ML20206E999

EDO Control of Rulemaking Package Re 10CFR50.47 & App E, Consideration of Earthquakes in Context of Emergency Preparedness. Recommends NRC Proceed W/Specific Rulemaking

ML20206E999
Person / Time
Issue date:	06/12/1985
From:	Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
References
NUDOCS 8606240080
Download: ML20206E999 (51)

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SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RES SPONSORED RULEMAKING Based on our review of the ongoing RES-sponsored proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E--Consideration of Earthquakes in the Context of Emergency Preparedness, RES recomends that the NRC should proceed with this specific rulemaking. This recomendation in draft form has been coordinated with IE. The basis for our recomendation is as follows.

In the Diablo Canyon full power license decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts."

This rulemaking is the staff's response to the above Comission decision. The proposed rule was published in the Federal -Register on December 21, 1984 and requested public coment on the merits of three possible alternatives:

o Adoption of the proposed rule codifying San Onofre and Diablo Canyon o Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis o Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes.

As a result of public comment the staff is now considering another alternative which would require that the emergency plans include a limited assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

The staff is now preparing to recommend to the Commission, based on a thorough 9606240000 850612 PDR

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public comment analysis, a final rule which would embrace one of the four alternatives mentioned.

~ The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDROGR) and to the Director IE.

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Robert B. Minogue, Dir or Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

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l JUN 121985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Execctive Director For Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES REVIEW OF ONGOING RES SPONSORED RULEMAKING Based on our review of the ongoing RES-sponsored proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50,, Appendix E--Consideration of Earthquakes in the

. - Context of Emergency Preparedness, RES recomends that the NRC should proceed with this specific rulemaking. This recommendation in draft form has been

g. coordinated with IE. The. basis for our recommendation is as follows.

In the Diablo Canyon full power license decision the Comission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts lj on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider 7 those impacts."

This rulemaking is the staff's response to the above Comission decision. The 4 proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on December 21, 1984 and requested public coment on the merits of three possible alternatives:

o Adoption of the proposed rule codifying San Onofre and Diablo 4

Canyon o Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis o Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the l impact of earthquakes.

As a result of public comment the staff is now considering another alternative which would require that the emergency plans include a limited assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.

The staff is now preparing to recomend to the Comission, based on a thorough i ~ . , l l > . . . . .. . . .

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William J. Dircks 2 JUN 121985 public coninent analysis, a final rule which would err. brace one of the four alternatives mentioned.

The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDROGR) and to the Director IE.

Robert B. Minogua, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

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William J. Dircks 2 The staff is now preparing to reconnend to the Consission, based on a thorough public connent analysis, whether to withdraw the proposed rule or to proceed to publish a final rule which would not pennit consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning. This final rule, if published, would then codify the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions.

The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDROGR) and to the Director IE.

Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Distribution RAMRB r/f Subject i Circ /Chron l

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Ther:fere, th; L3i \ s for ;;c r::a. . .. ding tk. :;ntinadieir of Inis7mlecak4m ts-4er The staff dto recommend to the Connission, based on a thorough public coment analysis, whether to withdraw the proposed ruleWor to proceed to publish a final rule which would not permit consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning. This final rulegwould nea codify the Comission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions. ? Fel 1{

The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDR0GR) and to the Director IE.

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RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD V0 TING SHEET T0: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM:

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• RES RULEMAKING REVIEW PACKAGE AS INDICATED BELOW l COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS:

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. sheets indicating their positions on the rulemaking..

Responses by c.o.b. JUN .;71985 RAMRB will use the voting will be appreciated.

. . . sheets to assemble the complete RES review package ,

for eventual transmittal to the OEDO and the Director of the user office.

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UNITED STATES

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8%,f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisstON

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%...../ DMR MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director For Operations .

Robert B. Minogue, Director FROM:

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research I

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RES SPONSORED RULEMAKING Based on our review of the ongoing RES-sponsored proposed amendment to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E--Consideration of This recomendation in draft fonn has been with this specific rulemaking.The basis for our recomendation is as follows.

coordinated with IE.

In the Diablo Canyon full power license decisicn the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern f those impacts."

The This rulemaking is the staff's response to the above Comission decision.21, 1984 and i

proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on Dec o Adoption of the proposed rule codifying San Onofre and Diablo Canyon o Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis o Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes.

As a result of public comment the staff is now cansidering another alternative which would require that the emergency plans include a limited assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phencmena.

The staff is now preparing to recomend to the Comission, based on a thorough l

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and to the Director IE.

Robert B. Minogua Director '

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UPDATED NRC REGULATORY AGENDA ENTRY l'

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TITLE:

I Consideration of Earthquakes in the Context of Emergency Preparedness CFR CITATION:

10 CFR 50

, ABSTRACT

The proposed rule would consider the need to take into account the complicating of f ects of earthquakes on emergency

preparedness. Existing regulations require that nuclear power plants be designed to safely shut down for most earthquakes. The probability of earthquakes large enough to cause major onsite i

damage that would result in a significant radiological release from the plant is low; and for large earthquakes, of f site damage could make prior of f site emergency plans premised on normal conditions marginally useful.

One alternative to the proposed rule change would be not to require that the emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes. The staf f believep this to be an inappropriate alternative because of the flexibility of existing emergency plans as well as the very low probability of the occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release i

i f rom the plant. Another alternative would be to adjudicate the l issue on a case-by-case basis. The staf f believes this to be an l inappropriate alternative because it would be extremely time l consuming ena at tne same time would necessitate the unwarranted l extensive NRC staff resources. The proposed rule change is the l best alternative for achieving the specific regulatory objective.

The proposed amendment will not greatly af feet the industry since licensees are required to have approved emergency response plans I which are flexible enough to assure that appropriate protective measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear emergency. The public will not be af fected as adequate emergency preparedness at nuclear reactors will be assured. The staf f anticipates that there will be no increase in cost to the NRC, State, and local governments and to licensees associated with the proposed rule change because it is interpretative in nature.

I ,

l TIMETABLE:

l NPRM 12/21/84 49 FR 49640 ,

NPRM Comment Period Begin 12/21/84 49 FR 49640 /

NPRM Comment Period End 01/2:!/85 FINAL RULE FOR DIVISION REVIEW "G/WA Final Action 4Es(4Gs(46- DFFICE CONCURRENCE ON FINAL RULE C0jiPLETEQ

• Y'*/" - T /- 37/o/g FINAL RULE PACKAGE TO EDO U (/$:/ 7 1.EGAL AUT50RITY: FINAL RULE PUBLISHED /

42 USC 2133, 42 USC 2134; 42 USC 2201; 42 USC buel e EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES: No 7/#st 45

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1i TITLE:

Consideration of Earthquakes in the Context of Emergency Preparedness AGENCY CONTACT:

Mike Jamgochian Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Washington, DC 20555 301 443-7615 e e 1

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9 RULEMAKING AS CURRENTLY PROPOSED (TEXT OF FINAL RULE HAS NOT YET BEEN DRAFTED)

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/** ** WUCLEAR 9ttOULATORY COMMisslON esins.assovow. o.c. sessa g

DEC 14 884

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. . . ' ' - M F1Nt: Joseph M. Felton, Director -t l a

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Office of Administration t

4'r past: Frank P. Gillespie. Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operation /'

i Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research ,,

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SUBJECT:

IMPLEMENTATION OF COMISSIOf; ACTION t

The Coanission has approved a Federal Register Notice . publishing a proposed regulation relating to emergency preparedness.

6. -

Please in)1ement the Comnission's actions by having the enclosed proposed regu-lation pus 11shed in the Federal Register. /1 $.

Also enclosed are the letters to the appropriate Congre'ssional committees in-forming them of the Connission's action. 4

/

h Trank P. Gillespir, '.91 rector

-j4A Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice

2. Congressional Letters.

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[7590-01]

D CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning And Preparedness for Production And Utilization Facilities AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

i ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUp9ERY: The Commission has ruled in previous adjudications that its regula-tions do not require the consideration of potential impacts of earthquakes on emergency planning for nuclear reactor sites. The Commission now proposes to

( provide explicitly through amendment of its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 that such consideration need not be given. Pending completion of this rulemaking, the interpretation of its rules set out in the adjudications remains in effect.

. It is not anticipated that this amendment will have significant impact on licensees, State, or local governments or on NRC or FEMA. .

DATES: Comment period expires (* ). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration can be given only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch. Deliver comments to: Room 1121, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC

)

I between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. weekdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC.

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• Insert date 30 days after publication.

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[7590-01]

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jemgochian, Di' vision of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: (301)443-7615.

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l $UPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

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Background

On Decen.ber 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear ~ Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33,14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emer-gency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unitkely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

The Commission recently aYfirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding.

In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC (August 10,1984), petition z,v J. for review in San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC (D.C. Cir. No. 84-1410).

In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough coricern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The l

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chief focus of the rulemaking will be to obtain additional information to deter-eine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." Slip Opinion at 9.

It should be noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reviews offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness to insure j

the adequacy of Federal, State, and local capabilities in such areas as emergency organization, alert and notification, communications, measures to protect the public, accident assessment, public education and information, and medical support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake i

consequences and response are not part of this process related to radiological emergencies. Also, FEMA has coordinated planning for the Federal response to radiological emergencies including commercial nuclear power plant accidents.

These efforts have resulted in FEMA publishing the Federal Radiological Emer-gency Response Plan in the Federal Register (49 FR 35896) on September 12, 1984.

In addition, FEMA has an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes hazards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties, planning for Federal response to a' major earthquake, and assistance to State and local l

govtrnments in their earthquake planning and preparedness activities. FEMA believes that all of thes'e activities are sufficiently flexible to complement each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

For general background on emergency planning at nuclear facilities, the public is referred to NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, I " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Aadiological Emergency Response 3

[7590-01) ,

Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plant.8 The latter docu-ment, developed jointly by the NRC and FEMA, foms the basis for both NRC and FEMA regulations on emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Also avail-1 able for public inspection are the complete case records for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon proceedings, both of which deal specifically with the earth-

! quake / emergency planning interface.

i The Commission, in its review of the record and consideration of arguments in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, reached the view that its previous San Onofre j holding was correct, i.e., that the potential impact of earthquakes on emer-gency plans need not be considered. The rationale for this holding was stated in Diablo Canyon (Slip Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized in part as

! follows:

...[T]he seismic design of a nuclear power plant was reviewed to render extremely small the probability that...an earthquake [SSE) would result in a radiologic release.... [For] those risk-dominant earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage.... Specific consideration has been given in this case to the effects of other relatively frequent natural phenomena. The evidence

. includes the capability of the emergency plan to respond to disruptions in communications networks and evacuation routes as a result of fog, severe storms and heavy rain. In the extreme, these phenomena are capable of resulting in area-wide disruptions similar to some of the disruptions which may result from an earthquake... Thus, while no explicit considera-tion has been given to disruptions caused by earthquakes, the emergency plans do have considerable flexibility to handle the disruptions caused by various natural phenomena which occur with far greater frequency than do l damaging earthquakes,'and this implicitly includes some flexibility to l handle disruptions from earthquakes as well.

l 3 Copies of these documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington,.DC 20555. Copies of these documents may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Infomation on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

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[7590-01)

W Although the Commission's remarks were directed to the Diablo Canyon emergency plan, all nuclear power reactor emergency plans do address the contingency that emergency actions may need to be taken under less-than-ideal conditions and with less-than-maximum emergency response capabilities.

Nuclear power plants are required to be designed to safely shut down for all earthquakes up to and including the " Safe Shutdown Earthquake," or SSE.

See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2; 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. Accordingly, the probability of earthquakes large enough to cause j

major onsite damage that would result in a significant radiological release l from the plant is low, and for such large earthquakes, offsite damage could I

make prior offsite emerger.cy plans marginally useful at best. In ' addition, the probability of the proximate occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magni-tude and a radiological release from the plant for reasons unrelated to the earthquake itself is even lower. Therefore, there does not appear to exist a set of circumstances at all likely where the consideration of earthquake impacts would significantly improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor.

The ability to take' protective actions throughout the plume exposure pathway (EPZ) could be hampered during the life of the plant by temporary adverse conditions resulting from natural phenomena such as rain, snow, flooding or by activities in the vicinity of the plant such as a major road repair. Existing NRC regulations require that emergency plans be comprehensive and flexible enough to assure the capability to take appropriate protective action to mitigate tne. effects of a nuclear emergency under such conditions.

Similar types of adverse conditions could result from earthquakes below the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which occur proximate in time with an unrelated accidental release of nuclear material from the facility. The concern is with 5

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i, seismic events in the region of the power plant which could impair offsite emergency response. However, ee9rgency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken under such circumstances.

The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet the SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be controverted in adjudicator / proceedings, but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reviewing or adjudicating l

emergency planning issues. If a larger earthquake were considered feasible, I

then a larger SSE would have been established. If an earthquake smaller than an SSE were considered to be capable of damaging a plant's safety systems, then the plant's design would have been corrected. Thus, emergenc'y plans need not take into account earthquakes larger or smaller than an SSE. Nevertheless, l the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant, and emergency planning efforts recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. A spectrum of potential consequences independent of the particular causes are analyzed in reaching decisions on emergency planning provisions, and the planning basis does not depend upon the particular scenario which may lead to significant offsite l releases of radioactivity. To explicitly consider earthquakes as causes for radioactive releases is inconsistent with the emergency planning basis used by NRC is adopting its regulations.

The Commission intends to consider this issue carefully in this rulemaking and to weigh all arguments before reaching a final decision. In the meantime,

this rulemaking should not be construed to affect the continuing validity of 1

the Commission's ruling in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

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Technical Information l When considering the possibilities of plant damage from seismic events, l

• it is important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabilities, and the potential for reactor accidents caused by seismic event.

l Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion. The first

! class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to the Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE). The OBE ground motion depends on plant location.

These accelerations vary in the range of about .05g to 0.33g. During an DBE, all safety related plant systems would be expected to remain operating.

The second class of events includes earthquakes with ground motion higher j than the DBE but equal to or less than the Safe Shutdown Earthquak'es (SSE);

the ground motion of the SSE is typically about twice that of the DBE. Because probabilities of occurrence have large uncertainties for the SSE, typical estimates are in the order of one in a thousand to one in ten thousand per year.

NRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe shutdown after an SSE. Given an SSE, all seismically qualified equipment would be expected to function to bring the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including l

an SSE would be cause for.an alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in a significant accidental release from the plant. Thus, although such an event would initiate certain emergency plan actions, no offsite response would be required. Only in the event of an accident attributable to multiple unrelated failures of safety related systems due to some undiscovered common cause failure mechanism (such as a major design error), coincident with a earthquake such as an SSE, would there be a situation which would require offsite emergency response when there was extensive offsite damage. The Commission believes that, because of the intensive, continuing review of nuclear safety conducted by NRC, there is an extremely low probability that any such failure mechanisms have been overlooked.

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The final class of events includes all earthquakes with ground motion levels above the $$E. Fragility analysis has been used to estimate the proba-bility of failure as a function of ground motion associated with these earth-quakes. The Zion, Indian Point, and Limerick Probabilistic Risk Assessments

• estimated that ground motion on the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration would be required to damage these nuclear power plants to the extent that s1gnificant 3 release of radioactivity could occur. Some plants, in certain regions, are l designed to withstand earthquakes with such ground motion. These plants are able to resist damage to still higher levels of ground motion because of the l

design margin. It is apparent that the probability estimates for ground accel-l erations which would be required to damage these nuclear power pla'nts to the I

extent that significant release of radioactivity would occur are less than the probability estimates for the SSE for these plants.

Based upon the probabilistic risk assessment results for these three plants, i

the NRC staff considers that for most earthquakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would generally not be expected to pose an offsite radiological hazard. For earthquakes which would cause plant damage leading to immedikte offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would ,not be seriously affected. For those earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage.

However, the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage may be ."of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in over-all risk reduction which could be obtained." CL1-84-12, (Slip Opinion at 5).

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Proposed Rule In the Diablo Canyon decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on i

emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider i those impacts. The chief focus of the rulemaking will be to obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the i

contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning."

i CLI-84-12 (Slip Opinion at 9).

The amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E which the l

f Commission is proposing wo'uld explicitly incorporate in them the

! interpretations in the Commissions San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings. A l new paragraph (e) would be added to 10 CFR 50.47 and a paragraph would be added to the " Introduction" section of Appendix E. The Commission wants to assure that it has the benefits of comments of all interested persons on the subject. The Commission therefore invites comment not only on the text of the proposed rule, but also on the fundamental question of the relationship between earthquakes and emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Commenters should, at a minimum, address the merits of three possible alternatives:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule explicitly incorporating the 1

' Commission's interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon;

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or

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3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes.

1,e Commissio'n would be most assisted by comments which offer specific policy and technical reasons for preferring one alternative over the others.

The Commission is also considering whether to include in this rulemaking i tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events. In that possible case, offsite emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the applicable standards of 10 CFR $ 50.47 and Appendix E would not need to specifically consider the l

impact on emergency response capability of earthquakes, tornadoes or any similar low probability naturally occurring phenomena which are presumed to occur proximate in time with an accidental release of radioactive material i from a licensed facility. Comments on this possible alternative are requested.

f Separate Views of Commissioner Asselstine It should be obvious that emergency planning is a site-specific exercise which is not amenable to a generic rulemaking such as that proposed by the Commission. In carrying out their emergency planning responsibilities, both the NRC staff and FEMA have recognized this. When they consider whether the emergency plan for a particular site is flexible enough to envelope all eventualities, they ccnsider the effects of whatever natural phenomena are most likely to disrupt emergency planning at that site. Thus, they have considered snow in New England, hurricanes in Florida, tornados in the Midwest, and earthquakes in California.

The Commission now tells us, however, that the experts were wrong and that earthquakes are somehow so different fro other natural phenomena that they need not be considered at all, even 1'. avec. of high seismic risk. I 10

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examined the basis for the Commission's conclusion in my separate views on CLI-84-12, the Diablo Canyon order, so I will not repeat here my reasons for disagreeing with the Commission's conclusion. Suffice it to say that I do not believe that there is any reasonable basis for a rule which would treat l

l earthquakes differently from other natural phenomena for purposes of emergency j planning.

In an attempt to counter my criticism of their course of action in the l

l Diablo Canyon case, the Commission has just recently decided to request comment on a possible alternative rule which would also exclude from emergency l' planning " tornados and other low-frequency natural events." I do not believe that such a rule would be in the public interest. While hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes may occur'relatively infrequently, should they cause or occur coincident with an accident or an emergency at a nuclear plant they could significantly disrupt emergency response capabilities. The staff's solution i to this problem has been to require licensees to consider what kinds of effects these natural phenomena cause and to determine whether their emergency plans are flexible enough to deal with these effects. This has hardly been an onerous burden. Thus, with a minimal expenditure of resources, the licensees can prepare for what could be a serious emergency planning problem.

When I agreed to the publication of a rule, I did so with the hope that the Commission intended to carefully and objectively examine the issue of whether and to what extent the complicating effects of earthquakes ought to be considered in emergency planning. I also hoped that the information gathered in the rulemaking would convince the Commission that a rule excluding altogether the considerations of earthquakes was not a wise thing to do. I find, however, that that was a forlorn hope. The Commission is instead intent merely on codifying its Diablo Canyon decision, and is going through with

! rulemaking procedures only so that it can say that it is allowing comment on 11 .

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4 the issue, no matter how meaningless that opportunity for comment turns out to be. Iwillnot,therefore,agrebtothepublicationofarulewithwhichI disagree when the rulemaking procedures are not being used .as they were l

intended, to meaningfully gather information to be factored into the rulemaking i decision, but instead are being used solely to circumvent the hearing process l

l in a particular licensing proceeding.

l PROPOSED FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT l

l The Commission proposes to determine under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations i'n Subpart A 1

of 10 CFR Part 51, that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environmental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 51.20(a)(1). This determination has been made because the Commission cannot identify any impact on the human environment associated with not requiring consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning and because it is an inter-pretation of existing regulation.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis of this proposed regula-tion. The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by the Commission. A copy of the draft regulatory analysis is available for inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Michael T. Jamgochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443-7615.

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PAPERWDRK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT i

This proposed rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),

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the Commission hereby certifies that this proposed rule will not, if promulgated, i

i. have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

i The proposed rule clarifies requirements for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant, licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The [

, electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are i

dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a l

small business found in Section 3 of the Small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.

Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexability Act of 1980.

, LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 ll Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention In:orporation

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by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, l Penalty Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and record-

{ keeping requirements.

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Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgani-zation Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 553 of Title 5 of the United States J

Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is contemplated.

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! PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION & l AND UTILIZAT]DN FACILITIES I

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1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows: 1 AUTHORITY: Sections 103,104,161,182,183,186,189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat.1244, as amended  !

! (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951 (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued j under Pub. L.97-415, 36 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239). Sec-l tion 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issue'd under sec.186, 68 Stat.

955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),

55 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); 55 50.10(b) and

! (c) and 59.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.

2201(1); and il 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are l

l issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(c)).

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2. In 5 50.47 a new paragraph (e) is added to read as follows:

5 50.47 Emeroency plans.

i (e) Emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the standards set forth in this section need not consider the impact on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioactive material from the facility.

3. A new sentence is added as an additional paragraph at the end of the Introduction section of Appendix E to read as follows:

1. Introduction Neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need i

consider the impact of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radion:tive material from the facility.

Dated at Washington, DC, this ___ day of , 1984. .

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samual J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

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I Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rulemaking to 10 CFR Part 50.47 and Appendix E Emergency Planning and Preparedness for 3

Production and Utilization Facilities l

i Statement of the Problem On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudication I that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of ,

potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors.

In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company. et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station. Units *2 and 3). CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the Casuission stated:

The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regu-1ations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe 4arthquake .on energency _ planning._.for_the _intetim._the . _..

proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt nomal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

The Cosnission recently affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceed-  !

ing. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2) CLI-84-12, 20 NRC (August 10,1984). In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergen:y planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts." Slip Opinion at 9. The focus of this rulemaking is to "obtain additional Ea/cs.2

2 information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning."

.!A-Objective The objective of the proposed rule change is: to not consider the impact of earthquakes on emergency preparedness.

The Commission has decided that its previous San Onofre decision was correct i.e., that the' potential impact of earthquakes on emergency plans need not be considered.

The rationale for this decision was restated in the Diablo Canyon (Slip Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized as follows. Nuclear power plants are

-required-to be -designed-to-4afely-shut-down-for-all-earthquakes up to .and . ._

including the " Safe Shutdown Earthquake." or SSE. See,10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A. General Design Criterion 2; 10 CFR Part 100. Appendix A. Accord-ingly, the probability of earthquakes large enough to cause major onsite damage that would result in a significant radiological release from the plant

- is extremely law, and for such large earthquakes, offsite damage could make prior offsite emergency plans premised on normal conditions marginally useful at best. In addition, the probability of the proximate occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant Therefore,

. for reasons unrelated to the earthquake itself is even lower.

there does not appear to exist a set'of circumstances at all likely where the consideration of earthquake impacts would significantly improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor.

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l In addition, as the Commission noted in its Diablo Can3on, decision (Slip I Opinion at 5-6), emergency plans are not rigid documents which become useless if offsite conditions are less than ideal:

Specific consideration has been given in this case to the effects of other relatively frequent natural phenomena. The evidence includes the capability of the emergency plan to respond to disruptions in communications networks and evacuation routes as a result of fog, severe storms and heavy rain. In the extreme,

these phenomena are capable of resulting in area-wide disruptions similar to some of the disruptions which may result from an earthquake.... Thus, while no explicit consideration has been given to disruptions caused by earthquakes, the emergency plans do have considerable flexibility to handle the disruptions caused by various natural phenomena which occur with far greater frequency than do damaging earthquakes, and this implicitly includes some flexibility to handle disruptions from earthquakes as well.

Although the Conslission's remarks were directed to the Diablo Canyon emergency plan, the noted flexibility is found in all nuclear power reactor emergency <

plans. Such plans do address the contingency that emergency actions may need

--- -- --. -to -be -taken --ander less-than-ideal conditions _and-.with__less _than-maximum .. ___

emergency response capabilities.

The ability to take protective actions throughout the plume exposure pathway (EPZ) could be hampered during the life.of the plant by temporary adverse conditions resulting from natural phenomena such as rain, snow, flooding or ,by activities in the vicinity of the plant such as major road repair. Existing NRC regulations require that emergency plans be comprehen-l sive and flexible enough to assure the capability to take appropriate protec-tive action to mitigate the effects of a nuclear emergency under such conditions. Similar types of adverse conditions could result from earthquakes below the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which occur proximate in time with

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4 an unrelated accidental release of nuclear material from the facility.

However, emergency plans which meet the standards ir. 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can and will be taken under such circumstances.

While the Commission intends to consider this issue carefully in this rulemaking and to weigh all arguments before reaching a final decision to be ambodied in the regulations. it should be clear from the San Onofre and o;

Diablo Canyon decisions that the existing rule established by precedent is not to consider the effects of earthquakes in emergency planning. This interpre- -

tation of the Commission's regulations must be considered binding unless altered by the outcome of this proceeding. All, Commission adjudicatory panels should follow the rule of these cases pending its modification, if any, as a result of the rulemaking. Parties to adjudicatory proceedings.any attempt .to

. . . . . __show. ".special cfrcumstances"._ pursuant _to _10_CFR 2.758 if_they_believe_this __._ _._

interpretation of the Commission's rules should not be applied in a particular case. .

Alternatives One alternative would be to revise 10 CFR 50.47 to require that emergency l

l plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes. The staff believes this to be an $ appropriate alternative because of the flexibility of existing emergency plans as well as the very low probability of the occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant.

Another alternative would be to adjudicate the issue on a case-by-case basis.

l The staff believes this to be an inappropriate alternative kcause it would be l

ve ,

i 5 extremely time consuming and at the same time would necessitate the unwarranted expenditure of extensive NRC staff resources. The proposed rule change is the best alternative available for achieving the specific regulatory objective.

x Consequences MRC The staff believes that the consideration of earthquake would not improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor.

Other Government Agencies The proposed rule change does not have a significani impact on othe'r ,

. government agencies because it is an interpretation of existing regulations.

Industry

- De-proposed-amendment-will -not--greatly-affect the industry since _ .

licenses are required to have approved emergency response' plans which are flexible enough to assure that appropriate protective measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear emergency.

Public The proposed amendment will have no effect on the public as adequate emergency preparedness at nuclear reactors will still be assured.

Impact on Other Requirements The proposed rule change has no impact on other NRC requirements.

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6 Constraints No constraints have been identified that affect the implementation of the proposed rule.

Decision Rationale The technical decision rationale that the staff used is based on techni-cal information regarding seismic events.

tihen considering the possibilities of plant damage from seismic events, it is important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabilities and potential for such events. Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion. The first class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to the Operating Basis Earthquake (08E). The 08E ground motion depends,on plant location. These accelerations vary in the range ef-ebout :05g to-dog-(higher-in -areas-of-high seismicity).Jr.ing _an __

OBE all safety related plant systems would be expected to remain operating.

The second catss of events includes earthquakes with ground motion higher

' than the OBE but equal to c7 less than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE); the ground motion of the SSE is typically about twice that of the OBE. Because probabilities of occurrence have large uncertainties for the SSE, typical l

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estimates are in the order. of one in a thousand to one in ten thousand per year. MRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe ,

shutdown after an SSE. Given an SSE, all seismictlly qualified equipment would be expected to function to bring the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including an SSE would be cause for an alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in m- -- .~., - - , _ - . - . _ - - . - - .-.. ,, .. <, ...._, _-.._..--.... - -. . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . .

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7 a significant accidental release from the plant. Thus, although such an event would initiate certain emergency plan actions, no offsite response would be required. Only in the event of multiple unrelated failures of safety related systems due to some undiscovered connon cause failure mechanism (such as a major design error), coincident with a severe earthquake such as an SSE, would there be a chance of an accident which would require offsite emergency response when there was extensive offsite damage. The probability of these two events occurring proximately in time is very much lower than the probability of either one, perhaps on the order of one in a million per year.

The final class of events includes all earthquakes with ground motion levels above the SSE. Fragility analysis has been used to estimate the probability of failure as a function of ground motion associated with these

-- earthquakes-The Zionr-Indianfoint 4nd-L4merick-probabilisticJisk_ Assess-ments estimatad that, in general, ground motion on the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration would be required to damage a nuclear power plant to the extent that significant release of radioactivity could occur. Of course, same plants, such as those in high seismic regions, are designed to withstand earthquakes with ground motion this high; they would resist damage to still higher levels of ground motion. The probability estimates for such ground accelerations are significantly less than the probability estimates for the SSE for these plants (the Zion, IP, and Limerick SSEs are .17g, .15g, and .15g respectively).

Based upon the probabilistic risk assessment results for these three plants, the NRC staff considers that for most earthquakes (including some

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earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would generally not be expected to pose an offsite radiological hazard. For earthquakes which would cause plant damage leading to immediate offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would no+ oe seriously affected. For earthquakes which cause more severe offsite draage, such as disabling a siren l

alerting system, the earthquake itself actr as an alerting system. For those' earthquakes which cause very severe daar.ge to both the plant and the offsite l area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage. Howe'ver, the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage may be of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in overall risk reduction which could be obtained.

It should be noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

-- - --reviews effsite radiological-emergency-planning and preparedness _to_ insure _the__

adt.quacy of Federal, State, and local capabilities in such areas as emergency organization, alert and notification, communications, measures to protect the i public, accident assessment, public education and infomation, and medical support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake consequences and response are not part of this process related to radiological emergencies.

Also, FEMA has coordinated planning for the Federal response to radiological -

emergencies including comunercial nuclear power plant accidents. These efforts have resulted in FEMA publishing the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan in the Federal Register (49FR35896) on September 12, 1984. In addition FEMA has an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes hazards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties,

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l planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning and preparedness 1 activities. FEMA believes that all of these activities are sufficiently flexible to complement each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

For general background on emergency planning at nuclear facilities, the public is referred to NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-06541/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1. " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" The latter document, devel-oped jointly by the NRC and FEMA, forms the basis for both NRC and FEMfi j - -- egulations on amergency-planning.at auclear power _ facilities.__Also available . _

for public inspection are the complete case records for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon proceedings, both of which deal specifically with the earth-quake /amergency planning interface.

Implementation In order to be responsive to Commission direction, the staff has estab-11shed the following schedule for publication of the proposed rule change.

Proposed Rule Published in Federal Register -10/20/84 30 Day Comment Period - 11/30/84 1

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RES TASK LEADER EVALUATION

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- 4nnual Office Review The Comission is proposing amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Ap-pendix E which will explicitly incorporate into the regulations the Comission interpretations in the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings.

The Issue To Be Addressed The Comission has ruled in previous adjudications (Diablo Canyon and San Onofre) that its regulations do not require the consideration of potential im-pacts of earthquakes on emergency planning for nuclear reactor sites. The Comission now proposes to provide explicitly through amendment of its regu-lations in 10 CFR Part 50 that such consideration need not be given. Pending completion of this rulemaking, the interpretation of its rules set out in the l adjudications remains in effect.

l The Necessity and Urgency for Addressing the Issue This proposed amendment to 10 CFR Part E0 responds directly to the Com-mission's Order CLI 8412,' In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Compagn (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2), dated August 10, 196,,

Moreover, this rule change will codify the Comission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions relating to the considerations of the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning.

Al'ternatives to Rulemaking One alternative would be to revise 10 CFR 50.47 to require that emergency plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes. The staff believes this to be an unappropriate alternative because of the flexibility of existing emergency plans as v211 as the very low probability of the occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant.

Another alternative would be to adjudicate the issue on a case-by-case basis.

The staff believes this to be an inappropriate alternative because it would be extremely time consuming and at the same time would necessitate.the unwarrant-ed expenditure of extensive NRC staff resources. The proposed rule change is the best alternative available for achieving the specific regulatory objec-tivp.

!iow The Issue will be Addressed Through Rulemaking This rulemaking will not permit consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning. A new subsection (c) would be added to 10 CFR 50.47 and a sentence would be added to be " Introduction" section of Appendix E.

How the Public, Industry, and NRC will be Affected as a Result of Rulemaking l

FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness and, therefore, would be affected by the promulgation of this proposed rule change. Therefore, the NRC staff consulted with the FEMA staff during the development of this paper. FEMA concurs in the proposed rule change.

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The staff anticipates that there will be no decrease or increase in cost to the NRC, State and local governments and to licensees associated with the proposed rule change because it is interpretative in nature.

NRC Rescurces And Scheduling Needed For The Rulemaking It is not known of further resources will be needed at this time.

Thefollowingschedu(basbeenaccomplishedy o Proposed Rule Published in Federal Register 12/21/84 Comnent Period Extended 3Q Days 2/27/85 C Final Rule Published,5/1/85] tDh\15 N

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Coq 11anceAssessment The following is a quality control review of the proposed rulemaking that would not permit consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning. The proposed amendment contains:

o Draft Commission Paper o Draft text of Rule o Draft Regulatory Analysis o Draft Congressional Letters o copy has been sent to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) on 12/28/84.

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9 USER OFFICE COORDINATION

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ACTRON-flAWHeah bue Apal T cd  % UNITED STATES N

<- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O

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< 0 WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

• ;E j P.PR 0 81985

/ MAR 211985 MEMORANDUM F0R: Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM: Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION TO ED0 CONCERNING WHETHER TO CONTINUE WITH ONG0ING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY RES Enclosed for your concurrence is a draft recomendation to the EDO supported by the draft annual review concerning whether to continue with an ongoing rulemaking sponsored by RES for which your office is identified as the user office.

This memorar.dum constitutes my concurrence in the enclosed ' draft recomenda-tion. I plan to dispatch this memorandum with the enclosed draft recomenda-tion to the RES Independent Review Board, two weeks from the above date.

l Please provide your concurrence by returning this memorandum with or without coments on the draft recomendation as indicated below.

/.

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1 Frank P. Gillespi , Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosures:

As stated ,

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.. e Receipt acknowledged. Concur with coments.

Receipt acknowledged. Concur with comments as follows:

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dward L. Jordan, irector Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement I

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