ML20205J855

Forwards Comments on 851216 License Amend Application Re Unresolved Insp Rept Item.Storage of Larger Hoppers & Fuel Rod Storage Box Packing Criteria Discussed

ML20205J855
Person / Time
Site:	07001100
Issue date:	02/14/1986
From:	Ketzlach N NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS)
To:	Lichtenberger ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY
References
NUDOCS 8602260568
Download: ML20205J855 (2)

Text

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FEB 141986 FCUP:NK 70-1100 Combustion Engineering, Inc.

ATTN: Mr. H. V. Lichtenberger

, Vice President, Nuclear Fuels 1000 Prospect Hill Rcad

Post Office Box 500 i Windsor, Connecticut 06095-0500

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Gentlemen:

We have reviewed your application dated December 16, 1985, regarding the unresolved item specified in a Region I Inspection Report. Our co~mments on the application are enclosed.

Sincerely, criginal Si.gned BY,L,

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. K etsinch j Norman Ketzlach Uranium Process Licensing Section Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety, NMSS

Enclosure:

As stated DISTRIBUTION-Docket.70 1100' NMSS R/F JRoth, RI FCUP R/F ALSoorg WTCrow l NKetzlach(2) VLTharpe j POR LCobb, IE Region I i

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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 8602260568 860214 PDR ADOCK 07001100 C PDR

4 FEB 1 41986 Comments on Combustion Engineering License Amendment Application Dated December 16,1985(70-1100)

1. page I. 4-14, Section 4.3.7, Line 5 The storage of larger hoppers applies to fuel enrichments > 3.5%. Please correct.

2. 'Pages I.4-14 and -15, Sections 4.3.11 and 4.3.14

a. Provide justification for the nuclear criticality safety of arrays of 6-inch deep boxes of close packed fuel rods at a water-to-fuel volume ratio of 0.48 (see Section 8.3.3). An isolated, 6-inch thick water reflected infinite slab of closely packed fuel rods is safe under these conditions. (see comment below on Section 8.3.3).

b. Your request for approval of a 5.5-inch thick slab of fue". rods'in storage boxes placed in the Double Shelf Rod Storage Rack and for a 6-inch thick slab of fuel rods in.the same type storage boxes when positioned in the multi-tiered Fuel. Rod Storage Rack is a poor practice. The plant operator may not only be confused by the apparently conflicting criteria but the criteria can be very misleading. No justification has been provided for the double standard,

c. In addition, Mr. Jerome Roth, Region I Fuel Facility Inspector, has informed me that he noted as many as 20 hollow tubes in a single storage box containing "close packed" rods. It appears this arrangement not only violates the close packing criteria but also introduces the possibility of water-to-fuel volune ratios > 0.48 in the box, under accident conditions.-

3. Page II. 8-18, Section 8.3.3 The referenced Figure 1.E.16 of the UKAE Handoook, AHSB 1, does not provide the indicated information. Extrapolation of the data is necessary. Although the staff believes your extrapolation may be non-conservative, a more cons %rvative extrapolation confirms the nuclear criticality safety of a single, isolated slab of close packed hexagonally.

spaced fuel rods having a maximum water-to-fuel volume ratio of 0.48. It appears you are misusing the safety factor of 1.2 for individual slabs.

It applies to known critical slab thicknesses.

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