ML20205J072
| ML20205J072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/04/1976 |
| From: | Gossick L NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | Udall M SENATE |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904090159 | |
| Download: ML20205J072 (7) | |
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June 4, 1976
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The Honorable Morris K. Udall
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l Chairnan, Subcocnittee on Energy IW
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and the Environment 383I l
Conmittee on Interior and Insular Affairs Au 43FWO'#
l United States Senate pq Washington, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are pleased to respond to the inquiries which you and Mr. Miller made of us in your letter of June 1, concerni ng the NRC's May 27th message to licensees. Attached is a background statement which I believe provides the information you had requested. That attach-ment has been provided to the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy and also placed in our Public Document Room.
1 I would note for your information that the matter of past threats against nuclear facilities was thoroughly reviewed by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in hearings earlier this year.
Enclosed is a copy of the Comittee print on those hearings.
Pertinent sections dealing with past threats are found beginning on page 140, and also in the Appendix on pages 564-566.
You asked whether the NRC has undertaken an investigation to determine how information on the fiay 27th action reached the press. He have not undertaken such an investigation. The NRC staff did not initially inform the press but did respond to inquiries received later.
With respect to the suggestion that the NRC should make a clarifying public announcement at this time, we see no need for one in view i
l of the straightfomard manner in which the matter already has been l
reported in the media. We will, of course, continue to respond to any inquiries from the press and the public.
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Sincerely, CC: Chairman Rowden Comrs.
i SECT 990409o159 760604 NMSS l
PDR ORO NE ED PDR Lee V. Gossick PA t
Executive Director CA for Operations NRR JCAE Enclosures PDR EDO i
Background Statement EDO 1
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l Committee Print LVGossick/sms Oq 6/3/76 g.
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Background on NRC's Message of May 27, 1976, to Facility Licensees on Increased Security Awareness i
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The Text of the Message i
" INCREASED SECURITY AWARENESS" "As you recall, we discussed with you on May 14, 1976, the reasons for increased attention regarding identifi-cation of NRC personnel requesting access to your facility.
We have obtained information, not fully verified, from the intelligence community that two groups may have plans to take over or occupy one or more nuclear power plants on Memorial Day Weekend or to take other actions in early June.
Incidents have occurred at two other utility facilities during the past week that may have security implications.
So far, the inci-dents have been scattered with no consequences.
"Because of these recent events, we request your coopera-tion in alerting your security forces and plant personnel for the period Friday, May 28 through Tuesday, June 8 to assure that:
"1.
Existing security plans are operative and that personnel are vigilant and security equipment and barriers are completely functional.
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"2.
Response forces and other interfacing organizations are alerted.
l "3.
Any security related even or occurrence at your nuclear facility is reported to the responsible Regional Office immediately."
The Decision Process The staffs of three major operational units are involved j
in assessment of security threats.
These are the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, headed by Ernst Volgenau; the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards, headed by Kenneth R.
Chapman; and the Office of Nuclear Reactor l
Regulation, headed by Benard C. Rusche.
Upon the receipt l
of information, the NRC staff seek whatever additional data 1
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4 is deemed necessary--such as checking to determine the c cdibility of the source, and maintaining liaison with other Federal agencies.
In the case of the May 27 action, the three senior office directors named above personally reviewed the information in hand and unanimously recommended that licensees be notified.
Dr. Volgenau put the decision into motion with the approval of the NRC's Executive Director for Operations, and the Chairman.
Events Leading to the Decision
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During several weeks preceding May 27, the NRC had received information from various sources--including utili-ties and other Federal agencies--that intrusions might be attempted at several nuclear power plants.
It is not unusual for individual threats to be received with respect t
to a particular plant.
What was unusual in this period was the number of t separated geogrhreats, and the fact that several plants widely aphically appeared to be potential targets.
Information received in May included threatened activities in Illinois (over the Memorial Day Weekend), Washington, and California (with the California activity to take place before the June 8 referendum vote on a nuclear proposition).
Also during May, there were reports of persons, under suspicious circumstances, in the vicinity of two power plants in Connecticut (one nuclear, one fossil-fueled).
In two separate instances in recent weeks, the credentials of the NRC inspec-tors have been stolen along with other personal belongings.
In neither instance did it appear the credentials were spe-cifically being sought, but their unauthorized possession created concern that they might be used to attempt entry to a nuclear facility.
Other Threats Attached (Table I) in tabular form is'a listing of threats to plants during the past 12 months.
Response to Threats When the threat information concerns a specific licensee, NRC usually receives the information from the licensee.- In such cases, the information is evaluated and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement ensures that the licensee has implemented his security response plan and that the FBI and
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local law enforcement agencies have been notified.
When the licensee is not the source of the information, the Office of Inspection and Enforcement immediately notifies the licensee and then takes the actions described above.
When the threat information concerns a group of licensees, the credibility is assessed within NRC and, if appropriate, the threat information is dispatched through the IE regional offices to selected licensees.
Since the NRC came into being in January 1975, two similar actions have been taken--6ne in late December 1975 as a result of a rash of threats that followed a bombing at New York's LaGuardia Airport, and one last month as a result of the loss of the NRC credentials mentioned above.
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The Receipt of Security Related Information Information of a security nature is received by the NRC through a variety of channels including the licensees them-selves, other Federal agencies, state and local law enforce-ment authorities.
The information may be received directly at NRC headquarters, or by one of the five regional offices (Philadelphia, Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, San Francisco) which then pass the information to headquarters.
Assessment of the information may involve communication with Federal or local law enforcement authorities or other Federal agencies as appropriate.
Regulatory action to be taken is determined as indicated in above in the section titled "The Decision Process."
The procedure is essentially the same for reactors and fuel cycle facilities.
Attachment i
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1 TABLE I A
l The following security threats to nuclear installations have already l
been made public through postings in the NRC Public Document Room:
DATE 6/10/75 Threat to Georgia Power Anonymous telephone call to 3
Company (Hatch) site security 7/2/75 Former employee gained Licensee security force illegal entry at Kerr-Mctice Nuclear Corp. (fuel plant) 7/4/75 Bomb threat to General Anonymous telephone call to Electric Co., Vallecitos site Nuclear Center 7/14/75 Bomb threat to Carolina Power Anonymous telephone call to
& Light (Brunswick) site 7/23/75 Suspected arson at NFS-West Licensee Valley 8/21/75 Bomb threat to Consolidated Anonymous telephone call to Edison company headquarters l
8/22/75 Bomb threat to Northeast Anonymous telephone call to l
Nuclear Energy Co.
site 1
(Millstone) 9/1/75 Bomb threat to Commonwealth Anonymous telephone call to Edison (Zion) site l
9/23/75 Bomb threat to Carolina Power Anonymous telephone call to
& Light (Brunswick) onsite contractor 9/25/75 Forced entry to MIT Research Violator reported himself to Reactor Building fenced Area Boston police
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9/26/75 Bomb threat to Consolidated Anonymous telephone call to Edison (Indian Point) site security 10/14/75 Bomb threat to Westitighouse Anonymous telephone call to Electric (fuel plant) site security 10/19/75 Bomb threat to Boston Edison Anonymous telephone call to (Pilgrim) site
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.ie 11/3/75 Bomb threat to Portland Anonymous telephone call General Electric (Trojan) to site 11/3/75 Two bomb threats to General Anonymous telephone calls Atomics (fuel plant) to site l
1 11/4/75 Six bomb threats to General Anonymous telephone calls Atomic (fuel plant) to site 11/8/75 Two bomb threats to Boston Anonymous telephone calls Edison (Pilgrim) to local police dept.
12/2/75 Sabotage threat to Consumers Local police notified company l
Power Co. (Palisades) 12/8/75 Bomb threat to Arkansas Power Anonymous telephone call And Light to onsite contractor 12/11/75 Bomb' threat to Allied General Anonymous telephone call Nuclear Services to site (reprocessing plant) 12/23/75 Two bomb threats to Long Anonymous telephone call Island Lighting Co.
to site (Shoreham)
These threats to nuclear installations have occurred thus far in 1976:
1/19/76 Bomb threat to Babcock Anonymous telephone call
& Wilcox (fuel plant) to site 2/3/76 Threat to Westinghouse Anonymous telephone call Electric (fuel plant) to site 2/4/76 Bomb threat to Pennsylvania Telephone call to New York Power & Light (Susquehanna)
State Police 2/26/76 Intruder at Pacific Gas &
flighway patrol intercepted Electric (Diablo Canyon) intruder following alarm j
3/4/76 Threat to Pacific Gas &
Threat message written on l
Electric (Diablo Cariyon) road map l
3/5/76 Bomb threat to CP&L Anonymous telephone call (Brunswick) to site.
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3/5/76 Bomb threat to Pa. Power Anonymous telephone call and Light (Susquehanna) to site.
3/8/76 Bomb threat to Pa. Power Anonymous telephone call and Light (Susquehanna) to onsite constructor 3/9/76 Threat to Florida Power Local newspaper l
& Light 3/25/76 Bomb threat at Purdue Anonymous call to campus University (research police reactorbuilding) 3/25/76 Bomb threat to Pacific Gas Anonymous call to site l
& Electric (Diablo Canyon) 4/6/76 Bomb. threat at Northeast Anonymous call to site Nuclear Energy Co.
(Millstone) 4/22/76 Intrusion threat at Florida Local newspaper Power & Light (St. Lucie)
-4/23/76 Bomb threat at Florida Power Local radio station
& Light (Turkey Point) 5/6/76 Bo$bthreatatPacificGas Anonymous call to' local radio a'nd Electric (Diablo Canyon) station 5/7/76 Bomb threat at VEPC0 Anonymous call to site (North Anna) 5/12/76 Intrusion threat to Chicago Office of FBI Comonwealth Edison (Zion) 6/1/76 Bomb threat to Boston Anonymous call to site Edison (Pilgrim)
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