ML20206S516

Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Auxiliary Sys 860626 Meeting in Washington,Dc Re Fire Protection at Nuclear Power Plants. List of Submitted Documents,Presentation Schedule & App R Status for Plants Licensed Prior to 790101 Encl

ML20206S516
Person / Time
Issue date:	07/09/1986
From:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
To:	Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards
References
ACRS-2432, NUDOCS 8609220250
Download: ML20206S516 (74)

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SUMMARY

/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS W

N $N C. ( INTRODUCTION The ACRS Subcomittee on the Auxiliary Systems held a meeting on Thurs-day, June 26, 1986 at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., to discuss several matters associated with the fire protection at nuclear power plants. The entire meeting was open to public attendance. Mr. Sam Duraiswamy was the cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer for the meeting. A list of documents submitted to the Subcomittee is included in Attach-ment A. Presentation schedule for the meeting is included in Attachment B. ATTENDEES: ACRS: J. C. Ebersole (Acting Subcomittee Chairman), P. G. Shewmon, C. J. Wylie, and G. A. Reed (part time). Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer). Principal NRC Speakers: J. Stang, R. Emch, R. Hernan, T. King, M.Grotenhuis, D. Sullivan, A. Datta, B. Buchbinder, K. Kniel, R. Ferguson, and L. Whitney. EXECUTIVE SESSION: Mr. Ebersole, the Acting Subcomittee Chairman, convened the meeting at 8:00 a.m. and stated that the purpose of this meeting was to discuss the following:

• Status of Appendix R compliance.

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s 4 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986

• Status of the resolution of the Differing Professional Opinions (DP0s) among the NRC Staff concerning the interpretation of the Appendix R requirements.
• Need for research in the fire protection area.
• Inspection activities to determine compliance with the fire pro-tection requirements.
• Inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems, including:

- Resolution of USI A-17, " Systems Interactions," as it relates to the inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems. - Recent experiences, such as the April 30, 1986 incident at Browns Ferry, Unit 1. - Equipment qualification to withstand the effects of inadver-tent actuation of fire protection systems. Mr. Ebersole said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time to make oral statements from members of the public. 0FFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION (NRR) PRESENTATION Organization of NRR to Handle Fire Protection Matters - Mr. J. Stang Mr. Stang discussed briefly the organization of NRR to handle fire protection issues (Attachment C, page 1). He said that each division of the NRR has both fire protection engineers and system engineers. In addition, in the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) division, they have an engineer to deal with contractors who perform work for NRC in the fire protection area. This type of organization enables them to perform a

4 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 well-coordinated review of matters associated with fire protection at nuclear power plants. i Mr. Ebersole asked whether there are backup capabilities to bring the plants to safe shutdown in the event of a fire in certain area, such as the control room, etc., where there are redundant circuits. Mr. Stang ~ responded that, to his knowledge, almost all of the plants have alter-nate type control system to bring the plant to safe shutdown status in the event of a fire in the control room or other essential areas. Appendix R Compliance Status of Fire Protection Modifications - Mr. J. Stang i Mr. Stang discussed the status of fire protection modifications for j plants licensed prior to January 1, 1979 (Attachment C, page 2). He said that there are 67 plants that fall into this category that are i required to make necessary modifications to comply with the Appendix R requirements. As of June 1986, the status is as given below. l

• Number of plants for which schedular exemption granted by the Staff 4

l

• Number of plants for which schedular exemptions l

are being reviewed by the Staff 7 ' Number of plants that are making modifications l in accordance with the schedule delineated in i 10 CFR 50.48 8

• Number of plants that are still making modifica-tions, but operating under approved compensatory measures 10 i

s 4-Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 )

• Number of plants in compliance with Appendix R 35
• Number of plants in outage and are not expected I

to restart until after the modifications have been completed 3 Mr. Stang discussed briefly the status of the alternate shutdown system completion, and the completion schedule for fire protection modifica-tions as well as for the alternate shutdown systems (Attachment C, pages 3-12). Indicating that most utilities are taking so long to make the Appendix R modifications, Mr. Wylie asked whether they are really dedicated to make such modifications. Mr. Stang responded that the utilities are very dedicated in completing the modifications. By 1989, all the utilities would have completed the necessary modifications. Mr. Ebersole asked whether any of the plants are expected to be shut down for noncompliance with the Appendix R modifications. Mr. Stang responded that he does not believe that any plants will be shut down by the Staff just because they have not yet completed the modifications. However, those plants that have run out of schedule and have not yet completed the modifications should employ certain approved compensatory measures until all the changes have been made. Mr. Ebersole asked whether the Staff could predict the degree of vul-nerability to which a plant can experience a core melt due to severe fire. Mr. Stang responded that the vulnerability to core melt from fire goes down as the Appendix R modifications are completed. Mr. Ebersole commented that during his visit of the South Texas plant, he noticed fire dampers on large Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) duct works that are traversing across various parts l

I i Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 of the plant. These dampers are intended to separate one room from another in the event of a fire. Since these dampers have been sitting there for a long time without proper maintenance, he is not sure whether they are reliable to do their intended function. He asked what the NRC Staff is doing to ensure the reliability of such dampers to prevent the spreading of fire across the barriers. Mr. Stang responded that the Staff makes sure that the dampers are approved by a testing laboratory and installed in accordance with the configuration specified by that laboratory. They also perform periodic testing of fire dampers to make sure that they operate. Mr. Ebersole commented that since the fire dampers are designed to close at a certain temperature, they may transport smoke and hot gases to other areas prior to closing. Mr. Stang responded that the National Bureau of Standards have been trying to come up with doors and dampers that limit transport of smoke, but they have been unsuccessful so far. He said that although the dampers are not the most reliable items in fire protection, experience has shown that they do an adequate job. He connitted to provide information related to certain testing done by the Swiss on ducts to show that the ducts themselves will prevent the flow of hot gases. Stating that Davis Besse Unit 1, has until 1989 to complete the modi-fications, Mr. Wylie commented that since that plant has been shut down for about a year, he believes that they could have completed the neces-sary fire protection modifications during that time. It seems that they are not dedicated to get the work done. Mr. Stang responded that an inspection conducted at Davis Besse showed that they had somewhat misinterpreted the Appendix R requirements. After the inspection, they understood what needs to be done to comply with Appendix R, and subse-quently they had submitted a new proposal which is being reviewed by the NRC Staff. Although, Davis Besse has until 1989 to complete the fire, protection modifications, in the mean time, they are required to r p--yw

4 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 implement some compensatory measures to ensure safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire. Mr. Wylie commented that Browns Ferry which is not operating now has decided to complete the fire protection modifications prior to restart. He does not understand why Davis Besse didn't even make an effort to do those modifications when it was shut down for almost a year. This sort of attitude implies that there is no real incentive to get the work done. Mr. Hernan responded that since Davis Besse had misinterpreted the Appendix R requirements, they had ended up performing extensive reanalyses and resubmitted those to the Staff. These are under review by the Staff. He believes that because of this reason, Davis Besse has l been allowed until 1989 to complete the Appendix R modifications. l Differing Professional Ooinions Among the NRR Staff - Mr. J. Stang Mr. Stang reviewed briefly the status of the resolution of the DP0s, concerning the interpretation of the Appendix R requirements, submitted by certain members of the NRR Staff (Attachment C, pages 13-14). He said that all of DP0s among the NRR Staff had been resolved satis-factorily. l Mr. Ebersole asked whether there were any objections to the resolution of the DP0s. Mr. Stang responded, to his knowledge, there were none. Mr. Ebersole asked whether there is a reasonable uniformity among the regional offices in enforcing the Appendix R requirements. Mr. Stang responded that recently the NRC has issued generic letter 86-10, "Imple-mentation of Fire Protection Requirements," which provides a summary of the NRC's position on several issues associated with the Appendix R. Since the issuance of that letter, Mr. Taylor, Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement (ISE), instructed all the regional offices to a

s Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 get together and make sure that all of them are using uniform guidelines in enforcing the Appendix R requirements. NRR Staff's Reaction to the Articles By Jack Anderson Related to Fire Protection Matters Appeared in the Washington Post - MR. J. Stang Mr. Stang said that articles by Mr. Anderson regarding the fire pro-tection issues at nuclear power plants basically discussed the DP0s among the NRC Staff. They did not present any new significant informa-tion other than that which had been discussed in the DP0s. The Staff believes that the resolution of the DP0s takes care of the concerns expressed by Mr. Anderson. NRR's Position on the Need for Research in the Fire Protection Area - Mr. T. King Mr. King said that NRR needs in the fire protection areas are as follows (Attachment C, page 15):

• Assess the impact of electrical equipment fires in control rooms, including:

- Source of fire. - How fast does the fire spread. - How long does the control room remain habitable. - What are the effects of fire suppressants.

• Develop and apply data and analysis tools to support nuclear power plant fire hazard risk analysis which includes assessment of the:

- Reliability of fire protection features.

y Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 - Interaction between the fire protection features and safety systems. - Likelihood of equipment to withstand the effects of fires and suppressants. Mr. King stated that so far several experiments have been conducted to provide data to NRR to meet the above needs (Attachment C, page 16). He said that because of severe budget constraints, NRR agrees with the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) proposal to terminate research in the fire protection area at the end of FY 1986. NRR be-lieves that based on the results of the proposed scoping study in FY 1987, additional fire protection research, if needed, could be performed in FY 1988. Inadvertent Actuation of Fire Protection Systems Resolution of USI A-17, " Systems Interactions," As it Relates to In-advertent Actuation of Fire Protection Systems - Mr. R. Hernan Mr. Hernan said that recently the ACRS has provided' comments on the resolution of USI A-17. He believes that the issue concerning the inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems is not within the scope of USI A-17. April 30, 1986 Incident At Browns Ferry Unit 1 Regarding Spurious Actuation of Fire Protection Systems - Mr. M. Grotenhuis Mr. Grotenhuis discussed briefly the incident that occurred at Browns Ferry Unit 1 on April 30, 1986 (Attachment C, pages 17 and 18). This incident involved inadvertent actuation of the fire suppression system which resulted in the actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and flooding of the basement. (NOTE: This ircident was dis-cussed by the ACRS Subcommittee on Reactor Operations on June 3, 1986. It was then referred to the Auxiliary Systems Subcommittee for addition-al review).

Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 19.86 + i Mr. Grotenhuis discussed the Staff's responses to several issues iden-tified by Mr. Michelson relating to the Browns Ferry incident. List of l issues identified by Mr. Michelson is contained in Attachment C, page 19 ( and the Staff's responses are included in Attachment C, pages 20-40. l Dr. Shewmon asked whether the spray system actuation was due to malfunc-tion or design deficiency. Mr. Grotenhuis responded that the actuation of the spray system was caused by some leaky check valves that are located in the same system where the deluge valves are located. Mr. Ebersole asked what would have been the consequences if the incident l occurred when the plant was operating at full power. The Staff's 1 response implied that they really don't know what would have been the consequences. i Mr. Ebersole asked whether the flamastic material used in the cable trays is made of material similar to that of sponge and how much water will it hold. Mr. Grotenhuis responded that it looks pretty similar to concrete, and he does not know how much water it will absorb. Mr. Hernan stated that the Staff did not ask the TVA as to how much water ( will be absorbed by the flamastic material. However, based on the information provided by the TVA, he believes that it is not expected to absorb significant amount of water so as to cause damage to cable trays. Mr. Ebersole suggested that the Staff look at the flamastic material issue carefully to ensure that, when saturated with water, it will not cause damage to the cable trays. Equipment Qualification for inadvertent Actuation Effects - Mr. Grotenhuis Mr. Grotenhuis stated that the equipment is qualified to withstand the effects of the inadvertent actuation of fire protection systems. l

o .S. Auxiliary Systems Minutes. June 26, 1986 RES PRESENTATION Fire Protection Research Program - Mr. A. Datta Mr. Datta discussed the status of the Fire Protection Research in FY 1986 and FY 1987 (Attachment C, pages 41-43). He said that initially the funding proposed for the FY 1986 fire protection research was $1 million. Because of the reductions resulting from the implementation of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Amendment, it has beed reduced to $658 K. For FY 1987, a total funding of $0.7 million was proposed. However, because of the Severe budget constraints, it has been zerced out. Mr. Datta said that some of the research that will be dropped or cur-tailed because of the budget constraints are as follows:

• Fire source characterization tests associated with cable trays, flammable liquid spills, and trash have been dropped.

i

• Some of the full-scale room environmental tests, such as room-to-room smoke migration tests, and smoke removal tests have been dropped or curtailed.
• Validation of the 3-D SAFFIRE Code has been terminated in January 1986 after completing one test.
• Validation of HARVARD and COMPBRN Codes have been curtailed.
• Some of the component failure thrush hold tests, such as tests of logic circuits, power supplies, recorders, and controllers will be performed on a limited scale.

Mr. Ebersole asked what did the tests show about the fire propagation capability of adjacent cabinets. Mr. Datta responded that it was found that the adjacent cabinet walls would get hot enough to ignite the cables or combustibles affixed to the wall. However, the cabinets did

b' .) s + l t 1 l' c-Auxiliary Systems Minutes. Jure 26, 1986 not quite get hot enough t flare up and propagate the fire all around. ~ Also, it was found that the inside temperatures of adjacent' walls y dropped off rapidly. J I g Mr. Ebersole asked whether the use of PVCfis prohibited:as a structural l material for piping and electrical conduits in nuclear plants. Mr. Sullivan responded the he is not sure. However, to his knowledge, there i are no industry Standards that prohibit t e use of such material. Mr.Wylieaskedaboutthetotalamount'$fmoneyinvestedsofaronthe l fire protection research. Mr. Sullivan responded that over the past 10 years, about $8 million had*been spent on research' in the fire pro-tection area. Mr.EbersoleaskedhowmuchmoneyhasbeenshantontheSAFFIRECode. Mr. Datta respon'ded that about $0.4 million.has been invested to develop segments of this Code. He said that most of the work associated with the development of the SAFFIRE Code has been completed. The remaining work involves preparation of a user package for this Code. Since the funding has been severely cut, they do not plan to complete the remain-ing task. N \\, RES Position on the Need for Additiona1 > Fire Protection Research - Mr. B. Buchbinder Mr. Buchbinder discussed briefly the potential importance of fire protectionresearch(AttachmentC,page44). He said that although implementation of the Appendix R requirements has improved the fire protection at nuclear power plants, he believes that there are still several issues associated with fire protection that need to be looked at; however, he is not implying that the operating plants are not safe from a fire risk standpoint. ,\\ k .__-__m_

-9 Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 Mr. Buchbinder stated that the following fire risk issues need to be lookedat(AttachmentC,page45):

• Control system interactions
• Smoke control
• Seismic / Fire interactions
• Effectiveness of manual fire fighting
• Spurious actuation of fire suppression systems
• Survivability of cable / component under severe fire environment.

Mr. Buchbinder said that the funding for fire protection research in FY 1987 has been zerced out by the RES management. In FY 1987, they plan to perform a scoping study to assess the risk significance of fire protection issues, such as those mentioned above, and also to look at I the uncertainties associated with tne existing fire risk analysis. Based on the results of the scoping study, they will recommend further research, if needed, in the fire protection area. i Mr. Buchbinder discussed briefly probabilistic fire risk estimates for certain plants, uncertainty bounds associated with the fire risk analy-sis, and locations of plant that are contributing significantly to fire core-melt frequencies (Attachment C, pages 46-52). Mr. Ebersole asked whether any analyses have been done after the com-pletion of the Appendix R modifications to see how much reduction in risk has resulted from such modifications. Mr, Ferguson resporded that he is not sure whether any such risk analyses have been done; he stated that he would check into that. Mr. Kniel added that they haven't actually measured the reduction in risk resulting from the Appendix R fixes. Mr. Ebersole and Mr. Wylie asked whether there would be a significant reduction in fire risk and also reduction in the fire protection efforts j e ....._,...,__..~,_,.,_m__.--

4 Auxiliary Systems Ninutet-June 26, 1986 if the plants had installed a virtually perfect system to remove shut-down decay heat energy from the core. Mr. Buchbinder responded th'at he believes that it would bring some significant reduction in risk. i PRESENTATION BY I&E - MR.'L. WHITNEY Status of Appendix R Insdection Activities Mr. Whitney stated that inspection activities to check compliance with the Appen' dix R requf Eements are organized and led by the personnel at the regional offices. They.are assisted by the NRR and contractor personnel. He discussed briefly the status of the Appendix R inspection activities as of April 30, 1986 (Attachment C, page 53). He said that about 10 percent of the total facilities inspected need to be reinspect-ed fully because they have failed the initial inspection. About 15 percent of the facilities need to be revisited to inspect certain specific items. Stating that even though there are two identical units at one site field-run cables and field-installed equipment might not be the same at both units, Mr.'Ebersole asked whether the Staff will inspect both units to make sure that they are not different or they just assume that they are same at both units. Mr. Stang responded, with an example, stating that when Comanche Peak submitted the fire risk analysis for Unit l'the Staff reviewed and approved it; Comanche Peak committed to do the same analysis for both Units 1 and 2. During the site visit, it was found that certain field-run cabling was different between Units 1 and 2. Consequently, the Staff decided to inspect Unit 2 separately foc4Appen-dix R compliance prior to granting full power license. Mr. Whitney said that inspection conducted during 1983 showed that several licensees failed to perform adequate fire risk analysis and also failed to implement properly the separation criteria of Appendix R. In 1984, the NRC conducted workshops to all licensees in an attempt to provice clarification to several issues. Since mid 1984, the licensees C D

m Auxiliary Systems Minutes-June 26, 1986 .y are not making the same mistakes t' hat they made in 1983. He discussed 1 briefly some of the findings resulting from the inspection (Attachment C,page54). t Mr. Ebersole asked what kind of measures are being used by the licensees to protect the structural steel in the event of a severe fire. Mr. Whitney responded that the licensees are required to take adequate measures te protect the structural steel. Mr. Stang added that since the 1983 findings which showed several problems with the unprotected structural steel, each licensee has reanalyzed the need to protect the ' structural steel. Mr. Ebersole asked whether during inspection they have found any evidence which showed that the auxiliary control centers are vulnerable to failures of fire dampers which, when failed, are expected to transmit smoke and fumes. Mr. Whitney responded that in many cases they have l found that the auxiliary shutdown centors are at a significant distance, possibly in a different building, from the control room. Differing Professional Opinion Among the ISE Staff - Mr. L. Whitney Mr. Whitney stated that on October 31, 1985, he submitted a DP0 concern-ing " Interpretation Three" of Appendix R. In his DPO, he stated that " Interpretation Three" logically leads to a reduction in fire protection standards; because it undermines the original technical basis of Appen-dix R, it represents a change to that rule. He noted that on November 18, 1985, the Office Director of I&E responded to his DPO, stating that the guidance contained in " Interpretation Three" is consistent with the Staff's past practice regarding Appendix R exemptions and therefore it is adequate and no need for any changes. However, as requested by Mr. Whitney, his DP0 was made available to the Commissioners at the time of their consideration of interpretations of Appendix R. The Commission considered Mr. Whitney's DPO, but did not make any changes to "Interpre-tation Three." t _ = -

Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 Mr. Whitney stated that he is satisfied with the process by which his DP0 was handled, however, he is not happy with the resolution. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO SECTIONS 9.2.1 AND 9.2.2 0F THE STANDARD REVIEW PLAN (SRP) The Subcommittee considered briefly the proposed revisions to the SRP Sections 9.2.1, " Station Service Water Systems," and 9.2.2, " Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems," that are made to incorporate the resolution of Generic Issue 36, " Loss of Service Water (Calvert Cliffs, Unit 1)." The Subcommittee decided to recommend to the full Committee that the proposed revisions are of clarification type and there is no need for a detailed ACRS review. SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS The Subcommittee felt that at least a modest level of research in the fire protection area should be continued in FY 1987. Discontinuing the research in this area in FY 1987 will kill the momentum. The Subcommit-tee decided to prepare a letter to the Commission emphasizing the need to continue research in the fire protection area and submit it to the full Committee for review and approval during the July 1986 ACRS meet-ing. Also, the Subcommittee suggested that the RES Staff give a presentation to the full Committee during the July 1986 ACRS meeting on the need for research in the fire protection area. Mr. Ebersole stated that he is not sure whether all the DP0s among the NRC Staff had been resolved satisfactorily. He wondered whether the Subcommittee should take a look at all the DP0s and the adequacy of their resolution.

4 s Auxiliary Systems Minutes June 26, 1986 NOTE: Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of I, this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room 1717 H. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from i ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 North Capitol Street, Washington, D.C. 20001, (202) 347-3700. 2 l l i J l i l l i

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS SUBCOMMITTEE JUNE 26, 1986 1. Presentation Schedule. 2. Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. 3. 10 CFR Parts 50.12 and 50.48 4. Generic Letter 86-10, Implementation of Fire Protection Require-ments. 5. Memorandum from V. Stello to Commissioner Asselstine regarding SECY 85-306 - Staff Recommendations Regarding the Implementation of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, dated March 11, 1986. 6. Memorandum from R. Vollmer to H. Denton transmitting the Differing Professional Opinion submitted by R. Ferguson, dated May 30, 1984. 7. Memorandum from H. Denton to R. Ferguson,

Subject:

Differing Professional Opinion Regarding Haddam Neck Fire Protection, dated September 21, 1984. 8. Memorandum from G. Edison to R. Hartfield regarding Quarterly Report on DPO, dated July 26, 1985. 9. Memorandum from J. Stang to J. Zwolinski regarding the resolution of the DP0 submitted by J. Stang, dated September 20, 1985. 10. Package containing information on the DP0 by Ferguson. 1

11. Package containing information on the DP0 by Eberly, et. al.

12. Information related to the Inadvertent Actuation of Fire Suppression System incident at the Browns Ferry Plant on April 30, 1986. 13. Presentation Material provided by the Staff. ATTAcupgar A

Revised: 6/24/86 PRESENTATION SCHEDULE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE AUXILIARY SYSTEMS JUNE 26, 1986 ROOM 1046, 1717 H STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. NOTE: TOTAL PRESENTATION TIME INCLUDES: N 50*. For Actual Presentation rv 50% For Subcommittee Questions and Answers ACRS CONTACT: Sam Duraiswamy 202-634-3267 TOTAL PRESENTATION SPEAKER TIME ACTUAL TIME 10 min 8:00 - 8:10am I. EXECUTIVE SESSION II. NRR PRESENTATION a. Organization - R. Emch/ 15 min 8:10 - 8:25am How the Agency J. Stang is organized to handle Fire-Protection Matters b. Status of 40 min 8:25 - 9:05am Appendix R Compliance c. Status of the 20 min 9:05 - 9:25am Resolution of i any Differing Professional Opinions d. Reaction to the 10 min 9:25 - 9:35am Article Appeared in the Washington Post on March 6, 1986,

Subject:

Fire Deficiencies Found at Atomic Plants Arr:9cnusar 8

j l Presentation $chedule June 26, 1986 TOTAL PRESENTATION SPEAKER TIME ACTUAL TIME II. NRR PRESENTATION (Continued) e. NRR needs for T. King 25 min 9:35 - 10:00am Research in the l Fire Protection Area:

• Does NRR believe that additional research in the fire protection area is needed?

if so, identify issues that need research input.

• Does NRR believe that no research in the fire pro-tection area is necessary? If so, does it mean that NRR has adequate information avail-able on this issue to carry out its regulatory func-tions effectively.

III. PRESENTATION BY I&E L. Whitney c5 min 10:00 - 10:25am Inspection Activities to determine compliance with the Fire Protection Requirements, and any differing professional opinions among the I&E Staff

• • • BREAK ***

10 min 10:25 - 10:35am AL

Presentation Schedule June 26, 1986 TOTAL PRESENTATION SPEAKER TIME ACTUAL TIME IV. PRESENTATION BY RES 40 min 10:35 - 11:15am a. List of research A. Datta programs that will be proposed by RES if there are no budget constraints b. Updates on the progress being made in the Sandia Experimental program in the fire protec-tion area c. RES position on B. Buchbinder the need for addi-tional research in the fire pro-tection area V. INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF 80 min 11:15 - 12:35pm FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS a. Resolution of USI . C : c': A-17, " Systems R ' H8Ad8d Interactions," as it relates to inadvertent actua-tion of fire pro-tection systems b. Recent experiences, g, g, such as the Browns Ferry Incident on April 30, 1986, and others c. Equipment Qualifica-s. anerunuse tion for inadvertent actuation effects VI. SUBCOMMITTEE REMARKS 10 win 12:35 - 12:45pm

• • • ADJOURN ***

12:45pm /AJR

NRR FIRE PROTECTION ORGANIZATION NRR TECHNICAL ASSISTANT TO DENTON 4 ASSIGNED TO FP 4 PWR A PWR B BWR i FIRE SYSTEMS FIRE SYSTEMS FIRE SYSTEMS PROTECTION ENGINEER PROTECTION ENGINEER PROTECTION ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER ENGINEER LEAD PM FOR FIRE PROTECTION CONTRACTOR HELP i 35 ll k i r l I Onk -t ln (1 ' = 4 s = -. m-- =

e e APPENDIX R I' STATUS OF FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1979. l FIRE PROTECTION STATUS i l SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION GRANTED so-SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION UNDER REVIEW j i // COMPLYING WITH S0.48 SCHEDULE so- - 22 OPERATING UNDER NON-COMPLIANCE A.C.M.* i COMPLF.TE N\\N IN OUTAGE; RESTART AFTER MODS. COMPLETE I l 10- - i 0 q 39

=

r i== = E ' E e + yd=a[- n E M M i no JUNE 1986 .A.c.u. .- courensAnur ucAsunes i

APPENDIX R ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM COMPLETION STATUS (FOR PIJLNTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1979.) ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM STATUS SCHEDULAR EXEMPTION GRANTED 33 SCHEDUL.AR EXEMPTION UNDER REVIEW IN OUTAGE: RESTART AFTER MODS. COMPLETE 30- - OPERATING UNDER NON-COMPLIANCE A.C.M.+ 33 COMPLETE COMPLYING WITH 50.48 SCHEDULE g g. Ri Bl a 10-z , g..

== n [)/, a- = f n , ll. -E JUNE 1986 - -- i 61

• A.C.M. - APPROVED COMPENSAWNtY MEASURES

COMPLETION SCHEDULE FOR APPENDIX R FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS (FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1,1979.) 67 ~ 62 COMPLETE l NOT COMPLETE 52 se.. 8 so- - a so- - 15 10- - 3 ne i ~ 1986 1987 1988 1989 YEARS a

COMPLETION SCHEDULE FOR ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS (FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 1979.) 67 COMPLETE 62 NOT COMPLETE l 50- - e q. b il SS-18 10- - 3 e-YEARS

O e FOOTNOTES THE FOOTHOTES BELOW WILL AID YOU IN REVIEWING THE FOLLOWING CHARTS AND GRAPHS: I

• 1 50.48 SCHEDULAR EXTENSIONS EXEMPTION GRANTED
• 2 50.48 SCHEDULAR EXTENSION, EXEMPTION REQUESTED AND l

UNDER REVIEW BY NRR '6 PLANTS FOLLOWING THE 50.48 SCHEDULE FOR COMPLETION OF FIRE PR0rECTION MODIFICATIONS AND ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM '7 PLANTS OPERATING IN NONCOMPLIANCE OF THE 50.48 SCHEDULE l WITH APPROVED COMPENSATORY MEASURES '9 PLANTS IN OUTAGE WILL NOT RESTART UNITL MODIFICATIONS COMPLETE I () I l ____._.,_,_.m.

Pago No. 1 06/25/86 APPENDIX R. STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1979-COMPLETION STATUS OF FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS l FACILITY DATE FIRE IF NOT NAME # PROTECTION

COMPLETE, MODIFICATION FOOTNOTE S/B COMPLETE ARKANSAS 1-COMPLETE ARKANSAS 2 COMPLETE BEAVER VALLEY 1 COMPLETE BIG ROCK POINT COMPLETE CALVERT CLIFFS 1 COMPLETE CALVERT CLIFFS 2 COMPLETE CRYSTAL RIVER 3 COMPLETE D.C.

COOK 1. COMPLETE D.C. COOK 2 COMPLETE DUANE ARNOLD COMPLETE FARLEY 1 COMPLETE FORT CALHOUN COMPLETE GINNA COMPLETE H.B ROBINSON 2 COMPLETE INDIAN POINT 2 COMPLETE INDIAN POINT 3 COMPLETE LACROSSE COMPLETE MAINE YANKEE COMPLETE MONTICELLO COMPLETE NINE MILE PT 1 COMPLETE NORTH ANNA 1 COMPLETE OCONEE 1 COMPLETE OCONEE 2 COMPLETE ( -7 i

I Pcgn No. 2 06/25/86 APPENDIX R STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN.~1, 1979 COMPLETION STATUS CC FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS FACILITY DATE FIRE IF NOT NAME # PROTECTION

COMPLETE, MODIFICATION FOOTNOTE S/B COMPLETE OCONEE 3 COMPLETE PALISADES COMPLETE PEACH BOTTOM 2 COMPLETE PEACH BOTTOM 3 COMPLETE FRAIRIE ISLAND 1 COMP'.ETE PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 COMPLETE RANCHO SECO COMPLETE SALEM 1 COMPLETE SAN ONOFRE 1 COMPLETE ST LUCIE 1 COMPLETE VERMONT YANKEE COMPLETE

-YANKEE ROWE COMPLETE OYSTER CREEK 10/31/86

• 1 HATCH 1 11/31/86
• 1 HATCH 2 11/31/86
• 1

~ KEWAUNEE 06/30/87

• 1 TURKEY POINT 3 12/31/86
• 2 TURKEY POINT 4 12/31/86
• 2 DRESDEN 2 06/30/87
• 2 DRESDEN 3 06/30/G7
• 2 QUAD CITIES 1 06/30/87
• 2 OUAD CITIES 2 06/30/87
• 2 HADDAM NECK 12/31/89
• 2 TMI 1 06/30/86
• 6

4 Paga No. 3 06/25/86~ APPENDIX R STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1979 COMPLETION STATUS OF FIRE PROTECTION MODIFICATIONS FACILITY DATE FIRE IF NOT NAME # PROTECTION

COMPLETE, MODIFICATION FOOTNOTE S/B COMPLETE PILGRIM 11/31/86

• 6 f

POINT BEACH 1 12/31/86

• 6 POINT BEACH 2 12/31/86
• 6 BRUNSWICK 1 05/31/87
• 6 MILLSTONE 1 12/31/87
• 6 MILLSTONE 2 12/31/87
• 6 BRUNSWICK 2 04/30/88
• 6 NORTH ANNA 2 06/30/86
• 7 SURRY I 07/31/86
• 7 ZION 1 10/30/86
• 7 ZION 2 10/30/86
• 7 FITZPATRICK 10/31/86

-*7 COOPER STATION 11/31/86

• 7 SURRY 2 12/31/86
• 7 TROJAN 12/31/86
• 7 FORT ST VRAIN 08/31/87
• 7 DAVIS-BESSE 12/31/89
• 7 BROWNS FERRY 2 12/20/87
• 9 BROWNS FERRY 3 12/20/88
• 9 BROWNS FERRY 1 12/20/89
• 9 l

r c-9

4 -Pcgo No. 1 06/25/86 APPENDIX R STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1979 COMPLETION STATUS OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS -FACILITY DATE ALT. IF NOT NAME # SHUTDOWN

COMPLETE, SYSTEM S/B FOOTNOTE COMPLETE ARKANSAS 1 COMPLETE ARKANSAS 2 COMPLETE BEAVER VALLEY 1 COMPLETE BIG FOCK POINT COMPLETE CALVERT CLIFFS 1 COMPLETE CALVERT CLIFFS 2 COMPLETE CRYSTAL RIVER 3 COMPLETE D.C.

COOK 1 COMPLETE D.C. COOK 2 COMPLETE DUANE ARNOLD COMPLETE FORT CALHOUN COMPLETE GINNA COMPLETE H B ROBINSON 2 COMPLETE HADDAM NECK COMPLETE . HATCH 1 COMPLETE HATCH 2 COMPLETE INDIAN POINT 2 COMPLETE INDIAN POINT 3 COMPLETE LACROSSE COMPLETE MAINE YANKEE COMPLETE MONTICELLO COMPLETE NINE MILE PT 1 COMPLETE NORTH ANNA 1 COMPLETE C-io ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _,1

e Pcgu No. 2 06/25/86 APPENDIX R STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1979 COMPLETION STATUS OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS FACILITY DATE ALT. IF NOT NAME.# SHUTDOWN

COMPLETE, SYSTEM S/B FOOTNOTE i

COMPLETE OCONEE 1 COMPLETE OCONEE 2 ' COMPLETE OCONEE 3 COMPLETE t PALISADES COMPLETE PEACH BOTTOM 3 COMPLETE PRAIRIE. ISLAND 1 COMPLETE PRAIRIE ISLAND 2 COMPLETE RANCHO SECO COMPLETE SALEM 1 COMPLETE 4 SAN ONOFRE 1 COMPLETE ST LUCIE 1 COMPLETE VERMONT YANKEE COMPLETE YANKEE ROWE COMPLETE ZION 1 COMPLETE ZION 2 COMPLETE FARLEY 1 10/01/86

• 1 OYSTER CREEK 10/31/86
• 1 FITZPATRICK 04/30/87
• 1 KEWAUNEE 06/30/87
• 1 TURKEY POINT 3 12/31/86
• 2 TURKEY POINT 4 12/31/86
• 2 PEACH BOTTOM 2 02/01/87
• 2 CUAD CITIES 1 04/01/87
• 2 OUAD CITIES 04/30/87
• 2 l

<3 - I l

-n. l Pagn No. 3. 06/25/86 APPENDIX R STATUS FOR PLANTS LICENSED PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1979 COMPLETION STATUS OF ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS FACILITY DATE ALT. IF NOT NAME.# SHUTDOWN

COMPLETE, SYSTEM S/B FOOTNOTE COMPLETE DRESDEN 2 06/30/87

• 2 DRESDEN 3 06/30/87
• 2 TMI 1 06/30/86
• 6 PILGRIM 11/31/86
• 6 i

POINT BEACH 1 12/31/86

• 6 POINT BEACH 2 12/31/86
• 6 COOPER STATION 03/31/87
• 6 BRUNSWICK 1 05/31/87
• 6 l

MILLSTONE 1 12/31/87

• 6 MILLSTONE 2 12/31/87
• 6

. BRUNSWICK 2 _04/30/88

• 6 NORTH ANNA 2 06/30/86
• 7 i

SURRY 1 07/01/86

• 7 SURRY 2 12/31/86
• 7 FORT ST VRAIN 08/31/87
• 7 TROJAN 12/31/87
• 7 DAVIS-BESSE 12/31/89
• 7 BROWNS FERRY 2 12/20/87
• 9 BROWNS FERRY 3 12/20/88 19 BROWNS FERRY 1 12/20/89'
• 9 i

<? - / JL i

NRR DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL OPINIONS ROBERT FERGUSON'S DP0 FEBRUARY 24, 1984 1.

SUMMARY

HADDEM NECK CONTROL ROOM: CONTENTION WAS IT IS i NOT POSSIBLE TO PREDICT THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FIPE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THEREFORE DPO RECOMMENDED ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY PER III G. AND lll l, OF APPENDIX R BE PROVIDED INDEPENDENT OF THE CONTROL ROOM. i 2, RESOLUTION - BY FAUST ROSA SEPTEMBER 21, 1984: l BECAUSE OF CONSTANT ATTENDANCE, HALON FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM, FIRE DETECTION AND MANUAL FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITY, IT IS A VALID CONCLilSION THAT FIRE SPREAD WOULD BE LIMITED TO EITHER THE MAIN I CONTROL CONSOLE OR ALL THE AUXILIARY CONTROL / PANEL, IN ADDITION, THE LICENSEE WAS ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM COULD BE EVACUATED FOR 1 UP TO ONE HOUR AND STILL SHUTDOWN THE PLANT. j e a C5 L L2

4 i i STAFF FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEE'S DP0 MAY 2, 1984 R NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF THE BASIC APPENDIX R REQUIREMENTS i 1.

SUMMARY

WERE DEVELOPED. THESE NEW INTERPRETATIONS WERE CONTRARY TO EXISTING GUIDANCE AND THE STAFF FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERS FELT IT WOULD NOT PERMIT EITHER A TIMELY OR CONSISTENT RESOLUTION OF APPENDIX R DEVIATIONS. l 1 2. RESOLUTION - BY FAUST ROSA NOVEMBER 17, 1985: CONTAINED IN SECY-85-306 1 l L AP . _ ~..

NRR NEEDS FOR FIRE PROTECTION PESEARCH 1). ASSESS THE IWACT OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FIRES IN C0fRROL ROOMS, INCLUDING: - SOURCES OF FIRE - HOW FAST DOES THE FIRE SPREAD - HOW LONG DOES THE C0fRROL ROCri REMAIN HABITABLE - WHAT ARE THE EFFECTS OF SUPPRESSANTS THIS WORK IS CONSIDERED CONFIRMATORY RESEARCH ASSOCIATED WITH BOARD NOTIFICATION $4-033. 2). DEVELOP N{D APPLY DATA N O ANALYSIS TOOLS TO SUPPORT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FIRE HAZARD RISK ANALYSIS. THIS INCLUDESJ - ASSESSENT OF,THE RELIABILITY OF FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES - ASSESSMENT OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES AND SAFETY SYSTEMS - ASSES 5NENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF EQUIPMENT TO WITHSTAfD THE EFFECTS OF FIRES N O SUPPRESS # US THIS WORK WILL IMPROVE OUR ABILITY TO USE RISK ASSESSMETR AS A TOOL IN LICENSING. 0 ~if

HOW NRR NEEDS ARE BEING ADDR,E_SSED 1). FES EMBARKED UPON A MJLTI YEAR PROGR#1 TO OBTAIN EXPERIMENTAL DATA AND DEVELOP ANALYTICAL TOOLS TO ADDRESS NRR NEEDS. THIS HAS i INCLUDED: i - 20 EXPERIENTS AT SNL RELATED TO ELECTRICAL EQUIFTEt# CABINET l FIRES l - 22 EXPERIENTS AT FACTORY fl1TUAL RELATED TO CONTROL ROOM FIRES - EXPERIEtGS ON EFFECTIVENESS OF FIRE RETARDANTS, SEPARATI0ft, COPPONENT FAILURE THRESHOLDS d - DEVELOPMENT OF AJMLYTICAL TOOLS CTFBRN-COMPLETE; SAFFIRE-NEARLY COMPLETE) i l 2). IN LIGHT OF CURRENT BUDGET CONSTRAIPCS FUTURE PLAN IS TO: I j - DOCtNENT WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED Tn DATE - ASSESS NHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HEPE BASED UPON PES FUNDED SRIDY IN FY87, WHICH WILL ALSO FACTOR IN RESULTS FROM TE RISK ftTHOD INTEGRATION AND EVALUATION PROGRAM (RMIEP). i - ASSESS PRIORITY OF ADDITIOfRL FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH IN RELATION TO OTHER RES PROGRNiS. - ADDITIONAL RESEARCH, IF TEEDED, WILL BE DONE BEGINflING IN l

FY88, i

1

i BROWNS FERRY UNIT 1 -UNDESIRABLE SYSTEMS INTERACTION AS A RESULT OF FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM SPURIOUS ACTUATION , APRIL 30, 1986 (R CLARK, NRR 492-8298) PROBLEM: FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ACTUATION RESULTS IN ECCS ACTUATION AND FLOODING OF SASEMENT SIGNIFICANCE: UNDESIRABLE SYSTEMS INTERACTION (GDC 3) LACK OF COMPLETE FOLLOWUP SUBSEQUENT TO FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ACTUATION DESIGN INADEOUACY OF SAFETY-RELATED CABINET CABLE SEALING DISCUSSION: UNIT 1 HAS BEEN DEFUELED FOR OVER A YEAR.,WITH REACTOR VESSEL AND DRYWELL OPEN. i. CS AND RHR PUMPS RACKED OUT; BUT MOVs WERE NOT. KEEP-FILL SYSTEM STILL ACTIVE, APRIL 30, 1986 REPLACEMENT OF FIRE HYDRANT IN COOLING TOWER AREA RESULTED IN DEPRESSURIZATION OF FIRE HEADER.WHEN PRESSURE IN HEADER WAS RESTORED, DELUGE VALVES TO THREE CABLE TRAY FIXED SPRAY ZONES IN UNITS 1 AND 3 ACTUATED., SPRAY SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE REMAINED UNACTIVE, SPRAYS WET DOWN CABLE TRAYS, PUMPS AND FANELS, INCLUDING RPS INSTRUMENTATION PANEL IN UNIT 1. MAY 3, 1986 INADVERTENT ACTUATION OF ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF) ON UNIT 1 AT 1:24 A.M. DUE TO FALSE HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE SIGNAL CAUSED BY ELECTRICAL SHORT IN TWOe' ' PRESSURE SWITCHES. SAME ACTUATION OF ESF RE0CCURRED AT 3:54 A.M. AND EARLY NEXT SHIFT. CS AND RHR PUMP MOTOR BREAKERS WERE RACKED OUT.RHR ISOLATION VALVES HAD BEEN TAGGED CLOSED BUT CONTROL POWER REMAINED ON C ,g OUTBOARD ISOLATION VALVES 75-25 AND 75-53 WHICH OPENED.KEEP-FILL SYSTEM VALVES WERE 0 PEN. 9-'!.7

- KEEP-FILL SYSTEM PUMPED 60,000 GALLONS AT 1,000 GPM TO VESSEL VESSEL OVERFLOWED CAUSING HIGH LEVEL ALARM IN REFUELING POOL AREA AND SPILL OF 28,000 GALLONS INTO VENTILATION SYSTEM: BASEMENT CORNER ROOMS FLOODED, OPERATOR IN CONTROL ROOM NOT LICENSED, DID NOT RECOGNIZE THAT CS VALVES WERE OPEN. TESTABLE CHECK VALVES INDICATED CLOSED SINCE CHARGINGF'OLVINSUFFICIENT TO RAISE DISC TO ITS LIMIT SWITCH POSITION. CAUSE OF FALSE PRESSURE INDICATION DETERMINED TO BE MOISTURE IN PRESSURE SWITCH JUNCTION BOXES DUE TO INADEQUATE SEALS. ALL OTHER JUNCTION B0XES IN UNITS 1 AND 3 SPRAY AFFECTED AREAS WERE INSPECTED AND NO WATER FOUND. SPRAY SYSTEM ACTUATION CAUSED BY LEAKING CHECK VALVES. TWO CHECK VALVES IN WATER SUPPLY WHICH HOLDS THE DELUGE VALVES CLOSED LEAKED ALLOWING DELUGE VALVE TO OPEN, WHICH SPRAYED TRAYS WHEN PRESSURE IN HEADER WAS RESTORED, SIMILAR INCIDENT ON MAY 11, 1986 WHEN TWO MORE DELUGE VALVES ACTUATED AFTER FIRE HEADER PRESSURE DROPPED AND WAS RESTORED, FOLLOWUP: LICENSEE WALKDOWN OF ALL CONDUIT JUNCTION BOXES, RPS CABINETS TO VERIFY SEALS. LICENSEE TO REVIEW IMFLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT ON THEIR EQ PROGRAM. LICENSEE REPLACING AFFECTED CHARGING WATER CHECK VALVES, OVERHAUL AND INSPECTION OF OTHER LIKE MODEL VALVES. POWER REMOVED ON CS INJECTION VALVES, l C?-18 l I

I Information Requested by ACRS Subcomittee P Brcwns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1 Inadvertent Actuation of Deluge Valves on April 30 and May 11, 1986 InadvertentActuationkofESFSystemsonMay3,1986 f 1. Provide design details and functional description of deluge valves including appropriate vendor. manual pages on recomended installation arrangement, maintenance and inspection. 2. Provide actual installation arrangement of these deluge valves in the units, including valve mounting orientation and piping arrangement i drawings. 3. Describe the fire protection nozzle array and the equipment which is located within the spray effect range (including gravity flow, fan induced or air-current induced flow or spray to other areas of the building). Discuss potential for water from spray to be conducted through conduit and ventilation ducts or to be carried by cable to other areas or equipment, if applicable. ] l 4. Describe design arrangement of check valves which you concluded were responsible for deluge valve actuation. How frequently are check valves l inspected? Has silt, algae or foreign matter caused problems with seating of the check valves? I 5. Discuss the environmental qualification of equipment within the spray effect range. Also discuss the extent to which the equipment is specifically qualified for fire system water intrusion. I 6. Discuss the principal of operation of the deluge and check valves in question. 7. Discuss the ultimate effect of the spray event on plant systems and components. 8. Discuss the extent of usage of these deluge valves at Browns Ferry and other TVA nuclear plants. 9. Describe the means of sealing cabinets and panels at BFNP to prevent water intrusion from sprays, including the types of sealing materials. l

10. Considering the extent that Flamastic material may have sealed openings in cable trays, are the cable trays designed to carry the potential added weight of water from fire protection sprays.

QUESTION 1 Provide design details and functional description of deluge valses including appropriate vendor manual pages on recommended installation arrangement, maintenance and inspection. ANSWER: Pressure in the pilot chamber (differential unit) provides latching force to the clapper. When the solenoid valve opens or, by some other means, charging water is released from the pilot chamber, header pressure lifts the clapper routing water to the open spray nozzles. The system is tested periodically in a number of instructions: SI 4.11.A.1.8 Hydraulic performance verfic - Triannual 4.11.A.1.5 Valve alignment - Quarterly MMI 122 Flush of supply hdr, inspection - Monthly 69 Nozzle check EMI 25 Operational nozzle check, strainer flush - Yearly FPSIL 1 Walkdown inspection - Monthly t (2

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STAR Dell 1GE VALVE Line pressure from the inlet side of the valve - A - passes through a 1/4" check valve and trim piping - B - to the Actuation Chamber - C - which presses lever arm - D - onto the I clapper - E , and holds the valva closed. Actuation - F - of an electrical solenoid valve or manual ball valve allows pressure in - C - to drop, lever - D - to move off of clapper - E , and the valve to open. The. valve must be opened and inspected in order to be reset.

--_ QUESTION 2 Provide actual installation arrangement of these deluge valves in the units, including valve mounting orientation and piping arrangement drawings. . ANSWER: All. installations.are vertical and as recommended by STAR. Compare TVA vs. Vendor drawings (see #8 and 12 following). QUESTION 3 Describe the fire protection nozzle array and the equipment which is located within the spray effect range (including gravity flow, fan induced or. air-current induced flow or spray to other areas of the building). Discuss potential for water from spray to be conducted through conduit and ventilation ducts or to be carried by cable to other areas or equipment, if applicable. ANSWER: The nozzles are arranged to provide spray coverage to both sides of a cable tray stack, where possible. The nozzles have been aimed (rotated) so that no other equipment receives direct i jet inpingement. Other equipment can only be affected by water Panel junction 'bx covers are gasketed and the conduit drainage. o penetrations into them are sealed with RTV silicon sealer. The conduits themselves are designed to be sealed but have not been found to be air tight in all inst:nces. Only equipmant located directly beneath the cable trays would have considerable likelihood of getting wet. l (2-;&iL

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C AT: VALV2. TJOTE: VALVE & Tn!MMING ARE 1G" WIDE. I ,,,w e n.rArJr: FLANGE TO FLANGE DIMENSION - 121/8" Wherewr Possitale Run 1" Drain Lino Frorn Cup (2) Separately to Outdce or Sewer. If Alnotately fMe: c.ity to Unite 1" Dir.in Line into 1%" M3in Drsin Line. This Connection 4' [g. y Must Da MJde 4 reft or M(.de Ccl3W Tep of Drain Cup with a Check V-Ive in:ts!!cd in the e 1" Drain Line. ~ MATERIAL FBR STANDARD INSTALLATION l 3" STAR HIDROMATIC DELUGE VALVE -MODEL "G" Indes No. flo. 61er;d. Itern Indes No. flo 11erad. II*'" g 1 1 T* P/od. "G" DJuge Valve 13 1 %" x %" x %" C.l. Tee to 2 y." x %" x %" C.I. Tee ITEMS FUnrJ13HED WITH DELUGE VALVE 20 1 %" 90* C.I. Ell 2 1 Dra.n Cup 21 3 %" 00* C.I. Ell g 3 1 Auto. Dr in Valee. Med. "D" 22 1 1%** To 1" Roducing Bushing 23 1 %". M.I.. G.J. Union i VALVES & SPECI ALTICS 24 2 %". M.I.. G.J. Union 4 1 1%" Anote Vatve 25 1 %". C.I. Pipe Plug 5 1 %" Ang'e V !.e 27 1 %". Brass Pipe Plug G 1 %" Angt Valve 7 1 %" Globa V..:.e

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l QUESTION 4 Describe design arrangement of check valves which you concluded were responsible for deluge valve actuation. How frequently are check valves inspected? Has silt, algae or foreign matter caused problems with seating of the check valves? ANSWER: There are dual check valves - One oriented horizcntally, the other vertically (see figure 12). The valve-are located in stagnent flow regions and are susceptable to seating problems. The charging lines are flushed once a year as the consequence of a simulated trip using air. There is a strainer in the charging l line whic'h is periodically flushed also. This does not provide j a direct test of the check valves. There is no test to j determine whether the valve is scated. QUESTION 5 Discuss the environmental qualification of equipment within the spray effect range. Also discuss the extent te which the equipment is specifically qualified for fire system water intrusion. ANSWER: Design requirements are specified for sealing essential equipment and conduit in the spray area. Further investigation and inspections are underway to assess and correct the apparent deficiency in the ficld sealing techniques. (Unit 3 was sealed better - i.e. no problem there). 1

t o g. e QUESTION 6 Discuss the principal of operation of the deluge and check valves in question. L e \\ ANSWER: The deluge valve is a quick action, high. flow valve. It is j operated by a release system (solenoid valve operated by i temperature and smoke detection or manual release). The deluge valve is kept closed by its own upstream pressure thru the check valve in question. When upstream water pressure is lost and if the check valve is not seated, the holding pressure for keeping the deluge valve closed would be lost. When supply l pressure is restored the deluge valve would open. j QUESTION 7 Discuss the ultimate effect of the spray event on plant systems and components. ANSWER: If the system's and component's electrical cables, junction boxes, etc. are well sealed there is no problem. (2-;&(b

O c 1. QUESTION 8 Discuss the extent of usage of these deluge valves at Browns Ferry and other TVA Nuclear plants. ANSWER: The fixed spray systems at BFN use a total of 43 STAR Deluge Valves. The manufacturer is no longer in business and main-taining them is a problem since replacement parts cannot be purchased. TVA is considering replacement of these valves (DCR-3022). The implementation of Appendix "R" mods may not permit the removal of these spray systems at this time because of time restrictions. QUESTION 9 Describe the means of sealing cabinets and panels at BFNP to prevent water intrusion from sprays, including the types of sealing materials. i ANSWER: Cabinets, panels and conduits are sealed with gaskets. The gasket material is generally neoprene rubber. Conduit openings are sealed with GE RTV 302. RTV is also used to seal conduit penetrations at boxes and panels. C-27

k . i QUESTION 10 Considering the extent that Flamastic material may have sealed j l openings in cable trays, are the cable trays designed to carry the potential added weight of water from fire protection sprays. t ANSWER: There are no localized " depressions" in the cable tray runs l that could collect water. Most trays are predominantly filled i P with cables and flamastic. While the flamastic has sealed some openings in the bottom of some cable trays, there are sufficient openings in the trays to preclude an appreciable accumulation.of water. i C -28

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- pfwm:t "g" m ~ /Q SETTING 1 C!ase bala ec98 o*:ir<> 13" V;f.e Det. 4 7. G" Vahe Ost.1:01 witer :u:ety to the we n. termined by the water prWure w* rhin th3 ch.imber 4? the Dit, (* #' Cr w n" Cro%' V.'.c in be ". t.t s on:aly bne to the c.f t:,. ferential Unit of the Fidromstic Defune Va:ve, which is nomin. u ttiv the water sucnty rec.wr:r revealed on the Water C rai,e emt 4 gngsg) w dt ena'11Pa r. r the precure-head dc=stluNd en thtr f*ilot LInc (g*9r above th? Opra stic t Sa a Cr *a VA' ID" A 43 :d 2' 3 ' SYSm 'o rfroin-Dirttrentian Uait, plus a praetermmad tactor of safety. ~ 4. Coen Au n AJrv Dra.n Va!ve 10rt.103 fu drain 8'J'm fir *e. *n'! att othre cus h.tv :: rain valves and/or riuss at all lo.v po nts in the systsm and CC*A V Mn '"Cr M 5 883Pd 'G d'3'n-SER E PAAX. ltElGHT OF 5. I'us** ia.wrd en.: ring tamd Manu..I Dr:in Pin c,f the Auto-ICE P,RE*M* pg

• PILOT CPRitJKLER rnstic Dr.an Valea fMI "D** 10(t. re31 es t.* sure this valve es cren end that t r. ? C6Jy of In: Hi.fromJr c Valve tiss been I',,

dr:ineJ. 20 5 4.5 G. nemo.e Valve Cc.r. C reluiry v4c,e crer.n W;ter Sue 01.:. Seat 40 7 12 n;nn, se;,:ing surf.ce crid note of Cte.mer Arm anel msdintd i 60 ba; on seat siin L t.u e care ail hinyng it free. Itetvnina Ltv" 10 21.5 shou!J mo<e freely to the lef t pr.nsag Plur?pr IJose on Plunytt E0 12.5 23 A;r.*mbty alon3 w.ah it. 1C0 7. ncinu.e Differen:ol Hauung Cover. Do not lose or dam:Je 17 37.5 Dittere ntial Unit Spang. 120 21 fety v.ge clean ene ut:ing surface nn tr:e Seit. 46 8. Utmove l'tur'Nr AWrrtfV for clean',nra an:t m, :rction. C;ro. g p g3 160 9. Car f.19 rech 't Pfurve Aucmbly.. Differential Unit Snring 37.5 62 i antt Hoatieig Co.er, t? ke s.s e Def t.rensist U.iit Spemg is in its 175 54 C3.5 pre. re poset.an, cut Altmt,ly Lo.dinut end in ilousm.J Coser t"* 2. " DRY".*ilor Line Sprinklers - requires v'c of the Ster Mod =1

10. Ur.l ren anet le.s:r Clec:t Arm to the 'et poLtion with its nm "A A.f;" Dry Ps!ct Actuatar. This unet as desirin?J for use mth the un6:t the Hv:ar:en<> Leser, and there is 0:orasimetely 1/lb*

Hid.*o.-.? tic Cclurp Valve when autornatic pacumitic fired tam-c: ar.m:c ber. wen I-6 up:t t;ose anJ the netening Ltver.

• pera*.nra (!*itot Line Sprinktrrs) and/or rnanual oneumatic (t. tan-

11. Rt,4cv Val.e C <cr.

ual Emcreency Stations - f.todel"A**) actuation is required fo? Delor r. pre actean or special types of fire protection. The M Jel

12. C sti f.t. awl T:.e V.:fva. Cet. est Reals:e di damard er fu ed

~^ ^ # ^('"**'"' "'" autocab: tiri s tsrs b ritat t u.:s. P.ntor: su r.tanual Emtr. D'*"' th' 'Cth*"I' 'ai watu nressure frorn the Diff rential Unit es forq cs the Pilot Line nerps nee, h.. tine s (..*3.t.t " A"). n:t I.rt.*Ca.s Stations to trcir t,ent,

• d're is raaint.and apptaannqv M pounds per snuare m h.

cit....t gy;g.,n.i t.:twr s. n r.:1.ce :: hesed tt;erratttets co ricetzscal The ip.cratino of a rpnnkivt on th,o (itot t.ina cr the f.trition et. Manust Cmcrrency Station instatted en the l'elot Line

13. ten.v i:wi tne sidierniti: Delure V*e end cperatin1 system

• v.,ll retc.Y4 inc ca.s or air pres:;ueo ebove the(tionnre.grn in the are, et stia et.rrr+1 " rat" posit:on, corn the n** Clove Va.ve Actuator. and trip the system. A %" Strainer must b3 ut4 in the ta v.i e Cci. o. ;" v-t.e Det. :.al to edin t wawr surpry f,

trim to protect the Moitet "AA.R" Actuator, t preis are into t. e f).ffcrantul Unit. . Sle. ly caen st.t !.tain Cate :nd clore tht FAcin Crrin Vetn (Det. INSPECTION f46. v.P.tn wPte f.c..s. No las:igt ur fisw shouki contmue taru 1 C.rckily chects that all controlling nete valves In the vystent cre Aut t c Or..n V;he when the 17.0 omJtiv Celup V.tve p s;t open, strcppert end sc !cd for normal opsration. 7 g., Valve Det. # 7. G" Va!ve Oc t.110) is rerrter any other %" w..lve from the tvater supply to Dillerentul gg yQQy s is op;n tur normal operation. -* ifnder norrrol coeditiert. reater pres urv under the Clapper Arm 3. Clo n the fAa;n Gate Valve or the water supply control valve. Cod in ti.e en:mhte of &!.? Oilterentiat Unit are equal. The t, ate, liOTE: seressure in the Ditfr.rrit;al Unit forces the FlunCs Accmbiv tvin. the Ib:tsminj Leser..rt laLa trie Clapper Arm in the closed (or FAILUDE TO DO SO WILL RESULT IN TRIPPING THE posit'an. ~ J HfDROMA T/C DELUGE VALVE WHEtt THE PRFSSURE .. Axternatic operat.on nf t?.c Hiifrornatic D:lage Valve is accorrrp. IS REllEVED IN THE CilAMSER OF THE CIFFER. lished by unc ret rn,3r, of tau fot:owiny CNTIAL UNIT. 4

• L thm;c licat Dett<ter tripping a sotannid valve. Fig No.1 To clean Struinar close %" Globe Valve (3" V lve Det. /17. G**

A Dec.AClas f.bnu:.I Cmersency Station in the electrical cir. Valvo Oct. ED) and removo Strainer Plug, anti sti$htly coen the

g. 2.

.,q cuiting ot et.e be,t ectectors: n ig. fJo. 7. %" Globa Valve to flush the Straincr. Rernovo Strainer Screcal,if Llan:' irrl f t.t inctac t non h nardous areas. rectuired. and then reptsee Screers and Plug. Opert %" Cic.co 8. Volve.

b. Nthee.p;ost 1v noidoor norehazardeus are:.a.

c. Capinsion pm..! fer are.as considered hasardous.

S. Push inward on spring learled f.tanual Drain ('in of the Auto-3. A thy 0. tot tin: w;th Automitic Sprint.tcrs and "AMl" Actus, matic Drain Valve Mocci "O** to be sure this valve is open and . tur, canns A.t Saysy - Fig. fJo 3. Nitror.an Supply - f q. that the Dowly of ttic Hid/omatic Velve h s been draincd. G. fl peat p:.r.wraphs G thnt 14 Iri the Instructions Setting the Star . fio. 4 Cie4vroatic Gelug: Velve. 4 A wet pilnt br e w.th Au: sm.u;c Sprinktcrs. rig iJo. 2. f EVOR APPL Y GREAr.E. TALLOW On ANY Of LY SU8 5. If y a :." Vs,4.: tne Ogu9, Vags lga in r. SI Ai*CC 101Hii MOLDED BluuSER WATCn SEAT DISC. OH UH e:f It!!NTIAL UfdlT DISC. N

c. A.n..n. i cn..,,en:, r.. tio,e tce.: "r.1 tenn.<ied to ihr hiot t inc i t Se tv.,a la,psr t.ir 3. 9 eg. f J0. G. IA c'.d 20.

TESTING A1. ARMS The fnittwir.g tc t procedure opplies to the Hidromette D24rne 7. Sul.cfvved n't..*:t;.sn System. Tit !?o C. VJve with the unmt.ry trim,v.nich inctod,s the provision for t:io g- 'Isovivd Ih.9 Vel.u ( n,.e. F ig f!u. G. v.ater ll..e t.:st s.1 atse f.*sts uc.st W1. ster Motor Al.1rmi nr C!a. trit.at On s ah.n. cf 3:,y..: ti, w 3.:..i3,n,iege,3 wg re..r.e th: v.: tr e (Pr..gnr., Alarm E4tth) ab vices. lhe tuting of tether or l'oth o! I8 0'u tb* tt.t ?";,i t'.t c :starm &vis:o thont.: 8,, iron, pf,or to ciudrug the f.*in Gata irn h f f *g,,,'g;ge, t.J U at 1. !ws ten it i;a:s e ns. r thr.a ti.v 1.'..

• hr.l.'

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.s c '. ~ STAlt MODEL "C"l!!DRDMATIC n.*. LUCE VALV lt); o >p @ ~ = 3"i.ODEL i (\\ c r. -. 3 >M SET POC! TION BILL OF MATERIAL "' " i.l:f Part C. t. flo. t)o. Nn. ReqJ. E# N ..W @) r.h $, O fj) '%,,(i h' 1. ~,.,f., i 9 'A 33'l 01 1 1 Vie Cody i I A 333 02 2 1 Va vo Cover I9 ' i I, Efl.I[,. f., \\' e %l.*$ A-32313 4 1 Cover Go'Aet A 3G115 3 G Cover Golts Y ag j.M S,1(H'{,j B 333 C3 6 1 Clapt >er Arm t...s i..  %').. J h'i '0-333 05 5 1 Seat Ring d 3 ,.,, u/ . h*,1 ',j ;

• ' M A 323-0G 7

1 Clapp;r Letch Pawl f,, y,q'. '.',i..'Q,I C., <.'.'t A 32422 8 1 Latch Spring .. _. _j.."7 ,t[ j p,.' .L.- w -. y i, .g A.333 31 .0 1 Reetrictor -}i * ; CT' I 0-323 07 10 1 Retaining lever 2 bg yI' / [,.f ;N / [ /' h A 3241G 12 1 Latch Hinw Pin I'.! A-32414 11 2 Hinge Pin l ' A-37 4 17 13 1 Latch llirge Pin Ret:Iner ~ ' " W l,' [{',. t c' t.y ( hi 'M 9.'d.k.-i-jim......;.*:m an- *^4.N /,g' N A 32410 14 2 Cottcr Pin .. i-7 ,y-A-32310 15 1 Water Seat D:re l t 77 3 - s. (j G G y/,. %' N.*i ! {J A-323 00 16 1 Di:e Rereining Ring ?- 9 g ( ',,\\,, /f U.33317 17 1* Differential Valve Housing ( ff N ,,I N j f, Nl ?'s;,l' 4 t' 33313 in 1 Housir2 Cover b ' -.- :.* l u -- fl/.f C e..w <- l A.7,N 2G 19 2 Hoosng G :ket

• !. ; "O pJ V.9 gp

'n.333.':3 20 1 Ditferentir.l Sost j A 3'.13 21 21 4 Housing Dotts D, &. - t :'*-- q A 324 37 22 1 ' '.fi 'f Dif feiential tinit Soring y A 32420 23 1 Differential Unit Plur:ger A 32?".0 24 1 Plunger No:o SE'C ION. ON C""N *'11!i1E A-3253: 2s 2 Leem ng i /, Differenu, Pin h ~s A 324-3'l 23 1 7 )Mf. A 37'.-24 27 1 Inner Ois itet.,iner I 1 -i t nit Dix j diL f;OTE:- t:c f'ritTr.' J L'IrrtqtfJTint itDts ;f:'G (0: TAIL ^ %10i 73 1 ^"'"58V L O("""' A-32435 23 1 Cluter Dix Ret..iner I ,/. I;O. I't) IS l'R AINhDJ.HEf4 EVEit VAL VE WILL C3 o EXPO'a20 TO l'thT41NG T3MPE:1ATUlihS. '[- .Theo pxrs are not rep /xeaWe ~ / -~ 7) a 6" r ",O D E L %r C'iT POSITION.. DILL OF MATERIAL Part Det. No. C'2i%. l;f fJo. No. Reed. p,,, gg,,

u......

Q@O lC Q (,[e ~ A 3v:m i i vae Doo -\\. r.7 /. ; / ',/- O A 33G 02 2 1 Vane Cover s A 32ti-03 3 8 Cover Bolts r - Nd, ^-323-os 4 i Cover caskei e.

• T B 335 05 5

1 Cf:pper Arm

• l//8,.p}iB ld. '.

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• . 2 ;',;j 0-313 13 18 1

f' ,e llousing Cover f

n A 37??3 19 2

Housing Ge:.ket / , ' :- s - / "~ N G (,.; (3 ~ h h) tv373 31 20 1 Rettrictor 4-A-33 t 21 21 4 Hcusinr Dolt f..* *h s A 3N 37 22 1 Differential Unit Snring

• ( " 'n A 32&?3 23 1

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i' i

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FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM (DET) PHASE I PROGRAM (NUREG-1148) ORIGINAL BUDGET: FY86: $1000K; FY87: $700K REVISED BUDGET: FY86: $658K; FY87: 0 ~ NOTE: PROGRAM ELEMENTS IN THE PARENTHESES ARE DROPPED OR CURTAILED BECAUSE OF BUDGET CUT, o FIRE SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION ELECTRICAL INITIATION EXPERIMENTS ELECTRICAL CABINET SOURCE (CABLE TRAYS, FLAMMABLE LIQUID SPILLS, TRASH) o FULL-SCALE ROOM ENVIRONMENT TESTS BASELINE TESTS: EFFECTS OF COMBUSTIBLE TYPES, FIRE 1 LOCATION, VENTILATION, (CEILING HEIGHT, ROOM GE0 METRY) CONTROL ROOM TESTS: EFFECTS OF CABLE TYPES, (CABINET TYPES, LOCATION, VENTILATION CEILI,NG HEIGHT) (R00M-TO-R00M SM0KE MIGRATION TEST.S) (SM0KE REMOVAL TESTS) o VALIDATE FIRE ENVIRONMENT COMPUTER CODES AGAINST FULL-SCALE ROOM TESTS LASALLE CONTROL ROOM FIRE ANALYSIS (3D "SAFFIRE" CODE) (" HARVARD" AND "COMPBRN" CODES) o COMPONENT FAILURE THRESHOLD TESTS: CONSTRUCT 2 TEST CHAMBERS CABLE DAMAGE TESTS: THERMAL ENVIRONMENT ONLY (CABLE DAMAGE IESTS: TOTAL ENVIRONMENT, INCLUDING SUPPRESSION) (COMPONENT DAMAGE TESTS: RELAYS, SWITCHES, LOGIC CIRCUITS, POWER SUPPLIES, RECORDERS, CONTROLLERS) I DOCUMENTATION AND FINAL REPORT PREPARATION o 42 /+ 1

FIRE PROTECTION RESEARCH PROGRAM (DET) REVISED FY 1986 PROGRAM BUDGET: $6.58K STATUS AS OF JUNE 26, 1986 k ~ o FIRE SOURCE CHARACTERIZATION l ELECTRICAL INITIATION AND CABINET TESTS COMPLETED, l DOCUMENTATION STARTED. CABLE TRAYS, FLAMMABLE LIQUID SPILLS, TRASH TESTS DROPPED. o FULL-SCALE ROOM ENVIRONMENT TESTS PHASE I BASELINE TESTS COMPLETED. PHASE I CONTROL ROOM TESTS TERMINATED NOVEMBER 1985. DATA-REDUCTION TO BE ) PERFORMED. o VAllDATE FIRE ENVIRONMENT COMPUTER CODES AGAINST FULL-SCALE ROOM TESTS 3-D SAFFIRE CODE VAllDATION TERMINATED JANUARY 1986 AFTER 1 TEST. LASALLE ANALYSIS COMPLETED. HARVARD AND COMPBRN VALIDATION TO BE PERFORMED. o COMPONENT FAILURE THRESHOLD TESTS: CABLES, RELAYS, AND SWITCHES TESTED IN STEADY AND TRANSIENT THERMAL ENVIRONMENTS. TESTS IN TOTAL (CORROSIVE GASES AND WATER SPRAY INCLUDED) ENVIRONMENT TO BE PERFORMED. TESTS OF LOGIC CIRCUITS, POWER SUPPLIES, RECORDERS, AND CONTROLLERS WILL BE PERFORMED ON A LIMITED SCALE. DOCUMENTATION AND FINAL REPORT PREPARATION PROGRESS ON THE o COMPLETED TOPICS. g C-42 esse

FIRE PROTECTION PESEARCH PROGRAM (DET) { ~ FY 1986 PEVISED BUDGET: $658K WORK TO EE PEPF0 PED JUf'E 26,1986 TO END OF FY 1986: t o FULL-SCALE ROOM ENVIR0f.KEhT TESTS COMPLETE DATA REDUCTION o FIPE ENVIRONMEhT COMPUTER CODES VAllDATION j " HARVARD" AND "COMPBPN" CODES O COMPONEtIT FAILURE THRESHOLD TESTS TOTAL ENVIR0t0Bff TESTS (CORROSIVE GASES AND SUPPRESSION It!CLUDED) 0F CABLES AND C0tiTROL EQUIPMFFT o DOCUK W ATION AND FINAL REPORT PREPARAT10M ee 4 C -43 G5EiFF l

I l ,1 POTENTI AL IMPORTANCE i l OF FIRE RESEARCH O FREQUENT OCCURRENCE O HIGH CMF CONTRIBUTION O NEW RISK ISSUES O TECHNICAL BASE FOR R/A VIA O FIRE VS. SEISMIC i 9 ++ G31.- i I

.a ,w '1

• * * * * " * * " * * * * " " ~ * * * * " * * ' " ' * * * * '

- - - - -. = * * * * * - * ~ ~ * * * " FIRE RISK ISSU ES O CONTROL SYSTEM INTERACTIONS O SMOKE CONTROL O SEISMIC / FIRE INTERACTIONS O MANUAL FIRE FIGHTING EFFECTIVENESS O SPURIOUS SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ACTU ATION O CABLE / COMPONENT TOTAL ENVIRO N M ENT SU RVIVABI LlTY o Aw G 33

o o P__ROBRBILISTIC FIRE ESTIMRTES TO DATE i % OF PROPOSED CH PRR SAFETY GORL (1.0 -4) } DRTE OF RNRLYSIS 230 W HRR 81 ~ BIG ROCK POINT 200 4 I HRR 82 INDIRN POINT 2 83 % l NRR 82 INDIAN POINT 3 25 X l DEC 83 I SERBROOK 23 X RPR 83 LIMERICK le X j JUL 79 HTGR le X JUN 84 f OCONEE 7% 1983 f SHOREHRH 5% AUG 83 l MILLSTONE 3 5X 1981 ZION I TAP R-45 PLANTS 53 % 1988 ST. LUCIE 1 51 X 1985 i TURKEY POINT 3 32 % 1985 PGINT BEACH 1 13 X l 1985 ~QURD CITIES 1 11 4 j 1985 l COOPER 8x 1985 ) TROJAN 8x 1985 RNO (due to continuing analyela)) ( TAP R-43 Frequenotes Sub, lect to Change (NOTE : I NRR. 22, 1975 Browns Ferry Fire b _ KEY DATES..: RUG. 23, 1978 BTP RPCCB 9.5-1 l 4 Nov. ta, i98: ia crR so, App. R i O' i.) eM i

i. t I i 'l 4 ) ( 5% - 95% ) f PUBLISHED FIRE UNCERTRINTY BOUNDS I i UNCERTRINTY j CM FREQUENCY (/RX YR) l PPR i 6.0 -6 to 7.3 -4 i 2.0 -4 Indian Point 2 8.4 -7 to 2 4 -4 6.3 -5 Indian Point 3 w 7.0 -6 to 5.0 ~5 Seabrook 2.5 -5 2. 3 -5' / 8.7 -7 to 8.7 -5 e Limerick 8. 0 -7 t o 8. 0 -5 ~ I 1.0 -5 l Oconee-l 1.7 -6 to 1.1 -5 4.8 -6 Millstone 3 1.5 -8 to 2.4 -5 i 4.6 -6 f ZIdn i. Uncertainty bound estimated

• - Not expitettly quantified in Seabrook Analysts.

by using the total CM frequency uncertainty distributton. l i

1. - Not explicitly'quantifled in Oconee Analysis. He,thod described to obtain

~ ~~ an uncertainty bound similar to Limerick. i 5 t kip l .. u -,-m,- .,,.r- -, ~..., -. -

I ~ o c 1. i i l \\ OF_lONTRIBUTIONS TO CORE MELT / COMPARISON fr IRR_ANO._ sE t tes_to AN A L Y S E S i FROM 4 OVERALL CORE MELT FREQUENCY PRA SEIBMf2 FIAE BIS ROCM PGINT 843 NE l i NA E3S HTSR 2OS

• I.

INDIAN POINT S 438 23 e INDIAN POINT S 333 ISS e 92S l LINERICM 242 e MILLSTONE 3 73 322 e 132 SEASROOM SS e I 73 ZION i e b as e not swatcavse i 4 mm = not avastanta I anvennet comessesteme . emov pense ano sesswee evente esensrscent CD M. I j

- = s LOCRTIONS SIGNIFICRNTLY CONTRIBUTING t o _ P L R N T _ F. I R E _.C M. F R E Q U E N C I E S RPPENDIX R PROVISIONS CONSIDERED CM CONTRIBUTION LOCRTION PRR 1 Dig Rock Point Inside Cable No 1.8 -4 Penetration Rrea No 4.0 -5 Station Power Room No 1.4 -4 Indian Point 2 Switchgear Room No Electrical Tunnels 4.9 -5 No 4.6 -8 Cable Spreading Room Indian Point 3 Sultchgear/ Cable No S.O -5 Spreading Room Yes S.7 -6 Control Room Seabrook Primary Component Yes 4.1 -6 Cooling Hater Rrea Yes 3.5 -6 i Cable Spreading Room Yes 2.3 -6 Turbine Building O ES

~ ~ ^ LOCRTIONS SIGNIFICRNTLY CONTRIBUTING PLRNT FIRE.CM_.FR.EQUENCIES to APPENDIX R PROVISIONS CONSIDERED CM CONTRIBUTION LOCRTION PRR Limerick CRD Hydraulic Yes 6.4 -6 Equipment Room Yes 6.2 -6 13 KV Switchgear Room Yes 6.1 -6 Safeguards Rccess Area Yes General Equipment Area 3.3 -6 Yes 3.8 -7 Contrcil Room Yda 3.6 -7 RuxilIary Equip.. Room Yes Cable Spreedthg Room 2.0 -7 Yes Static Inverter Room 1.0 -7 No 1.0 -5 HTGR " Cable Upreading Room Yee 1.0 -5 cable Ethnft Ooonas S

• - Core Heat Up i

So 6W

. __ c.;...;_.

n - --- ----. m...:.. - o ~ LOCRTIONS SIGNIFICRNTLY CONTRIBUTING to PLRNT FIRE CM FREQUENCIES i RPPENDIX R PRR LOCRTION CM CONTRIBUTION PROVISIONS CONSIDERED l Mt1istone 3 Charging and 'Yes 1.1 -8 CCP Zone Yes 9.9 -7 ) Cable Spreading Room Yes 8.0 -7 Switchgear Room Yes 7.3 -7 Control Room Yes Electrical Tunneis 6.9 -7 Yes Instrument Rack Room 2.4 -7 4 I Ruxillary Electrical l Zion No Equipment Room 2.8 -8 Inner and Outer No .l Cable Spreading Room 1.8 -6 4 e 9 e ~ SM, -~

O O LOCRTIONS SIGNIFICRNTLY CONTRIBUTING t_o PLFiNT FIRE CM FREQUENCIES APPENDIX R CM CONTRIBUTION PROVISIONS CONSIDERED _ 1 LOCRTION PRR TAP R-45 PLRNTS ~ Yes 5.3 -5 St. Lucie 1 Cable Spreading Room Yes 5.1 -5 Turkey Point 3 Cable Spreading Room Point Beach 1 Ruxillary Feedwater Yes 1.3 -5 Pump Room 4160 Voit Yes 2.8 -6 Switchgear Room Yes 4 6.7 -6 Quad Cities 1 Control Room Yes 5.8 -8 Cable Spreading Room Yes Cable Expansion Room 1.1 -5 Cooper Yes 8.1 -8 Cable Spreading Room Trojan Yes 5.8 -6 Cable Spreading Rnnm b AtlO (continuing analysis)) i (tlote : RLL TAP R-4'i Ct1 Fenquencies Fubject to Change

. S' APPENDIX R INSPECTION STATUS AS OF APRIL 30, 1986 (TABLE IN UNITS OF SITE VISITS) TYPE INITIAL FULL REVISIT INTERIM CONCEPTUAL OF VALIDATION REINSPECTION MEASURES REVIEW VISIT INSPECTION STATUS ACCOMPLISHED 52 9 8 2 1 SITE VISITS REQUIRED 34 5 9 9 1 ADDITIONAL SITE VISITS ESTIMATED g 4 8 1 ? ADDITIONAL SITE VISITS TOTAL NUMBER 86 9 16 3 ? SLIDE 1 C-53 p

+ o, s' ,j TYPICAL CATEGORIES OF INSPECTION FINDINGS !4ID-1984THROUGHMID-1986 POST-79 LICENSE CONDITION WORDING CONDUCT OF ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSES NON-RATED MATERIALS ALTERNATIVE SAFE SHUTDOWN CRITERIA ERR 0NEOUS SEPARATION CRITERIA CHANGES IN SHUTDOWN SYSTEMS SELECTION ^ PARTIAL BARRIERS AND WALLS IDENTIFICATION OF SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT SLIDE 2 C-Sdf .}}