ML20206Q260

Transmits Summary of 981208 Meeting with Owners Group in Atlanta,Ga.Meeting Summary,List of Attendees & Meeting Presentations Encl

ML20206Q260
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	01/07/1999
From:	Beckner W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To:	Byrd K, Hackerott A, Krueger G AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, OMAHA PUBLIC POWER DISTRICT, PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
References
NUDOCS 9901140107
Download: ML20206Q260 (24)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. I January 7, 1999 Mr. Alan Hackerott Mr. Greg Krueger Omaha Public Power District PECO Energy Company Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station Mail Code 63A-3 P.O. Box 399 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Ft. Calhoun, NE 68023-0399 Wayne, PA 19087 Mr. Kendall Byrd Mr. Xavier Polanski First Energy Corporation Commonwealth Ed coq Company Mail Stop 3105 Nuclear Engineenng Services 300 Madison Avenue 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Toledo, OH 43652 Downers Grove, IL 60515 Gentlemen: The purpose of this letter is to transmit the summary of a meeting with the Owners Groups held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region 11 offices in Atlanta, Georgia, on December 8,1998. Sincerely, Original Signed By William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Meetings Summary

2. Attendance List

3. Meeting Presentations cc: See attached list

[ / D) DISTRIBUTION: See attached. / ( DOCUMENT NAME: GANVG\\MTGSUM1.298 \\' OFFICE NRR/ADPR/TSEk NRR/DSSA/SPSB NRR/ADPR/TSB NAME NVGilles 1W P AEl-Bassioni AfD WDBeckner UJf)13 DATE 01/@/99 01/ b /99 01/ ~7/99 g OFFICIAL RECORD CdPY . g(h-@ / ~ 194 6 fM**$$$ $$hs gg@M

a*%g p 1 UNITED STATES s j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l p WASHINGTON, D.C. enmaa m i 4, ...+ January 7, 1999 Mr. Alan Hackerott Mr. Greg Krueger Omaha Public Power District PECO Energy Company Ft. Calhoun Nuclear Station Mail Code 63A-3 P.O. Box 399 965 Chesterbrook Boulevard Ft. Calhoun, NE 68023-0399 Wayne, PA 19087 Mr. Kendall Byrd Mr. Xavier Polanski First Energy Corporation Commonwealth Edison Company Mail Stop 3105 Nuclear Engineering Services 300 Madison Avenue 1400 Opus Place, Suite 300 Toledo, OH 43652 Downers Grove,IL 80515 Gentlemen: The purpose of this letter is to transmit the summary of a meeting with the Owners Groups held at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Region 11 offices in Atlanta, Georgia, on December 8,1998. Sincerely, t y cO O William D. Beckner, Chief Technical Specifications Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosures:

1. Meetings Summary

2. Attendance List

3. Meeting Presentations cc: See attached list

i Multiple Addressees- . January 7,1999 DISTRIBUTION: E-Mail w/ Enclosures 1 & 2 only SCollins/RPZimmerman (SJC1/RPZ) BABoger (BAB2) WDBeckner (WDB) JAZwolinski (JAZ) EAdensam(EGA1) TSB Staff GHolahan (GMH) ' RJBarrett (RJB3) AAEl Bassioni (AAE) MLWohl (MLW1) ' MACunningham (MAC3) IMRD COPY

• • FILE CENTER PUBLIC -

' TSB R/F NVGilles

Multiple' Addressees January 7, 1999 SG: l l l Mr. Biff Bradley Mr. Thomas Hook Nuclear Energy Institute San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Suite 400 Southern California Edison 1776 i Street, NW 5000 Pacific Coast Highway Washington, DC 20006-3708 San Clemente, California 92674-0128 l Mr. Bryan Ford Mr. Duncan Brewer Entergy Services, Inc.. Duke Power Company 1340 Echelon Parkway Mail Code EC081 M-ECH-660 526 South Church Street Jackson, MS 39213-8298 P. O. Box 1006 Charlotte, NC 28201 Mr. Rick Grantom South Texas Project Electric Generating Mr. Frank Rahn Station Electric Power Research Institute STP Nuclear Operating Company P. O. Box 10412 Mail Code N5010 Palo Alto, CA 94303 P. O. Box 289 .Wadsworth, TX 77483 Mr. Donald Hoffman EXCEL Services Corporation Mr. Jack Stringfellow 11921 Rockville Pike, Suite 100 Southern Nuclear Operating Company Rockville, MD 20852 P.O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295 I

NRC/ INDUSTRY MEETING ON RISK-INFORMED STS MEETING

SUMMARY

DECEMBER 8,1998 A meeting between the NRC staff and representatives from the four Nuclear Steam Supply System Owners Groups, the Nuclear Energy Institut6 (NEI), and the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) was held on December 8,1998. The attendees are listed in. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the creation of a fully risk-informed set of standard technical specifications (RI-STS). The meeting was held as a follow-up to the Licensing Managers' Workshop held in July 1998. The issue of the creation of a RI-STS was one of the issues that the NRC staff committed to pursue further with industry at that workshop. The staff presented some opening remarks and stated the objectives of the meeting. Several presentations from industry representatives followed. All of the presentations are provided in Enclosure 3. Some of the key points discussed at the meeting include the following: All attendees agreed that pursuing a fully risk-informed STS was the right thing to do and that this effort would require advocacy on both the industry and NRC sides. Initially, only improvements that could be achieved under the current regulations (10 CFR 50.36) would be explored. The biggest area of concern under the current technical specifications structure was limiting condition for operation required actions. Surveillance requirements should be refocused on important safety functions. Surveillance requirements should be optimized and moved out of technical specifications to a licensee program. Allowed outage times should be replaced with a greatly extended " backstop" time and reliance on a configuration risk management program. The issue of " functionality" versus " operability" of structures, systems, and components should be addressed. Some logical, generic improvements should be pursued first, such as: o Changing the end state for most LCOs from Mode 5 to Mode 4 (PWRs). O Revising the technical specification actions for a missed surveillance requirement. o Extending AOTs for systems such as residual heat removal and ECCS accumulators. o Addressing LCO required actions with extremely short AOTs. o Removing some of the mode restraint requirements. The long-term goal is a fully risk-informed, performance based STS. Representatives from all groups present at the meeting volunteered to be key contact points for this effort. Finally, the group agreed to meet again on January 14,1999,and discussed future planned interactions.

[ Meeting Attendees December 8,1998 Name Affi?istion Thomas Hook Southern California Edison . Ray Schneider ABB-CE Alan Hackerott Omaha Public Power District l Biff Bradley Nuclear Energy institute Bryan Ford Entergy Jerry Andrd Westinghouse l Jim Andrechek Westinghouse l Eric Smith NUSIS l Yehia Khalil Northeast Utilities l Dan Green Commonwealth Edison / EXCEL Services Tom Shaub Virginia Power l Dave Bucheit Virginia Power Jeff Sobotka North Atlantic Bob Christie Performance Technology Kenneth Kiper NAESCo Randall Best Northern States Power Gene Eckholt Notrhern States Power l Ken Byrd Toledo Edison l Duncan Brewer Duke Power i Frank Rahn EPRI Andy Dykes PLG William Burns Southern Nuclear l N. V. Stringfellow Southern Nuclear l-Rick Grantom South Texas Project L Xavier Polanski Commonwelath Edison i Brad Hardin NRC/RES/PRAB l Adel El-Bassioni NRC/NRR/SPSB Millard Wohl NRC/NRR/SPSB L Mark Reinhart NRC/NRR/TSB l Nanette Gilles NRC/NRR/TSB l-i e l

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Risk-Informed Technical Specifications The CEOG Vision A. Hackerott (OPPD) Chairman CEOG Probabilistic Safety Assessment Subcommittee Meeting at NRC Region ll, Atlanta, GA December 8.1998 l BACKGROUND e Risk-informed regulation goals and benefits e Prior CEOG risk-informed applications e Current CEOG risk-informed applications e Future CEOG risk-informed applications e CEOG Strawman e Proposed schedule l 1 - + -.. - -. - - -.. +.....,..

Risk-Informed Regulation e Goal l a Focus resources on activities important to safety by using risk insights in the decision-making process e Benefits i a Enhanced plant safety Reduced cost of operations a Added flexibility in allocating resources 4 I Prior CEOG Risk-Informed Applications initiated discussions with NRC on April 5,1994 e e Developed robust RG and SRP for risk-informed changes to technical specifications a CEOG Pilot j w Approved and accepted i e CEOG increased allowed outage times (AOT) for several plant systems and components: m Safety injection Tanks (1 to 24 hr AOT) m Lower Pressure Safety injection System (1/3 to 7 day AOT) m Emergency Diesel Generators (3/7 to 10/14 day AoT) l i l l j

Prior CEOG Risk-Informed a. Applications (cont.) e Establish efficient processes for integrating PSA into regulation e PSA methodology development a PSA standards development > Transition risk methods e Global PSA model comparisons Current CEOG PSA Applications . Technical specification changes > HPSI, and CS AOT extensions a Mode 4 versus mode 5 safe end states e Risk-informed ISI/IST e Inter-relationships between Maintenance Rule, PSA, and AOT extensions e Standardized guidelines e PSA certification l

i Future CEOG Risk-Informed Applications e Additional risk-informed technical specification changes a Containment isolation valves (up to 7 day AOT) m DC power supplies (8 - 12 hr AOT) e Support the new initiative for efficiently progressing to a more global risk-informed technical specification environment a CRMP/ Maintenance Rule sufficient to support implementation a No changes needed to 10CFR50.36 Initial Vision Control, planning and implementation of Maintenance activities is e more important than outage time e AOT extensions . Allow integration of risk into maintenance planning . Allow sufficient time to perform most PM and CM tasks at power . Allow flexibility in allocating plant resources . Allow planning work for restoration tirnes if required . Allow increased availability of component at shutdown . Reduces potential for exigent NOEDs Maintenance Rule governs total unavailability of systems and e configuration risk CRMP process for controlling risk being adopted by many utilities e l

~ Vision of the Future for Tech Specs Today's successes have indicated PSAsimpact on reducing and controlling plant risk can be dramatic e Our vision is a world where operators can make prudent risk-informed operational decisions based on plant safety using risk-informed tools and engineering judgment to make decisions + CEOG Strawman e Goals of Strawman > provide a staged change of key features of existing technical specifications. - Some focused changes can be implemented within a year of task initiation and would be broadly applicable to the Owner's Group - More global changes would take longer and may require use of pilots and experience a Establish a process that is cost beneficial, and not resource intensive a Final programs should reflect preeminence of Maintenance Rule for Controlling and Assessing plant Risk

CEOG Strawman Elements: Establish Mode 4 as end state for most action statements e Modify mode restraints to allow use of CRMP is justifying mode e changes with equipment inoperabilities Move ST!s to the Tech Spec Administrative control section to e preclude inoperability and potential shutdown actions when surveillance are missed and risk-inform STI test intervals Change AOT LCO action statements to a licensee centrolled e risk-informed assessment of appropriate actions with a AOT backstop (e.g.,31 days)(Task includes modifications to 3.0.3 Action Statements) Modify safety limits from two dimensional figures to n-e dimensional programs consistent with latest safety analysis Strawman Schedule Establish Mode 4 as end state: 3 - 6 months e Risk-inform mode restraints: 3 - 6 months e Move STis to the Tech Spec Administrative control section and e risk-inform: 6 to 12 months Risk-inform AOT LCO action statements e (including modifications to 3.0.3) : 12 - 24 months for pilot and 24 -48 months for remaining plants Modify safety limits to n-dimensional: 24 - 48 months e se= mea,,

i.4 Establishing an Integrated Basis for Technical Specifications F. Rahn/J. Haugh EPRI A. Dykes /D. Johnson PLO S. Schultz /P. O'Regan DES A. Ross Consultant NRC Workshop Atlanta GA December 8,1998 The Process MCfC arc we DOW - Starting to recogni:e the potential benefits of Risk informed Technical Specifications. having achieved afew successes. Pilot applications have proven to be too costly / uncertain to be considered viable by many utilities - Industry and NRC seem to agree that Risk informed Operations is easier to achieve than design / hardware issues - Realizing the relationship between Maintenance Rule and Technical Specifications - Progress has been made in issuing Regulatory Guides and industry templates (e.g., NRC RG 1.177 EPRI TR-109646, etc.) Where do we want to be - Use Risk Informed Technical Specifications to increase operational ticxibility and efficiency while maintaining safety - Have alternate approaches that allow plants to revise their Technical Specifications on an 'as needed' basis as long a the net immediate and cumulative effect falls within safety guidelines 1 i l g

1 t The Process . Why do we need to go there - Current Technical Specifications are too restrictive and inflexible and don't always improve safety - Current deregulation of the industry requires plants to reduce staff and budgets while maintaining safety How are we going to meet this goal 1 C - Difficult but possible - We must mutually define 'important-to-safety' - We must have an imperidace measurement tool - We have to demonstrate to the pu%c that current levels of safety are mamtained or improved, not just e made less costly by this process to the licensee management that operating efficiencies and costs saving are e real, and significant, not ephemeral Process Objectives Achieve the proper balance between - deterministic and risk based - presenptive and performance based - ' good enough' and legal requirements Determine which Technical Specifications are amenable to the Risk a I Informed Process - In operations space many things are measurable, but some areas are not quantifiable - Prioritize the changes to technical specifications that offer the greatest improvements to safety and operations 2

1 Relationship to Current Practices Current NRC policy emphasizes deterministic principles It is impractical to instantaneously implement a complete replacement of the existing technical specifications that form the basis for a plant's operation Integrated regulations should build on the current practices: + - meet intent of current regulations (equivalency principal) - maintain defense in depth - properly interpret and maintain sufficient safety margins - work within theframework of the Safety Goal Policy and the Backfit Rule - use quantitative performance indicators to monitorand communicate impact of changes Problems with Current Technical Specifications AOTs - No reaf ohvsical basis for outage time of specific lengths - do not address risk adequately for combinations of equipment outages - do not address cumulative outage time or number of times a component can be out of service - do not distinguish between major and minor maintenance - do not distinguish between primary and support components (e.g seismic suppon) STIs - real benefit of the testing is often unclear - relationship to and potential integration with RI-ISI/IST is unclear Action Statements do not cover all potential component outages within a system - do not recognize special conditions (e.g. approaching hurricane) i 3

Benefit of Current Technical Specifications (That we don't want to lose) Operators have prefer definitive criteria for making operating decisions. Risk Informed Technical Specifications will need to develop easy to interpret criteria and procedures to guide operators Sine qua non of Progress Benefits must accrue in areas of real licensee ' pain' Benefits should be available even to those that have limited PRAs Benefits should be forthcoming / visible in a short period (less than 6-9 months) NRC NRR and Regional management and staff must understand and support the concept and administer it in a L consistent manner Guideline and limit z.;ust be clearly established up front l Approach wst be integrated with other NRC guitace/ programs (e.g., Maintenance Rule) 4 7 _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

l Regulations 10 CFR 50.36(b) requires that technical specifications be derived from the safety analysis contained in the FSAR. FSAR safety analyses are deterministic. Does 10 CFR 50.36(b) need to be changed to allow technical specifications to be based on deterministic analysis, risk in::ights and operating experience? Is rulemaking required? Willit be necessary to submit PR A studies on docket as an UFSAR amendment?

• Does staff have the capability to rt.aw multiple submittals?

Could such information be subject to public hearings? Ibes PRA have to become part of UFSAR7 Willit have to be updated on a segular basis? Criteria & Scope of Risk Informed Technical Specifications Core Damage - Frequency - Defense in depth - Credit of non-technical specification equipment Containment Performance + - Large early release only - Ihirtydays - Benefit of secondary containment - Impact of Severe Accident Management Guidelines Offsite Release / Response + - Whole Plant pilot study - Revised source term - Impact of emergency plan 5 e.

i Roadblocks to Risk Informed Technical Specifications -Industry View It will require a lot of licensee work at at time when resources are scarce Technical expertise is also scarce both at NRC and in industry + Need to change culture at the plant sites everyone must think risk ins ghts a (we're already partly down this road due to MR and On-line maintenance) Licensee Regulatory / Engineering staff must ' buy-in' and support Will this be another case'of ' Regulation Plus?' Currently cost is high is it worth t' e effort?. i.e., what is the return on n investment Changes operational complexity and philosophy Will overall safety practices be degraded during transition phase? l + Differing perspectives and interpretations (licensing engineer, PSA specialist, i NRR NRC Regions) as to what is needed and acceptable Roadblocks to Risk Informed Technical Specifications - NRC View? How do we get from the current licensing approach to a risk informed one? Can we deal with some plants that have the traditional and some plants that l have risk informed basis? l What about plants that are partially risk informed? l Can the review process be streamlined? Which technical specifications are, and which ones are not, amenable to being risk informed? l I l t 6

I Issues to be Addressed ~

• - Status of expected Plant Operating Lifetime j

- Less than three years - less than te years - Greater than ten years - Status of industry transitions to Improved Technical Specifications - Plants that will not transition 'i - Plants that are currently transitioning - Plant that have already transitioned What is the impact on Life Extension + - Utilities may not decide to request approval for revised Technical Specifications until they decide on life extension i l Issues to be Addressed 1 Regulatory Implementation ) + - Required or optional j - One plant, single NSSS type, industry wide j l - Partial vs. full conversion to RI-TSs j - Will Technical Requirements Manuals ( and other Admin Requirements, e.g. Technical Clarification manual, Core Operating Limits Report, etc.) need to be risk informed also? - NRC pre-approval required for implementation? For revisions? l t i i f 1 4 7 -.~.. ma-e w r w y

l Risk Informed Candidates STI/AOTs (obvious and proven candidates) + Systems and Requirements (e.g. ECCS. fire protection) + .. Instrumentation . Limits (e.g. Power Distribution. DNB margins) i + Special Test Exceptions + Effluents (liquids, gaseous) Refueling + Reporting Priority for Changes to Technical Specifications Eliminating or reducing mid-cycle surveillances that require shutdown Reducing the need to go to mode 5 Simplifying JCOs in the event of failures + Facilitate decision making process based on 'real data' versus ' seat of the pants' Avoid testing that leads to component degradation - EDGs - Auxiliary Feedwater (especially turbine driven pumps) - Equipment inside containment i - Equipment which experiences thermal cycling - Equipment in high radiation areas ? 'l 1 I i 8 p

The Path Forward Define 'Important to Safety' - Re-examine content of Q-lists - Use PSA insights, combined with qualitative and other quantitative information - Conformance to recognized safety principles, defense in depth concept, codes Define ' Operability' - GL 91-18 limits the use of risk to define equipment as operable - Risk however can define inoperable in a more realistic light Demonstrate Safety to Public - Provide objective evidence by using trending data and developing cumulative risk profiles The Path Forward Industry steps required to transition to Risk-Informed Technical Specifications - Define needed changes (legal, regulations, processes, etc.) - Identify licensing basis, including other regulatory requirements and commitments - Perform Engineering Analyses and Operational Assessment - Define implementation strategy and monitoring / feedback program - Use new tools to manage cumulative and instantaneous risk, e.g., a configuration risk management program - Submit proposed technical specification changes (and technical basis therefore) 9 u-- a w q

The Path Forward What industry would like from NRC to help the transition to Risk-Informed Technical Specifications - Clarification and resolution of potential legal impediments (e.g., 1 rulemaking, public hearings,10CFR50.36 changes, etc.) - - Acceleration of the current pilot efforts - Expedited review of applications - Realization that we can make good operational / regulatory decisions in spite of uncertainty - Recognition that some plants will continue to use current set of regulations 1 l - More regulatory flexibility, e.g., ability to use JCOs containing ' blended' analyws in appropriate instances - If possible, regulation by ' precedent

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- Ability to ' combine change requests' in situations that + are related to same system activity + do not create new signincant accident scenarios EPRI Program Supporting Risk Informed Te'chnical Specifications EPRI Report TR 111379 " Template for the Submission of Revised + Risk Based Technical Specifications,"(in publication) EPRI Report TR-105867 " Guidelines for Preparing Risk-Based + Technical Specifications Change Request Submittals," December, 1995 l EPRI Report TR-111204 " Template for Submission of Risk-Informed Testing Program for Pumps and Valves," August,1998 EPRI Report TR 109930"Use of Level 3 PSA in Risk-Informed, + Performance Based Regulation of Nuclear Power Plants." Janua:y, 1998 EPRI Report TR-105987 ' Template for the Submission of Revised + Risk-Based Technical Specifications," December,1995 10 3}}