ML20205H651
| ML20205H651 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07000984 |
| Issue date: | 08/13/1986 |
| From: | Bidinger G NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20205H635 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8608200128 | |
| Download: ML20205H651 (4) | |
Text
(
AUG 131986 DOCKET NO:
70-984 APPLICANT:
Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (BPNL)
FACILITY:
Richland, Washington
SUBJECT:
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT, LICENSE RENEWAL APPLICATION DATED APRIL 1986 (SUBMITTED BY LETTER DATED APRIL 25, 1986)
BACKGROUND BPNL submitted an application for renewal of License No. SNM-942.
This document concerns a review of the application for nuclear criticality safety issues.
DISCUSSION A.
Possession Limits The applicant has proposed a possession limit of one effective kilogram of U-235, U-233, and Pu, where one effective kilogram is defined in 10 CFR 70.4(t).
BPNL has further restricted the request to no more than 1.5 grams of Pu or to no more than 200 grams of Pu if a Radiological Contingency Plan is approved by the NRC and not more than 5000 grams of uranium enriched in U-235.
Accordingly, the maximum possession limits considered in this evaluation are:
I6Fg 1000g 1000g 11
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where: E = decimal weight fraction of U-235 in Uranium; the possession of Pu is 1 200g; and Uranium containing U-235 is 5 5000g.
The above limits should be made a condition of the license.
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g A
s The 200 grams of plutonium represents less than 50 percent of a critical mass and is not of criticality concern.
The 1000 gros of U-233 represents about 2 minimum critical masses and requires a nuclear c.riticality safety control program. The 1000 grams of U-235 as fully enriched uranium represent about 1 1/3' minimum critical masses and requires a nuclear criticality safety a j control progiam. The 5000g limit for uranium containing U-235 assure subcriticality for U-235 enrichments below about 15 9/o.
Mixtures of the 9,
different isotopes may be slightly more reactive in come configurations but s
not significantly so.
Based on the above limitations, the nuclear criticality safety control program must be adequate to control a maximum of two critical masses of SNM.
B.
Authorized Activities BPtdrequestsauthorizationteconductresearchanddevelopmentactivities J
in the physical and life sciences and in the production and processing of nuclear fuel materials.
These activities would bt conducted at the DOE Hanford site; at Battelle's Physical Science Laboratory in Richland; and at other unspecified sites. All unspecified work locations would be subject to equivalent safety. requirements for the two specified sites.
C.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Training The applicant did not discuss training in the chapters of the application propor,3d as license conditions.
The applicant did discuss training in the demonstration section of Chapter 15. Therefore, the following condition should be incorporated into the license:
(
The licensee shall implement the training program and requirements in Section 15.1.2 of the license renewal application dated April 1986.
]
D.
Organization for Nuclear Criticality Safety A criticality analysis group within the Research Group provides technical criteria on matters pertaining to criticality safety.
BPNL does not have departmental separation of the material handler groups and the criticality analysis group.
However, because of the limited amount of fissile material, i.e., about two critical masses, this is not a significant issue.
BPNL did not establish minimum qualifications for the Specialist or the Senior Specialist who establish and approve criticality safety specifications.
The resume for the Senior Specialist exceeds the minimum requirements for a senior staff member deemed necessary by the staff.
To assure that future specialists have acceptable qualifications for the position, the following condition should i
l be incorporated into the license:
The Specialist or Senior Specialist Criticality Analyst who approve I
criticality safety specifications shall possess a bachelor degree in a physical science or engineering and shall have a minimum of 2 l
years experience in nuclear criticality safety.
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A criticality safety representative is appointed for each nuclear facility by operations management.
This individual is trained by the research criticality analysis group for the activities of the representative.
The representative, who reports to the operating manager, is responsible for facility auditing, approved criticality safety specifications, and for liaisen with the laboratory safety group.
E.
Nuclear Criticality Safety BPNL uses a two-contingency policy to minimize the possibility of a criticality accident.
This policy is implemented through formal procedures.
The principle written procedure is a criticality safety specification (CSS).
The facility criticality safety representative is responsible for obtaining a new or revised CSS.
Each CSS is approved by the Specialist and the Senior Specialist for nuclear criticality safety; the senior engineer and the technical engineer for nuclear safety; and the building manager, the facility nuclear safety representative, and the operating manager.
A CSS is required for any facility which contains more than 45 percent of a minimum critical mass.
Work stations are posted with the criticality limits or with the CSS number when the CSS limits are too complex.
In the application, BPNL included Table 4.1 which provides allowable mass units in an isolated facility.
BPNL defines an isolated facility as a facility which contains up to 45 percent of a critical mass.
It appears that Table 4.1 limits exceed 45 percent of a critical mass by several percent at intermediate and low enrichment.
Because of the limited quantity of licensed material, this is not significant.
BPNL does request authorization to exceed the limits if DOE approved.
Because this is unacceptable to the staff, the following license condition is recommended:
Limits in Table 4.1 of the licensee's application dated April 25, 1986, for an Isolated Facility shall not be exceeded.
BPNL has committed to writing a Safety Analysis Report (SAR) whenever more than 45 percent of a minimum critical mass must be handled and to having DOE approve the SAR.
This has the effect of limiting BPNL privately-owned facilities to less than 45 percent of a critical mass.
BPNL has established minimum safety factors for mass, volume, favorable geometry, areal density, and k effective.
Neutron moderation, reflection, and interaction will be considered in SARs.
BPNL will use favorable geometry control as the preferred method of control.
Fixed neutron poisons may also be used.
BPNL relies on guidance in several ANSI standards but does not use the most current revisions in all cases.
This is acceptable, but puzzling to the staff.
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4 F.
Nuclear Criticality Safety Demonstration Chapter 15 of the application describes the administrative portion of a nuclear criticality safety program.
This chapter is very well written and describes many aspects of a good program which normally would be included as license conditions.
However, as explained above, the limited quantity of SNM to be possessed under this license does not require a vigorous program.
G.
Nuclear Criticality Alarm Exemption BPNL has requested exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 70.24(a) for facilities which contain no more than 45 percent of a minimum critical mass.
The applicant does not differentiate between DOE and licensed material.
Accordingly, the staff recommends approval of the exemption request.
%i iuolpaned4:
George H. Bidinger Uranium Fuel Licensing Branch Division of Fuel Cycle and Material Safety 1
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