ML20205E518

Submits Comments Re Proposed Export Reorganization Act

ML20205E518
Person / Time
Issue date:	04/19/1975
From:	Huberman B NRC
To:	Anders B, Gilinsky V, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 9904050211
Download: ML20205E518 (4)

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April 19, 1975 Mc/sw.wl b. 4

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Chairman Anders bx2/,

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Commissioner Gilinsky 4 a, y 3; r 8 -///

y Commissioner Kennedy gQ Commissioner Mason Commissioner Rowden Ben sfuberman FROM:

PROPOSED EXPORT REORGANIZATION ACT

SUBJECT:

l sis, I will not go Since you will have received Howard Shapar's ana yInstead I f

Act in detail.

through the proposed Export Reorganization organizational and ie will give you some thoughts on the substant v,

i l tion.

tactical implications of the proposed leg s a pihat MRC Gains and Loses _

d law far outweigh the losses.

In The substantive gains to NRC in the proposeresponsibility for issuing licenses.

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uld hold a veto over The chief loss is the clerical addition, the substantive grounds on which we wolicen (d2 fined as materials accountability and physical security).

for issuing export i

security" and "public health and safety" criter aith the paper work.

licenses would be transferred to Commerce, along w ch on overall foreign

Finally, policy and national security responsibility wouibility regarding ncn-tly have no formal veto while we would also have an advisory resp as proliferation aspects of exports, we would apparen on these grounds.

ine whether the recipient NRC's principal responsibility would Le to determl security practices are i

countries' materials accountability and phys cadards we impose on the substantially comparable to the safeguards stan ake Although the proposed act says we would have to m domestic industry.

this determination for all export licenses ld probably be done on a non-military technology, in practice this cou For example, t licenses.

country-by-country basis for nearly all exporonce we had f guards for a given class g

a, of materials or facilities were adequate, we woulook at Q

say a year --

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x April 19, 1975,

The Commissioners ld mesh with our NRC's two other functions in the export safeguards wou i l tion.

proposed' export licensing' responsibility under the new icg s a iteria for First, we would be charged with establishing safcguards cr for cooperation.

t use by the Secretary of State in developing agreemen sSec i

untry personnel in materials accounting and physical security.

i s NRC In addition to its cicar and comprehensive safeguards funct on,

iferation area - a would also have two responsibilities in the non-prol f the non-continuing duty to provide the Director of ACDA assessments o

xports, l

proliferation aspects of " strategically significant" nucicar e tionalizing and a one-time mandated study on the feasibility of internaIt is unclear what strategically significant fuel cycle facilities.

t and, in ACDA is supposed to do with NRC's non-proliferation assessmen I

ss.

general, how that assessment would fit into the licensing proce Organizational Implications for JEC_

se the Com-The safeguards responsibilities under the Act should not cauThe technical understa mission insuperable organizational problems.

l in the of safeguards and safeguards training and recearch is in p a iha f foreign much more active presence abroad, probably in terms both o Commission.

of the Act However, Section 6(a) NEC, so little travel and overseas representation.

provides for the transfer of ERDA safeguards personnel to new hiring might be necessary.

iferation-related On the other hand, if URC ends up with the non-prol d an functions, there will have to be major organizational changas anTh iferation. Thus, expansion of personnel.

to cope with'the broader policy aspects of non-prolthe sta t ol and political-d military specialists, and a new organizational niche create.

Effect on Export Licensing tices would The substantive ef fect of the legislation en our export prac In accordance differ between materials accounting and physical security.

i afeguards --

'with the EPT, the U.S. now requires IAEA materials account ng s ny non-which do not differ materially from our own -- for exports to nuclear weapons state.

standards would not represent any significant changeOn the p h

er.

sure that The present U.S. policy adopted by the AEC last yea ments.

h port i

No of significant amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uran um.

technology.

standards are presently applied in the export of facilities or D) be threefold:

The net ef fect of the new legislation therefore, would U.S. regulations:

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to change the present " adequate" standard to one based on i

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April 19, 1975 The Commissioners J

to include all materials, (2) to expand the standard from HEU and Puto apply the standard to exports to facilities and technology; and (3)

Since no IAEA physical security nuclcar as well as non-nuclear weapon states.this would be a substantially increase requirements exist, It should be said, however, that some physical in the form I

supply for recipients. security requirements are probably in the offing in any cas il

'of an international convention on physical security of nuclear mater a s such as Secretary Kissinger proposed at the Ut:GA last year.

l The proposed act does not distinguish between nuclear and The U.S. and UK have made voluntary safeguards offers, but the weapons states.

f uards USSR and France would aluust ceAlainly bolk aL accepting fornal sa eg states.

conditions on imports from the U.S.

lose A more general foreign policy implication is that the U.S. would flexibility to negotiate less stringent safeguards conditions with The U.S. standard would have to be l

i recipients or other suppliers.In commercial ecmpetition, this would make it easy for S.

competitors to offer more favorable safeguards con applied.

d d nd other safeguards not covered by the IAEA rules.

d t nd-new legislation would be to put a premium on our reaching an un ers a l

ts ing with suppliers so that the safeguards conditions they put on expor I

would be as close as possible to our own.

Is the Proposed Legiclation Acceptable to !:EC?

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for My preliminary judgment is that the present t:RC responsibilit es in which NRC has the i

export licenses under the Energy Reorganization Act, l

i final sign-off, are not an essential and integral part of our bas c regu-If export license issuance were transferred to i

On the latory responsibilities.

Cor.merce, as in the new law, NRC would not lose a vital funct on.

d expertise other hand, it makes sense for NRC to apply its experience anI do not believe it is w to the problem of safeguards in exports.for Congress to make U.

t k the safeguards, but if they do,'then URC is the logical place to ma eBu NRC could necessary determination.

the Executive Branch more discretion on export safeg h Executive agencies.

h hange As to the general policy aspects of non-proliferation, I think t e cCommerce (

made in the legislation makes no sense at all.needs assessments on non But the present practice) in deciding on export license applications.

foreign policy matters) i ith ACDA and State are the proper places to carry out this funct on, w NRC being one recipient of their assessments.

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The Commissioners April 19, 1975 In dealing with the Congress, I believe our approach should be that we can handle the export licensing function either under the existing or the proposed legislation.

i.e should not corplain about the proposed non-proliferation ass.Jsment function, sinc? that would irpact adversely on Congressional perceptions of NRC's ability to carry out its export licensing function under the current law.

l A Tactical Point it While there are some defects in the legislation from URC's viewpoint, On the other hand, ERDA is likely to find is generally acceptable to us.

in tilat ERDA thic prcpeced lau even worsc than tha present sitantion, would lose whatever responsibilities in tne export licensing area it still retains.

The chances that the new legislation will pass will be less if Congress sees that the present export licensing system is functioning effectively.

Thus, ERDA's present obstructive approach to setting up a smooth and effective export licensing process may prove counterproductive.

This is a point we could make to ERDA on Tuesday in talking about the proposed Executive Order on export licensing. At the same tir.e, we 5.hould cr.phasize to ERDA that we can live with the proposed law.

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