ML20206E596

EDO Control of Rulemaking Package Re 10CFR71, Packaging & Transportation of Radioactive Matl, Allowing Change of Activity Limits for Certain Waste Shipments.Continuation of Rulemaking Not Approved Until Satisfactorily Explained

ML20206E596
Person / Time
Issue date:	02/13/1985
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Minogue R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
References
NUDOCS 8606230453
Download: ML20206E596 (66)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:' p sLatuq f ~k UNITED STATES i [' g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 7.

y WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 FEB 131985 MEMORANDUM FOR

Robert R. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING By memorandum of February 13, 1984, " Control of NRC Rulemaking by Offices Reporting to the EDO," Offices were directed that effective April 1,1984, (1) all offices under EDO purview must obtain rqy approval to begin and/or continue a specific rulemaking, (2) resources were not to be expended on rule-makings that have not been approved, and (3) RES would independently review rulemaking proposals forwarded for my approval and make recommendations to me concerning whether or not and how to proceed with the rulemakings. In accordance with my directive, the following proposal concerning rulemaking has been forwarded for my approval. Proposed revision of 10 CFR Part 71, Packaging and Transportation of Radioactive Material, to change allowed specific activity limits for certain waste shipments. (Sponsored by RES - memorandum, Minogue to ED0 dated January 29,1985.) The proposal included: 1. A Regulatory Analysis, 2. the sponsoring office (RES) Director's recomendation to continue the rulemaking, 3. the user office's (NMSS) concurrence with the sponsoring office director's recommendation to continue the rulemaking, and 4. the RES independent review finding that the rulemaking should proceed. I call your attention to Tables 1 and 2 of the Regulatory Analysis accompanying the rulemaking. These tables indicate that the rulemaking, if finalized and implemented, would likely increase nonradiological deaths and injuries due to traffic accidents while only slightly reducing the man-rem exposure at considerable dollar cost. I note that this matter was not addressed in the RES independent review. Consequently, I do not approve continuation of this rulemaking until such time as this issue is explained to my satisfaction, g62g453e60213 ll PDR

1 l 4 2-The NRC Regulatory Agenda (NUREG 0936) should be modified to reflect the status of this proposal. WinC6 Walic J.;;;c:q i William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations V. Stello J. Roe H. R. Denton J. Taylor J. G. Davis P. G. Norry Distribution WSchwink DEDR0GR cf i L_JSniezek Central File l VStello WDircks ED0 rf JPhilips ] l l I d 0FC :DEDROGR

DEDg0GR

DED GR

ED

_____:_a.g._____.: h.______:.. NAME :W M hk e2ek

VS l10

WDircks Ef5R22BWDL -

M ETL MfBG M72iin

helb) k' i ol e w

1. " "'%g UNITED STATES V

ye ,4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [ lt WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 e \\*****/ l JAN 2 S 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULEMAKING: RES REVIEW 0F ONG0ING RES SPONSORED RULEMAKING l l Based on our review of the ongoing RES sponsored rulemaking " Transportation of l LSA Material," RES recommends that this rulemaking be continued. This recommendation, in draft form, has been coordinated with the Office of Nuclear Material Sa'fety and Safeguards. The basis for our recomendation is as follows: ExistingNRCregulationslimitthecontentofLSApacRagbs(whichdonot o have to meet strict NRC accident resistance requirements) based on potential internal radiation hazards which could result from breach of package integrity during a transportation accident. In some cases, these limits are not restrictive enough to adequately limit the consequences of external radiation levels which could result from transportation accidents involving one or more of these packages. This rulemaking would limit the content of LSA packages based on consideration of both internal and external hazards. o Consistency of international and domestic rules enhances safety by unifor-mity of application and applicability of worldwide experience. o The need for new categories of LSA materials as a result of decommissioning activities is close at hand. The direction and scope of this rulemaking has been modified based on comments received from NMSS in the course of this review. The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDR0GR) and to the Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Distribution: h RES Central File R-2913.01 i CIRC /CHRON RAMRB Subject / Reading 4 i DHopkins JMalaro i MErnst FGillespie i Dross RMinogue j JAN 2 91985 MEMORANDU:1 FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations FROM: Robert B. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

CONTROL OF NRC RULENAKING: RES REVIEW OF ONGOING RES i SPONSORED RULEMKING i Based on our review of the ongoing RES sponsored rulemaking " Transportation of i l LSA Material," RES recorrnends that this rulemaking be continued. This recomendation, in draft form, has been coordinated with the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, i The basis for our recomendation is as follows: o Existing NRC regulations limit the content of LSA packages (which do not have to meet strict NRC accident resistance requirenents) based on 4 potential internal radiation hazards which could result from breach of package integrity during a transportation accident. In some cases, these limits are not restrictive enough to adequately limit the consequences of external radiation levels which could result from transportation accidents involving one or more of these packages. This rulemaking would limit the content of LSA packages based on consideration of both internal and i external hazards. o Consistency of international and domestic rules enhances safety by unifor-mity of application and applicability of worldwide experience, o The need for new categories of LSA materials as a result of decomissioning activities is close at hand. i The direction and scope of this rulemaking has been modified based on coments i received from NMSS in the course of this review. The complete RES review l package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDROGR) and to the Director, Office j of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards. i ) F&=c hT.' obert B. Minogue, Director / Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

• m geom %sm n A rA l

-m=> RAMRB:RES B:RES RAMR S DD*

RES DD:RES ES

...f. ~* i ..I /.... / 8.5..,.. ..I/.& /.65.... /.85.........] /.h/.85...,,,, ,,1 S.,,,,,, 1/,,/,85 85 ,l unc ronu ne no-so Nacu eno OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

,h... ... n... c- ..s .. 3 ..3.,..... .. g,,.,. 7.,?.. p.. c- .n. , e s < &. m. y:...,... n. ...._..,.,v.. p :, f J f'.s s '. ~ .r.

s..

s ? ' #' ' N Date

• ..q; ROUTING AND TRAN3MITTAL SUP 2 fC T;

~ E. ;c. W ';.. g.i s a .>, q. r. ~ ,q. h' '[ $r y ..a e i 6%.. :. ;. .{ P ' M, QylQ.- /q-b s TO: (Name office symbol, room number, Initials Date y.;. ). Q,J,q V. - 3...(.~ c .d. ', n# ' -$ - .y" : &.1. .si+ bundong Agency / Post)

1. OEDO (ATTEcnoM : DED R06R )

,,..sp-yx.gi O.y;;f.j_:}:ff..o ..; v... i k...: .. -3*s. ~.M y ' &.':y y. y; .,<. f _s ;: V: Q, .1 L .y,y... :.g...... - '. '. [.,. ':. :.w ':,...,

m..

. a 'f(.~c+:...c.. _..,. V.. %, ; y f g )\\ ,l C (' L ^ .i;7.. ;;;,V.[.:..._., :. q. t i . ' :~ .. _ %,+i '.s.' r %

.J.*:

...s p. _ 4.".s..h..,q g ~ 4 4.[_,., ls,p,.,..','. ( -.y . x : ..,... :.c ; Y' g.

4...

s ,,f,... . m.* ,- ;,...,j.. q ;..i,. o.. z..; u, ..} _ ~ : u. f,y. ;.f. ' _. g '. [,:.r. 3 ;[ '.3 .} y y; g [ .L. ". ' k,'.[ ' f;. p [Act6on File Note and Retum > 4 '. 1 - Approval For Clearance Per Conversation Wq 1i t ' ':,, ' :--...f 3. '~* 1 j.@...... - c^ 7. T '- e. As Requested For Correction Prepara Reply l'y[ ' g(. '.. ' U [f. ' ~ ~. !. C (.2 ~ f '/ [.,lp. Circulate For Your information See Me y:.?.i b.:.~E ..[. O1 Comment Investigate SJgnature T;i ,. e -,- ...+ t.: - p - s Coordination Justify +g :f,y/.' a -.i '.,. ~. f., f :v. - ' ' 'y g C k~t ;

[ Y.. ;;..

. - ' t il - gmgg ,6.g M5 W }', I ' i,,. l f ~. ' ' " ' ',j.:^ '. - l?'f'L

• r._,,

g g ) SA- -... ' Y :... . r T. 4 9 L5A how QM .j. j' .[} -. 3 g m.0Q ff:. -{,f'f l-l Y.. M bN ~' Q (Q 65,g4 f. (: .,T / ..'. } ' " :.N -hl ~ &$7t skih W A n ~T * %: ':G.: J:*'. .c; ...C'.- J '. - -A '.: ;." :., x

.

- l l;*.

p (L654t^3+J 4':.*.. ^ A k% 4r AmW> ~,f..k . 'f;v ,[ ^T f ' ; % q

.fl MD Y gy$5 3 1.

~_; w)- .g'.*'.:..r.[_(J,[,'.[9 ' J ?.. j %G, 1 p 3,?. '.,;9 N. "* ) ;:. ..? q :.,.- aahC& k.... .i*' n w?. i: .o L

r... w w., *.

s? s' ";.. ' l '. W.'.~, . h M. Q(:.L'-l.Q 'Y;. 3 l'.

m:

c..:. . :.. [ J s :;;.: -.,,'. - 9 / y' .?- i f '.?., f.' > '. 4 MJ['.'.* [ # l9. : Q y J.W;;;.y.; '. [;y,. - a, .i " : b '. f.. -. : DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, g{..{ ' ; f.f, g...; ;.;. y /'..s.Jl.l,'U,4 ; lg,. y... clearances, and similar act6ons ...m. 2 FROM: (Name, org symbol, Agency / Post) f Room No.-Bldg. .'j; ; 3 ;..4y.w ; 0: f.; {. 7.- }.g. N l 0 /> (k O) V & i . W ; a ; %:~ s y s :,.y.,).4, -.O.c y hMf %z.. Ptsone No. y l 9t-(j ) - )(o/ V = 4.. 7 %4 .g,,..m C Q n r-SMb ,7 ;yr...@ I(- h?/h -) -v. ..s fr.. N;.: $h.h'.k.a -9 s :.q r.. 4 F(' - 1.@h & #i.,:h 5043-102 ' OMIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76) -1 .p;g g% R~ emermed av csA Ag rewn (4a cnu aoa-11.20s 4

j.;

(..g.,, q:p y..fg,t(;,{., g..; .; -, K-g - V,..g s..c..e. e g, 3,. : mj ,[ j j p. .. ; s# W_u j v! 8&.o. _M 8 s g 7, g _m N. M : 'h hhbMhdbNMMk@Mhh. t [ j l h l I l a L u &a ~m a %m am % m $,Q W,A & g 7 p; k dg;gM ygg. m., \\ 4

o

..+ Muh r $ & n #. n W ' 1 $M:. W L.3& / I @H k iM--- ]: t g) m_ _m.m,ms --mm = v . g hw _rn.__masm-

7 2

g J - i l %-_ ~ n > = " v g .ww g _. ~ - d-l d

jy g

,my-mq= _ t Aj s ~ m un' an Mnign% j --x =.- TI '1cw a s y tMir -- ~-.ame wm M . m n%.~ = %- w- - M_i ggg h'- h! $( kI W.

i I RES REVIEW PACKAGE i

4 4 RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD VOTING SHEET 10: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM: G. A. Arlotto, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULE"A* :M: " TRANSPORTATION OF LSA MATERIAL" AGREE W:TH DRAFT RES REQUEST RIRB V INDEPEN:ENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEETING. IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACrJGE. MODIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATIN'G. INDEPECENT RECOM!iENDATIONS A5 INDICATED BELOW. i COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS: 4 l J h[h / / MEMBER, RIRB Qi&lrr DATE i

_RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD VOTING SHEET TO: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB FROM: K. R.- boller, Member, RIRB TITLE OF RULEt%.'.ING: TRANSPORTATION OF LSA MATERIAL" AGREE WITH DRAFT RES RE0L'EST RIRB [ !!;DEFEfoDEfiT RECOMMEliDATIONS MEETING. IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PAtrJGE. M3DIFY DRAFT RES NOT PARTICIPATING. INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW. COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS: MEMBER, RIRB // /23/E4 DATE

i i RES INDEPENDENT REVIEW BOARD l V0 TING SHEET i j 10: F. P. GILLESPIE, CHAIRMAN, RIRB i i FROM: 0. E. BASSETT, MEMBER, RIRB i i TITLE OF RULE"A'.!!a: " TRANSPORTATION OF LSA MATERI AL" 4 AGREE WIT" DRAFT RES REQUEST RlRB INDEPENDENT RECOMMENDATIONS MEETING. XX l IN DRAFT INDEPENDENT REVIEW PACKAGE. I MODIFY DRAFT RES NDT FARTICIPATING. INDEPENDENT RECOM"ENDATIONS AS INDICATED BELOW. COMMENTS AND SVGGESTIONS: l 1 i l i l Ys O. E. BASSETT MEMBER, R*.RB l NOVEMP".R 26, 1984 0 ATE 1 l k l l' } I i

1 "' NOV 15 1984 ROUTING AMD TRANSMITTAL SUP inRials Date (Na me. ofnee symbol, reem number, 10*. bulld.ng. Agency /Peet)

3. O. E. Bassett, Member, RIRB

g. K. R. Goller, Member, RIRB

3. G. A. Arlotto, Member, RIRB 4.

S. Note and Retum X Action Flie Approval For Clearance Per Conversation As Recuested For Correctaon Propero Reply Circulate For Your Information See Me Comment investigste Signature rWinetton Justify "" " *f G L.SA N M RIRB members are requested to conduct an independent review of the attached RES rulemaking review package and provide the Chairman, RIRB, with their voting sheets indicating their positions on the rulemaking. NOV 261994 Responses by c.o.b. will be appreciated. RAHRB will use the voting sheets to assemble the complete RES review package l for eventual transmittal to the OEDO and the Director l of the user office. DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvels, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions Room No.-Sids. FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency / Post) RAMRB staff-? pn n.. p0RM 41 (Rev. 7-76) seea-nos NI III*I

• cPO: 1903 0 - 101*l29 (732) e l-l I

a TASK LEADER REVIEW PACKAGE WITH DIVISION DIRECTOR CONCURRENCE

MEMORAfsDUM FOR: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations Fl:0!:: Robert B. Minogue Director Office of I.uclear R -gulatory Rcse. arch $UbdECT: CONTRCL OF NRC RL'LEF/11hG: RES REVIES. OF Gh601hG RES SPONSUhED RULEFA.KlhG fwc: on cui r. view uf the or. ping PES sponsored rule.r.akino "Tra:.spcria:hn of LSA t aterii.1," RES recomends that this rulei.. eking bt. continued. This recom.;tidetion, it. crrf t form, h s becn coordinated with the Office of 1:uclear tete:it.1 S fet; cod Stieguards. Finci coments b3 the Directcr, FCI'.S, IMSS, bra i.r. closed as sre draf t l'ES responst s te these car..nts. The Lasis for our recomendation is as follows: i o The need to linit the radioactive contents of ar.y single LSA package to I control external radiation levcis in case of package failure in a trans-portation accident is widely recognized both naticnally and internation-ally. This ruleraaking would satisfy that need. 4 o Consistency of international and domestic rules enhances safety by unifor-ruity of application and applicability of worldwide experience. o The need for new categories of LSA materials as a result of decomissioning activities is cicse at hand. The complete RES review package has been sent to OEDO (Attention: DEDROGR) and l to the Director, Office of Nucleer Material Safety and Safeguards. Rebert E. Minogue, Director Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Er. closures: 1. FCMS/HMSS Corrients dated September 10, 1984, and RES 4 RES Draft Responses D:RES Distribution: RMinogue RES Central File R-2913.01 11/ /84 CIRC /CHRON ,,,,, y bject/ Reading l difhilES ] DD:DRAR0:RE Q

RES

)D:RES

w. w,W g$ala{ol l DHtipKTrfs/mf/T JCMNro i

nst iF llespie Dross lif 84 1 8018 11/a(/84 ?/84 11/'i/84 11[/84 ~ ~ RMinogue c., ,,,, z e 9;z. g r..

6 e .g NRC REGULATORY AGENDA ENTRY

1 l i TITLE: Rule to Amend the Transportation Provisions Per'taining to the Shipment of Low Specific Activity (LSA) Material CFR CITATION: 10 CFR 71 AESTRACT: The proposed amended rule would define._two classes of LSA materials with specified shipping or packaging requirements. The two classes represent a consolidation of'five class'es of LSA materials and solid contamination objects-(SCO) proposed in draft c 1964-regulations of.the International: Atomic: Energy Agency (IAEA). In addition, the proposed rule provides special consideration for the inherent safety associated with the shipment of solid, nonflammable objects which are net-dispersible in water. A new requirement of the amended rule would-impose a dose. rate limit"on LSA materials. This requirement, which is philosophically consistent.with.the proposed 1AEA regulations, is considered necessary to keep current and future LSA shipments within'the. envelope of safety originally conceived for such caterials. This proposed rule would be responsive to PRM-71-1, PRM-71-2 and PRM-71-4. TIMETABLE: o NTRx 1:/::/:4 o<./../g( LEGAL AUTHORITY: 42 USC 2073; 42 USC 2093; 42 USC 2111; 42 USC 2232; 42 USC 2233; 42 USC 2273; 42 USC 5842 EFFECTS ON SMALL BUSINESS AND OTHER ENTITIES: No AGENC*i CONTACT: -Denald R. Hopkins ~Cffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research Washington, DC 20555 301 443-7678 l I 117 I .. l

RULEMAKING AS CURRENTLY PROPOSED

[7590-01) s NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR PART 71 Rule to amend the Transportation Provisions Pertaining to the Shipment of Low Specific Activity (LSA) Material AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMMARY

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to revise its regulations applicable to the shipment of Type B quantities of low specific activity (LSA) radioactive materials to increase the limitsTon~ specific activity of soli.d objects and solidified materials that can be shipped in strong industrial packages, and to impose allimi.t fon'externalira'diation levels which could be expected!if; radiation shielding _were lost as a result of transportation accident. These E regulations apply.to-all:NRC specific-licensees who place:byprdduct, source or special' nuclear material into transportation. The proposed ~ changes would raise'the.. allowedpecificiaclivity for some solidified s waste shipments which are not characterized by high external radiation levels, but would primarily1 reduce? allowable limits"fo'r'some=, resin: waste ~ shipments;frominuclear power-reactors. DATE: Comment period expires Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration cannot be given except as to comments received on or before this date. ~ i 1 M i n

[7590-01) \\ ~ ADDRESSES: Send comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch. Hand deliver comments to: Room 1121, 1717 H St. NW., Washington, D.C. between 8:15 am. and 5:00 p.m. Examine comments received, the environmental impact appriasal, and regulatory analysis at: The NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St. fM., Washington, D.C. / Obtain regulatory analysis (single copy) from: DonaU,R Hopkins, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 443-72?f FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Donald R. Hopkins, Of fice of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 443 7E' SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In August 1979 (44 FR 48234) the NRC proposed extensive changes to its transportation regulations to make them, compatible" with those of the InternationalfAtomic. Energy; Agency-(IAEA). Included in these changes were a substantial revision of regulations governing the transportation of low specific activity (LSA) radioactive material to create a new category of low level solids (LLS) which would have permitted a greater concentratioW of radioactive material in the contents of the package, while imposing greater'restrictionsLon.the-dispersibility of the contents and on the method of shipment. It was subsequently recognized that, while the greater allowable concentrations were justified from the standpoint of potential inhalation hazards, there was no corres-m less / ponding. limit on external radiation levels created by the cestructio$ of f, er w e sh w...'d;triF packagi'np7n a severe transportation accident. Although the current x packaging requirements and the regulatory package design review imposed by NRC when Type B quantities of LSA are contained in a single package a improve the chances of an LSA package surviving transportation accidents, the regulatory review would have been eliminated under the proposal that regulatory control for all quantities of LSA materials be consolidated in the regulations of the Department of Transportaton (00T). Because of 2 N 3

[7590-01) this flaw in the regulatory system regarding external radiation levels, the LSA proposal made in August 1979 was withdrawn until appropriate corrections could be made. DOT also withdrew its corresponding changes to the LSA regulations. The IAEA Me er State experts currently involved in revising the IAEA transport regulations have recognized the need for an unshielded external radiation limit on @}L..I SA package cor. tents and have proposed to add such a limit. An NRC contract report, NUREG/CR-2440 " Transport of low Specific Activity Radioactive Materials" was published in Decembbr 1981. This report identified the numbersland characteristics ;of 'LSA" shipments 'in the United States and described the unshielded external radiation problem. An expansion of the shipment data found in NUREG/CR-2440 has provided more detailed data on shipments containing overf200; millicuries in a single package, and, by appropriate sorting, provided information on numbers of shipments where unshielded external radiation levels exceeded the two limits under consideration. Those limits were 1 rem /hri,at one T I mete [and 1-rem /hr. at' three meters' from the packags contents" excluding consideration of packaging _. shielding.' The data shows that about M M 4 packages per ye'ar in cur _ rent shipments would exceed.a; radiation',levelLof 1 rem /hr. at three meters from the package contents if.all packaging seco shielding were lost in a transport accident; almost M packages per year would exceed a radiation level of.1 re_m/hr. cat ~one meter. This is ~ out of a total of about 150,000Tw~aste.packagesTof~LSA; materials per N i yeard This expanded data and the conclusions to be drawn from it are available in the NRC public document room at 1717 H Street NW., Washingtion, D.C. 20555. It is identified as a memorandum dated November 3, 1983 from Donald R. Hopkins to C. E. MacDonald g c__. and R. G. Page. Single copies of the data are available on request, the contact. Forfeach package which=is dis ~ qualified from'the LSA-category by the addition of an unshielded external radiation limit, the disqualified l ,, material must be shipped in a different way. The alternatives are jeiii~tEIs fol1ows: t l l l 3 1 O

- m f, - N '*f MA4

• e,

/. ~ e l' W L.- /. ['/n r c ad4 e T/'per- -/s d.%-c+1 M. ~[7590-01I '). b d v v cjovy,L p$ gT W.<. M A F $6 Q ) (Ne & 1 y 7 5 m e} i t afe.Ad A ~!N < ri I N ^Ir-l T Devolm a Tyra 9-psdage which will hoic aDgM'e ~ L,ity of material; 2. Reduce the qilantity of r active material in the package, replacing it w* iner rial; 3. Divide content of the packa Qntotwoormoresmaller, ckages; and Solidify the materia _1._to_provida calf.shial* s. Each of these alternatives would be effective in restricting.the maximum > c-exposure of. altransport' worker of 'an?e'mergency, response worker 6o 5 rem ~ ^ in;as'erious[ transportation accident) but only'the first alternative ~ effectively reduces accident risk by surrounding the same radioactive material with a higher grade of packaging. b.c All t Q a /lternativejwould have undesirable _ features associated-with; The first alternative would not affect the material (b4we. w, them. or 1ty I4 quantity in a single ack gp # h t would require the use of expensive TypeBpackaging,each[ecEcs he order of $200 000. If the Type B,

.[

a en uu. id packajes could be used at a fre uency of 25 times a. m.-r.,.c . a wr.+ yeay, it would t"ake y [n ackages valued at' million dollars to replace LSA g. b"1

• If the packages last 10 years, a cost of tis b"I b>t>

a d N ' h eYc' year. million dollars a year is projected. If the lower radiation level limit -ivre were imposed such that h ackages per year are displaced from the LSA a v uo, w... *. category, an investment of milliondollar:s/wouldtransla,teintoan au 7 as 1.x + annual c t of SF million dollars. T second alternative (that 4f mixing ine,rt material wittfa smaller quantityo)/radioactivematerialinthesamepackage)wouldhavethe,.- / effect creating a larger volume of total, waste for the same radio-i acti ty,.-a'nd to increase the number'of waste packages to be trans-poh. Thi,s may increase -normal transport radiation exposures a3d # would increase 'the associated nonradiological rish-due to the" increased p number 6f.,4hipments. More shipments would also increase total Shipping x . costs. 7 4 c c cw ci The tJ p e alternative (that of dividing the contents of a single package into two or more smaller packages) would have no effect on the radioactive + 1 4 k A

[7590-01) s material itself or on the total volume going to waste. The cost of multiple small drums to replace one larger drum would be substantial considering the number used and disposed of each year. Shipping c sts should remain the same since there would be no substantial changes in volume or weight of the cargo. Although there would be a larger number of packages to be handled at both the generation and disposal facilities, there would probably not be big changes in normal radiation exposure from that operation because the same amount of total radioactivity would be handled. The Tourth alte native (that of solid fyMg the waste and providing self shieldingofsomeradiation).mayb[usedasasolutioninitselffor some shipments and used in combination with other alternatives for other shipments. Since soMciification is normally 'a remote process, no addi- / tional radiaticii exposures of significance should result from the process. Theregat[equipmentanditsuseisexpensive,however,withcosts d,ep ddent on the individual operation. The accident risk' associated with LSA waste shipments was estimated (c.J to produce.0008 latent.cancerffstalitiesfper' year;in~1975 and;.0031-latent' ~ cancer fatalities ~in 198p. The s'avingslin' accident risk associated with theradiationlevellimitagionunderconsideration;isivdry~small. If we assume that the 1 percent

• shipments which ngw exceed the 1 rem per hour w c-cf u c,,

at three meters limit constitute percent of the present risk, elimina-tion of most of that risk b .ec ? the use of Type B packages (alternative 1) would eliminiate only eGN e latent cancer fatalities per year in 1985. At a value of eight million dollars per fatality (one thousand. dollars iKOOch per person-rem) this savings in accident risk would be worth $2400~per year, far below the one million dollar an al st of the use of Type B packages. OtheralternativesforsatisYyingfthe propo,sM-elmay cosl....# Maua - a ~ less, but there would be no saving in accident risk associated with them. Therefore,fcost'-effective reduction ~in' accident {cciunted ~among:the reasonsifor]the' proposed regulatoryl_' risk"c -- ~ 7 .... _ hangd. Le 6 Anijntolerab1e consequence 'of a Lsingle ^accidentiis hombtimesiused? ~

to' justify the imposition of a regulatory 1 requirement ~ that woulditeduce 5 f)0,A W 0) W 08 M

l

[7590-01] , ic k.. f that" consequence L-i,7 d ith'effect.on risk'. Current restrictions on plutonium shipments may fall in this category.

However,

failure of an LSA; package'inla transportation' accident-is generallyLnot hem -

associated.with high/ consequences. Limitationjof the specific. activity of the containe'd mate' rial 'was derived!so'that no' individual ~ could ~ receive ~ ~ 'anexposure.frominhaledoring~estedradioa'cgcve material-i excess of $ tr4 ait ' afe-g4 'fs c e

• *V cf ~ ke a* v five rem to the whole, body. /five rem is :

l_

J 1 % below the median lethal dose for a single short radiation exposure where normal medical treatment is available. Radiation dose from the exposure to direct radiation from a damaged package from which g radiation shielding has been lost'in a transport accident is the subject of this proposed rule. The radiation' dose limitation proposed here is for the pro'tectionldf persons who.are involved: in the accident wreekage' before. local authorities arrive. who are competent to measure or otherwise judge the. severity.of the radiation hazard. The persons involved in the accident wreckage may be the truckTdr'ser who stays by the vehicle to survey the damage to his vehicle or cargo, or it maybeapa'sserbiwhoittryingtosavethelifeofavictimtrappedin the wreckage. In either case there'should be-reasonable' assurance that the~ person'will'not. suffer' death or.. serious injury from radiation damage. ~ The'; limitation proposed is that:the~ totally.unshie1ded contests of a single LSA package cannot~ produce ^ radiation levels in excess of one rem per hour'at three meters'from the material. This limitation has to provide adequate protection in a wide variety of circumstances. Consid-erations as to the appropriateness of this level are as follows: 1. The assumption of complete loss of shielding is very conservative. Packages for shipping T,ype B quantities of s u.- nuclear reactor waste one typicallyJtfetween 20 and 30 tons, fabricated with lead shielding enclosed by steel walls. Although this packaging is required to protect only against normal conditions of transport, such packaging is by its nature extrem rugged and resistant to damage by mechanical means. While shielding slump is a realistic consideration, , allowing beams of radiation to escape the package, a total lossofshhdingishighlyimprobablefrommechanicalstresses. i 3 6 h O

[7590-01) J., ~j While a severe transportation fire could melt-tire lead shielding,J causing its lots from the package, the structural walls of the cask (approximately one inch thick) would continue to provide significant shielding to the contained material. An inch of steel would have a shielding effectiveness of about three h5Dr [; -value layers of the LSA waste materials under consideration, reducing radiation levels by a factor of about eight. 2. The scenario which relates high radiation levels after loss of shielding to exposures to people is somewhat general since there are infinite combinations of time and distance from the radiation source which could describe the activities of a vehicle driver or lifesaving activities after an accident. The standard time and distance chosen internationally would have a person standing for three hours at a distance of three meters from the unshielded radiation source. This standard and distance corresponds to anMal dose of three rem if the radiation level at three meters were 1000ge&* mi m per hour. The same individual dose would result from that radia-tion level if the person spent one-half hour at one meter from the radiation source, or if he spent 15 minutes at one meter and 90 minutes at three meters. The trendsLwouldJcertainlyjbe' that;the more: severe theltrans'portation accident, particularly if[there were. a severe fire ' associated with' it?thelle'ss" li_kelyikwould.belthat'peoplewo0ldbeinclosbtothevehicles ~ and its cargo. 3. Another consideration which makes the radiation level limitation proposed here a conservative one is the reluctance of most people to venture close to a wrecked vehicle which has a radioactive placard on all four sides, to venture close to a package which has a radioactive label on two opposite sides, or to override the warnings of the vehicle driver ( if able to provide warnings) that he was carrying hazardous cargo. 4. Finally, the arrival of a local police or fire representative who has had some training in radioactive material emergency , response should result in controls to keep people away from 7 n a

[7590-01] radioactive cargo. Even if this local representative has no radiation measuring instrument to indicate the exter)t of the hazard, he should have had enough training to clear the scene of the accident to a safe distance. j In consideration of the four factors just described, the ' proposed!' rule -includes;a provision whichlallows : considerationofithe" shielding' ability of a steel'shell' completely 1 surrounding the contained; radio-active material. M._, .a ! i l2 S t i n, 3/4" '.t. d. This;gives? some" credit'to the inherent'~ accident resistanc4 of the massive casks" described?infthe preceding text', while~recog ing that a~ severe _trans-portation fire.could melt and cause the release of lead shielding'-in the l cask's? k / ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: NEGATIVE DECLARATION The proposed amendment, if adopted, would not result.in any:activits that effects th'e environment. The Commission has determined under the ~ Naticaal Enviromental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations 10 CFR Part 51 that an environmental. impact statement is not The-=s. w n,laia.,.J 7 s. s u reg r jed for this proposed regulation. ci e vimieu iwou s opp.oisal forming the basis for this determination is available for inspection at the NRC Public Documentation Room,1717 H. St. NW., Washington D. C. / PAPERWORK REDUCTION REVIEW C d c. 7 The proposed rule would reduce the paperwork; burden' associated-with f) shipment of : low specific : activity.(LSA). material. Application to the NRC for approval of packaging for shipment of LSA material would no longer be required. The licensee must continue to substantiate in his own records that the LSA packaging meets the standards set, and must continue to register with NRC his intended use of the general license offered in 10 CFR Part 71 for shipment of LSA material. This proposed rule amends information collection requirements that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seg.) This rule will 8 M D

[7590-01] s be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for review and approval of the paperwork requirements. Cc.. /m REGULATORY ANALYSIS ~ The Commission has prepared a draft regulatory analy sis on this g Theanalysisexaminesthecostsandbenefitsofh proposed regulation. alternativ[consideredbytheCommssion. The draft analysis is available for inspection in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St. NW., Washington D.C. Single copies of the analysis'may be obtained from Donald R. Hopkins, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, telephone (301) 443469fr. 7916". The Commission requests public comments on the draft analysis. Comments on the draft analysis may be submitted to the NRC as indicated under the ADDRESSES heading. I Ccue, x c/TORYFLEXIBILITYACTCERTIFICATION REG t I j In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (5 U.S.C. 605(b)), the Commission certifies that this rule jill:not',iif,promulgatedi have"a significant economic-impact on a;subst' ntial' nuinbefof 'small a entities? Although the rule would apply to a number of small entities engaged in the waste brokerage business, the proposed rule has been designed to avoid significant economic impact. "1 LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 71 Part 71: Hazardous materials - Transportation, Nuclear materials, Packag ng and containers, Penalty, Reporting requirements. ":' S the authority of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended, and 5 U.S.C. 552 and 553, the NRC is proposing to adopt the following amendments to 10 CFR Part 71. 1. Amend the definition of " low specific activity" material in f 671.4 to read as follows: r e m

[7590-01] = Low Specific Activity (LSA) material shall mean material which by its nature has a limited specific activity, or material for which -s w.,_.,--.m,- 1 limits of estimated average specific;a'ctivity(apply'.I External cshieldingimaterials surroundi_ng'the:LSA' materials'shall not'be r conside' red'i_n; determining the estimated' average spe_cificiactivity. ~ LSA material shall be in one of two groups: LSA-Ijf (1) Ores containing naturally occurring radionuclides (e.g., uranium, thorium) and natural or depleted uranium or thorium concentrates of such ores. (2) Solid unirradiated natural or depleted uranium metal, compounds, or mixtures; or solid unirradiated natural thorium metal compounds, or mixtures. (3) A radioactive solid object in which the radioactivity is distributed throughout, the object is not soluble in water, is non-flammable, and the estimated average specific activity does not exceed 5 x 106 A /9-2 (4) A solid object on which: i. the non-fixed surface contamination does not exceed 4 2 (10 4 2 Bq/cm pCi/cm ) for beta-and gamma-emmitters and the low-toxicity a'lpha-emitters, or 0.4 Bq/cm ~ 2 (10 5 2 pCi/cm ) for all other alpha-emitters; and 2 ii. the fixed surface contamination averaged over 1 m ( op 2 the area of the surface if less than 1 m ) does not 2 2 exceed 4 x 104 Bq/cm (1 pCi/cm ) for beta-and gamma-3 emitters and the low-toxicity alpha-emitters, or 4 x 10 2 2 Bq/cm (0.1 pCi/cm ) for all other alpha-emitters." f (5) Contaminated earth in a closed transport vehicle for wh ch the estimated average specific activity does not exceed 10 A. 10 M l M

[7590-01) s LSA-II?3 (1) Material in any form in which the radioa,ctivity is distributed throughoutandtheestimatedaveragespg@ficactivitydoesnot exceed 5 x 10 SA2fg; (2) Material in which the radioactivity is essentially uniformly distributed and the estimated average specific activity does A/9] not exceed 10 4 2 (3) A radioactive solid object in which the radioactivity is distributed throughout, the object is not soluble in water, is non-flammable, and the estimated average specific activity does not exceed 2 A /kg (2 x 10 3 A /9); 2 2 (4) A monolithic solid material in which the radioactivity is distributed throughout a solid, non-flammable, compact binding agent which is relatively insoluble in water such that: i. The estimated average specific activity does not exceed 2 A /kg in any 1% part of the total mass and any mass of 2 10 kg does not contain more than 20 A ; 2 ii. Under loss of packaging, the loss of radioactive material pge package resulting from the immersion test in $71.75(d)(1) is less than 0.1 A " 2 (5) A solid object on which : i. the non-fixed surface contamination does not exceed 40 Bq/cm2 (10 3 2 pCi/cm ) for. beta-and gamma-emitters and the low-toxicity alpha-emitters or 4 Bq/cm2 (10 4 pCi/cm ) 2 for all other alpha-emitters; and ii. the fixed surface contamination averaged over 1 m2 (of 2 the area of the surface if less than 1 m ) does not 11 M

[7590-01] s 2 exceed 8 x 105-Bq/cm2 (20 pCi/cm ) for beta-and gamma-emitters and the low-toxicity alpha-emitters or 8 x 10* 2 2 Bq/cm (2 pCi/cm ) for all other alpha-emitters." 2. Add a new paragraph (b)(3) to 671.10, " Exemption for low level materials," to read as follows: 971.10 Exemption for low level materials. (a) ----- (b) A licensee is exempt from all requirements of this part, other than S71.5 and S71.65, with respect to shipment or carriage of the following packages: (1) ---- (2) ---- (3) A package containing only low specific activity materials in category LSA- [ [ M N. n sC a,w s e 3. Add a new section 71.26 to read as follows: 571.26 General license: Low specific activity material. (a) A general license is issued to any licensee of the Commission to transport, or to deliver to a carrier forit = :p -+, d ex m.e m e % n:p low specific activity material (LSA) in strong industrial packaging as defined in the regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation in 49 CFR 173.403 " Definitions". (b) This eneralilicense applies ~only when the ,, o f 1.6 i d^l any single p'ackage is so restricted that the_ externa 1I ~ radiationilevel:at three meters from the unshielded contents ~ does not exceed 1000 millirem / hour. For packages which have a steel shell et L i ....cm P ':5 completely w..... , surrounding the radioactive contents, that steellshell can be considered.in evaluating.the limitation of;thisfparagraph. ~ 12 L o

.o 4, pe,M 7/. Gw X 'x x x y k., D.C., Y _ ) Oa i a' s \\' /- > / 9 S' 3 3 Em W< /M-8 5 C. n=a 3 C l nw 9 13 O

TASY LEADER EVALUATION I

TASK LEADER REVIEW 0F RULE TO AMEND THE TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE SHIPMENT OF LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY MATERIAL 1. Screening Process Issue o be addressed. The LSA regulations are to be modified to cover additional types of low specific activity materials (e.g., materials from decomissioning operations) and to limit potential hazards from external, as well as internal, radiation resulting from accidental release of LSA materials in transit. The radioactive content of any single package will be controlled to limit the external radiation level potential in a transportation accident which causes package failure. New definitions of LSA materials will include slightly radioactive, massive objects, expected from decommissioning operations in the next few years, for which regulatory packaging is not very practical. The modified LSA regulations are expected to be consistent in many respects to the LSA regulations of the International Atomic Energy Agency in its Safety Series Number 6, 1984. Necessity and urgency for addressing the issue. Compatibility with IAEA and inclusion of new types of materials within the LSA scope are routine functions for which normal processing is adequate. There are concerns however that failure of a package containing a large quantity of LSA material in an urban environment could have severe consequences, including protracted loss of public transportation networks. The Director, FCMS, NMSS, bel.ieves these_ concerns are serious enough that the rule change should be considered urgent.' Alternatives to rulemaking: Although exceptions to current rules and imposition of new rules could be accomplished without rulemaking action through licensing activities, the wide applicability of the rules makes it inappropriate to modify individual licenses to impose the requirements. How the issue will be addressed through rulemaking. A Notice of. Proposed Rulemaking would define two classes of LSA materials with specified shipping or packaging requirement,. The two classes represent a consolidation of the LSA_ definitions in IAEA. ..The. proposed rule wo'ld provide.special' consideration for the,' regulations. u

inherent l safety associated with the shipment.of solid, non-flammable'

^ t . objects:which are not dispersiblezin _ water? The, proposed rule ~ would 1mpose .an-accident dose rate' limit and'aTlimit on.the quantity of; radioactive ~ material (in'a single package. The proposed rule would be negatively responsive to PRM-71-1, PRM-71-2, and PRM-71-4, all asking that NRC leave the regulation of LSA materials to the Department of Transportation. The proposed rule would have NRC continue to regulate Type B quantities of LSA material shipped in a single package.

2 Effect on public, industry, and NRC. The rule,wil.1 reduce. the~ risk of? loss?offpublicitransportationi networks ~as a. result of=a; transportation' accident 1 involving. low specific activity material. The primary impact of achieving this gain would'be a1 costrimpactiof;asLyet unknownLmagnitude to be borne by the regulated industry! NRC resources and scheduling. The development of the proposed rule thus far has consumed hundreds of staff-hours" of effort and several division director level meetings trying' ' to find agreement on what restrictions to apply. The' task was begun in 1982 with a first draft position distr.ib to the_p.rogram office by memo dated June 2, 1982._. Staff; agreement hasuted,been reached.on!a general now. approach to the proposed rule assset;forth'in a memorandum dated June 15, 1984. The schedule calls for a Notice of; Proposed Rulemaking to.be, issued by Jun'e 1985, with the final rule to be issued a year later. :Two: staff r years of effort would be required to complete the rulemaking action. Preliminary judgement. Based on the problem to be addressed, the urgency ascribed to the issue, and the limited alternatives available, our sunnaryfjudgment is'to L proceed withithe rulemaking'. action. 2. Quality Control Evaluation As a rule of general applicability to al1 power reactor licensees, the proposed rule _will be proc.essed through-CRGRD There is likely to be a geduction in recordkeeping requirements because the licensing staff is not expected to continue'its present practice of review and approval of all packages containing Type B quantities of LSA materials. In the future, only packages of LSA materials which exceed the radiation level or quantity limits prescribed for LSA packages must be of_a design approved by NRC. There is adequate' technical ' data' available 'oni the' numbers and' ~ characteristics.of LSA; shipments to support the rulemaking ~ arid the ~ regulatory analysis associated with Lit. ~ It. is not clear where datawill ~~ <be obtained on.the.Limpacts of protracted; loss ofLpublic. transportation ~networksi However, because similar, but less severe impacts are associated with transportation of non-radioactive materials, it is reasonable to believe that some information will become available. There are no policies or planning guidance associated with this rulemaking action except to carry out the: mandate' ofEthe Trade Agreements 1 Act of M .1979 that international standards'be considered when11mposing domestic? regulation.s. 3. Draft Recommendations on Continued Rulemaking ~ ~ The recent staff agreement on an' approach to this rulemaking' action (as set forth in the June 15, 1984 memorandum);must now'be reflected in the3 associated lregulatorya'nalysis.' Assuming no new considerations, the I.

I 3 proposed, Federal,; Register Notice can be drafted around this: approach and the ~ SECY paper drafted.. Division review'will be' requested prior'to a request for office concurrence. Coordination with the Department of Transportation will be necessary because a corresponding rulemaking action will be necessary by DOT. The paper should be drafted for_. Commission approval since heavy reliance-is' expected :to' be' placed on limiting economic. consequences of transportation' accidents._a precedent setting consideration. 1 I i

I 1 l SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION i I I 1

DRA:I REGULATORY ANALYSIS FOR LSA RULE A. Statement of Problem B. Objectives C. Alternatives D. Consequences of Alternatives 1. Consequences of Technical Alternatives (Cost / Benefits) Alternative 1 - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to a. i rem / hour at 3 Meters b. Alternative 2 - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to i rem / hour at 1 Meter 2. Consequences of Administrative Alternatives (Cost / Benefits) l Alternative 2 - Define Two Classes of LSA Materials a. b. Alternative 2 - Adopt IAEA Classifications for LSA Materials and Surface Contaminated 3. Impacts on Other Requirements 4. Constraints e E. Decision Rationale F. Implementation 1. Schedule 2. Relationship of Other Existing or Proposed Requirements G. References H. Appendices (Supporting Calculations) _y y m y

9 REGULATORY ANALYSIS A. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM The proposed action addresses (1) a technical issue regarding appropriate limitations on~ materials ~which can be' classified as LSA'and (2) an atiinis-trative issue regarding the fomat forfdefining various" subclasses of LSA madrialsi The technical issue involves the pefinitionlofan(appropriate" unshielded Exterriallradiation~ level limitatiorr for LSA;mateNals - the imposition of which would keep current and future LSA shipments within the envelope of safety originally conceived for these materials. In this analysis, the./en-velope of safety is defined by the magnitude of potential impacts to the gen-eral public and individuals. The impacts are assessed through the use of a hypothetical accident scenario described in the appendix. The proposal for ~ an external radiation level limit is generally consisten,t with theiactions ~of the. International Atomic Energy Agency. The outstanding issue involves the numerical magnitude of the proposed limit. The adeninistrative issue involves the selection of the proper format to be used to define the relationship between various classes of LSA material and appropriate packaging / shipment requirements. i Action is necessary at this time for two major reasons: (1) to minimizelthef likelihood tiat a ' transport accident involving LSA materials ~ ~couldTcause~ exces- ~ ~

2 sive-impacts and (2)l.tolettain'.'thd aUropriats' degree ~ oflonsisterky.with pro- ~~.. posed international regulationsiin ejudiciousitimelframe, l m NRC regulations governing the shipment of LSA materials are currently descri- ~ i bed in 10 CFR 71' and are consistent with 1967 IAEA regulations. IAEA regula-tions now allow higher specific activity radioactive materials to qualify as LSA, subject to the external radiation level limit identified in Alternative Withoutie'nyllimitif sig'nificant pusiic.or; individual; impacts could result ? 1. jo51owing s3 vere accidehts ?involiing th$se higher.s'pec'ificiactivityI LSA mate-rials: Taking no action would be contrary to the NRC statements made in the latest 10 CFR 71 revision. B. OBJECTIVE The objective of-this; regulatory action is 'to' place an unshielded radiationi level;. limit on the radioac'tive contents of. an LSA.l package ~in transportation so that the benign nature of LSA material can continue to be used as a basis for minimal packaging and shipment requirements. C. ALTERNATIVES Two' sets ~ of alternative ~s are identified to resolve the technical and a&1inis-trative issues. The first set includes two unshielded radiation level limits which can be identifief as reasonable. alternatives to resolve the technical i issue. The second set of alternatives identifies two. approaches for' defining ~ classes of LSA'r.aterials with differing packaging or shipment requirements. i i i i

. 1. ALTERNATIVES TO RESOLVE TECHNICAL ISSUE Currently, the definition of LSA material includes uranium or thorium ores or ore concentrates, unirradiated natural uranium or thoriurn, depleted uranium, limited activity tritium solutions and other radioactive materials which meet tabulated specific activity limits. The derivations of these limits have been based onl eialuations' of individual $radiologicalleUosures resultini from po~ ten-tial accident scenarios ~ in"which' inhalation' of LSA material ~was: assumed to be the most'~significant~ exposure patheay. Under the current LSA limit, shipments of dewatered spent resins, solidified evaporator bottoms, and filter materials have been made from nuclear power plants. These ma'terials,could pfoducetacci - ~ dent' impacts in.which potential external exposures rather than inhalation ex2 posuresJcould' dominate rad 5olog'icallimpactito specific' individuEls. Based on an evaluation of a hypothetical accident scenario (described in the appendix), two external radiation level limits can be identified as reasonable technical alternatives. Each provides for the protection of.an individual ~in the event' of a serious' transportation' accident involving' release'o.f LSA matefisis. The limits, which are assumed to apply' to unshielded LSA materials, are (ll.l' rem /hr whole body or equivalent at three meters 1'and_ (2)li jem/hr whole body or' equiva-11entatonelmeter. Imposing no exposure limitation is not considered a viable alternative because the potential individual radiological exposures which could result from the loss of package shielding or a release of material to the en-vironment could be excessive.

-4 2. ALTERNATIVES TO RESOLVE ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUE LSA materials can be divided linto' classes ;for which specific ' requirements for ~ ~ packaging. integrity and shipment; restrictions could be~ imposed. The IAEA, in the 1984 revision of its regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, (reference 1) has proposed three classes of LSA materials and two classes of surface contaminated objects (SCO). For these material classes, three levels of containment integrity are defined. Each material class is assigned a required level of packaging integrity which can vary depending on whether the shipment is made in an " exclusive use" or "not-in exclusive use" conveyance. The proposed IAEA matrix of LSA classes, containment integrity requirements and shipment restrictions can be simplified by reducing to two the number of LSA classes and incorporating the surface contaminated objects within these classes. Two alternatives, therefore, can be identified as reasonable to resolvefthe. administrative issue: (1) define two classes of' LSA materials representing a consolidation of the five classes of LSA materials and surface contaminated objects (SCO) pro-posed in the 1984 regulations of the IAEA or (2) use the classes proposed by IAEA for its11984 ' regulations. ~ I b 6

, ] l D. CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVES 1. CONSEQUENCES OF TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES The costs and benefits of the two technical alternatives are based on an assess-ment of the public health and economic impacts associated with their implemen- ~ tation. These impacts 'are assessed:as differential's using the impact' associa- 'tedMithithe cu'rrentiLSA regulatory requirement as' a ~ baseline. The definition of this baseline relied on an NRC contractor report, NJREG/CR-2440, " Transport of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Materials," published in December 1981. This report identified the numbers and characteristics of LSA shipments in the United States during 1980. From detailed printouts of the report's shipment data base, infomation was derived on the number of shipments which could be affected by the proposed alternative limits on unshielded external radiation. Once identified, the cost and benefits of meeting the proposed new requirements were developed. t a, Alternative 1 - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to lirem/ hour at 3 Meters An evaluation of the above referenced infomation indicates that disposal sites i received 455 LSA packages which would not meet the proposed radiation limit. ~ In all cases, these packages involved large shielded: liners containing reactor l resins or waste solidified in cement. Typically, a single shielded overpack containing a liner makes up a shipment; however, for smaller liners, 3 packages l l l 1

_ _ _ _ _ _. _ - per shipment are possible. The unshielded; point source radiation levels cal-culated for these 455 shipments are as follows: Calculated Unshielded Radiation Level l Number of Shipments at 3 Meters-144 (resin) 17 rem / hour 144 (cement) 4.7 rem / hour 23 (resin) 3.3 rem / hour 144 (resin) 1.4 rem / hour For all but the last 144 shipments, the most cost-effective and practical al- ~ ternative shipping option would involve replacing _.the current'LSA packaging with an NRC. certified' Type!B' waste package. Based on existing packages, the capacity of a Type B package is assumed to be one-half that of an LSA package.* For the remaining 144 shipments, the assumption is made that the quanti.ty of' contents in a: single package would be reduced to meet thellfrem/hourLunshielde'd radiation level limit. Such action would cause the, number of. shipments to in~- ~ crease by a factor of 1.4; Partially offsetting the costs associated with these changes, a small economic benefit results from the use of Type'B packages. This benefit is based on the fact that Type B package use would reduce the occur-rence frequency of accidents leading to material release thereby reducing the expected cost of cleanup. With these assumptions, the economic costs of this alternative are illustrated in Table 1. The reductionfin capacity. depends on content ~ form and the. type of: secondary ~

containers' required. Existing LSA material packages are typically designed to contain liners or 55 or 30 gallon drums.

D l

7-The;public health impacts of this-alternative includela'small increase in the: radiological and non-radiological risks associated with the increased number of shipments and a,small decrease in the potential radiological risk ' associated ~ with~ transportL accidents. (resulting from both.the oroposed radia' tion limit andl .th'e use of Type B packages). These impacts are evaluated in terms of differ-ences in estimated population doses from norral and abnormal shipment activities. In addition, the reduction in the maximum individual dose from potential acci-dent situations is evaluated. These differentials are also shown in Table 1. i Table 1 Estimated Public Health and Economic Costs - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to I rem / hour at 3 meters PUBLIC HEALTH ECONOMIC Additional Traffic Deaths 0.012/3r Differential Package $917,000/yr. Costs Additional Traffic Injuries

0.24/yr Additional Normal Exposures 2.0. manrem/yr Cost of Extra Shipments $934,000/yr Reduction in Potential 4.5 manrem/yr Reduction in Accident

($17,000)/yr Accident Exposures Recovery Costs Max. Potential Individual

68 rem

• to Dose Reduction 14 rem Total 51,834,000/yr Based on questionable shipment data.

19 rem rey ~ be a more accura'te worst case estimate.- t 9

_ _-. b. Alternative 2 - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to I rem / hour at 1 Meter An evaluation of the same reference cited under the discussion of alternative 1 indicates that disposal sites received 2309 LSA packagesLwhichLwould.not; meet ~ the~proposeddose:ratellimitation. Of these packages, 1175 were large shielded liners containing reactor resins or waste solidified in cement. The remaining 1134 packages were drums containing similar contents with the addition of a few packages containing filter material. As noted previously, a single liner typi-cally makes up a shipment; however, many drums could be included in one shipment. No detailed information regarding number of drums per shipment was available. The unshielded point source radiation' levels

• calculated for these shipments are as follows:

Calculated Unshielded Radiation Number Level at 1 Meter 144 liners 153 rem / hour 144 liners 42 rem / hour 23 liners 30 rem / hour 144 liners 13 rem / hour 288 liners 5.3 rem / hour 144 liners '~__ _4J_ rem /hou r ~lTi2 Wuns" 3.4 rem /hou F 162 drums 3.3 rem / hour 486 drums 2.7 rem / hour 144 liners 2.7 rem / hour 162 drums 2.2 rem / hour 162 drums 1.8 rem / hour 144 liners 1.4 rem / hour 2309 At a distance of 1 meter, the point source assumption would lead to an.over prediction.of radiation levels. l l For all but the lowest radiation level liner shipments, the most cost-effective and practical alternative shipping option would involve replacing)the. current LSAl packaging with NRCLcertified. Type B packages. Again, based on a capacity reduction of 1/2 for Type B vs. LSA packages (see footnote, Pg. 6),1031 of the liner shipments would be accomplished as 2062 Type B package shipments. The re-maining 144 liner shipments would be made as 201 liner shipments with reduced contents to meet the limiting radiation level. The 1134 drums identified above are assumed to be included as items in exclusive use vehicle shipments. It is further assumed that 10 of these drums are in-cluded in the interior of a single shipnent 50 as to provide required shielding. Reducing the contents of the affected drums to meet the radiation limitation would lead to an increase-in-the number of _ drums shipped.from 1134 to 3045. The need to ship -1911~ additional drums could_ involve approximately 191' additional shipments. The costs associated with these changes are shown in Table 2. As with alternative 1, the small economic. benefit associated with the reduced fre-quency.of radioactive material release' due toLths use of; Type B_ packages _is; als^o indicated. t N i Table 2 Estimated Public Health and Economic Costs - Limit Unshielded External Radiation Level to i ree/ hour at 1 Meter i Public Health Economic Additional Traffic Deaths 0.04/yr Differential Package Costs $3,000,000/yr Additional Traffic Injuries 0.8/yr; Cost of Extra shipments 53,ll4,000/yr Additional Normal Exoosure 7.0 man-rem /yr-Reduction in Potential 8.5 man-rem /yr Reduction in Accident ($80,000/yr) Accident Exposures Recovery Costs 56,034,000/yr Max. Potential Individual 68 rem

• to 0.44 - 1 rem **

Dose Reduction Based on questionable shipment data. 19 rem may be more" accurate worst' case - . estimate. 1 rem applies to cleanup worker limit. 0.4e rem applies to all other involved individuals. The oublic health.. impacts cf.this alternative. include a smail: increase in.the radiological land non-radiological; risks associated withl.the'-increase'd numberio'f-- shipments and a small. decrease.in'the potential radiologi:al= risks. associated

withl transport accidents (resulting from both the proposed. radiation ' limit and the.use of Type B packages). Again these impacts are evaluated in terms of differences in estimated population doses for norwel and abnormal shipment activ-ities.

In addition, the reduction in the maximum individual dose for potential L accident situations is evaluated. These differences are shown in Table 2. n-

_ 2. CONSEQUENCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE ALTERNATIVES a. Alternative - Define Two Classes of LSA Materials The two classes of LSA materials defined in this alternative represent a con-solidation of the five classes of LSA and surface contaminated objects proposed in the 1984 Revision of the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radio-active Materials. In the IAEA proposed revision, one of three levels of contain-ment integrity is specified for each of these five classes depending upon whether the shipcent is, or is not, made in an exclusive use vehicle. The staff has reviewed the proposed IAEA revision and has concluded that the com-plexity associated with the definition of five classes of materials, three con-tainment integrity levels, and the exclusive /non-exclusive nature of the vehicle used for shipment is not warranted. The proposed alternative defines two classes of materials, LSA-1 and LSA-II. All categories of material contained within the five classes defined in the IAEA draft regulations are included under one of these two classes. The only difference in required containnent integrity level between the two alternatives involves non-soluable, non-flamable, solid objects with radioactivity distributed throughout the object. This alternative exempts such materials from all requirements of 10 CFR 71, other than 571.5 and 571.65, if the estimated average specific activity does not exceed 5 x 10-6 A2/ gram. For simi-lar material, the draft IAEA regulations would set the exemption limit at 10-4 A /9'- 2 The factor.of 20idifference'is; believed _ by the. staff to be;a prudent conservatism to account for the-potential:non-unifatdistribution of radioactivity withiri these materials. The major benefits, of:the 5 x'10-6 A / gram limit-would be-thatr 2 individaul doses under accident conditions.(assuming an tinhalation-pathway) would \\

_ _ - -. be. lim'ited;to values of.less than Il-31 ren even.if. it is assumed that the distriE bution of radioactivity within! he material varies bha factor of 20. The eco-t nomic-impact of this. difference is m'inor since the number of shipments of mate-rial exceeding the proposed limit is not expected to be significant. A second difference between the draf t IAEA standard and this alternative invol-ves the required use of exclusive use vehicles for all LSA-I shipments in alterna-tive 1. In contrast, the proposed IAEA standard would allow ores containing natu-rally occuring radionuclides, solid unirradiated material or depeleted uranium or thorium compounds or mixtures, and SCO-I defined, solid contaminated objects to be transported in non-exclusive use vehicles if only minimal packaging

• is pro-vided. The staff believes that these minimal design requirements do not specifi-cally address the capabilities of the packaging design to withstand handling mis-haps so that they should not be allowed in non-exclusive use transport.

The major benefit of. exclusive use shipments would be a reduction-in -individual exposure to package. handlers. Again, no; economic cost can be-calculated since.a need for non-exclusive use vehicle shipment cannot-be identified. b. Alternative 2 - Adopt IAEA Classifications for LSA Materials and Surface Contaminated The cost and benefits of this alternative have been discussed in (1) above. The design requirements for this packaging include withstanding the effects of any acceleration, vibration or vibration resonance during nonnal trans-portation. Design requirements against nonnal dropping events during hand-ling are not required. I t.

1 3. Constraints (To be added) E. Decision Rationale (To be added) F. Implementation (To Be added) 1. Schedule (To be added) 2. Relationship of Other Existing or Proposed Requirements (To be added) 1. Schedule 2. Relationship of Other Existing or Proposed Requirements i 1 s 1

a-a G.

REFERENCES:

Ref. (1) Third Draft Revision of the IAEA Regulations for Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials, Safety Series 6, 1984 Edition, Published by DOT on February 15, 1983. Ref. (2) Transport of Low Specific Activity Radioactive Materials, NUREG/CR-2440, December 1981. i I t t 4 4 4 ,_--,.,.--,,.n----._,..,,n.n_.,. H. APPENDICES (Supporting-Calculations ) i i

i APPENDIX SUPPORTING CALCULATIONS DIFFERENTIAL SHIPPING PACKAGE COSTS BASIC ASSUMPTIONS (1) TYPE B PACKAGE COST $300,000 (2) COST OF LSA PACKAGE FOR TYPE B QUANTITY SHIPMENTS $150,000 (3) PACKAGES CAN BE USED 25 TIME / YEAR (4) DISCOUNT FACTOR 0.163 10 YR LIFE 101 INTEREST (5) CAPACITY OF CUTTENT LSA PACKAGE 2 CAPACITY OF TYPE BE PACKAGE COST OF ALTERNATIVE PACKAGINGS - ALTERNATIVE 1 5.Vk.r-( 311 CURRENT LSA PACKAGE SHIPMENTS t-622 TYPE B SHIPMENTS 144 CURRENT LSA PACKAGE SHIPMENTS 7-201 REDUCED CAPACITY gr,ge SHIPMENTS W 12b CURRENT LSA PACKAGES 25 TYPE B PACKAGES / %:f 6 CURRENT LSA PACKAGES T 8 SIMILAR LSA PACKAGES

• P AANNUAL COST OF PACKAGE TYPE CHANGE = (25 x $300,000 - 12h x $150,000) 0.163

= $917,000 COST OF ALTERNATIVE PACKAGINGS - ALTERNATIVE 2 es6k r-Y 7,,vy 4 5) s 1031 CURRENT LSA PACKAGE SHIPMENTS

r 2062 TYPE BE SHIPMENTS 144 CURRENT LSA PACKAGE SHIPMENTS e-201 REDUCED CAPACITY SHIPMENTS ADDED DRUM COSTS, ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCED CAPACITY SHIPMENTS NEEDED FOR 1134 "0VER LIMIT" DRUMS, ASSUMED TO BE INSIGNIFICANT 41 CURRENT LSA PACKAGES

?- 82 TYPE B PACKAGES 6 CURRENT LSA PACKAGES

r 8 SIMILAR LSA PACKAGES

• a ANNUAL COST OF PACKAGE TYPE CHANGE = (82 x $300,000 - 41 y $150,000)0.163

= $3,000,000 THE ADDITIONAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED USE OF EXISTING LSA PACKAGES IS INCLUDED IN ESTIKATES OF SHIPPING AND HANDLING COSTS. y---

__ ___. DIFFERENTIAL SHIPPING & HANDLING COSTS BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ROUND TRIP DISTANCE 1000 Mi MILEAGE COMMODITY RATE (FOR ONEWAY DIST.) $3/Mi CASK USE FEE & HANDLING (FOR ONE WAY DIST.) $1.50/Mi WEIGHT SURCHARGE (3) $500/ CONTAINER NOTES: (1) NO IMPACT FOR DIFFERENTIAL DISPOSAL CHARGES WAS ASSIGNED, ASSUMIN3 TOTAL VOLUMES OF WASTE MATERIAL NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED. (2) NO RADIATION SURCHARGE WAS INCLUDED FOR DISPOSED MATERIAL. ANY ADDITIONAL COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH INCREASED NUMBER OF PACKAGES HATERIAL ARE ASSUMED TO BE COMPENSATED BY THE LOWER SURCHARGE ASSIGNED TO PACKAGES WITH LOWER SURFACE RADIATION LEVELS. (3) WEIGHT SURCHARGE APPLIES TO ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS OF 20,000 LB LINERS h Pr Ps 04 ug OR DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN 2-10,000 LB, LINERS VS 1-20,000,LB LINER. (4) NO CURIE SURCHARGE WAS INCLUDED. SURCHARGE REDUCTION ASSOCIATED WITH CURIE / SHIPMENT REDUCTION ASSUMED TO BE BALANCED BY INCREASED NUMBER OF SHIPMENTS. l i L

17 - COSTS OF DIFFERENTIAL SHIPPING AND HANDLING ALTERNATIVES ALTERHATIVE #1 ANNUAL SHIPPING COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS USING = & HANDLING COST EXISTING PACKAGES + COSTS ASSOCI ATED WITH ADDITIONAL TYPE B PACKAGE SHIPMENTS + ADDITIONAL HANDLING COSTS gf 44fD s See a 0.4 x 144 x $2250 + 311 x $2000* = + 366 x $500 = $934,000/YR ALTERHATIVE #2 ANNUAL SHIPPING SAME FACTORS AS ALTERNATIVE il + COST OF ADDITIONAL = & HANDLING COST DRUM SHIPMENTS 0.4 x 144 x $2250 + 1031 x $2000* = + 1088 x $500 + 191 x $2000** = $3,114,000 Jo,rr-x W /* $250 CASK USE FEE ASSUMED TO BE INCLUDED IN ADDITIONAL PACKAGE COST $250/ SHIPMENT DIFFERENTIAL IS ASSUMED BETWEEN SHIPPING AND HANDLING COSTS FOR TYPE B VS. LSA PACKAGING SHIPMENT

. HEALTH EFFECTS BASIC ASSUMPTICNS: t'* j.t. ((,[I 2.'e ACCIDENT FREQUENCY (TRUCK) 1.6 x 10-6 accid /mi ~ FRACTION OF ACCIDENTS RESULTING ( IN SIGNIFICANT MATERIAL RELEASE: f# f. , } i' W W *{~ CURRENT LSA PACKAGINGS 0.09 4 }s TYPE B PACKAGINGS 0.004 5 s ASSUMED NORMAL MAN-REM / SHIPMENT 0.006 4 /g,ff TRAFFIC FATALITIES / ACCIDENT 0.02 o 03 TRAFFIC INJURIES / ACCIDENT 0.4 e, fj ALTERNATIVE 1 ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC FATALITIES = 368 x 103 x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.02 = 0.012 ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC INJURIES = 368 x 103 x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.4 = 0.24 ADDITIONAL NORMAL MAN-REM = 368 x 0.006 = 2 ALTERNATIVE 2 ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC FATALITIES = 1279 x 103 x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.02 = 0.04 -6 ADDITIONAL TRAFFIC INJURIES = 1279 x 103 x 1.6 x 10 x 0.4 = 0.8 ADDITIONAL NORMAL MAN-REM = 1279 x 0.006 = 7 t l L DIFFERENTIAL ACCIDENT IMPACTS ALTERNATIVE 1 BASE CASE EXPECTED = 455 x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.09 x 500 NO. OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS ALT. #1 = 0.032 ACCIDENTS /YR ALT. #1 EXPECTED NO. = 201 x 1.6 x 10-6 0F SEVERE ACCIDENTS + 622 x 1.6 x 10'g 0.09 x 500 x 0.004 x 500 = 0.015 ACCIDENTS /YR BASE CASE ALT. #1 = 151 MAN-REM ACCIDENT EXPOSURE ALT. #1 ACCIDENT = 25 MAN-REM EXPOSURE DIFFERENTIAL REDUCTION = 0.032 x 151 - 0.015 x 25 IN ACCIDENT EXPOSURE = 4.5 MAN-REM /YR ALTERNATIVE 2 BASE CASE EXPECTED = 2309 x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.09 x 500 NO. OF SEVERE ACCIDENTS ALT. #2 = 0.26 ACCIDENTS /YR ALT. #2 EXPECTED NO. = (201 + 1325) x 1.6 x 10-6 x 0.09 x 500 0F SEVERE ACCIDENTS + 2062 x 1.6 x 10~6 x 0.004 x 500 = 0.18 ACCIDENTS /YR BASE CASE ALTERNATIVE #2 = 35 MAN-REM ACCIDENT EXPOSURE ALT. #2 ACCIDENT EXPOSURE = 2.5 MAN-REM DIFFERENTIAL REDUCTION = 0.26 x 35 - 0.18 x 2.5 IN ACCIDENT EXPOSURE = 8.5 MAN-REM /YR i i

. i i COST SAVINGS - ACCIDENT IMPACTS ASSUME $1 MILLION CLEANUP COST FOR ACCIDENTS INVOLVING MAJOR RELEASE OF RADI0 ACTIVITY ALTERNATIVE 1 (0.032 - 0.015)106 = $17,000/YR DIFFERENTIAL COST SAVINGS = ACCIDENT IMPACTS j ALTERNATIVE 2 (0.26 - 0.18)l06 = $80,000 DIFFERENTIAL COST SAVINGS = ACCIDENT IMPACTS i

HYPOTHETICAL ACCIDENT SCENARIO \\ A set of people who could be exposed as a result of an accident are hypothesized as follows: (A) Driver (2) (B) Accident Victims (2) (C) Emergency Personnel i) Fireman (4) ii) Police (1) iii) Rescue (2) (D) Police - Forming exclusion area (3) (E) Public Overlookers (10) (F) Clean-up Workers (5) It is assumed that the truck is driven by a team of two people, which is routine for long-distance hauling. The accident involves another vehicle in which 2 other individuals are riding. We will assume that 2 of the 4 people involved in the accident are injured severely enough that they cannot move themselves away from the innediate accident scene. Responding to the emergency are 2 police cruisers (each with two officers), a fire unit (4 firemen) and a rescue unit (ambulance) which has two attendents. A small group of onlookers gathers at the edge of the accident. ) While the number of onlookers varies with time, it is as-sumed that 10 equivalent people are present for the duration. The same number ik of person hours could be accumulated by 10 people present for the entire time,l or 40 people present only one-fourth of the time. A clean-up crew of 5 is assumed I to take responsibility for cleanup of the accident scene. D 1 1 1 4 "p

\\ . 1 The exposure times may be estimated as follows: for the two occupants involved in the accident who can nove around, an exposure time of 30 minutes at an effec-tive distance of 2-4 meters (avg. 3m) is assumed. The occupants who cannot move are assumed to acctsnulate 1 hour of exposure at a 1-2 meter (avg.1.5m) distance. The fire fighters are assumed to respond and complete their task in about an hour. During this time they are constantly moving about and may well step inside of the contaminated zone as a direct consequence of their job. An equivalent time of 1 hour at 2-4 meters (avg. 3m) is assumed. Rescue personnel are assumed to respond, free, and treat the injured occupants. They are aiced by one of the police officers responding. An exposure time of 30 minutes at 1-2 meters (avg.1.5m) is assumed for these three individuals. For the more serious types of accidents where occupants are trapped, a greater number of rescue workers may be involved in the operation. However, it is assumed for simplicity that the total exposure of the rescue workers may be represented by the three individuals outlined above. The other three police officers are assumed to work at crowd and traffic control. Their distance from the source will be greater, and they are unlikely to be close to the source for any significant period of time. These three officers are also assumed to represent those individuals who maintain the restricted area during the clean-up operation. An exposure of 2 hours at 10-30 meters (avg. 20m) is therefore assumed for the initial exposure, after which they are moved back to a radiation level of 2mr/hr for 10 hours. i

. Members of the public will inevitably gather at the scene of any~ accident. The crowd will be especially large during the early phases, and gradually disperse "after the excitement is over." Other individuals will be briefly exposed as they travel past the scene. To estimate the collective exposure of these on-lookers, etc. the exposure of 10 individuals for 2 hours at 10-30 meters (avg. 20m) and 10 hours at 2 mr/hr has been assumed. Obviously, it is unlikely that any single individual will be present for the entire 12 hour period, so the individual exposure calculated for this group of members of the public will represent a con-servative maximum of the individual exposure of an onlooker. The period of clean-up is whatever is required (up to 12 hours). During this time the workers are assumed to be controlled so no individual exceeds an exposure of 1 rem. Limitations may be applied and exposure reduction techniques such as shield-ing and remote handling devices may be used to control exposure. i 1

USER OFFICE CONCURRENCE

UNITED STATES 4 NUCLE AR RFGULATORY COMMisslON y-j .j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 z hM kU '4, ,o ....+ MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Office ~of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards FRON: Frank P. Gillespie, Direcfor Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research SUBECT: DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS TO EDO CONCERNING WHETHER AND HOW TO CONTINUE WITH ONGOING RULEMAKING SPONSORED BY RES-- TRANSPORTATION OF LSA MATERIAL Enclosed for your consideration are draft recommendations supported by a draft office review concerning whether and how to continue with an ongoing rulemaking sponsored by RES for which your office is identified as the user office. This second draft takes account of the comments contained in your memorandum dated August 10,1984. This memorandum constitutes my concurrence in the enclosed draft recommenda-tions. I plan to dispatch this memorandum with the enclosed draft recommenda-tions to the Director, RES, two weeks from the above date. Please acknowledge receipt by returning this memorandum with or without comments on the draft recommendations as indicated below. (ys> b Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosure:

As stated (LSA Rule) Receipt Acknowledged. No comment i Receipt Acknowledge. Comments as follows: Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards 4 t l I

/ nb\\M kd 5 J O g d^S',V / p*"4 Ts fI g?g CO Q, UNITED STATES y ' p, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION \\ hf 7l [p h 5 l WASHING TON, D. C. 20555

• .,*****/

&'4')9c'J@c SEP 101984 Vf Y d 'p) MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank P. Gillespie Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, RES h 4 M @Xh FROM: Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS o

SUBJECT:

DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS TO EDO CONCERNING RES SPONSORED LSA RULEMAKING $N ~ We have reviewed the draft recommendations to the EDO, submitted with t your memorandum of August 29, 1984, concerning whether and how to continue t with the LSA rulemaking. We concur with your recommendations to procede,

1. U I t

but believe the supporting information couldIbe significantly improvedi Our comments on the supporting information are enclosed. f ~ Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS

Enclosure:

As stated

( COMMENTS ON " TASK LEADER REVIEW 0F RULE TO AMEND THE TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO THE SHIPMENT OF LOW SPECIFIC ACTIVITY MATERIAL" Comments on Page 1 Paragraph 1 " Issues to be addressed." The paragraph probably should say the definition of LSA materials will be changed to limitithe types.;and-' amounts off radioactive' material ;that can be: transported -in packages that will not : withstand a transport accident. We also question inclusion of the third sentence which states LSA materials are those "for which regulatory packaging is not very practical." The practicality i of packaging should not determine whether materials are declared to be LSA. Paragraph 2 " Necessity and urgency for addressing the issue." We do not understand the meaning of the first sentence. Also, the last I sentence seems to waffle the question of.how urgent the rulemaking is considered to be. We believe a stronger statement should be made. Paragraph 3 " Alternatives to rulemaking:" It is not clear to us how new requirements on LSA shipments can be imposed through " licensing activities." Also, we do not understand how " exceptions to current rules," as stated, could result in the imposition of new requirements. Comments on Page 2 Paragraph 4 Ouality Control Evaluation We do not understand the second sentence which reads, "There is likely to be a reduction in recordkeeping requirements because the licensing staff is not expected to continue its present practice of review and approval of all packages containing Type B quantities of LSA materials." Some clarification of the sentence would be helpful. l i

Q R F T~ RES RESPONSES TO NMSS COMMENTS ON INTERNAL REVIEW 0F TRANSPORTATION LSA RULE 1. NMSS Coment--State that LSA definitions will limit types and amounts of radioactive material in LSA packages. RES Response--There is no intention to limit LSA package content through the LSA definitions. The LSA definitions proposed in the NMSS memo dated June 12, 1984 did not limit quantities in LSA packages. The quantity limitation will likely be a condition of the LSA general license. 2. NMSS Coment--Question third sentence which states LSA materials are those "for which regulatory packaging is not very practical." Practicality of packaging should not determine whether materials are declared to be LSA. RES Response--The NMSS logic is impeccable, and we agree that impracti-cality of packaging does not by itself justify an alternate package scheme. Unfortunately, the quotation criticized was taken out of context. The full sentence discussed "slightly radioactive, massive objects, expected from decommissioning operations in the next few years, for which regulatory packaging is not very practical." This description provided both the justification and the need for an alternative packaging scheme. 3. NMSS Coment--We do not understand the meaning of the first sentence under " Necessity and urgency for addressing the issue." The sentence reads i

2 " Compatibility with IAEA and inclusion of new types of materials within the LSA scope are routine functions for which normal processing is adequate. RES Response--This paragraph is distinguishing between two of the issues to be addressed in the rulemaking (i.e., compatibility with'IAEAiregula- ^ tions and the addition iof new; types.1of materials' to if.e'LSA definition), and the third issue of controlling the single package content for the purpose of limiting external radiation levels in case of package failure. The fir ' sentence simply states that consideration of the first two issues can be handled routinely (i.e., without any special urgency). The following sentences suggest that there are some concerns which would impart a sense of urgency to our consideration of the third issue. We will make those latter sentences more clear and specific with respect to your concerns. 4. NMSS Comment--It is not clear how new requirements on LSA shipments can be imposed through licensing activities. RES Response--Imposition of new LSA requirements through licensing activities was suggested as an " alternative to rulemaking," but not as a preferred alternative. What we had in mind was some condition on the LSA package approvals that would limit the allowable contents of that package design to whatever NRC decides is acceptable, in much the same way that conditions of package design approvals already limit the package contents.

3 j S. NMSS Comment- "Also, we do not understand how ' exceptions to current rules,' as stated, could result in the imposition of new requirements." RES Response--The text of the supporting statement does not seem to say that the " exceptions" result in new requirements. The comment is not applicable to that phrase. 6. NMSS Coment--We do not understand the second sentence under " Quality Control Evaluation" which reads, "There is likely to be a redur. tion in recordkeeping requirements because the licensing staff is not expected to continue its present practice of review and approval of all packages containing Type B quantities of LSA materials." RES Response--Present NRC regulations require that a package to be used for transporting Type B quantities of LSA materials must have its design reviewed and approved by NRC prior to its first use. As a result of the LSA rulemaking, the LSA packages over which we want to exercise design approval control will be more closely defined and only a small part of the packages now being approved will be subject to the design-approval requirement. Although the NRC design review of the remaining packages will be more stringent because they will be Type B packages, the overall change in recordkeeping requirements should be a reduction.

l 4 1 Since this background information should be well known within NRC trans-f portation staff since it is the Transportation Certification Branch which f' performs the reviews and which anticipates a need for fewer reviews in the l future, the sentence being criticized here appears adequate to make the reduced recordkeeping point. { j s } l l i 1 .}}