ML20206F945
| ML20206F945 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/17/1986 |
| From: | Palladino N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8606250036 | |
| Download: ML20206F945 (9) | |
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g PREPARED TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PRESENTED BY NUNZIO J. PALLADINO, CHAIRMAN TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NUCLEAR REGULATION COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS UNITED STATES SENATE CONCERNING SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR AND OTHER MATTERS SUBMITTED:
JUNE 17, 1986
!IOE00SIOIO$*7 CORRESPONDENCE PDR
MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, WE ARE PLEASED TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING 3 ISSUES:
(1)
WHETHER THE NRC SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED AS AN AGENCY HEADED BY A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR (2) WHETHER AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED TO INVESTIGATE SIGNIFICANT EVENTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR FACILITIES OR MATERIALS AND (3) WHETHER THE NRC SHOULD HAVE AN INSPECTOR GENERAL, WITH RESPECT TO hHETHER THE NRC SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED AS AN AGENCY HEADED BY A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR AS PROPOSED IN S.1235, EACH COMMISSIONER HAS GIVEN THIS MATTER CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT AND A MAJORITY OF THE COMMISSION SUPPORTS THE SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR CONCEPT.
IN RECENT YEARS THERE HAVE BEEN THREE INDEPENDENT EXAMINATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION, FOLLOWING THE THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT, BOTH THE KEMENY COMMISSION AND fHE R0GOVIN SPECIAL INQUIRY GROUP RECOMMENDED THAT THE NRC BE HEADED BY A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR.
IN A STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT, THE KEMENY COMMISSION DECLARED THAT "AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, THE NRC"DOES NOT POSSESS THE ORGANIZATIONAL AND MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES NECESSARY FOR THE EFFECTIVE PURSUIT OF SAFETY G0ALS."
THE ROGOVIN INQUIRY GROUP CONCLUDED THAT "THE CENTRAL AND OVERWHELMING NEED IS FOR LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION TO ESTABLISH A SINGLE CHIEF EXECUTIVE WITH THE CLEAR AUTHORITY TO SUPERVISE AND DIRECT i
THE ENTIRE NRC STAFF."
MORE RECENTLY THE GRACE COMMISSION RECOMMENDED;THAT CONGRESS ENACT LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN 3
THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHAIRMAN AS THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE AGENCY.
IN LARGE PART THE CENTRAL FOCUS OF THE DEBATE ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE NRC IS WHETHER THE PUBLIC IS BETTER SERVED BY AN ORGANIZATION WHERE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE MADE THROUGH A COLLEGIAL PROCESS OR BY A MORE EFFICIENTLY MANAGED AGENCY HEADED BY A SINGLE DECISION-MAKER.
IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE THE ROGOVIN INQUIRY GROUP STATED "THERE IS NOT AN AGENCY IN GOVERNMENT THAT WOULD NOT
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BETTER PROVIDE FOR A DIVERSITY OF VIEWS IF IT WERE HEADED BY A COMMISSION.
IT IS NOT LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT ANY OF THESE AGENCIES WOULD BE AS WELL MANAGED."
IN 1954 WHEN CONGRESS AMENDED THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT, ONE OF THE PRIMARY MANDATES OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WAS TO REGULATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL USES OF NUCLEAR POWER WHICH WERE THEN IN THEIR INFANCY. IN THE ENSUING 32 YEARS MUCH HAS CHANGED.
ONE HUNDRED COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS HAVE BEEN LICENSED TO OPERATE, AND THE COMMISSION'S PRIMARY FOCUS NOW IS ON ENSURING THE SAFE OPERATION OF THOSE OPERATING PLANTS.
IN CARRYING OUT THIS ROLE, IT IS THE COMMISSION'S VIEW THAT EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT IS INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT.
COLLEGIAL DECISIONMAKING AND EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT ARE NOT WELL SUITED FOR EACH OTHER.
FOR EXAMPLE, PROMPT DECISION-MAKING IS
. t DIFFICULT BECAUSE TIME MUST BE AFFORDED FOR EACH COMMISSIONER TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES AND PROVIDE SEPARATE VIEWS.
AS A RESULT, THERE IS FREQUENTLY DELAY IN RESPONDING TO REQUESTS FROM CONGRESS, IN ISSUING ADJUDICATORY DECISIONS, MAKING RULEMAKING DECISIONS, AND PROVIDING POLICY DIRECTION TO THE NRC STAFF.
DEBATE OF ISSUES IS OFTEN UNDULY PROLONGED IN AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS POSITION, AND BECAUSE OF THE DIVERSE COMMISSIONER VIEWS, THE NRC STAFF AND THE PUBLIC SOMETIMES RECEIVE CONFUSED SIGNALS.
MORE0VER, THE GOVERNMENT IN THE SUNSHINE ACT HAS GREATLY
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DIMINISHED THE EXCHANGE OF DIVERSE VIEWS WHICH IS THE PRIMARY BENEFIT OF A COMMISSION STRUCTURE.
THE COMMISSION CANNOT USUALLY MEET AS A BODY EXCEPT IN PUBLIC MEETINGS.
THIS REQUIREMENT THAT COMMISSION DELIBERATIONS BE HELD IN SCHEDULED PUBLIC MEETINGS GREATLY DIMINISHES THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AND QUALITY OF SUCH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE RECENTLY LOOKED AT THIS ISSUE AND REACHED THE SAME CONCLUSION.
IN A 1984 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, IT CONCLUDED THAT AN UNDESIRABLE EFFECT OF THE SUNSHINE ACT HAD BEEN A DIMINUTION OF COLLEGIALITY IN MULTI-MEMBER AGENCIES.
IN THE EVENT THAT CONGRESS DOES NOT ENACT LEGISLATION TO CREATE A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR, THEN THE COMMISSION WOULD ENCOURAGE A CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF THE SUNSHINE ACT TO ELIMINATE OR REDUCE THE PROBLEMS IT CREATES FOR COLLEGIAL DECISION MAKING.
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. t WITH RESPECT TO THE.SECOND ISSUE IN THE COMMITTEE'S LETTER OF INVITATION, THE COMMISSION OPPOSES S. 2291 WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD.
IN 1984 CONGRESS DIRECTED THE NRC TO CONDUCT A STUDY OF THE NEED FOR AND FEASIBILITY OF AN INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR CONDUCTING INVESTIGATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT SAFETY EVENTS AT NRC-LICENSED FACILITIES.
IN RESPONSE, THE NRC CONTRACTED WITH BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY.
BROOKHAVEN SUBMITTED ITS FINAL REPORT TO THE NRC IN FEBRUARY OF 1985.
BROOKHAVEN RECOMMENDED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STATUTORY OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY, HEADED BY A DIRECTOR REPORTING TO THE COMMISSIONERS.
HOWEVER, THE STUDY STATED CURRENT PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATIONS OF OPERATING EVENTS HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED IN A
" PROFICIENT AND TECHNICALLY COMPETENT" MANNER.
WHILE BROOKHAVEN SUGGESTED A NUMBER OF IMPROVEMENTS FOR EVENT INVESTIGATIONS, IT ALSO NOTED THAT, FOR THE MOST PART, THESE IMPROVEMENTS COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WITHIN THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE.
MANY OF THE IMPROVEMENTS RECOMMENDED BY BROOKHAVEN HAVE BEEN ADOPTED AS PART OF THE NEWLY ESTABLISHED AND SUCCESSFUL NRC INCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM.
BASED ON THE COMMISSION'S REVIEW OF THE BROOKHAVEN REPORT AND OTHER STUDIES OF THE ISSUE, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THERE ARE NO MAJOR DEFICIENCIES IN THE NRC ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION PROGRAM v
. t THAT WOULD WAR' RANT FORMATION OF AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD.
RATHER THAN TO CORRECT AN EXISTING DEFICIENCY, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR A NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD APPEARS TO REST ALMOST ENTIRELY UPON A PERCEIVED NEED TO ELIMINATE ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN ORDER TO GAIN INCREASED PUBLIC, MEDIA, AND CONGRESSIONAL CONFIDENCE IN THE INVESTIGATORY PROCESS.
IT IS ARGUED THAT A NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD WOULD INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN THE INVESTIGATORY PROCESS BY RELIEVING THE NRC OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO INVESTIGATE AND DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF AN EVENT TO WHICH THE NRC'S OWN REGULATORY ACTIVITIES MIGHT HAVE BEEN CONTRIBUTING FACTORS.
UNDER S. 2291, THE NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD COULD DIRECT THE NRC TO PERFORM THE DESIRED INVESTIGATIONS AND THEN REVIEW THE RESULTS.
THIS WOULD NOT CREATE THE PERCEPTION OF AN " INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION."
ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD WOULD CONDUCT ITS OWN INVESTIGATIONS, THEN THE RESOURCES CONTEMPLATED FOR THE BOARD WOULD NEED TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY AUGMENTED.
IT APPEARS THAT ITS WORKLOAD COULD BE COMPARABLE TO THAT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD.
THAT BOARD CURRENTLY HAS APPR0XIMATELY 320 EMPLOYEES AND ITS BUDGET IS IN EXCESS OF 22 MILLION D0LLARS PER YEAR.
WHILE WE ARE NOT SUGGESTING THAT THE
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BOARD BE GIVEN A STAFF 0F 320, THE DESIRED INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS y
WOULD NOT BE OBTAINED BY TRANSFERRING THE 40-45 FULL-TIME EMPLOYEES CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO NRC'S OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA TO THE NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD.
EITHER THE RESOURCES ALLOCATED MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASED OR THE EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE RESULTS MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED.
A NUCLEAR SAFETY BOARD WOULD ALSO LIKELY LEAD TO A DUPLICATION OF EXISTING COMMISSION FUNCTIONS.
FURTHER, THE BOARD'S ACTIVITIES MIGdT HINDER THE COMMISSION FROM ACTING EFFECTIVELY IN THE EVENT
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OF AN INCIDENT.
AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE BOARD COULD WELL BE PREEMPTED BY A PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION IF THERE WERE,A SIGNIFICANT ACCIDENT IN THE FUTURE.
REGARDINGTHETHIRDISSUE,THECOMMISSIONALSOOPPOSESS.2k71 WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH AN INSPECTOR GENERAL WITHIN THE NRC.
THE COMMISSION'S AUDIT AND INVESTIGATIVE UNIT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS--THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR (0IA)--HAS DIRECT ACCESS TO THE COMMISSIONERS, AND HAS ALL THE NECESSARY INDEPENDENCE TO DO ITS J0B.
MORE0VER, SINCE THE AGENCY IS RELATIVELY SMALL, THE COMMISSION BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT OIA REMAIN A NECESSARY MANAGEMENT EXTENSION OF THE COMMISSION IN OVERSEEING THE PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES OF THE NRC.
ESTABLISHMENT 0F AN INDEPENDENT INSPECTOR GENERAL WOULD TAKE SOME OF THOSE MANAGEMENT BENEFITS AWAY FROM THE COMMISSION.
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SHOWING THAT STATUTORY INDEPENDENCE IS NEEDED FOR OIA, THE
_7-COMMISSION OPPOSES ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OFFICE WHICH WOULD LESSEN ITS ABILITY TO DIRECT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE AGENCY AND WHICH WOULD IMPOSE NEW, BURDENSOME, AND PROBABLY COSTLY, REQUIREMENTS ON THE COMMISSION, FURTHERMORE, BY INCLUDING UNDER THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE ACTIVITIES OF NRC'S OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDI' TOR AS WELL AS NRC'S OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION, THIS BILL WILL DIFFUSE THE ATTENTION OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL BY DIRECTING ITS OPERATIONS TO BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PROBLEMS.
ALSO, BY SOME OF ITS
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PROVISIONS, THE INSPECTOR GENER'AL FUNCTION WOULD OVERLAP AND COMPLICATE SOME OF THE COMMISSION FUNCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO INVESTIGATING LICENSEE ACTIONS AND SAFETY ISSUES.
THE OVERLAP 0F RESPONSIBILITIES WOULD BE EVEN MORE COMPLEX IF BOTH THE PROPOSED IG BILL AND THE PROPOSED NUCLEAR SAFETY BILL WERE TO BE ENACTED.
FINALLY, THE COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THE COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER OTHER LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES COULD IMPROVE THE REGULATORY PROCESS.
WE COMMEND SEVERAL OTHER LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS TO YOU.
THE COMMISSION BELIEVES THAT THE TIME IS LONG OVERDUE FOR LICENSING REFORM LEGISLATION.
THE NRC HAS SUBMITTED A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO CONGRESS (S. 836) AND WE URGE PROMPT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION ON THAT IMPORTANT SUBJECT, EXTENSION OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT IS ALSO ESSENTIAL.
WE ALSO URGE CONGRESS TO ENACT S.274, LEGISLATION WHICH WOULD ENHANCE PHYSICAL SECURITY AT POWER REACTOR SITES BY AUTHORIZING OUR LICENSEES TO HAVE ACCESS TO
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- FBI CRIMINAL. HISTORY RECORDS.
THAT INFORMAT_ ION WOULD BE USED BY LICENSEES AS PART OF THE SCREENING PROCESS TO DETERMINE WHICH EMPLOYEES SHOULD BE GRANTED UNESCORTED ACCESS TO VITAL AREAS OF THE REACTOR SITE.
S.274 HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE SENATE AND IS CURRENTLY PENDING IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
THIS CONCLUDES THE COMMISSION'S PREPARED STATEMENT, MR Cl! AIRMAN.
WE APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE IMPORTANT MATTERS WITH THE COMMITTEE THIS MORNING AND WILL BE GLAD TO RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.
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