ML20205L931
| ML20205L931 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 03/27/1987 |
| From: | Sutko P KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#287-2967 OL-5, NUDOCS 8704020226 | |
| Download: ML20205L931 (65) | |
Text
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y 00LKETED USNRC March 27, 1987
'87 HM 31 P4 :32 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OF FILL.
00Chlim 1"*
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board
)
In the Matter of
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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
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Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
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(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
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Unit 1)
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SUFFOLK COUNTY MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF LILCO ' S TES'2. MONY ON CONTENTION EX 50 Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.743(c), Suffolk County hereby moves to strike those portions of LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50 which improperly seek to provide testimony on:
1.
FEMA-graded exercises relating to nuclear power plants other than the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station ("other exercises") as being (a) irrelevant to the issues raised in Contention Ex 50, and (b) beyond the scope of Contention Ex 50; and 2.
A " content analysis" of the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment Report (the " FEMA Report"), because LILCO improperly withheld the analysis from Suffolk County during discovery in this proceeding; 3.
An analysis of the FEMA Report based on NUREG CR-3524, because LILCO failed to disclose during discovery that this analysis had been performed.
For the reasons set forth below, those portions of LILCO's testimony which address (1) other exercises; (2) the above-mentioned content analysis; and (3) the above-mentioned analysis 8704020225 870327 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G
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i of thd FEPp Report based upon 'NUREG CR-3524 should be stricken.
In the' alternative, if the Board denies th Motion, the Board
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will need to order LILCO to produce documents for re, view and i
witnesses for deposition.
This obviously will impact the trial s
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schedule.
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j The County is filibg this Motion on Contention Ex 50 well before the deadline for strike motions because the' Board's ruling 4
will dictate how the County conducts witness preparation and prepares for trial.
The County,thus respectfully requests the s
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s Board to schedule early argument on this motion so that a prompt decision can be rendered.
s I.
LILCO's OTHER EXERCISES TESTIMONY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTENTION EX 50 i
1 Contention Ex 50 focuses upon a' single issue,'the
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Governments' allegation that:
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[t]he (February?l3, 1986] exercise demonstrated that LILCO's Plan is t
l fundamentally flawed in that members'of LERO, as well as the personnel of various i
organizations upon which LILCO relies for implementation of the Plan, are unable to carry out effectively or accurately the LILCO i
Plan because of inddequate training.
As its language reveals, Contention Ex 50 focuses solely upon the actions of LERO personnel.
The contention does not address, directly or indirectly, the actions of other personnel at other nuclear plants.
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l Nevertheless, LILCO attempts to introduce into evidence the results of sixteen (16) FEMA-graded exercises for nuclear plants other than Shoreham.
These data are irrelevant.
The other exercises LILCO seeks to explore 1/ involve:
(1) different plants;1/
(2) different offsite plans;1/
(3) different scenarios; (4) different exercise objectives; (5) different personnel; (6) different mobilization procedures;i/
i (7) different geography; (8) different local conditions; I
1/
If LILCO's testimony regarding other exercises were allowed 7
into evidence, adjudication of Contention Ex 50 would be
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i lengthened significantly.
The circumstances underlying each of LILCO's 16 other exercises would have to be reviewed in order to determine whether the FEMA-Post Exercise Assessment Report for each comports with the gloss placed upon the Report by LILCO's consultants.
Moreover, exercises in addition to LILCO's handpicked 16 exercises, which may be less favorable to LILCO, also would have to be discussed at length.
If LILCO's other exercise data are allowed to remain in LILCO's testimony, the Governments will rebut such data, and this Board should i
recognize, as must LILCO, that extensive cross-examination of LILCO witnesses about each of the 16 other exercises will be a time consuming, but most necessary, process.
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Indian Point, Oyster Creek, Ginna, J.A.
Fitzpatrick, Salem, and Nine Mile Point.
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LILCO's Plan is unique.
Never before has a plan solely relied upon private personnel to attempt to protect public health and safety.
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In its testimony on Contention Ex 40, LILCO has conceded, as it must, that "[u]nlike any other nuclear power station emergency exercise, where partial samples of field personnel [were]
mobilized and evaluated by-FEMA, the February 13 Exercise involved the mobilization of all LERO field personnel." (Emphasis supplied.)
Testimony of LILCO on Contention Ex 40, at 3.
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(9) dif ferent -levels of state and local' government participation;1/
(10) different training regimens;i/ and (11) dif ferent criteria used' by FEMA to evaluate performance.1/
i Moreover, these other exercises occurred over a five-year period, j
during which FEMA personnel, FEMA guidance documents, and the i
. scope of emergency planning were undergoing constant change.
Thus, no relevant comparisons can be made between the 1/
Egg footnote 3, above.
The Shoreham Exercise represents the first time FEMA has evaluated an offsite-exercise performed solely by utility employees, without any state and local government participation.
That was not true for Indian Point, Oyster Creek, Ginna, J. A.
Fitzpatrick, Salem or Nine Mile Point, the other exercises against which LILCO seeks to compare its l
February 13, 1986 performance.
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The LILCO training at issue in Contention Ex 50 bears no resemblance to the training provided personnel at the other exercises LILCO attempts to incorporate into its testimony.
The other exercises evaluated trained emergency response professionals (police, fire, etc.).
In contrast, these types of-trained professionals did not participate in the Shoreham Exercise.
Instead, LILCO used non-professional personnel in its Exercise.
LILCC,, therefore, unlike utilities in the other exercises cited in its Contention Ex 50 testimony, had - to develop f rom scratch an entire training program which attempted to convert, for example, meter readers into police of ficers.
Such an extensive training program was not necessary in the other exercises LILCO cites.
As a result,.there is no basis to believe, and none is provided by LILCO's testimony, that training was as carefully scrutinized in the other exercises as'the Governments have done with LILCO's February 13, 1986 Exercise results.
As LILCO seeks to compare apples and oranges, its testimony is irrelevant.
1/
Even LILCO must concedc that the criteria used by FEMA.to evaluate player performance at the various exercises cited in its Contention Ex 50 testimony has changed, not once, but several.
times, over the last six years.
Sgg LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50 at 28-29.
Nevertheless, LILCO attempts to compare exercises evaluated under ~ the dif ferent and outdated FEMA grading systems with the criteria used by FEMA on February 13, 1986.
In and of itself, this makes LILCO's other exercises testimony irrelevant.
1 LERO training program as evaluated by FEMA on February 13, 1986, and the different training programs differently evaluated by different FEMA personnel at different plants over an earlier one-half decade period.
II.
LILCO's OTHER EXERCISES TESTIMONY ALSO SHOULD BE STRICKEN SINCE IT IS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF CONTENTION EX 50 Contention Ex 50 is narrowly drawn.
It focuses only upon LILCO's training program.
No mention of other exercises is found anywhere in Contention Ex 50.
LILCO knows that testimony must fall within a contention's scope before it is admissible.E/
LILCO has violated this rule by attempting to include other exercise data in its Contention Ex 50 testimony.
Since Contention Ex 50 does not refer to oter exercises, and since other exercises data cannot reasonably be construed to be probative of the Contention Ex 50 issues, LILCO's prof fered "other exercises" testimony is beyond the scope of the contention and should be stricken.
III.
PRIOR BOARD RULINGS SUPPORT SUFFOLK COUNTY'S MOTION TO STRIKE LILCO'S OTHER EXERCISES TESTIMONY During earlier stages of the Shoreham emergency planning hearings, the Licensing Board (then chaired by Judge Laurenson) ruled that the only plan at issue was LILCO's so-called S/
Sgg LILCO's Motion to Strike portions of Suf folk County's Testimony on Contention Ex 41 and LILCO's Motion to Strike portions of Suffolk County's Testimony on Contention Ex 40 as j
examples of where LILCO has sought to strike testimony as being outside the scope of admitted contentions.
" Transition Plan," which called for implementation without State or local covernment carticioation.
Egg Order Limiting Scope of Submissions (June 10, 1983).
On this basis, the Laurenson Board consistently excluded from the hearings evidence concerning other plans.
In one particular instance very similar to the present issue, LILCO attempted to introduce testimony and documentary evidence regarding State of New York plans for accidents at nuclear plants within New York State other than Shoreham.
See Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro et al. on Contention 92 (State Emergency Plan) at 3, 5, Attachments 1-9 and Attachment 11, ff.
Tr. 13,899.
The State and Suffolk County filed motions to strike the proffered testimony on grounds that it was irrelevant to evaluating LILCO's Plan.
The Laurenson Board agreed that the only plan at issue in the proceedings was LILCO's Plan, and struck major portions of LILCO's profferred testimony, ruling that such testimony was irrelevant.
Egg Tr. 5562-67.
Egg also Suffolk County Motion to Strike Portions of LILCO's Group II-A Testimony, at 26-27 (March 9, 1984); Motion of Governor Mario Cuomo to Strike Portions of the Testimony of Matthew C. Cordaro and John A. Weismantle on Phase II Emergency Planning Contention-92 (State Emergency Plan) (March 9, 1984).
By the same token, LILCO's attempt to raise training issues regarding FEMA-graded exercises other than the Shoreham Exercise also should be rejected. :
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IV.
LILCO'S REFUSAL TO PRODUCE THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE FEMA POST-EXERCISE ASSESSMENT, WHICH IS.THE BASIS OF TESTIMONY FILED BY LILCO ON CONTENTION EX 50, REQUIRES THE BOARD TO STRIKE ALL PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY AND ATTACHMENTS TO THAT TESTIMONY WHICH RELATE TO SUCH ANALYSIS 1.
LILCO Has Refused to Produce the Content Analysis Despite a Specific Request by Suffolk County for the Document i
During the deposition of LILCO witness Elliott Pursell on January 20, 1987, Suf folk County learned for the first time that LILCO witnesses Pursell, Behr and Daverio were preparing a j
" content analysis" of the FEMA Report for use in the testimony LILCO was planning to file on Contention Ex 50.
Sgg deposition of Elliott Pursell (January 20, 1987) at 33-34 (attached hereto as Attachment A).
At that time, Suffolk County specifically requested a copy 'of the content analysis (id. at 52 (ggg Attachment B hereto)), in order to address the analysis in the testimony that was to be prepared and filed by Suf folk County on Contention Ex 50.
Despite the fact that LILCO intended to rely upon this document as a basis for its testimony on Contention Ex j
l 50, LILCO refused to produce the content analysis under. the guise 1
of the work-product doctrine.
Sag Letter from Jessine A.
Monaghan to Michael S. Miller, dated February 9, 1987, at 1-2 (attached hereto as Attachment C).
In fact, LILCO still has not produced this document, despite the fact that the. document is explicitly relied upon by LILCO's witnesses in the testimony LILCO filed on Contention Ex 50.
Sag LILCO's testimony on l
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Contention Ex 50, at 8, 21-27 (attached hereto as Attachment D).
Instead, LILCO has chosen to provide but a few self-selected examples from its content analysis.
See LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50, Attachment E (attached hereto as Attachment E).
2.
LILCO's Refusal to Provide Suffolk County with a Key Document Upon Which It Relies in Order to Reach Specific Conclusions Requires that Any Mention of that Document or the Conclusions Derived from It Be Striken from LILCO's Testimony LILCO's continuing refusal to provide the content analysis relied upon by LILCO's witnesses in their Contention Ex 50 testimony has made it impossible for Suffolk County to prepare adequately for trial, both in the preparation of the County's direct testimony and in preparation for cross-examination of LILCO witnesses during the hearing.
There can be no question that Suffolk County was entitled to discover in advance of the filing of testimony and the start of trial the opinions and the bases of those opinions held by " expert witnesses."
Egg Commonwealth Edison Co. (Briarwood Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-86-7, 23 NRC 177, 178-79 (1986); Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. (West Chicago Rare Earths Facility and Kress Creek Decontamination), LBP-85-38, 22 NRC 604, 609-10 1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),
LBP-83-17, 17 NRC 490, 496-97 (1983); Carolina Power and Licht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), LBP _ _
27A, 17 NRC 971, 976 ( 1983 ) ; Boston Edison Co. (Pilgrim Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2), LBP-75-42, 2 NRC 159, 161 (1975).
As the notes of the Advisory Committee, 48 F.R.D.
487, 503, explain with respect to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4),
which the above-cited NRC cases have adopted and applied in the context of NRC proceedings:
A prohibition against discovery of information held by expert witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent.
Effective cross examina-tion of an expert witness requires advance preparation.
The lawyer, even with the help of his own experts, frequently cannot antici-pate the particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on the stand.
LILCO's actions in refusing to produce the content analysis relied upon in its Contention Ex 50 testimony fly in the face of the purpose of discovery.
Further, LILCO's refusal to provide this document during discovery, despite requests for its production, has prejudiced Suffolk County by making it impossible for the County's witnesses to respond to this analysis in their testimony.
Simply put, LILCO's continuing failure to provide this analysis has resulted in Suffolk County being unable to j
determine how such analysis was performed and how LILCO's witnesses reached the conclusions set forth in their testimony.
Further, without access to the analysis, Suf folk County is unable to determine its accuracy.
LILCO should not be allowed to violate the discovery rules and.then profit from the fact that they have hidden information from the County.
The only equitable solution is to strike all mention of the content analysis from LILCO's testimony.
V.
THE FAILURE OF LILCO'S WITNESSES TO DIVULGE THE FACT THAT THEY WERE PERFORMING, OR PLANNING TO PERFORM, AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEMA REPORT IN RELATION TO THE THEORY DISCUSSED IN NUREG CR-3524, AN ANALYSIS UPON WHICH THESE WITNESSES RELY IN THEIR CONTENTION EX 50 TESTIMONY, REQUIRES THE BOARD TO STRIKE ALL DISCUSSION OF, AND REFERENCES TO, SUCH ANALYSIS i
During the depositions of Dennis Mileti on January 8,
- 1987, and Michael K. Lindell on February 5, 1987, counsel for Suffolk County asked both of these LILCO witnesses what kind of analysis they had done, or were planning to do, in relation to Contention Ex 50.
Neither witness said anything about the analysis relied upon by LILCO's Contention Ex 50 testimony involving the FEMA Report, analyzed with respect to the theory discussed in NUREG CR-3524.
The first time that Suffolk County became aware of this information was when LILCO filed its testimony on Contention Ex 50.
See LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50, at 14-21 and Attachment F (attached hereto as Attachment F), where LILCO first made known its secret study to Suffolk County.
This failure to disclose during discovery the basis upon which LILCO's witnesses would rely for their testimony directly contradicts the NRC discovery rules.
Under those rules, expert witnesses are obligated to disclose the theories upon which they will base their opinions prior to trial.
(Egg cases cited
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above.)
LILCO's expert witnesses failed to do this.
- Rather, they waited until Suffolk County's testimony was filed before informing the County of their analysis, thereby keeping the County from addressing the analysis in its testimony.
This use of surprise tactics is exactly what modern discovery rules are designed to avoid.
- Egg, U.S.
v.
Proctor and Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677, 682-83 (1958) (discovery makes " trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest
").
The appropriate remedy for LILCO's violation of the discovery process is to strike all testimony concerning the analysis tendered by the LILCO witnesses relating to their NUREG CR-3524 analysis.
Eeg Weiss v.
Chrysler Motors Coro., 515 F.2d 449, 456-457 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversible error for trial court to allow an expert to testify to a theory not disclosed in answers to interrogatories requesting the theories upon which experts would be testifying at trial).
To allow such testimony to remain would severely prejudice Suffolk County, since the County was unable to question LILCO's witnesses concerning the analysis they now rely upon in their testimony, making it extremely difficult for Suffolk County to even understand what analysis was, in fact, performed.
Further, because of LILCO's decision to hide its analysis from scrutiny during discovery, Suffolk County's witnesses were not afforded the opportunity to address such analysis in the testimony they filed on Contention Ex 50.
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VI.
LILCO'S SURPRISE TACTICS NECESSITATE ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY IN THE EVENT THIS MOTION TO STRIKE IS DENIED A.
"Other Exercises" Discovery If Suffolk County's Motion to Strike LILCO's "other exercises" testimony is denied, it will.be necessary for LILCO to produce its other exercises study; fairness dictates that LILCO also must produce Dennis N.~Behr, who authored the other i
exercises testimony, for deposition.
Moreover, a Mr. Millioti (not to be confused with Mr. Mileti, another LILCO witness) also should be produced for deposition, since ha, according to LILCO, is the person who principally analyzed the other exercises relied 4
upon by LILCO, and produced extensive notes
(" hundreds of pages 1
1 long") relating to these other exercises.
Egg Deposition of Dennis N. Behr (January 13, 1987) at 38-40.
Although Suffolk County requested that these data be produced during discovery, LILCO refused upon the grounds of work-product.
Sag 14. at 13, 19.
I Now LILCO relies upci this unproduced data in its "other exercises" testimony on Contention Ex 50.
However, the author of i
the comparison, Mr. Millioti, is not listed as a sponsor of LILCO's testimony.
Rather, Mr. Behr is listed as the sponsor, I
but he likely will be unknowledgable of much of Mr. Millioti's analysis.
As a result, at a minimum, Suffolk County is entitled to depose Mr. Behr and Mr. Millioti regarding their report.- Such depositions should go forward only af ter LILCO turns over the i
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hundreds of pages of data upon which LILCO relies for -its other exercises conclusions on Contention Ex 50.
This data clearly no longer constitute work product (assuming, arauendo, they originally were); such data, after all, have been relied upon by LILCO in its testimony.
And, certainly at this juncture, additional discovery has become appropriate and necessary.
B.
Content Analysis Discovery The failure of LILCO to provide Suffolk County with the content analysis discussed above also makes it impossible for Suffolk County to prepare properly for cross-examination on that issue.
In order to reduce the prejudice that will accrue if the testimony concerning the content analysis is not stricken, Suf folk County, at a minimum, requests immediate production of the content analysis, as well as all notes, drafts and underlying documents relating to such analysis.
In addition, Suffolk County needs to depose LILCO witnesses Pursell, Behr, and Daverio, af ter the content analysis and underlying documents are provided.
This is necessary so that Suffolk County can prepare for cross-examination at trial.
C.
NHREG CR-3524 Analysis Discovery LILCO's reliance upon the NUREG CR-3524 analysis discussed by LILCO witnesses Lindell and Mileti, which LILCO failed to disclose to Suffolk County during discovery, has prejudiced the l
j County in preparing.
Prompt discovery is needed to diminish the 1 l
damage caused by this surprise analysis being included in LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50.
To deny such discovery would result in Suffolk County being unable to cross-examine adequately LILCO witnesses concerning such analysis or how it was performed.
This is particularly true because LILCO witnesses Lindell and Mileti fail, in their testimony, to define terms, to fully discuss the variables used in their study, or to explain clearly what the analysis is or how it was performed.
Suffolk County also needs to obtain any notes, draf ts or underlying documents relating to the analysis and to depose LILCO witnesses Lindell and Mileti concerning such analysis.
D.
The Impact of the Recuested Discoverv Uoon the Trial Schedule If this Board decides not to strike the testimony discussed above, as the County believes it should do, then for the reasons set forth, the County must at least be given the discovery requested.
It must be understood, however, that discovery at this stage of the proceeding will necessarily impact the schedule for trial which has been established by the Board.
The extent of such impact is difficult to estimate at this time, since the County has not been provided with the documents requested herein j
and the scope and extent of deposition discovery, to some extent, would be dependent upon those documents.
As a conservative estimate, however, the County would need at least a two week break in the hearing schedule, during which time such discovery could go forward. -.
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VII. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the following portions of LILCO's testimony on Contention Ex 50 should be stricken:
A.
Other Exercises Testimony (1)
Page 8, line 13 of the page beginning with the word " Third" through line 16 of the page.
(2)
Page 9, line 5 of Answer 5 beginning with the word "Second" through line 7 of Answer 5.
(3)
Pages 9 and 10, all of Answer 6.
(4)
Page 23, line 14 of the page through the word " Exercise." on line 15 of the page.
(5)
Page 25, all of Answer 24.
(6)
Page 25, line 4 of Answer 25 beginning with the word "The" through line 6 of Answer 25.
(7)
Page 27, line 1 of the page through line 7 of the page.
(8)
Page 27, all of Answer 28.
(9)
Pages 27-28, all of Answer 29.
(10) Page 28, all of f nswers 30 and 31.
(11) Page 28-29, all of Answer 32.
(12) Page 29, all of Answer 33.
(13) Page 30, all of Answer 34.
(14) Pages 30-31, all of Answer 35.
(15) Page 31, all of Answer 36.
(16) Pages 31-32, all of Answer 37.
(17) Page 62, line 8 of Answer 75 through the word "use." on line 11 of Answer 75. i
(18) LILCO Attachment C to the Testimony on Contention Ex 50.
(19) LILCO Attachment D to the Testimony on Contention Ex 50.
B.
Content Analysis (1)
Page 8, line 11 through line 13, ending with "very well overall."
(2)
Page 21, line 5 the word "two".
(3)
Page 21, line 7 beginning with "One is" through line 9 ending with " analysis technique".
(4)
Page 21-25, all of Answers 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25.
(5)
Pages 26-27, all of Answer 27.
(6)
Attachment F to the Testimony on Contention Ex 50.
C.
Analysis of FEMA Report Based On NUREG CR-3524 (1)
Page 8, line 9, "First, as Drs." through line 10.
(2)
Pages 14-21, all of Answers 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.
(3)
Attachment F to the Testimony on Contention Ex 50.
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l VII. EXPEDITED RULING REOUESTED Suffolk County requests expedited ruling upon this Motion.
Respectfully submitted, Martin Bradley Ashare Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Highway Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 W O R N " > N) t W
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Michael S. Miller P. Matthew Sutko Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C.
20036-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County 1
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6 ATTACHMENT A
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F TI M N5Clu?..
OF PROCKEDINGS UNITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x In the Matter of:
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (EP Exercise) 4 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, (ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL)
Unit 1)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x l
DEPOSITION OF ELLIOTT PURSELL l
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Washington, D.
C.
Tuesday, January 20, 1987 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. -
Stenotupe Rt.vrters 444 North CaoitelStreet i
Washington, b.C. 20001 (202) 347-3C0 l
1 Nationwide Cowra5e S00-336-6646 i
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gyboward 1 report that we discussed.
Bat it was not specifically a 2
meeting for preparation of this deposition.
3 0
Can you recall about when you had this meeting?
4 A
Yesterday.
5 O
That's easy.
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A Yes.
j 7
(Laughter.)
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O Mr. Purse 11, I want to ask you the substance of I
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the conversations you had with Mr. Daverio and Mr. Behr.
10 And for the purposes of my question, exclude those times 11 when Ms. Monaghan was present and involved in thos,e 12 discussions.
13 In other words, I'm not asking you to reveal 14 conversations or discussions with counsel.
15 A
But what you are asking is what the discussions 16 were with Chuck Daverio and Eennis Behr?
17 O
Correct.
18 A
The conversations involved a content analysis of 19 the FEMA report -- and the planning for content analysis, I 20 should say.
O And that essentially summarizes the discussions y u had with Mr. Behr and Mr. Daverio?
ACE-FEDER.u_ RE?oRTERs..Ixc.
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Correct.
2 O
Now, would you tell me what.is a content analysis?
3 A
Well, specifically, what I'm referring to here is 4
the application of a technique known as the critical I
5 incident technique, which would be a content analysis of 6
the FEMA report.
7 0
Critical incident techniques and content analysis 8
are not terms that I'm familiar with, Mr. Purse 11, so I'm 9
trying to get an understanding for, if one were to do a 4
10 cc'ntent analysis of the FEMA report, what would you be 11 doing?
What would you be looking for?
12 A
Positive, neutral and negative statements, l
13 specific actions, behavioral actions that were taken by l
i 14 LERO personnel during the FEMA exercise.
15 C
Could you give me an example, say in terms of the 16 LERO traf fic guides, of how you would apply such a content li analysis?
A Yes.
For example, with the impediment, the fuel 9
truck impediment, the traffic guide called in for assistance and also requested additional cones.
That was an action.
It was an observable action that was recorded and it was a positive action. So it would 1
S CE-FEDERAL FJEPORic.RS, INC.
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'J C'JITED STATES OF AMERICA i
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x In the Matter of:
Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (EP Exercise) i
)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, (ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL) l Unit 1)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x DEPOSITION OF ELLIOTT PURSELL i
Washington, D.
C.
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l Tuesday, January 20, 1987 ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. --
Stenarvpe !Mvrtm l
444 North Cacitel Stee.
l Washin5 ton. D.C. _0001 G0-) 347-37:0 l
l Nationwide Cowrage S00-336-6646 I
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i And that, of since the time of LILCO's first production.
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course, would include any December training documents and
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training drill-related documents.
3 I also would request production of the content 4
I 5
analysis that is being prepared, once it is completed by l
l Mr. Behr, Mr. Daverio, Mr. Purse 11, and any and all l
6 statistical analyses which are being prepared by Mr.
7 Purse 11 and perhaps others, with respect to the litigation 8
9 presently before the licensing board.
10 I think, as you realize, if these analyses and research matters are carried through to fruition and relied 11 upon by Mr. Purse 11 or any other LILCO witness, then the 12 governments would be entitled to their production, and I 13 i
would expect to see such production prior to the time that 14 15 testimony is filed in this case.
16 MS. MONAGHAN:
Mr. Miller, I'll take your request 17 under advisement. I just want to make clear to you that the 18 December, 1986 drill reports have not been generated yet j
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19 and I'm not sure whether you understood that that was the l
20 case.
21 MR. MILLER:
Mr. Kors points out that there must, though, at this time be certain training documents frcm 22 ACE-3EDERAL 3IPORTERS, INC.
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........ 8552 Michael S. Miller, Esquire Kirkpatrick & Lockhart South Lobby - 9th Floor I
1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036-5891
Dear Mike:
We have reviewed the deposition of Elliott Pursell to iden-tify Suffolk County's request for discovery of additional docu-ments and information.
Here are your requests and our responses:
REQUEST:
There have been a number of matters mentioned today by Mr. Pursell that I would request production of.
The first would be the December, 1986 training documents.
I think at one of our last depositions, I indicated that our discovery request re-garding post-exercise training matters, although your response was sometime in late October, I believe, was a continuing re-quest.
And we would also request any documents generated with respect to post-exercise training since the time of LILCO's first production.
And that, of course, would include any December training documents and training drill-related documents.
I also would request production of the content analysis that is being prepared, once it is. completed by Mr. Behr, Mr. Daverio, Mr. Pursell and any and all statistical analyses which are being prepared by Mr. Pursell and perhaps others, with respei:t to liti-gation presently before the Licensing Board.
.There must, though, at this time be certain training documents from those December drills.
For example, the player logs and observer logs.
And those documents would fall within the scope of our request.
(Pursell Deposition at 51-53).
Huwrow & WILLIAwe Michael S.
Miller, Esq.
February 9, 1987 Page 2
RESPONSE
Under cover of a February 2, 1987 letter to Michael S. Mill-er from Lee B.
Zeugin, LILCO produced many of the post-exercise training documents generated since the closure of the files for the initial document production of November 5, 1986.
The remain-der of those documents are being sent to you today under separate Cover.
LILCO objects to Suffolk County's request for the content analysis that is being prepared by Mr. Pursell as well as to the request for any and all statistical analyses being prepared by i
Mr. Pursell or others.
These documents are being prepared at the direction and under the supervision of counsel for LILCO and con-stitute work product.
REQUEST:
Assuming that such proposal [to the North Carolina Police) still exists, I would request its production.
(Pursell Deposi-tion at 81).
RESPONSE
Unclosed is a copy of proposal made by Human Resource Sys-tems to the North Carolina Department of Crime Control and Public Safety.
e t
j
Huwrow & WILLIAMG Michael S. Miller, Esq.
February 9, 1987 Page 3 REQUEST:
I would like to have produced the paper, Training for Orga-nizational Mergers, the Adverse Impact, Validity, Job Perfor-mance, and Cut Score Determination Paper, and the last one we just discussed, Predicting Logging Performance through Behavioral Accounting those three.
(Pursell Deposition at 103).
RES PONSO :
Enclosed are copies of the following papers:
Training for Organizational Mergers; Adverse Impact, Validity, Expected Job Performance, and the Determination of Cut Scores; and Predicting Logging Performance through Behavioral Accounting the North Carolina Producer Inventory.
REQUEST:
Training managers to minimize rating errors in the observa-tion of behavior, that one.
I will ask.for it, Mr. Pursell, only because I feel compelled, given your comment, to make that re-quest.
(Pursell Deposition at 104).
RESPONSE
Enclosed is a copy of Training Manager to Minimize Rating Errors in the Observation of Behavior.
HUNTON & WILLIAMO 1
Michael S.
Miller, Esq.
4 February 9, 1987 Page 4 We have reviewed the deposition of Elliott Pursell carefully i
to cull out your requests; however, if we have overlooked one of the requests contained in that deposition please let us know.
Sincerely, WW essine A.
Monag 283/6176 cci Richard J.
Zahnleuter, Esq.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exerciso)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 50 l
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 l
March 20,1987 i
)
1 J
. t perfect performance is not to be expected in any drill, exercise, or emer-gency and it is not necessary for an effective response.
Not only do we disagree with the conclusions reached in Contention EX 50, but we believe that the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment demon-strates that the LERO training program was effective. We looked at the results of the Exercise as reported in the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assess-ment using three different methods of analysis: allindicate that the LERO training program effectively trained personnel to carry out their emergen-t cy jobs. First, as Drs. Lindell and Mileti will testify, during the Exercise, LERO exhibited the three basic factors for organizational effectiveness.
Second, as Mr. Pursell will testify, a content analysis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment using the critical incident analysis technique reveals that, in FEMA's opinion, LERO performed very well overall.
Third, as Mr. Behr and Ms. Goodkind will testify, the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assess-ment compares favorably with other FEMA post-exercise assessments in FEMA Region IL Finally, it is w opinion that the mistakes which occurred during the Exercise and are referenced in Contention EX 50 do not demonstrate either a failure of the organization to function effectively or a failure of the
~
LERO training program. An offsite emergency response organization such as LERO is not likely to suffer a total f ailure in an emergency as a result of mistakes.made by individual members. Experience has shown that even emergency organizations without specialized training accomplish their overall objectives during an emergency. In addition, the specific incidents referenced in Contention EX 50 are neither singly nor collectively of a nature or gravity that would demonstrate a fundamental inability on the part of LERO to protect the health and safety of the public.
h t
_- l response to an emergency. The training program, in my judgment, appears to be fundamentally successful.
- 17. Q.
Are there other means to establish whether the organization as a whole functioned effectively?
A.
[Pursell] Yes. I have employed two means of analyzing the results of the Exercise to determine whether it is likely that the LERO organization will be able to protect the health and safety of the public. One is a content analysis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment using the critical inci-dent analysis technique. The other is to consider the degree to which LERO was able to meet the Exercise objectives. -
[Behr, Goodkind] We analyzed the results of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment by comparing FEMA's assessment of LERO with its assessment of other offsite emergency response organizations for nuclear plants in FEMA Region II.
/
- 18. Q.
What is the critical incident analysis technique?
1 A.
[ Purse 11]
The critical incident analysis technique is a process for col-lecting and categorizing observations of human behavior for use in, among other things, evaluating demonstrated performance.
The technique is widely applied and accepted, and is used in a variety of settings, including i
i the development of job analyses, the designing and evaluation of training j
\\
programs, and performance appraisals.
With this technique, an incident is any observable behavior "that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences [either positive or neg-ative) and predictions'to be made about the person performing the act. To be critical, an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or the i
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intent of the act seems fairly clear to the observer, and where its conse-quences are sufficiently definite to leave little doubt concerning its effects (positive or negative)." J. C. Flanagan,"The CriticalIncident Technique,"
5 Psychological Bulletin 372-358 (1954).
In practice, the technique, as applied to an evaluation of a training program, involves several steps. First, the objectives of the behavior to be observed must be clearly defined. Next, data are gathered by evaluators who observe the performance to be evaluated and record the " critical inci-dents." The criticalincidents are categorized as either positive or negative in the attainment of the objectives.
Finally, the data are complied, creating a picture of the relative efficacy of the performance.
i
- 19. Q.
Why is it appropriate to use the critical incident technique to analyze the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment?
A.
[Pursell] The critical incident analysis technique is appropriate because the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment contains all of the necessary ingredients for use of the technique. The Exercise objectives are clearly defined in the Assessment. The Assessment records the occurrence of inci-dents observed by FEMA during the Exercise. These observations can be categorized as either positive or negative in the attainment of the Exercise objectives, and a view of the overall performance of LERO can thereby be generated.
- 20. Q.
How was the critical incident analysis technique applied to the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment?
A.
[ Purse 11] First, we established a list of criteria for classifying the inci-dents reported in the Assessment so that different evaluators could per-form their own assessment and attain comparable results. The criteria k
=.
' i were designed to ensure that the classification process was done as objec-tively as possible. See Attachment E. Observable behavior would be classi-fled as either positive or negative. Statements that did not report behav-ior, but were, for instance, statements about procedures, recommendations, or were factual, were classified as neutral. The analysis was limited to 4
information reported in the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment; incidents known to have occurred during the Exercise, but not specifically reported in the Assessment, were not included.
Next, a three-man team analyzed every sentence in pages 27-83 of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment; the summary portions highlighting the deficiencies and ARCAs were not analyzed. Each incident of reported i
behavior was given either a positive or negative classification. The total number of positive and negative responses was then tallied and recorded.
The same team also performed an analysis of the Post-Exercise Assessment of the August 24-25, 1983, Indian Point Compensating Exercise. A second three-man team performed an analysis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment employing the same criteria. This second analysis serves as a reliability check.
4
- 21. Q.
How were the individuals who performed the evaluation chosen?
A.
[ Purse 11] To ensure the validity of the analysis, each group included one person experienced in the application of the criticalincident analysis tech-1 nique. I performed that function for the first group, and my colleague, Philip Lichtenfels, did so for the second group. It is also important to have someone involved in the analysis who is familiar with the behavior to be evaluated. Thus, the other two people in each group were chosen for their -
extensive familiarity with the LILCO Plan and with the Exercise itself. In
= _,
- _. this way, we were able to ensure that the evaluators had sufficient knowl-l edge of their task and of the activity evaluated to perform accurately the critical incident analysis.
- 22. Q.
In performing a critical incident analysis is there any weighting of the crit-ical incidents?
A.
[ Purse 11]
No. Each critical incident is categorized simply as positive, i
negative, or neutral.
The critical incident analysis technique does not involve a weighting of incidents because that would introduce subjectivity into the process. Moreover, when a large number of incidents are observed j
(over 1,000 in the case of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment), the very strong and very weak incidents in each category will tend to cancel each other out.
- 23. Q.
If there is no weighting of the positive and negative criticalincidents, how does one take into account FEMA's characterization of sonte of the inci-dents as deficiencies and others as ARCAs?
A.
[Pursell] The portions of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment sepa-rately setting forth the deficiencies and the ARCAs were not themselves included in the analysis since they concern conclusions, not observations of behavior. Instead, we looked at the statements of FEMA's observations upon which the deficiencies and the ARCAs are based. My overallimpres-sion of the Post-Exercise Assessment is that more statements were made about individual deficiencies than about individual ARCAs and that more statements are made about each deficiency.and ARCA than about each pos-t itive observable. Therefore, it would appear that the deficiencies do have i
a greater impact on the results than do the ARCAs.
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. 24. Q.
Why did you compare the post-exercise assessment for the Indian Point Compensating Exercise with the Shoreham Assessment?
A.
[Behr, Daverio] We wanted to find another exercise that provided as close a parallel as possible to the Shoreham Exercisc. In our opinion as emergen-cy planners who are f amiliar with other FEMA exercises, the Indian' Point Compensating Exercise (August 24-25,1983) was the most appropriate for a number of reasons. First, both plants are located in FEMA Region II and, therefore, the exercises were evaluated by essentially the same group of persons. Second, Roger Kowieski was the RAC Chairman for the Shoreham Exercise and also the principal FEMA individual involved in the Indian Point Compensating Exercise. In that role he would have, among other things, approved the scope of the exercise scenario and objectives. Third, for those exercises, Indian Point and LILCO were in similar positions because both offsite emergency response organizations were forced to deal with a situation in which a local government was not providing the offsite emergency response. Finally, the population of Rockland County - that portion of the Indian Point EPZ for which the local government was not providing the offsite response - is comparable to the population of Shoreham's EPZ.
- 25. Q.
What were the results of the critical incident analyses performed on the Shoreham and Indian Point Post-Exercise Assessments?
A.
[ Purse 11] The results of each analysis were very positive. Specifically, Group 1 found that 82% of criticalincidents noted in the Shoreham report were of a positive nature. Group 2 found that 83.1% of the critical inci-dents,were positive. The results of the. critical incident analysis of the Indian Point Post-Exercise Assessment were similarly positive; 87.2% of the.
critical incidents were positive.
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- 26. Q.
What other information does the Shorcham Post-Exercise Assessment pro-vide that is useful in evaluating the performance of the LERO organiza-tion?
A.
[Pursell] The Shoreham Post-Exercise Assertment also reveals that FEMA evaluated LERO against the Exercise objectives 121 times (of ten an objec-tive, such as SA-1, was evaluated more than once). Based on that evalua-tion, for 96.7% of the observations the objectives were found to have no l
deficiencies associated with them. In addition, for 95.9% of the observa-l tions the cbjectives were either completely or partially met and for 74.4%
i of the observations the objectives were completely met.
- 27. Q.
What do these results tell you about the overall performance of LERO as assessed by FEMA?
A.
[ Purse 11] These results indicate to me that the LERO organization func-tioned extremely well during the February 13 Exercise. The results are even more impressive given the nature of FEMA's post-exercise assess-ments which generally identify individual performance errors in an effort to identify and correct any errors; they are not designed to be a positive reinforcer. Given the nature of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment, then, it is particularly impressive that the results turned out so positive.
While it would be inappropriate to use the percentages derived through the critical incident analysis as a " grade" for LERO's performance, they do provide a means both of gauging LERO's performance and comparing that performance with the performance of other organizations evaluated by FEMA. With the results at over an 80% positive level, as here, I am confident that the training program was effective.
s
(..
. This confidence is further supported by comparing the results of the analyses performed on the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment with that of the Indian Point Assessment, which I understand was the basis for a FEMA
' findirg of reasonable assurance - a positive conclusion for FEMA. Based on my experience in the training field, the results of the ' analyses per-i formed on the Shoreham and the Indian Point Assessments show an equiva-lent level of performance.
- 28. Q.
How does the LILCO Post-Exercise Assessment compare with other post-exercise assessments for operating nuclear power plants other than the Indian Point Compensating Exercise?
A.
(Behr, Goodkind] We have examined 16 FEMA post-exercise assessments for other nuclear power plants now operating in FEMA Region II, including the assessment of the Indian Point Compensating Exercise. In our opinion, the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment compares quite favorably with the post-exercise assessments for these other plants.
- 25. Q.
What other post-exercise assessments have you compared with the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment?
l A.
(Behr, Goodkind] The other FEMA post-exercise assessments with which we have compared the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment are:
Nuclear Facility Exercise Date Indian Point March 3,1982 March 9,1983 August 24,1983 November 28,1984 June 4,1926 Oyster Creek March 16,1982 June 5,1985
e 9
ATTACHMENT E
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Attachannt E CRITERIA fQB CRITICAL INCIDENTS / EVENTS / BEHAVIORS / ACTIONS Definition:
. Knowledge and/or action by LERO and other emergency personnel as specified in the FEMA Report - excluding the medical drill, pgs. 84-85 Observable by FEMA observ'ers.
. Know1cdge of the objectives of the actions was known and apparent to the FEMA observers.
. FEMA observers knew the consequences (positive or negative) of the outcomes /results.
i 1.
Objective statements are neutral.
I (e.g., pg. 27 "The objective of demonstrating the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notification was met (EOC1).")
2.
Recommendation statements are neutral.
( e.g.,
pg. 30 - LERO should consider whether operations could be improved by additional training stressing the mandatory use of standard message forms and the importance of legibility.")
3.
Factual statements are neutral.
q
( e.g., pg. 35 "An evacuation of the entire '10-mile EPZ would require that about eight hundred eight (808) individuals with special needs be picked up.")
4.
Statements regarding OPIPs are neutral.
(e.g.,-pg.
34 "0 PI P 3.3.4, Se c tion 2.1, requires that sirens be activated in coordination with the EBS system subsequent to the declaration of a Site Area Emergency ECL, the declaration of General Emergency ECL, and the decision by the Director of Local Response to initiate or change protective action recommendations.")
5.
Procedural statements are neutral.
(e.g., pg. 43
" Field activities dispatched from the LERO EOC were evacuation of special facilities by ambulance and ambulette, and school evacuation.")
6.
" Compound" sentences with separate actions should be treated as multiple (i.e., 2 or more) incidents.
( e.g., pg. 58 -
"Each driver was dssued route-specific maps and directionsjat the transfer point, / drove the route correctly, and Varrived promptly at the Reception Center.")
( e.g.
pg. 31 - "TheabilitytodeterminetheneedforState assistance was demonptrated when requepts were made for
/ simulated police,Vroad cl ea ran c e, va nd radiological monitoring support personnel.")
( e. g., pg. 30 "However, when the two
- 2) free play impediment messages were introduced at the.LERO EOC, all pertinent information was not transferred from the free play impediment message forms introduced by the exercise controller to the LERO message forms.")
(e.g, pg. 31 -
"At these times, a secretary ok the calls andfindicated to the caller that the Director would call back.")
7.
A single incident evidenced by multiple groups should be counted as multiple incidents.
~"A41 the coordinators in thed Js.g.,
p g.
30 ic,
/ transportation, anddpecial facilities areas kept and generally used LERO message forms.")
( e.g.,
35 "Th e dr a f fi con trol, / Traffic control
- Point, vacuation Route, and oad Logistics Coordinators each proceeded to determine the procedures required in their respective areas of responsibility.")
8.
All duplications (positive or negative) should be counted as they appear in the report.
( e.g., p g. 3 "In addition, the downwind distance of the sample was ncorrectly reported as 7000 meters instead of 700 meters for one of the thyroid doses reported by a DOE RAP field monitoring team.
This errorXwas caused by a decimal point misplaced during the conversion of the distance units and meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 9000 mrem /hr at 4.3 miles downwind instead of 9000 mrem /hr at about 0.5 miles downwind.")
9.
Timeliness is credited (positive or negative) only when there is a specific reference or some indication that it was positive or negative.
General references to times are considered neutral statements.
( e.g.,
- g. 35 -
"By 1023, telephone calls (simulated) were being ade to homebound individuals.")
( e. g., pg. 37 -
"T h i s)(d el a y of about forty-f e (45) minutes, although apparently caused by the need to rief the Route Spotter at the Port Jefferson Staging Area, interfered with the timely verification of the fuel truck im)(pediment.")
i
i 10.
Ambulance and a m b ul e t t e
- drivers, bus / van
- drivers, state / county personnel, and displays and maps are considered to be the same group unless specific separate actions or incidents are noted.
( e.g., pg. 36 -
"TheVambulance had been dispatched by about 1100 and thedmbulette by about 1114.".)'
( e.g., pg. 33 - Moth state and county representatives (simulators) were briefed in the issuance of EBS messages
...")
(e.g.,
pg. 44 -
mbulance and ambulette personnel were issued dosimetry equipment consisting of 0-200 mrem and 0-5 Rem direct-reading dosimeters (DRDs), a thermoluminescent dosimeter (TLD), dose record forms, and simulated potassium f
iodide tablets (KI).")
11.
The incidents should be classified on the basis of the FEMA report -- not on the interpretation of what "might" have been meant, or what occurred or may have occurred in addition to what was stated.
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of
)
.)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP. Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 50 Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 March 20,1987 O
L
. functionally equivalent although not identical), or both.
These backup mechanisms provide flexibility that assures that important goals will not be threatened by individuals failing to report for duty or performing their tasks incorrectly, or, for that matter, by failures of equipment or inade-quate facilities.
Finally, LERO has multiple methods for detecting and interpreting unexpected situations during an emergency and for monitoring the quality and timeliness of each subunit's performance of its emergency response assignments. This enhances the overallinterorganizational response.
- 10. Q.
Are there any other means to tell whether an organization such as.LERO will be able to respond effectively to an emergency?
A.
[Lindell, Miletil Emergency response organizations are like most other organizations. On both theoretical and applied grounds, organizational be-havior in relation to emergencies reflects the findings of research on com-plex organizations in general.
l Research into what factors promote coordination and cohesion (im-portant antecedents to effective emergency response) suggests that three, f actors are important. In general terms, these factors are: a clear under-standing about what to do; flexibility in approach; and a good idea about the j
overall inter-organizational emergency response. These factors are dis-tilled from general research on complex organizational effectiveness and specific research on actual organizational emergency response. They have been empirically illustrated as relevant to exercise assessments at nuclear power plants. See NUREG/CR-3524, J. H. Sorensen, E. D. Copenhaver, D.
S. Mileti, and M. V. Adler, Organizational Interf ace in Reactor Emergency Planning and Response, report prepared for the Division of Facility
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Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. by Oak Ridge National Labora-tory, Oak Ridge, Tennesse (1984).
- 11. Q.
The f actors that you've outlined to assess organizational effectiveness seem fairly abstract and all-inclusive. Are there more specific things that one can lock at to measure organizational effectiveness?
A.
[Lindell, Mileti] Yes, the three basic factors are in fact each comprised of subfactors.
First, the factors that demonstrate a clear understanding about what to do are basically those which demonstrate a knowledge of intra-organizational relations. They are: role definition (clearly defined respon-sibilities); authority (clearly defined powers and authority hierarchy); terri-tory (clearly limited boundaries of authority); priority setting (understood mechanisms for setting priorities); normativeness (similarity between nor-mal and emergency responsibilities); legitimacy (responsibilities are viewed as significant); communications ability (ease and clarity of accessing infor-mation); and knowledge (level of understanding about responsibilities).
Flexibility in approach is generally characterized by both intra and inter-organizational flexibility such as: formalization (ability to deviate from written procedures); adaptability (ability to respond to new situa-tions); and control (ability to exercise and retain authority).
Finally, an understanding about the overall inter-organizational emergency response or, stated another way, the inter-organizational net-work, may be demonstrated by: domain (clearly defined division of respon-sibility); disputa rmky!ca (m;;hanism for negotiating differences); legiti-4 macy of roles (acceptance by other organizations); resource adequacy (sufficient resources to perform role); autonomy (ability to relinquish for l
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the good of the system); communications ability (high level of linkages between organizations); authority (network hierarchies are clearly estab-11shed); interaction clarity (organizations know with whom to interact); and knowledge (functioning of the system is understood).
- 12. Q.
How do you know that these factors will show whether an emergency response organization is effective and, therefore, whether the training pro-gram was effective?
A.
[Mileti]
In the early 1980's, three members of the staff at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and I performed research for the NRC to determine if existing emergency planning regulations and guidelines had led to effective interf aces between utilities and offsite emergency planning or-ganizations.
The results of our research were published in NUREG/CR-3524, Organizational Interface in Reactor Emergency Planning and Re-sponse (1984), and then in other publications and papers.
Our work sought to accomplish the following tasks: (1) review and summarize the lesults of actual studies on organizational effectiveness in non-emergency situations; (2) review and summarize the results of actual studies on organizational effectiveness in responding to emergencies; (3) develop an integrated theory about the determinants of organizational ef-fectiveness in responding to emergencies baseo on the empirical record produced by past studies; (4) review emergency plans at nuclear power plants; (5) conduct two case studies at nuclear plants which focused on the factors that the theory we developed suggested as determinants of effec-tiveness; and (6) observe a test exercise, in light of the same factors, to collect further data about interf ace and organizational effectiveness.
~..
l The results of our work enabled us to comment on the adequacy of existing emergency planning regulations, feel confident that the f actors we identified are sound predictors of organizational effectiveness in response to emergencies, and illustrate that these same factors are useful in evaluating exercises.
- 13. Q.
What if the theory turns out to be incorrect?
A.
[Lindell, Mileti]
We think it unlikely that the theory discussed in NUREG/CR-3524 will prove inapt for two reasons. The theory was derived by identifying from actual empirical studies, common attributes of effec-tive organizations. Those attributes were then assessed in light of both the functions that would need to be performed in a radiological emergency and the human and material resources required to accomplish those functions.
The theory, consequently, proposes what would constitute attributes of an ideal emergency response organization in a radiological emergency.
- 14. Q.
How were the factors that are critical to an effective emergency organiza-tion demonstrated by the LERO organization and its performance during the February 13 Exercise?
A.
[Mileti] First, these factors, which were identified as important for orga-nizational effectiveness in response to emergencies, were taken into account in the LERO Plan and training program. Babb et M. ff. Tr.11,140, at 5,22-23. In my opinion, the incorporation of these concepts in the Plan and training program increases the probability that the LERO organization will be effective in its response to an actual emergency.
Second, during the February 13 Exercise, LERO exhibited all of the factors described in NUREG/CR-3524 that are critical to effective.emer-gency response.
L
.. = _.
l The method used to apply the NUREG/CR-3524 factors to the February 13 Exercise can be described as follows. First, the Shoreham 1
Post-Exercise Assessment was selected as the data base. Second, each organizational subdivision within LERO (as those subdivisions were defined in the Assessment) was treated as if it were a separate organization. Third, FEMA comments for each objective were reviewed in terms of whether or not those comments provided any information about the factors in
~
NUREG/CR-3524. If no information was provided on any one of the factors in' NUREG/CR-3524, then no judgment concerning that factor was recorded. If a FEMA comment existed, however, that did cast light on one or several factors in NUREG/CR-3524, then that comment was used as an indicator of one or more factors.
For example, the FEMA comment
... verification of this initial notification was received within 15 minutes... " was taken as indicative of there being adequate resources to accomplish this task and that role definition was also clear enough to have this task performed. In this way, each of the LERO subunits was appraised in reference to each FEMA objective and in reference to each of the effee-tiveness factors listed in NUREG/CR-3524.
Fourth, scores were recorded as follows: 0 (no data was available in Shoreham Assessment on which to judge a particular factor); C (the
\\
l Shoreham Assessment illustrated that a positive score should exist, and a positive score would suggest " cohesiveness" to use the term in NUREG/
CR-3524); pC (the Shoreham Assessment illustrated that there was both a positive and negative aspect to what was observed, for example, "Patchogue bus drivers were not gotten out on time"- but this would not have created a major response problem - and thus a " partially cohesive" i
k
score was recorded); and U (a totally negative FEMA comment was observed and was recorded as "uncohesive").
Neutral values were not recorded since they were not obvious in the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment, although they could have been imputed from an absence of i
data.
This piocess resulted in a score of C. pC, U or O for each of the fac-tors in NUREG/CR-3524, the FEMA objectives listed, and the nine organi-zational subunits in LERO exercised in February 1986. The results of this review produced the findings listed in tables in Attachment F.
- 15. Q.
Was there any difference between the analysis in NUREG/CR-3524 and the analysis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment?
A.
[Mileti] There were differences between the method of assessing organi-zational effectiveness for LERO based on the Exercise and the method in NUREG/CR-3524. There are several reasons for these differences. First, 4
the research performed for NUREG/CR-3524 had the factors clearly estab-lished before data collection began. Consequently, we were abic to develop and use measures that squarely addressed each of the factors in NUREG/CR-3524 for evaluating each of the organizations in the exercise and the case studies.
This was not the case in our assessment of the Shoreham Exercise. There it was necessary to use indirect measures; we had to infer the NUREG/CR-3524 factors from the text of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment. The persons who evaluated the Exercise did not
^
seek to measure our social science f actors as they conducted their exercise evaluation, and different exercise evaluators looked for different things de-pending on what part of LERO and what FEMA objective they, were evaluating. Consequently, the data base available to us on the Shoreham l
\\
E
4 Exercise was more limited than if we had designed' tne sort of social sci-ence study used in NUREG/CR-3524.
Interestingly, however,- the evaluators of the Shoreham Exercise did produce a good deal of information from which we could reach conclusions about the factors in NUREG/CR-3524. This suggested to us that the effectiveness factors in NUREG/CR-3524 do underlie emergency planning and exercise evaluations.
Second, no valid way existed to integrate the scores compiled on the i
basis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment into single scores (cohe-sive versus uncohesive) for each f actor within each organizational subdivi-sion of LERO.
We were able to develop composite scores in NUREG/
CR-3524 on each factor for each organizationai subdivision because we had employed the factors when collecting the data. Since the factors were not specifically used in FEMA's assessment of the Shoreham Exercise, our as-sessments were unstandardized (they were inferred from the text 'of the FEMA Assessment of the Exercise). Consequently, it would be quite sus-pect to reduce the findings presented in Attachment F to composite orga-nizational scores as we did in NUREG/CR-3524.
l
- 16. Q.
What can you conclude about the LERO training program based on your analysis?
A.
[Miletil Within the limits imposed by the available data, the analysis dem-onstrates that LER0 exhibited a high effectiveness potential during the Exercise. Obviously (seg Attachment F), the Shoreham Post-Exercise As-sessment documented a much greater potential for LERO cohesion and ef-i fectiveness than it documented potential uncohesiveness or effectiveness problems. The analysis clearly suggests that the LERO training program has produced an organization with high potential for effectiveness in i
u
. response to an emergency. The training program, in my judgment, appears to be fundamentally successful.
- 17. Q.
Are there other means to establish whether the organization as a whole functioned effectively?
l
^
i A.
[Pursell) Yes. I have employed two means of analyzing the results of the Exercise to determine whether it is likely that the LERO organization will be able to protect the health and safety of the pubile. One is a content analysis of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment using the critical inci-dent analysis technique. The other is to consider the degree to which LERO was able to meet the Exercise objectives.
[Behr, Goodkind] We analyzed the results of the Shoreham Post-Exercise Assessment by comparing FEMA's assessment of LERO with its assessment of other offsite emergency respor.se organizations for nuclear plants in i
FEMA Region IL
- 18. Q.
What is the critical incident analysis technique?
A.
[ Purse 11]
The critical incident analysis technique is a process for col-lecting and categorizing observations of human behavior for use in, among other things, evaluating demonstrated performance.
The technique is widely applied and accepted, and is used in a variety of settings, including the development of job analyses, the designing and evaluation of training programs, and performance appraisals.
With this technique, an incident is any observable behavior "that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit inferences (either positive or neg-l ative] and predictions to be made about the person performing the act. To be critical, an incident must occur in a situation where the purpose or the
Attechmtnt F Summary of Cohesiveness Factors All Facilities C
p,E E
Intra-organizational Relationships Role Definition 79 0
1 17 3
1 Authority 12 0
0 Territory 15 5
4 Priority Setting Normativeness 1
0 0
2 1
0 Legitimacy Communications 27 6
1 Knowledge 69 15 3
l Intra-and Inter-organizational Flexibility
~
l Formalization 1
0 1
Adaptability 5
1 3
Control 0
0 0
Inter-organizational Network Domain 24 0
0 Dispute Resolution 0
0 0
Legitimacy of Roles 2
0 0
Resource Adequacy 67 13 4
0 0
0 Autonomy Communications 25 1
2
)
Authority 6
0 0
Interaction Clarity 19 3
1 Knowledge 28 1
0 1
C1 O2 C
C C
C E
O2 C
C C
C C
C C
C C0 E
C C
C C
C C
C9 O1 C
E C8 O1 E
C U
C7 O1 C
U U
p U
E C6 C
C C
C C
C O1 C
C C
C C
C C
C C
C E
C C
C4 C
O1 C
C E
C C
C C3 C
C O1 C
E C
O1 C
p U
C C
p C
c C2 E
C1 C
C C
C O1 C
E C0 C
C C
C O1 C
C E
C C
C C
C C
C O9 E
C CO8 C
C C
C C
p E
C C
C C
p p
C O7 C
p C
E C
C C
O6 C
E C
C U
C p
C O5 E
C C
p O4 E
O3 C
C C C
C C
C E
C C
C C
C O2 C
C C
C E
Ol C
C C C
C C C
C C C
E y
s t
L n
e i
L A
o l
y r
A N
i o c t
R a
a N
g O
0 n
n u
u s
l I
l o
i s
RL e
T l
f q
n C
lSl t
s n
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y A
o o e o
apt t
s o
T N o
n N0Yl t
Z s
d l
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t I1T t i
I e
y A
t o
e e t
lIl a y y
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y e c ay e II e N
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c t t
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v a ct g
DAt z l
A a
l i i i c d GK e m c
m ant C~
d NZli b
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l r a e ii nl e
AI e l o o RR n t
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o n
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i u
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HI D s
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n TR R A
T P N L
C k
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C TN D D L
R A
C A
I k
N N
N I
I I
w u
e C
C N7 C
C E
C U
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C U
U N5 C
C E
C C
C C
C N4 E
C C
C p
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D E
CN2 E
CNI C
C C
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C TND D
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C C
C C
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C C
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C O3 C
C W
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C D2 W
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C TND D L
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l F
6 C
C C
C d
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v C
C i
d 5 C
C C
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F d
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C C
C C
C e
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F F
C C
C C
C O3 E
F F
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C E
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C O1 C
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d i
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t IITt i
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t o
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c a y y
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NSi y
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A e h r o m mA t
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t RE o u e r o e o n
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EE o i e e u o u n n TRR A
T P N L
C K
TOFF A
C 1ND D
L R
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d l
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d C
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C c
C e7 i
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l C
C e4 i
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C l
C C
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i F
d l
C C
C C
C e2 i
F OO C
C C
C HI C
C B
OH9 C
C C
B OH8 C
C C
C S
OH7 C
C C
C C
C C
B OH6 C
C C
B O
C C
H5 B
O C
H4 B
O C
H3 B
OH2 C
C C
C B
O C
C Hi C
C C S
s y
t L
n e L
i l
y A
o A
i o c r
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N O
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a I
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f q
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o o e e
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Z s
d l
ZIi e e t
Hn S
n y
t IITt i
I e
y A
t o
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y e
c ey e
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c a y y
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l A
a e y
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t u
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GK e m c m
d NZIi b
m l
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H TOFF A
C TND D
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C A
I M
TRR A
T P
N i
t N
N N
I I
I P
L
d d
C lo6 C
U C
C 4
t1 P
d C
p i
C C
e4 l 1 F
d C
C C
l e2 C
p p
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d C
l C
C el il F
d Cp l
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d C
l e9 C
D i
F d
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C p
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l F
d l
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C D
p i
F d
Cp l
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C C
i F
d Cp l
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C i
F C'
C d
C p
p l
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i F
AO C
C C
C SI C
A C
C p
S9 C
C C
p p
A S8 C
C C
C C
A C
C S7 C
C C
p A
c C
A C
C S5 A
C S4 A
C S3 AS7 C
C C
A C
C Si s
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a y y
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y e c u y e
TI a l
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v a ct g DAL r i A
a e y
c t t
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t EE o u e r
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C TN D D L
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d l
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C C
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d e9 C
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d c
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C e1 i
F A0 C
C C
C S1 A
C S9 C
p C
C s
A S8 C
C C
C A
C C
p A
C C
S6 C
A C
C S5 A
C S4 A
S3 C
C C
A S2 C
C A
C C
Si s
y t
L L
n e i
A o
l y
A i o c
r N
o N
s a
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n O
t R
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I o
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RL I
u s
s TSi t
s n
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T l
f e
n C
apt t
s e
TN o
y A
o o e
o n
NOVl t
Z s
d i
d ZIi e
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Hn S
n y
t IITt I
I e
y A
t o
a I
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NSt y
y e
c ay e TI a I
N R
c ay y
t t
A a
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t g
h ant t
r v
v a ct g DALz ti i
e d
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m e d
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r GOe i o t
l i i nl e
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u mb v
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REo u e r
TRR A
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C TND D
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A C
A I
K N
N N
I I
I e
d le2 C
C C
C i1 F
d C
C l
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i I F
d C
l eO C
C C
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d l
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C C
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d l
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C C
i F
d i
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C C
C l
F d
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C C
C C
i F
d c
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C C
C C
p C
C e5 l
F d
C c
l C
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p p
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C S1 p
p AS9 C
C C
C C
S8 C
C C
C C
C C
A A
C S7 C
C C
C AS6 C
C C
A C
C S5 A
C S4 A
C S3 A
S2 C
C C
C A
C C
SI s
y t
L n e L
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y A
i o c r
n N
e N
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a s
I o
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RL 1
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s l
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l f
q i
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t o
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nl e
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a RRn t
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a EE o s
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o REo u e r
TRR A
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L R
A C
A I
M N
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I
-r w
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C C
C D
C C
C C
C d
l8 e2 i
F d
C C
l 9 e1 i
F d
l C
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d e8 C
C C
C C
l i
F d
l e7 i
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l eI C
C C
C C
C i
F s
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n e t
L i
l y
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r r
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N e
O n n
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a t
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l_
s RL I
u u
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n TSl t
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f q
n C
e apt t
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C ZIt e
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NOYt t
Z s
d i
Hn S
n y
t IITt i
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t o
s e
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c ay y
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n NSi v
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v a ct g DALa l
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DCLKETED USNRC March 27, 1987 17 WE 31 P4 :33 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Qlg{yhg NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BRAhC-Before the Atomic' Safety and Licensino Board
)
i In the Matter of
)
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY
)
Docket No. 5 0 -3 22-OL-5
)
(EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
)
Unit 1)
)
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 50 have been served on the following this 27th day of March, 1987 by U.S.
mail, first class, except as otherwise noted.
John H. Frye, III, Chairman
- Dr. Oscar H. Paris
- Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licer. sing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.
20555 Mr. Frederick J.
Shon*
William R. Cumming, Esq.*
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Spence W.
Perry, Esq.
)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 Federal Emergency Management Agencj 500 C Street, S.W.,
Room 840 Washington, D.C.
20472
Anthony F.
Earley, Jr., Esq.
Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq.*
General Counsel Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company George E.
Johnson, Esq.
175 East Old Country Road U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission l
Hicksville, New York 11801 Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C.
20555 Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.**
Suffolk County Legislature Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O.
Box 1535 Office Building 707 East Main Street Veterans Memorial Highway Richmond, Virginia 23212 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L.
F.
Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street i
North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary l
Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
j Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C.
20555 MHB Technical Associates Hon. Michael A. LoGrande 1723 Hamilton Avenue Suffolk County Executive Suite K H.
Lee Dennison Building San Jose, California 95125 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Fabian G.
Palomino, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney Special Counsel to the Governor Bldg. 158 North County Complex Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 Veterans Memorial Highway State Capitol Hauppauge, New York 11788 Albany, New York 12224 David A.
Brownlee, Esq.
Mr. Philip McIntire Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Federal Emergency Management 1500 Gliver Building Agency Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10278 W
N V
- By Hand.
ichael S. Miller
- By Telecopy.
P. Matthew Sutko KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
I South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C.
20036-5891
]