ML20205J855
| ML20205J855 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001100 |
| Issue date: | 02/14/1986 |
| From: | Ketzlach N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | Lichtenberger ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8602260568 | |
| Download: ML20205J855 (2) | |
Text
Iet to 6%
$46-33
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FEB 141986 FCUP:NK 70-1100 Combustion Engineering, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. H. V. Lichtenberger Vice President, Nuclear Fuels 1000 Prospect Hill Rcad Post Office Box 500 Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500 i
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Gentlemen:
We have reviewed your application dated December 16, 1985, regarding the unresolved item specified in a Region I Inspection Report. Our co~mments on the application are enclosed.
Sincerely, criginal Si.gned BY,L,
- . K etsinch
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j Norman Ketzlach Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS
Enclosure:
As stated DISTRIBUTION-Docket.70 1100' NMSS R/F JRoth, RI FCUP R/F ALSoorg WTCrow l
NKetzlach(2)
VLTharpe j
POR LCobb, IE Region I i
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NAME:NKetz ac /ks:VLTharpe:WTCrow DATE: 71 ///86
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 8602260568 860214 PDR ADOCK 07001100 C
4 FEB 1 41986 Comments on Combustion Engineering License Amendment Application Dated December 16,1985(70-1100) 1.
page I. 4-14, Section 4.3.7, Line 5 The storage of larger hoppers applies to fuel enrichments > 3.5%.
Please correct.
2.
'Pages I.4-14 and -15, Sections 4.3.11 and 4.3.14 a.
Provide justification for the nuclear criticality safety of arrays of 6-inch deep boxes of close packed fuel rods at a water-to-fuel volume ratio of 0.48 (see Section 8.3.3).
An isolated, 6-inch thick water reflected infinite slab of closely packed fuel rods is safe under these conditions.
(see comment below on Section 8.3.3).
b.
Your request for approval of a 5.5-inch thick slab of fue". rods'in storage boxes placed in the Double Shelf Rod Storage Rack and for a 6-inch thick slab of fuel rods in.the same type storage boxes when positioned in the multi-tiered Fuel. Rod Storage Rack is a poor practice. The plant operator may not only be confused by the apparently conflicting criteria but the criteria can be very misleading. No justification has been provided for the double
- standard, c.
In addition, Mr. Jerome Roth, Region I Fuel Facility Inspector, has informed me that he noted as many as 20 hollow tubes in a single storage box containing "close packed" rods.
It appears this arrangement not only violates the close packing criteria but also introduces the possibility of water-to-fuel volune ratios > 0.48 in the box, under accident conditions.-
3.
Page II. 8-18, Section 8.3.3 The referenced Figure 1.E.16 of the UKAE Handoook, AHSB 1, does not provide the indicated information.
Extrapolation of the data is necessary. Although the staff believes your extrapolation may be non-conservative, a more cons %rvative extrapolation confirms the nuclear criticality safety of a single, isolated slab of close packed hexagonally.
spaced fuel rods having a maximum water-to-fuel volume ratio of 0.48.
It appears you are misusing the safety factor of 1.2 for individual slabs.
It applies to known critical slab thicknesses.
u