ML20205E518
| ML20205E518 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/19/1975 |
| From: | Huberman B NRC |
| To: | Anders B, Gilinsky V, Kennedy, Mason, Rowden, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9904050211 | |
| Download: ML20205E518 (4) | |
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UNITED STATES ,
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NUCLEAR '1GULATORY COMMISSION .". ' : ~
W ASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 1
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._. . .-. April 19, 1975
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Commissioner Gilinsky 4 a , y 3; r y8 -///
Commissioner Kennedy gQ Commissioner Mason Commissioner Rowden Ben sfuberman FROM:
PROPOSED EXPORT REORGANIZATION ACT
SUBJECT:
l sis, I will not go -
Since you will have received Howard Shapar's Act inorganizational ana yInstead detail. and I f through the proposed Export Reorganization ie will give you some thoughts on the substant i l tion. v, tactical implications of the proposed leg s a pihat MRC Gains and Loses _ d law far outweigh the losses. In ,
The substantive gains to NRC in the proposeresponsibility for issuing licenses. /
uld hold a veto over The chief loss is the clerical (d2 fined as materials addition, the substantive grounds on which we wolicen for issuing export accountability and physical security). i security" and "public health and safety" criter aith the paper work.
ch on overall foreign licenses would be transferred to Commerce, along w Finally, policy and national security responsibility wouibility tly haveregarding no formal ncn- veto while we would also have an advisory resp as proliferation aspects of exports, we would apparen on these grounds. ine whether the recipient NRC's principal responsibility would Le toi determl security practices are countries' materials accountability and phys ca dards we impose on the ake substantially comparable to the safeguards Although the proposed act says we would have to m stan domestic industry.
this determination for all export licenses ld probably beFor done on a example, non-military technology, in practice this cou t licenses.
g f guards for a given class a, country-by-country basis for nearly allsay exporonce a year --
we had Q of materials or facilities were adequate, we woulook at y
assuming there were no significant g,s sichanges ,
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April 19, 1975 The Commissioners l ld mesh with our NRC's two other functions in the export safeguards wou i l tion. ;
proposed' export licensing' responsibility underforthe new icg s a iteria for cooperation.
First, we would be charged with establishing safcguards t cr i untry use by the Secretary of State in developing agreemen sSec ,
personnel in materials accounting and physical security.
i s NRC In addition to its cicar and comprehensive safeguards iferationfunctareaon - a, would also have two responsibilities in the non-prol f the non-continuing duty to provide the Director of ACDA assessments xports, o l proliferation aspects of " strategically significant" nucicar e tionalizing and a one-time mandated study on the feasibility of internaIt is unclear what strategically significant fuel cycle facilities. t and, in I ACDA is supposed to do with NRC's non-proliferation assessmen ss.
general, how that assessment would fit into the licensing proce Organizational Implications for JEC_
se the Com- ,
The safeguards responsibilities under the Act should not cauThe technical understa !
mission insuperable organizational problems. l in the iha of safeguards and safeguards training and f foreignrecearch is in p a Commission.
much more active presence abroad, probably However, Section 6(a) ofboth in terms the Acto NEC, so little travel and overseas representation.
provides for the transfer of ERDA safeguards personnel to l new hiring might be necessary.
iferation-related On the other hand, if URC ends up with the non-prol d an functions, there will have to be major organizational iferation. Thus, changas anTh expansion of personnel. t ol and political-to cope with'the broader policy aspectsd of non-prolthe sta military specialists, and a new organizational niche create .
Effect on Export Licensing tices would The substantive ef fect of the legislation en our export prac In accordance l
differ between materials accounting and physical security. i afeguards --
'with the EPT, the U.S. now requires IAEA materials account ny non-ng s which do not differ materially from our own -- for exports to nuclear weapons state.
h er.
standards would not represent any significantsure ments.
changeOn that the ph h port The present U.S. policy adopted by thetechnology. i AEC No last yea ,
of significant amounts of plutonium or highly enriched uran um. D) standards are presently applied in the export of facilities or be threefold:
The net ef fect of the new legislation therefore, would U.S. regulations:
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to change the present " adequate" standard to one based on p
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The Commissioners J to include all materials, (2) to expand the standard from HEU and Puto apply the standard to exports to facilities and technology; and (3) Since no IAEA physical security nuclcar as well as non-nuclear weapon states.this would be a substantially increase requirements exist, It should be said, however, that some physical in the form I supply for recipients. security requirements are probably in the iloffing in any cas
'of an international convention on physical security of nuclear mater a s
- such as Secretary Kissinger proposed at the Ut:GA last year.
l The proposed act does not distinguish between nuclear and weapons states.
The U.S. and UK have made voluntary safeguards offers, f uardsbut the states.
USSR and France would aluust ceAlainly bolk aL accepting fornal sa eg conditions on imports from the U.S.
lose A more general foreign policy implication is that the U.S. would flexibility to negotiate less stringent safeguards conditions with l The U.S. standard would have to be i recipients or other suppliers.In commercial ecmpetition, this would S. make it easy for applied. nd competitors to offer more favorable dsafeguards d con other safeguards not covered by the IAEA rules. d t nd-l I
new legislation would be to put a premium on our reaching an un ts ers a ing with suppliers so that the safeguards conditions they put on expor would be as close as possible to our own.
Is the Proposed Legiclation Acceptable to !:EC?
f i for i My preliminary judgment is that the present t:RC responsibilit in which NRC has thees l
export licenses under the Energy Reorganization Act, i final sign-off, are not an essential If export and license integral issuance part were of our bas transferred to c regu-latory responsibilities. i On the Cor.merce, as in the new law, NRC would not lose a vitaldfunct on.
expertise other hand, it makes sense for NRC to apply its experience anI do not believe it is w t
to the problem of safeguards in exports.for Congress k the to make U.
safeguards, but if they do,'then URC is the logical NRC could place to ma eBu necessary determination.
h Executive the Executive Branch more discretion on export safeg agencies. hange h
As to the general policy aspects of non-proliferation, I think t e cCommerce (
made in the legislation makes no sense at all.needs assessments But on non the present practice) in deciding on export license applications.
foreign policy matters) i ith ACDA and State are the proper places to carry out this funct on, w NRC being one recipient of their assessments.
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April 19, 1975 The Commissioners In dealing with the Congress, I believe our approach should be that we can handle the export licensing function either under the existing or the proposed legislation. i.e should not corplain about the proposed non-proliferation ass.Jsment function, sinc? that would irpact adversely on I
Congressional perceptions of NRC's ability to carry out its export licensing function under the current law. .
l A Tactical Point While there are some defects in the legislation from URC's viewpoint, it is generally acceptable to us. On the other hand, ERDAinistilatlikely to find ERDA thic prcpeced lau even worsc than tha present sitantion, would lose whatever responsibilities in tne export licensing area it still retains. The chances that the new legislation will pass will be less if Congress sees that the present export licensing system is functioning effectively. Thus, ERDA's present obstructive approach to setting up a smooth and effective export licensing process may prove counterproductive.
This is a point we could make to ERDA on Tuesday in talking about the proposed Executive Order on export licensing. At the same tir.e, we 5.hould cr.phasize to ERDA that we can live with the proposed law.
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