ML20206S588
| ML20206S588 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/06/1986 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2435, NUDOCS 8609220276 | |
| Download: ML20206S588 (20) | |
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DATE ISSUED:
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SUMMARY
AND MINUTES OF THE
$'i' JUNE 27, 1986 JOINT MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES ON " OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS" (O&EPS) AND " AUXILIARY SYSTEMS" WASHINGTON, D. C.
Purcose:
The ACRS Subcommittees on O&EPS and Auxiliary Systems met on June h
27, 1986 at 1717 H Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.
20555 in Room 1167.
The purpose of the meeting was to a) be briefed by NRR and Region Staffs on the status of various control room HVAC systems problems and the NRC's control room habitability improvement effort, b) be briefed by the AEOD Staff on the effects of ambient temperature on I&C systems, c) discuss with the Staff its procedures and criteria for reviewing Chilled Water Systems, its walk-down of the Chilled Water Systems at Shearon Harris, and the contribution to the " risk to safety" from Chilled Water Systems failures based on NRC sponsored and reviewed PRA Studies, and d) discuss with the Staff "de minimis" environmental radiation levels.
Notice of the meeting, published in the Federal Register on June 13, 1986, is shown as Attachment A.
The schedule for the meeting is Attachment B.
Sign-in sheets of meeting attendees are contained in Attachment C.
Attachment D contains a list of meeting handouts kept with the office copy of these minutes.
The t,
entire meeting was open to the public.
There were no oral or r
written comments from members'of the public.
Mr. John Schiffgens was the assigned ACRS Staff member for the meeting.
Attendeas:
ACRS HEC Staff D. W. Moeller, Sube. Chairman U. Minners, NRR/DSRO/RSIB C. Michelson, Subc. Chairman J. B. Read, NRR/DSRO/ RIB J. C. Mark, Member R. L. Pedersen, IE/DEPER/EGCB C. J. Wylie, Member J. J. Hayes NRR/ PAPS G. A. Reed, Member J. L. Milhoan, HRR/ PAPS J. E. Till, Consultant R. Hernan, NRR/TOSB R. L. Kathren, Consultant M. Chiramal, AEOD M. W. First, Consultant R. L. Baer, IE/DEPER/EGCB J. O. Schiffgens, Staff B. C. Buckley, NRR/ PAD 2 DESIC"ATED ORIGINAL Nb B609220276 860806 Certified By /
JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS, MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 Ch MINUTES t
Others NRC Staff J. Driscoll, ANL-West R. P. Goel, NRR/ PAPS M. Wetterhahn, C&W A. J. Buslik, NRR/SORR J. Trotter, NUS N. H. Wagner, NRR/PBPE S. Letournean, Bechtel I. N. Jackiw, RIII P
N. Nichols, C&W c~
D. C. McCarthy, CP&L Others S. Jones, Dept. Labor T. J. Myers, Toledo Edison, E. D. Harward, AIF J. K. Wood, Toledo Edison /
L. Wertebauer, UPI J. Hirsch, Toledo Edison '
R. W. Brown, Mallinekroth, INC.
P. Hildebrandt, Toledo Edison B. R. Moeller, Self J. Fay, Toledo Edison M. Fertel, Delian Corp.
T. Williams, Toledo Edison J. Silberg, Shaw, Pittman, etc.
J. Pearson, Toledo Edison V. Mahathe, Bechtel Meetina Hiahliahts. Aareements. and Reauests:
D. Moeller 1.
Opening Statement Mr. Moeller chaired the meeting.
He began by commenting briefly on the purpose of the meeting then introduced the first speaker, Mr. Milhoan.
2.
Control Room Habitability (CRH) Systems Improvement Effort J. Milhoan and J. Hayes Mr. Mark asked if the Staff had consolidated its review procedures for CRH Systems or if the responsibility was still scattered among various branches.
Mr. Milhoan replied that the engineers who, perform these reviews have been brought together into three Plant Systems Branches (one in each of the three NRR water reactor licensing divisions);
i.e.,
while there are a number of engineers involved, each complete review comes out of a single branch.
He said that the Staff uses Standard Review Plan (SRP) Section 6.4 in its reviews of CRH Systems.
Mr. Milhoan mentioned that the Staff last briefed the Subcommittee on CRH Systems on June 17, 1986 and made a presentation on NUREG-4191, which dealt with a survey of CRH practices at three plants.
In addition, the Staff informed the Subcommittee at that time of plans to expand its survey' of CHR practices by looking at an additional 12 plants.
The reason for expanding the scope of the survey to at least 15 plants was to determine the prevalence of the problems encountered at the first three plants.
He said that actions to address the preliminary conclusions and observations of the original CRH study are being held in abeyance, pending completion of the 12-plant survey and the evaluation of the 2
JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING' w
JUNE 27, 1988 MINUTES
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- k Staff conclusions and observations in light of the more extensive data. The Staff concluded that this was necessary to justify any recommendations for backfits.
He pointed out that the CRH concerns are being' treated as Generic Issue
.39' No. 83.
After the 12-plant survey is completed, the Reactor. c.4'",
Safety Issues Branch of the Division of Safety Review and
<M' Oversight will assume responsibility for final resolution of e-Generic Issue No. 83.
The survey is a volunteer effort on the part of selected utilities.
Mr. First wondered why 'it is voluntary rather than part of a normal inspection.
Mr. Milhoan said that there were certain measures the Staff was taking that require licensee cooperation to be most effective.
He pointed out that ANL-West personnel, NRR Staff, and Regional Inspectors make up the survey team.
Mr. First wondered if violations uncovered by the team would be subject to enforcement action.
Mr. Milhoan assured the Subcommittee,that if violations are found that require enforcement, such action will be taken. -
Mr. Moeller asked if the improvement effort was moving along well.
Mr. Hayes said that it was until May of this year when.
the NRR Staff was called on to send the team to assist Region V with CRH inspections prior to the restart of three i
facilities.
Mr. Michelson asked about what is involved in developing a survey protocol.
Mr. Hayes said that the protocol establishes the basis for the inspection, i.e.,
it describes what the CRH Systems will be reviewed against, and is very plant specific.
The Staff compares the facility to what they said they would be doing under TMI action item III.D.3.4; i.e., they are judged based on adherence to that commitment, and are not asked to meet some sort of new design criteria.
He reminded the Subcommittee that as a. result of THI, each utility was asked to respond with a submittal which explained how they met control room habitability requirements.
Their submittals addressed radiological and toxic gas challenges.
A Safety Evaluation Report was prepared for each of these submittals and, in some cases, licensees were recuired to make backfits in order to meet new requirements.
9he Staff's survey for a particular facility also looks at the Technical i
Specifications to determine whether they are really adequate in ensuring that the conclusions reached by the Staff, and reported in the SER, are maintained.
CRH surveys involve two plant visits.
The first visit:is intended for the team to become familiar with the glant; i.e., to pick up piping and instrumentation drawinds (P& ids),
procedures, and plant descriptions, to walk-down the systems, and to develop a working relationship with the plant staff.
l After the initial visit, the Staff reviews the information
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dOINT O&EPS/ AUX, SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES gathered, and the Technical Specifications, to identify Questions are generated by the Staff and submitted w
problems.
to the licensee approximately one week before the second l
visit, and discussed in detail during the visit.
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Mr. Michelson asked if the Staff looks for fire hazard ci Mr. Hayes said that the Staff '- a.is lyg concords during its surveys.
focuses on challenges to operations in the control room.
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said that while the Staff does consider fire, from the protection systems point of view, and how if the protection systems are actuated they might affect the environment of the control room, fire causes and prevention practices are not considered.
Mr. Milhoan said that the Plant Systems Branches have fire protection engineers, but that because of resource problems they do not participate in these surveys or review of survey reports.
With regard to the expanded survey effort, Mr. Hayes described briefly 14 plants (Attachment E) that have been added to the survey list (they initially planned to add 12), and explained how they were chosen to cover the spectrten in tems of prominent architect-engineer (AE) firms and provide a balanced view.
All the plants chosen are operating plants; the Staff has found that the information from operating plants is better, more useful, than that from NTOLs.
Mr. Michelson asked for an estimate of the " typical" rate of rise in control room temperature on loss of all heat removal v
capability.
Hr. Hayes suggested 0.4 degrees F per minute as a reasonable rule of thumb.
The Staff's surveys indicate that no record is kept of control room temperature.
The control room temperature technical specifications for the ventilation system at most f acilities are based on equipment requirements, v
not operator limitations.
Yet, the temperature gauges, essentially room thermostats, are located to measure the temperature of the operators work space and, hence, reveal
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little if anything about the temperature of sensitive equipment in cabinets.
Because of concern about degradation of instrumentation due to aging at the Trojan plant, they put temperature gauges in l
cabinets and did a 10 hour1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> heat load test.
Mr. Driscoll pointed out that during the test, the temperature in some of l
the cabinets rose to 150 degrees F, while the ambient room temperature rose into the high 80s.
The licensee had been told that the equipment was designed to operate in an ambient temperature of 105 degrees F, but they failed to realize that i
when placed in a sealed cabinet the temperature of the room is not ambient for the equipment.
The Staff has found problems with the ability of the control i
room isolation systems to function properly on a toxic gas signal.
Mr. Hayes said that the Staff has also identified 4
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JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1936 MINUTES unfiltered in-leakage into#the control rocm systems coming 4
from air handling units-drain pipes, outside air dampers, duct work, and the control room boundary; the Staff has measured in-leakage rates from 10-19 cfm to 2000-3000 cfm. - Ocp., n-He said that the Staff'is not concerned when it measures an FO -
Ambalance of a couple hundred ofm, due to measuring IEI difficulties, but is concerned when it encounters imbalances ?c:.:.f in:the neighborhood of'a thousand ofm or more.
The Staff found that many facilities had excess flow, as high as three times the design flow rate, through the charcoal absorber unit, reducing residence time and absorber efficiency.
Mr. Hayes also mentiohed that the Staff has found considerable variation between HVAC trains; in some cases one resulted in a positive control room pressure and the other a negative pressure.
It should be noted-that the positive or negative pressure is relative to the atmosphere, i
so that the control room may be positive relative to the atmosphere but, as has been found on numerous occasions, negative relative to its surroundings, wi?,h corresponding in-leakage.
Mr. Hayes explained that licensees and AE firms do not place a high level of importance on HVAC Systems which tends to result in systems that perform poorly.
It appears that AE firms use the same system design from generation to
'I generation without going back to test them to see that they work as they should, and licensees never bother to provide the AE with any operational feedback.
Mr. Michelson asked if control room chillers used water for cooling or used air to Freon exchange.
Mr. Hayes said that 1
the units they saw were air to Freon.
Mr. Till asked about the total time required to make an inspection (i.e., planning, inspection, and report writing).
Mr. Hayes estimated that each inspection requires about four a
weeks fer three individuals.
Mr. Moeller asked if a NUREG would be coming out summarizing what the Staff has told the Subcommittee so far.
Mr. Hayes said'that a NUREG would be published at the comp.letion of the extended surveys program.
Program completion is schedule'd for December of this year, with a report due to be published '
in March or April, of next year.
S. Miner 3.
Rancho Seco CRH Systems Mr. Miner said that inspection of the emergency HVAC system scheduled for last week has been postponed until August, anticipating a December start-up.
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4 JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING MINUTES JUNE 27, 1986 w
The system was modified during the March-June 1985 refueling l
outage; prior to that outage they had a single-train systea for the control room. The system now consists of two, 100
.j,.
o percent, single-failure proof trains that serve both the
., ;f control room and technical support center.
Intake was i-m increased from 400 to 1,600 cfm and the recirculation 2 4h.
capacity was increased from 5,000 to 16,950 cfm.
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The plant operated from June until December 1985; it has been down since the December 26, 1985 transient.
This event was initiated by a loss of DC power to the ICS.
About three minutes later the SFAS automatically initiated, then both A and B control room / technical support center Emergency HVAC trains started.
The Emergency HVAC trains made so much noise that the operators in the control room could not hear each other speak, hence, first train A was turned off and reset then train B was turned off and not reset.
At this time, the Staff does not know the cause of the noise.
According to Mr.
Miner the licensee had first encountered a noise problem with the Emergency HVAC trains in November but was not able to determine the cause before the December 26 event.
2 4.
Characteristics of Information Notices (ins) and the McGuire R. Baer June 4, 1984 Event Mr. Baer said that Information Notices are issued to inform licensees or construction permit (CP) holders of a variety of events as well as provide information.on channes in NBC procedures or regulations.
About 2/3 to 3/4 of the appmxistely 100 ins issued each year describe nuclear power plant events.
ins do not impose requirements.
However, they should provide enough information so that a responsible licensee can evaluate the applicability of the issue or likelihood of occurrence'of the problem to his plant and then decide on appropriate corrective actions; ins often describe the corrective actions taken by others.
The decision to issue an IN depends both on the safety significance and the generic applicability of the issue.
Generally, an IN will not be l
issued if the Staff thinks the industry has already been adequately notified (e.g., by INFO or AEOD documents).
With regard to the June 4, 1984 McGuire event, the Staff thought it clearly had safety significance and was potentially generic.
The plant experienced a total loss of the control air ventilation system while both units were operating at full power; a final SER was issued Marph 22, 1985.
Because McGuire had previously experienced a' number of failures of solid state circuit cards due to high control room temperatures, they were able to quickly establish alternate cooling until they could restore the HVAC systems.
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' JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES Mr. Michelson asked if McGuire lost both the chiller and air handling portion of the HVAC systems.
The Staff was not sure 1*
if air handling was lost but was sure that a chiller was lost; the other chiller was out of operation for maintenance.
Mr. First said that it was his understanding that the cabinets that contain the electronic equipment were not ventilated; i.e., they had no means to continually draw filtered air through the cabinets.
Mr. Baer said that he thought that was neglected in many cases.
5.
Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Inspection-T. Myers and J. Wood at Davis-Besse Mr. Wood pointed out that the June 9, 1985 event at' Davis-Besse was described in detail in NUREG-954.
According to the NUREG, "The control room HVAC system spuriously tripped to its emergency mode" during the event.
He pointed out that Davis-Besse has a normal control room ventilation system consisting of two separate HVAC trains, each with a 40 i
ton capacity, and that this system is backed up by CREVS, also a two train system, with a lower capacity (6 tons -
recently increased to 10 tons), designed for post-accident heat loads.
Mr. Michelson asked why post-accident heat load would be less than operational heat loads.
Mr. Wood responded that post-accident control' room temperatures are allc.4ed to be higher by design.
The normal ventilation system at Davis-Besse is designed to shut down under four conditions: a) detection of high levels of radiation; b) detection of high levels of chlorine; c) loss of off-site power; and d) initiation of safety features actuation system level 1 (i.e., essentially a large break LOCA).
Under these conditions, the normal ventilation system i
dampers close and the control room is isolated, but the CREVS i
f does not automatically come on; it must be turned on by the operator when he thinks it is needed.
It was a spurious spike pulse from a radiation detector transmitter that l
isolated the control room last June.
Since Davis-Besse has had an intermittent problem with spike initiated isolations l
of this kind, the system was reset and the damper opened; the I
fact that it could be reset meant that initiation was due to i
a false signal.
They had false signals from the detector three times on June 8, the day before the event.
Mr. Wood said that the control room equipment cabinets are supposedly designed for room temperatures up to 110 degrees F.
I 6.
Effects of Ambient Temperature on Electronic Equipment in i
M.
Safety Related Instrumentation and Control Systems l
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- JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES Chiramal O
Mr. Chiramal said that he would be talking about events at j
three plants: a) McGuire (described above); b) Davis-Besse;
".1 and c) Palo Verde, Unit 1.
In all three cases the plants were operating at power when adequate cooling was lost to
.a equipment in instrument cabinets; none of the reactors n! -
tripped.
a)
Mr. Chiramal explained that in many cases spurious indications caused by high temperatures in instrument cabinets clear themselves automatically when the temperature goes down, and are not reported.
Mr. Mark asked if temperatures high enough to cause spurious indications have any long term effect on cards.
Mr.
Chiramal said high temperatures tend to decrease card life and increase their failure rate.
i The cabinet affected was the process control system cabinet manufactured by Westinghouse.
Westinghouse recommends that the ambient temperature for the cabinet be 75 degrees F, plus or minus 10 degrees F, but it should continue to function at ambient temperatures up to 120 degrees F for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, provided the card temperature does not exceed 140 degrees F.
During the McGuire event, operators estimate the control room ambient temperature was about 90 degrees F.
Later measurement showed that for a control room ambient temperature of 72 degrees F, the air temperature at the bottom of the cabinet was 73 degrees F, that at the top was 109 degrees F where the temperature of the top rack was 125 degrees F.
Mr. Till asked if it was standard procedure to replace a l
card if it fails and corrects itself.
Mr. Chiramal said they will only replac, it if it does not perform l
Properly when the temperature is reduced.
The licensee now has procedures for bringing in extra cooling when the control room temperature exceede85 degrees.
b)
This Davis-Besse event took place on September 21, 1982.
The control room operators received a full trip alarm of l
channel 3 of the steam and feedwater rupture control system (SFRCS).
An analysis by the manufacturer and an I
investigation by the licensee (in 1984) determined that l
the failure was due to overheating of components in the i
SFRCS instrumentation cabinets.
The plant kept operating because only one of four channels was affected.
To corruct the situation, fans were installed I
in the SFRCS cabinets to provide additional cooling.
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' JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES Mr. Wylie asked if there was any move on the part of licensees to put permanent thermocouples in critical I
cabinets.
Mr. Chiramal said that he did not know of anF.
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The Palo Verde event occurred on December 16, 1985.
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control room operator heard a popping sound and smelled i
something burning in the engineered safety features system (ESFS) cabinet.
Operators also noticed that the cabinet fan was off and the sequencer lights were on.
The ESFS sequencer spuriously actuated and caused (1) the train A emergency diesel generator to start, (2) a train A 4160 V bus load shed and loss of power to occur, and (3) the initiation of fuel building ventilation actuation, containment purge initiation actuation, and control room essential filtration actuation.
The cause of the event was the failure of the cabinet fan leading to overheating of electronic components in the ESFS cabinet.
To correct the situation, the fan was replaced with two larger capacity fans and a control room alarm that annunciates on high cabinet air exit temperature was installed.
In summary. Mr. Chiramal pointed out that (1) elevated temperatures in safety-related instrument cabinets cause decreases in the reliability of heat sensitive electronic components, (2) the loss of cooling can result in the common cause failure of instrumentation, and (3) failures of electronic components in instrumentation and control systems can lead to malfunctioning of control and safety systems, i
inoperability of instrumentation channels in protection
' i systems, inadvertent actuations or failures of safety systems including the reactor trip system and erroneous indications and alarms in the control room.
B. Buckley, N. Wagner, McCarthy, 7.
Chilled Water Systems l
and A. Buslik With regard to the walk-down of the Essential Services Chilled Water System (ESCWS) at Shearon Harris, Mr. Wagner emphasized that it was carried out by the Staff to assure itself that the original SER was correct.
Based on its observations, the Staff concludes that its previous l
acceptance of the ESCWS, as reviewed against the criteria of SRP Section 9.2.2, is still valid and that the system is, therefore, acceptable.
Concerning the susceptibility of both trains A and B to a fire in the switch gear room, the system does not meet fire protection criteria.
However, the Staff accepted the applicant's position that the combustible loading in that area was very low and, hence, that the fire hazard to trains A and B is minimal.
Concerning a potential' fan blade missile rupturing the cooling coils, the fan i
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JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES
'o manufacturer performed an analysis which showed that fan blades could not escape the fan housing.
With regard to cooling the Shearon Harris control room, Mr.
Wagner noted that if both trains of chilled water were lost they have a smoke purge system to. help remove heat, however, during normal operation, 405,000 Btu /hr (i.e., about 121 kw) of heat are generated in the control room.
Mr. Michelson asked if the ESCWS electrical controls were seismically qualified.
Mr. Buckley said that he didn't know, but would find an answer for him.
Mr. Michelson asked if Shearon Harris had ever written any kind of a safety analysis report on the ESCWS.
Mr. McCarthy said that they had prepared a very extensive design basis document'for the system.
Mr. Michelson asked if the ACRS could have a copy of this report to improve its understanding i
of chilled water system design considerations.
Mr. McCarthy said that he would look into the matter and, if possible, provide the ACRS with a copy of the document.
4 With regard to an appropriate SRP Section for ESCWS review, the Staff had planned to reconsider the need for it, but with i
the recent reorganization this has been deferred.
Mr. Buslik presented some data, extracted from PRA studies, on the contribution '1x) core melt of chilled water system failures.
For example, he pointed out that the preliminary i
scoping analysis for the South Texas PRA estimated that the electrical auxiliary building room cooling failure, by resulting in a station blackout, contributes 3 times ten to minus 4 per year to the core melt frequency.
A more 4
realistic reanalysis, allowing for the fact that only one of two cooling trains is needed, and taking credit for opening doors, portable fans, transferring electrical loads, etc.,
resulted in a core melt frequency contribution of 6 times ten to the minus 6.
Mr. Buslik also pointed to the Zion probability safety study; they assumed that loss of RHR pump room cooling resulted in failure of RHR pumps in the recirculation mode after a LOCA.
With no inspection or testing of the room cooling function, l
they estimated that the average probability of failure over the lifetime of the plant would be about 0.6, yieldhlg a contribution of 2 times ten to the minus 2 per year to the core melt frequency.
The NRC Staff did not make its scheduled presentation on da minimis environmental radiation levels.
However, the Subcommittee did discuss de minimis levels during its executive session.
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JOINT O&EPS/ AUX. SYS. MEETING
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JUNE 27, 1986 MINUTES Future Meetinas:
The Subconsnittee is scheduled to make a brief report during the 315th ACRS meeting, Jtily 10-12, 1986, and to develop several related reports for consideratioh for forwarding to the NRC Chainnan.
A transcript of this meeting is available in the NRC Public Document NCTTE:
Room,1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, Inc. 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, D.C.
20001, (202) 347-3700.
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Federal Rest ter ! Voi. 51. Nr.114 / Frity. }une 13. 2486 / Notices 21641 s
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. Diencia'r. Whk':r 6& 'i r" He agenda for the subject specting Assi,etont Edcutiw Demrorfor Project -
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Triday. June 27.1966~B.30. AM antil IFR Doc Be ua: Fi;ed M:-as a 45 sm)
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the conclusion ofbusmess s u n.c coot rsemewas I
NUCLEAR REGULATORY ne Subcommittees will; a)Be briefed
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COMMISSION by NRR and Region Staff on the status Advisory Committee on Reactor d various control room HVAC systems Safeguards Subcommittee on Metsil l
IDoctet No 50-2st(CH),(ASUBP No.Si-problems and the control room Components; Meeting 514-02-cTil habitability improvement effort. b) be General Public Utilities Nuclear. Three briefed by the AEOD Staff on the effects The ACRS Subcommittee on Metal Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1, of ambient temperature onI&C systems.
Components will hold a meetmp on junt Evidentiary Hearing cl discuss with the Staff their 25.1986. at the Westmghouse Researci.
p ocecures and criteria for reviewmf and Development Center.1310 Beulab pn u, m Chi!ied n a:er Sycems. their **wah-Road. Churcha!.1% toutsirt o!
Before Adrmrustrotne Lan lud.,
c;wn" of tho Chined Water sys:rms s' p,..sburFL PA:
Mortor. B Marguhes Smaron Har i.t End tne co;.mbi.twn tc The entin mee:mg will be en H pubhc attencanu Not.ce a hereb g.sen tna: ar.
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Tnz agend, io- %. c. meetmp 6%
evident.un hearint will commena i, 5 sws fakes basad or. PRA 5 udjes b as fulions 3
tras proc eedmg onjune 23.19E a195 and d) dacuss with the Staff ce minmi a.m. local tamt. in the Commonweal!n e.m arunmental rad:ation levess-M ende kne 3 M*-EJU A M Court. Courtroom No. 2. 5th Floor Soutr.
Oral statements may be prtsented b3 unti!rie renclusion ofbz smess Ofnct Buildmg Commonwealth Avenue me mbers of the pubhc with the The Subcommittee will review the liarrisburg Pennsyivama.The hesnn3 c.uncurrence of the Subcommittee status of NDE of cast stainless stee) and wih contmue through June 2".198t, and Cnairman: written statements will be changes in steel. making practice.
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then reconsene on Jul 1.1986. all at the 3
accepted and made available to the Oral statement may be presented b) t somt location An3 changein scheduhng Committee. Reccrdings wil' be permitted n.* mW of the pubhc with concurrence will be at the direction of tne JudgL oni) dunng those portions of the of the Subcommntee Chairman: written Tne Commasion ordered that the heanns be held to determine (1) whether meeting when a transcript is being k ept.
statements wit be accepted and made the Atomic Safety and licensing Appeal and questions may be asked only by available to the Committee. Recordags Board's condition.1n its decision on members of the Subcommittee.its will be permitted only dunng those portions of the meeting when a g
management.related issues in the Three consultants. and Staff. Persons desirin8 transcript is being kept. and questions pA Mile Island. Unit 1 (TMI-1) Restart to make oral statements should notify.
may be asked only by members of the Proceedmg. barring Charles ilusted imm the ACRS staff membernamed below as Su6 committee. its consultants, and Sta!!.
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supervisory responsibihties insofar as far in advance as is practicable so that
' Persons desiring to make oral the training of non heensed personnel.
appropriate arrangements canbe made.
statements should notify the ACRS staff should be vacated, and (2) whetherhe is During the initialportion of de members as farin advana es sc_ :.<
barred by concess about his attitude ac meeting. the Subcommittees, along with practicable so that appropriate,,Q 1
i integrity from serving as an NRC any of their consultants who may be arrangments canbe made. 7 7
licensed operator. or a licensed operator present, may exchange preliminar).
During the initialportion of the instructor or training supervisor views regardmg mauers t&
meeting. the Subcommittee, along with The pubbe is inured to e tend tne considered dunng the balance of the ans ofits consultants who m. ay be haanns rnecting l
P r sc u oe..
Tnt Subcomrmttres will tnen hur wh i
Dated at b. the si M i :..t. trn Imr pwntations by and hald discuss: ens c..n
- m. red dunne the bahnte of th' i
d.n o!)ane 1%t w tn n paesentmes of the NRC Paf S
Tm bio --% e tner. her Monnn B Maern.t.r, their r nsaitants and other inteeh r '. cia tion,',13 ang y ed is::en.cr.>
.ur.
e..
.. c., f.; -
0">
ns regardmg this renew m m.rmm*nes ei the NFC Staf:
Furiber mia mation regardmg top cs lrb Dx tu-nm ha a t-n4t tre or comuNnts. and o:r,er m:erestec t.. b-d:scussed whether the meenr.g sue coot roc-+t+
has been renulled o reschedu:ed tne y er.,nt rega dag th.3 reuen Ch..rmaris ruirng on rec;uests fo-tb Furfr.er m!armM.:,n n P 'd mF to:
- ., c
- unt: w b r 't.o Acuscer) Committee or. Reactc-cppo tum 3 te prernt or.'sta:t mn
i., cc.n:.1 ic--
Safegua'or Jom! Subcommittees or cod the i.rra allotted tnertfor ce td Cuar en 6 ruhng ur rtu e ia
Occupat ona. and EmironmentC obtained by a prepaid teiephone col it e;:.u unov to presen' cri sverr Frotection Lytterns and Aastha')
tv cowzant ACf6 stafi r,rmbe:. M:
niin abotted the Vfm t at i-Systems Meet;ng Jahr. 5:hif 9< ns [tch r.hene 2d. (N-w d t> a p*rt.= d it P'N
- i 1m t briw ur 815 A.M snd T V f.M t-
- 4. g aont ACES s.eE n 'i t - S*
Tht ACKS imn Sata.rctices c:
Occupation ; and Ennrur. mental iesons plenning tc anend tr.n mung F..,.. lgne litiephant N.W MW are urged to contact one of tne anos e bi'tw + er. 615 a.rn and 5 0i' p m I em Ptotection and Auuhars Systems wih named mdwidual one or two days pinnmg to attend tha mee ung arp hold a meeting on June hr.'1986 Room before the scheduled meetmp it. W u ged to contact the abeu nome c 110.. 1717 11 Street. NW %shme'on -
DL edused of any changes m sr hedu'e. eir indaidual one o* twe dm ht for' !f wbn.h n,a3 har onurre:.
s: t J ied n. < ug t-
- r. e m "e v
~
n v.
June 6, 1986 REVISION 3
PROPOSED SCHEDULE FOR THE JUNE 27, 1986 JOINT MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES'ON OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-SYSTEMS (O&EPS) AND' AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 8:30ad Opening Statement D. Moeller 1 Sr,.i n deviewControlRoomHabitability 8:45 Systems 4CRHS) Improvement Effort:
7 f-Overview and Status of J. Milhoan/
Revisions to
-Dr MuHer -
?
- CRHS Review Procedures,
- CRHS Environmental Criteria,
- Long Range Plan; and Status of the 12 Plant CRH Practices Survey; and J.
Hayes Recent Problems at Trojan, J. Hayes /
Haddam Neck, and San Onofre.
C. y '
10:00 BREAK 15 10:15()))RanchoSecoCRHS:
30 Status of Modifications to Rancho Seco Control Room Habitability Systems; S. Miner Discuss Problems with Control Room HVAC System during the Dec. 26, 1985 incident; and S.
Miner
\\
NJc/
Preliminary Results of NRC hols Inspection (if available).
C.
N [ Discussion of Results of Control Room Emergency Ventilati.on System (CREVS) Inspection at Davis-Besse and Response to Questions on Specific Problems.
N. J,ckiw 7 30 7
1,3.N!rhStaffbriefingon"PotentialLoss k "' g/
3 of Solid-State Instrumentation lD: Yb-
//77Ac//#wT
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SCHEDULE / JOINT MEETING O&EPS AND f
June 6, 1986
' AUX. SYS. SUBCOMMITTEES
- ' JUNE'27, 1986~
' REVISION 3
Following Failure of Control Room Cooling"
~ k SLewai*t 15 min b
11:
Staff briefing on " Effects of Ambient Temperature.on Electronic Equipment in Safety Related Instrumentation and Control Systems".
M. Chiramal 60 12:30 LUNCH 60 f
1: 30pq 'l \\
5 Staff report on Chilled Water-Systems:
75 Review Procedures & Criteria
/.
- Technical Position S.
i, ).
- Seismic Qualification l'
Q-)
Considerations
" Walk-down" of Systems at Shea.on' Harris; B.
Buckley
~
r(Perhaps'a Discussion of Systems at South Texas);_
P..
Kadambi L
'df-
.Results from NRC/RES 3
f Sponsored PRA Studies; and
,fJ. Murphy
+',/
/
Results from NRC/NRR f
- )
[
heviews of PRAs.
F. Congel i
~
\\
j 2:45 BREAK 15 3:00 Executive Session-30 3:30 k Discussion with the NRC Staff of:
R.
Alexander 60 De Mh imis Environmental Radiati n Level,g; y
p The "1 mr m/yi cut-off dose
[' h
,,,~
~
'JA
'[/
rate" for dilective
~
population / oses (in
/
particular); and ACRS R,c/
9 ommend tions (2/19/86 Letter to EDO). N 4:30 Review Staff Position on Proposed b-$
1 SCHEDULE / JOINT MEETING'O&EPS AND June 6,:'1986 AUX. SYS. SUBCOMMITTEES. -
JUNE 27, 1986 REVISION 3:
Rule on Emergen'c'ysPr aredness.for-
-Fuel Cycle and Ot '
Radioactive-Material Licens s,
N S. McGuire
-30 min-
"'l
\\
/
/
5:00pm' Executive Session 30 J5:30.
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AUXILIARY SYSTEMS LOCATION ROOM 1167 DATE JUNE 27, 1986 ATTENDANCE LIST NAME AFFILI ATION,
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c JOINT ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE 3/ MEETING ON OCCUPATIONAL & ENVIRONMENTA AUXILIARY SYSTEMS LOCATION ROOM 1167 DATE JUNE 27, 1986 ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:NAME AFFILI ATION stub ilEb $
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JerA/T' ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE 5 MEETING ONOCCUPATIONAL & ENM RONMENTAL PROTECTT_ON SYSTEM AUXILIARY SYSTEM:
ROOM 1167 LOCATIO:1:
'DATE:
JUNE 27, 1986 ATTENDANCE LIST PLEASE PRINT:
NAME BADGE N0.
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ATTACHMENT D LIST OF MEETING HAND 0UTS JUNE 27, 1986 JOINT MEETING OF ACRS SUBCOMMITTEES ON OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS /
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS WASHINGTON, D.C.
1.
J. Hayes, NRR Presentation on Developments since June 1985 Subcommittee meeting 2.
S. Miner, NRR, Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Emergency HVAC System 3.
R. Baer, IE, Characteristics of Information Notices 4.
T. J. Myers and J. K. Wood, Toledo Edison, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System 5.
M. Chiramal, AE00, Operating Experience on the Effects of Ambient Temperature in Safety-Related Instrumentation and Control Systems 6.
Arthur Buslik, NRR, Chilled Water Systems / Room Cooling - Results from PRAs l
{
l ATTACHMENT D 3
E LIST OF PLANTS TO BE VISITED FOR ANL CONTRACT WORK ON CONTROL ROOM HABITABILITY ORIGINAL
' ACTUAL ANTICIPATED OPERATING REGION PLANT g
OPERATING DATE
_ DATE I
CALVERT BECHTEL 73, 74*
75, 77*
j CLIFFS VT. YANKEE EBASCO 72 11 BRUNSWICK UE&C 75, 74 77, 75 NORTH ANNA STONE & WEBSTER 74, 75 78, 80 V.C. SUMMER GILBERT 77 84 III D.C. COOK UTILITY 72, 73 75, 78 KEWAUNEE FLUOR-PIONEER 72 74 PALISADES BECHTEL 70 71 IV AN0 BECHTEL 72, 75 74, 80 FORT CALHOUN GIBBS & HILL 71 73 COOPER BURNS & ROE 71 74 V
TROJAN BECHTEL 74 76 WNP 2 BURNS & ROE 77 84 FIRST NUMBER IS FOR UNIT 1 WHILE THE SECOND IS FOR UNIT 2 g y y g c y sy: n T $
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.