!ght ' 'h: Ondi: t::t re:g't:

17. Effect of fire barriers and cable coatings on ::p::ity EQ
18. Meauacy of equipment protection from fire suppression system attuations
19. voinerabilities due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines r
20. /olnerabilit ies due to seismic /f4+eEQ interactions
?! oct, of 'tre and smoke on plant aculpment rg7 7 7 y5 Y , b] -

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Table 3.2  !

4 l ISSUE DISPOSITION (cont.)-

23. Aeeet4eb444+y Effect of using foam and: deluge nozzles 4n-M 9 h-f4n harac4-* **s on E0
24. Acccotability of not requiring" shutdown systems to satisfy seismic, l'

' male fei!*ee- or other EQ criteria Aeeent+t444t.y-ef not p:'tu!: ting -1:nt :::!d:nt;, tur:? phenomenar 25.

l emWn  : relat d f:!!ure: : nturr:nt alth "r: Ovent'

26. Adecuacy of (4+e safe shutdown capability and prc:: duce + with regard to EO
27. 47 tab +441 - V "h ' - ' ' f: Aet-dewn#ppend!: " c au ; peeM
28. Aeeee44h44-H y ^ ' ',arve i'!:n:: 10;t re uir;; nt', f;r :ltern:t: 'hutd wr paw k
29. Ade9 scy of-pr 1070 ' F-ic:1 D::i'! :t'On: for ::tive "re bor-icre
30. Adem,*ey-of- behn e t :1 Ep :t'!::ti:n: '

addec'::ng-up9eeded f're bece+ees a

31. Au+f4+b41'ty of oper:b;ty r; Quirt;;nt; f r ::f ;hutdown/ Appendix equ+ pre-i due+on-+bu44c= :nd ut:g: cendit! n:

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32. Aeeent+b4I'ty of 00f: :hutd v. 04ulpment On the 'hutdOWG unit not-l be+ g-cvailab!: i: 'upperi iS Oper: ting urii at mlii unii 'ite:
33. Adecuaey-of- H>!::.0- det:0t0r t ;t 'n; I

i d,34 - Ademaey-c4 feiemoc r t -' i i ng

35. Adequacy of licensee OA programs for 'tr
pret::tica EQ 1
36. Adcouacy of NRC 44+e-oeotection E0 review and inspection programs
37. Adecuacy of training /aualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers
38. Adeauacy and consistency of pr:vicu',1y i::ved ::=ptice* exceptions that were allowed to EQ requirements

, 39 Adewacy nf the exemption process

40. Diffnrentiate safety-significance between issues
41. Adecoacy of E4 M atted' 'n:ly',0; :nd "re EQ analyses (i .e. , 50.59 rev ows) performeo by licensees
42. Adcouacy of fiRC reporting requirements for f'r; v nt', EQ-related problems

! 43. Au+nt+tnM4e4+4*g " r . :t che' ' ' i ^u o f e t h r ' :tsees ,

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!$5UE. DISPOSITION . '

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' (cont't)' "~'

l 44 Acceptability of using engineering evaluations.and techniques as an '

alternative to deterministic requirements i

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45. Define " margin of safety" recuirements for M r: pr:t:: tion E0
46. Adeewet-c' CL 30 13 'n -;ddr:::in 70 P RP P07 b!'I!7 200 0TE
47. Acceptability of r -!:L ::::::::nt EQTnie[hB61ogy uncertainty
48. Accepub ' t y ' :: binet r: :;re:d :: h:ri::: i
49. Reconsider the need for further research Y ,,

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4.0 ONCLU510NS _

Bec ause the E0 Rule and the rire Protection Rule are nuite similar in the way they were established and imposed on the industry, it would be reasonable to l

assume that the issues that were identified during the staff's programmatic j Therefore. the staff review of fire protection may also be applicable to E0.

revtewed the issues that were identified during the programmatic reassessment of f:<e protection and, unless the issue was specific to fire protection only, it 4. restated in terms of EQ.

The potential issues that resulted from this effort are Itsted in Table 4 and will be addressed in the staff's. final report on E0 (E0-TAP Action item 3 9). I l

TABLE 4 I POTENTIAL EQ ISSUES

'1 :dentification and resolution of " risk-significant* C0 scenarios

?. Weliability of E0 barrier elements 3

Acceptability of E0 tests that were not conducted by a Nationally I recoonized testing laboratory

! A. adequacy of protection from control systems interactions

> 5. if fect of f tre barrters and cable coatings on f 0 t

6 Adecuacy of routpment protection from fire suppression system actuations

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Vulnerabilittes due to broken or leaking flammable gas lines ,_ ,

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5 Julnerabilities due to seismic /E0 interactions I,

ficcis of fire ano smoke on plant ecutpment

[9

10. Effect of using foam and deluge nozzles on F0 11 acceptability of not recuiring shutdown systems to satisfy seismic or other [0 criteria i
12. Adecuacy of safe shutdown capability with regard to f0

" 13 Adecuacy of licensee 0A programs for E0 14 Adecuacy of f4RC E0 review and inspection programs

!! .idecuacy of training /aualification of NRC inspectors and reviewers 16 Adecuacy and ( cn;istency of exceptions that were allowed to EQ

! recuirements i I? Adecuacy of the exemption process Dif f erent t at e 5.af ety-stanificance between issues g 'E t

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i TABLE 4  :

POTENTIAL EQ ISSUES (cont.)

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19. Adecuacy of_E0 analysesi(i'.e., 50.59' reviews) performed by licensees ...

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20. Adecuacy of NRC reporting'reQtlirementt'for.EO-related problems
21. Accepta'sility of using engineering evaluations and techniques as an alternative to deterministic raoutrements 22 Define "marain of safety" recuirements for E0 23 Acceptability of E0 methodology uncertainty _

24 Reconsider the need for'further research Pru ipal Contributor: J. latum (SPLB) w ,

t 4 ,E s

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