ML20205P799
| ML20205P799 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/26/1987 |
| From: | Hebdon F NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD) |
| To: | Jordan E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205P752 | List: |
| References | |
| AEOD-E704, NUDOCS 8704030375 | |
| Download: ML20205P799 (2) | |
Text
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4 March 26, 1987 AE0D/E704 MEMORANDUM FOR: T W M M ; Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement FROM:
Frederick J. Hebdon, Deputy Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
SUBJECT:
DISCHARGE OF PRIMARY COOLANT OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT AT PWRs WHILE ON RHR COOLING Enclosed for your information and use is a recently completed AEOD engineering evaluation report on operational events involving the discharge of primary coolant outside of containment at PWRs while on RHR cooling. Seven operating events which occurred at different PWRs in the last nine years were identified and evaluated in the study. These events were primarily caused by human errors and insufficient procedures associated with the operation of the RHR system in the shutdown cooling mode. The personnel errors were primarily caused by inattention or lack of training; while the procedural deficiencies were related to omissions or lack of specificity in sequential valve operations when conducting tests on the RHR system.
If the loss of primary coolant is not terminated in a timely manner, these types of events could eventually progress into loss of RHR cooling situations with a containment bypass. Recovery from upset conditions while on RHR cooling is complicated by the lack of automatic plant responses. Procedures covering these situations may or may not exist.
If they are available, they are usually diagnostic in nature to cover the many degraded plant configurations that are possible during plant shutdown operations. The potential of significant offsite dose exists for the types of events considered in this study because of containment bypass.
Because of the moderate safety significance associated with these operating events, it is suggested that an information notice be issued by the Office of 4
l Inspection and Enforcement to alert the licensees to the observed problems and potential safety significance associated with these events.
I l
i R
ORG R
Edward L. Jordan If you have any questions or comments, please do not hesitate to contact either me or Sanford Israel (x24438) of my staff. We shall be pleased to meet with you or your staff to discuss this matter.
onsmusmeadtr
- c. J. m Jr.
Frederick J. Hebdon, W puty Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data
Enclosure:
As Stated cc w/ enclosure:
G. Holahan, NRR B. Boger, NPR B. Sheron, M. Beaumont, W R. Borsum, B&W L. Gifford, GE C. Brinkman, CE T. Guynn, OCM DISTRIBUTION:
PDR AE0D CF AE0D SF ROAB SF ROAB CF SIsrael SRubin WLanning KBlack FHebdon CHeltemes, Jr.
Plam 0FC :ROAB cq3
- RCAB:SC
- ROAB:BC
- AEOD
- AEOD:D gg'_____:____________:___________
doh____::CQ NAPE :SIsrael:nc :Plam
(( M :SRubin
- F temes DATE:3/p9/87
- 3/i9'/87
- 3/ll/87
- 3 87
- 346c/87
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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