ML20206K474
| ML20206K474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 11/23/1988 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206K462 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8811290419 | |
| Download: ML20206K474 (2) | |
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+t UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3
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W ASHING TON. D. C. 20555
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 24 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE LO. NPF-37 AND AMENDHENT 60. 24 TO FACILITY cm.,. A3 LICENSE NO. NPF COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY BYRON STATION, l' NITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-454 AND 50-455 l
1.0 INTRODUCTION
In May 1984 Comonwealth Eolson Company (the licensee) submitted its Limiting Conditions for Operation Relaxation Program (LCORP) for Byrto Station. The program was rubmitted to justify extending the allowable outa9: times (A0TS) for certain equipment from 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to 7 days. The BNL review flagged a plant vulnerability when Byren 1 opercted its two-pump essential service water (ESW) system without crosstie capability for ESW backup from Unit 2.
2.0 BACKGROUND
AND TVALUATION The ESW system consists of two redundant and independent full capacity pump trains per unit. The trains are cross-connected within each unit. They are also cross-connected between the units through two redundant isolation valves powered from separate emergency (class IE) power supplies. The controls for the isolation valves are provided in the control room. The isolation valves are nomally closed. The cross-over design is safety-related and reets GDC 5 requir nents (refer to Byron SER-NUREG-0576).
The proposed adoition to the Technical Specification submitted August 15, 1986 would have required the availability of one ESW pump and associated valves from the shutdown tinit to support the operating unit and increase the availability of the essenttal service water system.
However, the staff noted several deficiencies in the Technical Specifications proposed in the August 15, 1986 letter. The first deficiency is that one ESW pump on Byron 1 and one ESW pump on Byron 2 could be in maintenance simultaneously. The second deficiency is the lack of Technical Specifications on the ESW system crosstie tetween the Byron 1 and Byron 2 when either or both units are in Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 By letter dated October 29, 1986, the licensee corrected both these deficiencies. The licensee made a comitment that it would not intentionally take one ESW pump from each unit out of service for maintenance at tN same OG11290419 0011.73 DR A DUCK O '>O 4
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time, and the nicensee proposed Technical Specifications requiti.19 the l
availability of the crosstie when either er both units are in modes 1. 2. 3 t
and 4 With these mocifications, the staff finds the proposed Technical Specifications acceptable and concludes that the Byron ESW system satirties i
GDC 44; GDC 44 requires that cooling water systems have suitable redundancy to transfer heat from structures, systems and compoaents important to safety to a heat sink under both normal operating and accident conditions.
3.0 ENVIR0hMENTAL CONS 10 ERAT!0'.'
These amendrents involve a change in the installation or use of the facilities componer,ts located within the restricted areas as defined in 30 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that these attendments involve no significant increase
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in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents l
that may be releaseo offsite and that there is no significant increase in j
individual or cu:nulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission j
has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendnents involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public cowent on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the iligibility criteria l
for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these arrenaments.
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4.0 CONCLUSION
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1)there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be i
endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will j
be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations ano the issuance of these amendtrents will not be inimical to the cortunon defense and security or t
to the heaith ano safety of the public.
i 5.0 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTORS:
A. Busiik R. Goel L. Olshan i
Dated:
Nove.ber 23, 1988 1
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