ML20205D947
| ML20205D947 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/05/1986 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8608180215 | |
| Download: ML20205D947 (91) | |
Text
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ORIGINAL r'
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
COMMISSION MEETING Briefing on Engineering Research Program (Public Meeting)
Docket No.
Location: Washington, D. C.
1 - 57 Date: Tuesday, August 5, 1986 Pages:
l 8608180215 860805 PDR 10CFR PT9.7.
PDR ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES Court Reporters I
(
1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 I
Washington, D.C.
20006 (202) 293-3950
1 1
4 1
D ' SCLA I M ER 2'
S 4
5 6
This is an unofficial transcript of a meeting of the 7
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission held on S
8/05/86 In the Commission's office at 1717 H Street, 9
'N. tJ., Washington, D.C.
The meeting was open to public i
10 attendance and observation.
This transcript has not been 11 reviewed, corracted, or edited, and it may contain 12 inaccuracies.
13 The transcript is intended solely for general 14 informational purposes.
As provided by 10 CFR 9.103, it is 15 not part of the formal or informal record of decision of the 16 matters d i s cu s sied.
Expressions of epinion in this transcript 17 do not necessarily reflect final determination or beliefs.
No 18 pleading or other paper may be filed with the Commission in 19 any proceeding as the result of or addressed to any statement 20 or argument centained herein, except as the Commission may 21 authorire.
22 23 24 25
4 1
1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION i
3 4
BRIEFING ON ENGINEERING RESEARCH PROGRAM 5
6 (PUBLIC MEETING) 7 8
Nuclear Regulatory Commission j
l 9
Room 1130 i
10 1717 H Street, Northwest 11 Washington, D.C.
i 12 i
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13 Tuesday, August 5, 1986 14 1
15 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 2:04 p.m., the Honorable LANDO W.
ZECH, JR.,
17 Chairman of the Commission, presiding.
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18 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:
19 LANDO W.
ZECH, JR., Chairman of the Commission 20 THOMAS M. ROB"RTS, Member of the Commission 21 JAMES K. ASSELSTINE, Member of the Commission 22 FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL, Member of the Commission 23 24 i
25
- - -.. _ ~ _ _ - _ _. _ - -.
s 2
1 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT COMMISSION TABLE:
2' 3
S.
CHILK 4
W. PARLER i
5 G. ARLOTTO 4
6 V. STELLO 7
D. ROSS 8
4 9
i 10 11 12 13 l
14 15 s
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
3 1
PROCEEDINGS 2
CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Good afternoon, ladies and 3
gentlemen.
This afternoon, the Office of Nuclear Regulatory 4
Research will provide the Commission with a briefing on 5
current and planned activities in the Division of Engineering 6
Safety.
7 This briefing is part of an effort to keep the 8
Commission better informed on the various research programs 9
the Agency is involved in, and their impact on the Agency's 10 mission.
11 The Agency has had a research program in engineering 12 research for over a decade, and the progran has made a 13 significant impact on our regulations.
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14 The program has enhanced our understanding of the 15 response of pressure vessels to transients, the consequences 16 of various pipe breaks, and steam generator tube rupture 1/
actions, to name a few.
18 The program has, and is also contributing to our 19 understanding of the response of containments in severa 20 accidents.
It is helping to define what is important, looking 21 at plant aging, and possibly plant life extensions.
1 22 Today's discussion will be a briefing only.
There 23 will be no vote involved.
Do any of my fellow Commissioners 24 have opening comments?
25 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
No.
4 4
1 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Then, I will turn the meeting over 2
to Mr. Stallo.
Proceed, please.
3 MR. STELLO:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it is 4
important to recognize that to the best of my knowledge this 5
is the first opportunity I can recall in a long, long, time 6
where research was going to come down and talk to you about 7
what they were doing, rather than the inferences that are made 8
in a lot of other programs about the benefits and results of 9
research that apply to our programs, to take it, and tell you 10 really what is going on in research certainly is an 11 appreciation of the valuable work and the contributions they 12 are making to fulfill our regulatory responsibilities.
13 I hope that this is just the first of such 14 briefings.
We just picked one of the Divisions to come down, l
15 because I think it would be too much to try to cover in one 16 meeting, and to schedule later other meetings in other areas 17 of research some time in the future.
18 We have with us today Dr. Ross.
We all know him.
19 Mr. Arlotte, and a number of his principle staff that are 20 responsible for the research work.. Whether than spending a 21 great deal of time, I will ask Guy to run through crisply and 22 sharply, and tell us all about the research.
23 MR. ROSS:
Just a minute of preliminaries.
The 24 research office recently reorganized.
The principles in this 25 program did not change.
l
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C 4
5 1
Guy Arlotto is the Division Director, and he will be 2
the main speaker today.
His deputy is Larry Shao.
There are 3
two branches in Arlotto's Division that are principally 4
responsible for this work.
Jim Richardson, who is here, Chuck J
5 Carpain, the other branch chief is not here.
He is 6
represented today by Milt Bagins.
7 These four managers, Arlotto, Shao, Richardson, and 8
Carpain, collectively have seventy-two years of Government 9
experience, and forty-five years experience in other places; 10 either other Government agencies, or in the private sector.
11 And each has two college degrees in their field of 12 expertise.
/
13 Today we are not talking budget.
Programs 14 collectively amount to about thirty-eight million a year, or 15 about forty percent of the budget, but this is not a budget 16 presentation.
17 Also, representing the prime customer, NRR, in the 18 audience is Dick Vollmer and Bob Bosnack.
If there is any 19 question about end use, they are available.
l 20 So, with that, I will introduce Arlotto, who will 21 proceed with the discussion.
l l
22 Thank you.
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Proceed.
l l
24 MR. ARLOTTO:
Mr. Chairman, I am here to talk about 25 the Engineering Research Program.
As you will hear, it is a 1
6 6
1 very hardware oriented program, directed at operating
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2 reactors.
Of course, you can't completely eliminate the fact 3
there will be feedback to standardized plans as we begin to 4
understand more about how the various components I will be 5
talking about work.
6 I would like to point out differently than maybe you 7
have been hearing mostly from research, this program is 8
principally directed at prevention.
Different from 9
mitigation.
10 Except in the containment program, you will be 11 hearing a lot of very simple things like cracks and flaws and 12 concerns like that.
Quite different -- maybe not so esoteric 13 as some of the things you have been listening to in research.
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14 I would also like to point out that we work 15 extremely closely with our counterparts with some places like 16 IEE.
In a fact, I think the Staff has almost become a blur in 17 the sense that we almost always have at least one or two 18 people from our particular staff working with NRR.
19 Right now we have somebody trying to help evaluate 20 the pressure or establish the occidentals.
21 The first slide, please.
22 (Slide.]
23 Mr. Chairman, I am going to try to try to present 24 the program very, very up frunt in terms of why we do the
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25 research, and I will try to identify what the broad safety L
7 1
issue is that we are trying to address, and then side by side, 2
I am going to try to show you how we are applying the i
3 research, and what the program is that flows into that 4
application.
5 Next slide, please.
l 6
(Slide.]
7 The engineering research program, I am going to talk 8
about it in these particular general areas.
This generally 9
covers most of the stuff I do, certainly the majority of the 10 budget.
11 Next slide, please.
12 (Slide.]
r 13 In the area of reactor vessels, this is what we 14 consider to be the key safety issues, particularly ycu ought 15 to focus on the second bullet, because this is unique to 16 nuclear power plants.
17 This is because of the fact that we do produce 18 certain neutrons and fission.
We end up having -- these 19 neutrons have an effect on the materials.
20 Next slide, please.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Let me ask a question.
- What, 22 if anything, is being done about the concept of annealing?
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
I am going to touch on annealing I
24 later, sir.
Actually, there is very little right now.
I will 25 address what we have done.
8 1
This slide, just to orient you what happens when we 2
are actually subjected to -- when a pressure vessel seal is 3
subjected to this kind of neutron bombardment.
4 What happens is, the material becomes a little more 5
brittle.
The key thing you want to remember, as the current 6
shifts to the right or down, it means that it is becoming more 7
brittle.
But you will see there are three curves there.
8 The dotted one says this is what it looks like when 9
we are in very good shape, and the second one, pulled out six 10 copper, says this is what it looks like after we had it 11 irradiated with a relatively small amount of copper as a tramp 12 element, and t2 2 third one, the 23 percent copper, is what it
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13 looks like if we have a little more copper as a tramp element.
14 The key thing to remember here is, one is in 15 irradiation, you lose certain amount of toughness, or it 16 begins to get brittle, and the second thing is even very small 17 amounts of impurities li, copper can have a cignificant 18 effect, which is one of the key elements in pressurized vessel 19 shock issue.
20 Next slide, please.
21
[ Slide.)
22 okay.
I think that nearly everyone of my slides, 23 Mr. chairman, have a bullet such as this.
We have learned 24 that over the years one of the key applications of research is 25 that be prepared for you, the decision makers to make good, l
9 1
responsible regulatory decisions.
In that way, we feel as one 2
of our key objectives is to have available for you at that 3
time information so that you can make more responsible 4
decisions, and this program about vessels is not new.
We 5
already have seen flaws in several vessels that we have had to 6
make decisions on, whether or not they should be allowed to 7
continue to operate, whether we should grid out the flaws, et 8
cetera.
9 I can name some of the particular plants.
Pilgram 10 had a flaw.
At one time Hatch had some flaws in the weld 11 nozzle, and Indian Point 2 had some cracks also.
12 I would like to particularly hit on a couple of
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13 quick points on what our programs were about.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
What were those cracks 15 caused by, Guy?
16 MR. ARLOTTot They were probably caused initially l
17 by fabrication, and possibly by welding.
Because those l
18 appeared in the heat effect, in the vicinity of the nozzles.
j 19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Let me ask you something.
20 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Whether it was the ASME or i
l 22 the NRC, the reactor pressure vessel built today would be i
I 23 required to have the low copper content, is that not correct?
l 24 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir.
l 25 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS Was that Section 3 of the
l 10 1
ASME Code?
2 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes.
Section 3, of the ASME Codt does 3
not really say exactly what the amount of copper that would be 4
allowed, but now that we know it, the key element that occurs 5
with the copper, Commissioner Roberts, was the fact that they b
6 knew they had it in the weld material.
Actually, it was in 7
the weld rod.
8 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
So, it is not in the plate.
9 It'is in the --
10 MR. ARLOTTO:
Generally speaking, it is not in the 11 plate.
It is principally in the weld rod.
That is the reason 12 why we focused on the low upper shelf material, which is
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13 really what the welds require.
14 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Thank you.
1 15 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Why wasn't this problem 16 anticipated, or was it?
17 MR. ARLOTTO:
The copper problem, I don't know.
18 Back in the years when we put out its first code, back in I 19 guess it was 1964, the copper problem was not anticipated.
As 20 far as I know, it was not anticipated in the Navy program 21 either.
22 The Navy program is where most of the ASME, the 23 foundation came from the work in the Navy program.
24 In fact, one of the key elements was some of the 25 people that came out of the Navy program, like Milt Shaw, when
11 i
1 they came to the Agency, continued to pursue the heavy section 2
steel.. Why wasn't it anticipated?
I guess people just didn't 3
feel that these elements would be significant.
4 You are stealing some of my stuff.
I will point out 5
later that there are other tramp elements that will have some 6
effect.
Nickel, particularly if you have low copper, and you 7
have high nickel, it could have an effect.
Maybe not quite as 8
bad as very high copper, but it could have an effect, and that 9
is one of the concerns that we continue to pursue in terms of 10 vessel work.
I 11 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is it fair to say that at l
l l
12 least the original assumption was that the vessels first would l
13 be manufactured to very high quality, and that that would stay j
A 14 that way throughout the operating life, and what we are having 15 to deal with here is the realization that in the real world 16 the expectations haven't been matched by performance?
17 MR. ARLOTTC:
I think that what it says is that we 18 started with a technology that was evolving.
We had to make l
19 some tough decisions, and we went forward, and we are now 20 beginning to see the real engineering feedback.
1 21 Most engineering really is done by finding out what 22 is wrong, and building on our successes.
And I think what it 23 says is that we have a potential program.
We just didn't know 24 it.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Well, also I think it was recognized m
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1 that there could be a potential problem many, many, many 2
years ago, when we first started in this business.
When you 3
built a reactor vessel, and you knew you were going to i
4 irradiate it, I think there was some cause for concern.
What 5
was uncertain is exactly what would happen.
6 I remember visiting various cites where vessels were 7
being built many years ago, and I remember being told that it 8
was -- we would have to find exactly how much embrittlement 9
resulted from an environment of radiation, and I think it was 10 a matter of recognition that something would happen, but I 11 think it was, as I recall, they just didn't know how much, but 12 it was going to be watched carefully, as I remember, and I 13 think that is what has happened.
7 14 Is that fair, do you think?
15 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir, I think that is fair.
I 16 don't specifically address the copper problem.
I think the 17 copper problem --
18 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Right.
I think about embrittlement 19 mors than anything.
20 MR. ARLOTTO:
Another thing is, let's face a very 21 clear fact.
I think that the engineering community, wo have 22 to try to take our hat off, the fact that they recognized that 23 the need to have high quality and a high reliance on the 24 vessel was paramount, and that is the reason why the ASME went 25 to an entirely different standard with the ASME Section 3.
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O 13 1
After all, they have been building vessel, 2
boiler-type vessels for a long time.
Section 8 vessels which 3
have done very well, but there was a recognition that there 4
was a need for even higher quality, and therefore, Section 3 5
evolved.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Okay.
Let's go ahead.
7 MR. ARLOTTO:
Okay.
Let me just make one point on s
8 that slide.
I would like to be clear that one of the key 9
elements of many of our programs is to develop a methodology 10 that could be generically applied, and then validate the 11 methodology.
12 In the case of vessels, as I just tried to indicate,
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13
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you are almost dealing with a different kind of materials and 14 their thickness.
Close to areas becoming embrittled, it will 15 behave linearly we call it, and in between it would behave 16 somewhat brittle and somewhat plastic, and at the very end, it 17 will behave plasticly.
18 And we have to deal and understand all three of 19 those elements.
Let's go to the next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.]
21 MR. ARLOTTO:
Just to give you an outline of why 22 pressurized thermal shock was a concern, the principle thing 23 that happens to pressurized thermal shock is when you do cool 24 the vessel, you end up with thermal stresses -- the upper 25 graph, you have pressure stress into the pressure vessel.
As
14 1
you can see, a little crack on the inside of that wall, the 2
tensile stresses add up, thereby tending to pull that crack 3
open.
l 4
Let me quickly also point out, there is one more 5
thing, one recognizes that we have had great difficulty in 6
driving a crack through a wall even under very, very demanding 7
conditions, if there is no pressure.
8 And you can see by this curve when the pressure is 9
bigger than the compressive stress, that we can push it 10 through the last ligaments.
Otherwise, you are just not going 11 to get it through that vessel.
j 12 Let's go on, please.
- {'
13 (Slide.]
14 This is something I thought you would like to see.
15 This is a PTSE -- this is the vessel that was generally used.
16 It is a vessel thirty-nine inches in diameter, it is six feet 17 high, six inches thick, and that compares with a PWR which 18 might be fifteen feet in diameter, but a length of forty-five 19 feet, but wo have to have a vessel this big in crdar to get 20 the constraints we need, so that the crack will grow similarly 21 to the way it would grow in a real vessel.
22 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
Where was this, Oak Ridge?
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
Oak Ridge, yes, sir.
We had the PTSE 24 experiments.
25
[ Slide.)
15 l
1 This particular slide, I just wanted to point out 2
that one of the key things, again we were looking into the j
3 future and saying that there is a good chance that in its 4
present state of the nuclear industry, there doesn't seem to 5
be too many utilities that are going to order nuclear 6
properties.
There is a good chance we are going to have to'be 7
faced with applications for life extension, and of course the 8
vessel being essential and most demanding, and probably the 9
most expensive single item, we are going to have to face that 10 issue up front.
11 So, the programs are factored into that.
12 I would like to particularly point out two of our
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13 programa.
One is the Gundremmingen Reactor which we have a 14 clever program in Germany.
We are actually getting pieces of 15 material from a vessel that has been irradiated for twelve 16 years.
17 We need this to benchmark some of our accelerated 18 aging that we do in our basic work at Oak Ridge where we l
19 actually irradiate th6 specimens, test them to find out the 20 toughness they have lost.
This has to be done at an l
21 accelerated rate.
22 This will give us a benchmark against which you can 23 test whether or not our accelerated aging really matches the 24 long term effects of normal aging.
25 In addition, we are going to get material from
O 16 1
Shippingport, and that reactor has been in operation about 1
2 twenty years or so.
So, we will have a couple of more points b
3 to double check and validate our methodology, hopefully even 4
4 better.
5 The last thing I wculd like to point out is the 6
question that Mr. Roberts has anticipated, and others are i
7 concerned about, annealing.
g i
8 We do expect that given the fact that the vessel 9
would be the most expensive single item, we have done some 10 preliminary studies.
It appears like -- not only we, but 11 industry has done also some preliminary studies.
It appears
/
12 like even the potential for annealing a vessel might be
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worthwhile from an economic viewpoint rather than replacing 13 J
14 it.
15 And what we are doing, we are not going to l
l 16 demonstrate annealing.
I think that would have to be a 17 demonstration by the industry.
I think if they would like to 18 come in and apply for an annealing, they would have to show us 19 that that vessel could be annealed properly.
20 But we have done some work.
Particularly two 21 specific problems.
One is an engineering-type problem, and 22 that is annealing just to make clear, in case someone isn't 23 following me, annealing is really just as heating up of the 24 vessel, the particular micro-structure changes, and the vessel 25 comes back to nearly its same characteristics, and initially, I
O 17 1
that is, it becomes very tough.
2 We are concerned with two things.
One is,'how much 3
of that material can we get back in terms of its toughness.
4 The second thing is how could they re-embrittle if, indeed, we 5
get this recovery, and then it is going to re-embrittle in a 6
year or two, that will not do us much good.
7 We feel that should be demonstrated by the 8
industry.
That is the engineering part, whereby they could 9
demonstrate and feel comfortable that if they actually go 10 through this they are not going to have distortions of the 11 vessel due to this heating, where the nozzles may not match up 12 with the piping, and that is the other issue.
13 I am not really addressing this part in my program, 14 but we have looked at that issue also.
I believe that it is 15 practical to do.
16 But our key element here is to be able to have the 17 information available, particularly for our NRR associates, to 18 make the judgments, ask the right questions in this areas.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
No question it can be done.
20 It is just a matter of costs.
21 MR. ARLOTTO:
Going on, I did want to point out that 22 we have that direct input, obviously, to the PTS.
Mostly the 23 screening criteria flowed directly from the work we had done 24 in our research program over the years, and Reg Guide 1.99 is 25 also a key issue which really puts more meat on the PTS rule,
18 1
and it too flows from our research program.
2 I think that our research program also looked, is 3
feeding back and helping us implement the PTS rule, because.
4 the PTS rule requires, as you may recall, a submittal by the 5
applicants which was due on January 15th or 16th, and I think 6
they are most in the ring by now, for them to update their 7
copper and the nickel content, and basically to track the 8
material so that we can make our evaluation of are certain 9
actions required by flux reduction.
10 And our programs feed directly into this.
I think 11 what I ought to point out is there is another small problem I 12 have which is the effects of cladding.
i 13 Cladding turns out to be a double barrel kind of an
,i 14 issue.
It could actually help us in a pressurized thermal j
15 shock, because if a crap were underneath the clad, the clad 16 wold tend to hold it together, thereby holding that crack in.
17 However, if the crack grew through the clad, we l
18 would have the opposite effect.
The clad would actually end 19 up cladding it out.
l 20 What we are doing is trying to do it by separate i
l 21 effects test, because of the very high expense.
Trying to do 22 it by separate effects test, try to understand whether or not 23 the crack would grow deep, or try to come out, and that is 24 what we are doing now.
25 Incidentally, the Navy is very interested in I
,,. ~,, -,., -
19 1
cladding effects.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Guy, on the PTS rule, my 3
recollection was the objective of the PTS rule was to ensure 4
that even in plants that had embrittlement problem, they would
)
5 be okay for the remaining operating life of the plant.
6 If utilities are really --
7 MR. ARLOTTO:
Or take action to insure 8
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Or take action to insure 9
that they don't get into trouble during the normal operating 10 life of the plant.
11 If utilities are seriously considering plant 12 extensions of ten or longer years, how does the PTS rule fit i
13 in with that kind of a scenario?
14 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, I think the PTS rule is all 15 right.
The bigger problem we are going to be faced with are 16 maybe institutional kinds of problems. That is, if we are 17 evaluating a particular extension, plant extension.
Somebody 18 says I want to have a plant extension for twenty years, and we 19 look at it and we say, gee whiz, we think you are going to 20 trip the PTS screening criteria after ten, would we give them
(
21 a ten year extension and say, look, forget it.
22 I think it is an institutional problem. I think the 23 PTS rule says that we want to be sure that up to that 24 particular point you are all right.
If you want to go beyond 25 it, all bets are off.
1 i
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20 l
1 MR. STELLO:
I think maybe there are two more issues 2
though.
Licensees know what the requirements are.
If they 3
are really thinking in terms of life extensions, there are t
4 things they can do today.
Anticipating they may opt to extend 5
the life, which is reduce the flux of the walls.
6 On the other hand, if this is not an issue, then 7
they ought to get serious about thinking about the possibility i
i 8
of annealing, and start to make some groundwork for the case i
9 of annealing, so what it does it makes it clear what the rules 10 are, and then they have got choices, and it is up to them to 11 make them.
12 If they really think life extension, that seems to I
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13 me one or two courses of action to take.
If you are going to
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i 14 get difficulty, take the action now, reduce the flux, so you i
l 15 don't know the problem.
j 16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Or anneal or replace.
17 MR. STELLO:
Get serious about thinking about 18 annealing?
19 MR. ARLOTTO:
Next slide, please.
20
[ Slide.]
21 I just want to take a couple of seconds to say that 22 this slide is strictly anticipatory.
We know that we have 23 some material that may be getting close to our Appendix G.
24 Appendix G is fracture toughness requirements, and 25 we have something in there that says the toughnesce shouldn't 1
21 1
go below fifty foot pounds, or you have to make a case that it 1
2 is okay.
3 We would anticipate, and our NRR associates, are 4
going to get potentially some exemptions to Appendix G, which 5
might lead to rule changes, but we want to be in the position 6
where we could feed them information to make accurate and 7
timely regulatory decisions.
8 Next.
9 (Slide.]
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
These are vessels as well.
11 MR. ARLOTTO:
These are principally welds.
Turning 12 to piping for a beginning, I think that the key questions in I
i 13 piping are going to be something you have made some decisions 1
14 on, which basically concerned about whether or not the double 15 ended pipe break really does give us the balance of safety we 16 are looking for, and the second thing I would like to 17 particularly address is scme of the fixes that have been posed 18 by industry where our restraints has helped in evaluation.
19 Again, the first bullet, as 1 indicated 20 Mr. Chairman, it directs itself at having in place good 21 decision-making.
I would particularly like to point out that 22 piping is different than vessels.
The loads are different.
23 We have bending, which is a key element, that we don't really 24 see in vessels.
We probably see greater affects of dynamic j
25 load, such as seismic in piping, and we really don't see as
22 1
much in vessels.
2 So, therefore, the methodology that we have to 3
evolve is different.
Usually we are dealing with stainless in 4
the bigger piping systems, and of course in the vessels we are 5
dealing with carbon steel, so we do need a different 6
methodology, and that is evolving, and we much benchmark the 7
methodology to have some idea of where we are going.
8 I did want to focus a little bit -- I am sorry, next 9
slide please.
10 (Slide.]
11 I did want to focus a little bit on the last bullet 12 here, because this has a lot of implications.
We have cast r
13 stainless steel.
Cast stainless steel is a particular
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14 material that is used in some Westinghouse piping, and in some 15 casings and valve finds, and based on some testing that has 16 been done, we find that this material actually looses some of 17 its toughness just being in normal operation at temperature.
18 This has been a concern, particularly you may recall, the ACRS l
l 19 in commenting on my program specifically pointed out that 1
20 they thought we should continue this program vigorously, and 1
21 of course we are.
22 Of course, the next point is, it is obvious that 23 anything like that with a life extension, this particular 24 thing is completely aggravated.
If you are going to have 25 trotble in normal life, at time of temperature, life extension l
l 23 1
is going to be trouble in spades. So we are trying to 2
understand that issue much better.
3 Next slide, please.
4
[ Slide.]
5 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
How much of that equipment 6
is out there in plants?
7 MR. ARLOTTO:
There is quite a bit.
Just about 8
every plant will have some kind of a valve or pump casing of 9
some sort of cast stainless.
Only Westinghouse uses cast 10 stainless piping, to my knowledge.
11 The next one is something that you people have dealt i
12 with, and I think one of the real successes of our research 13 program.
The revision of general design criteria for, as you I
14 recall your recently approved application in final form of the 15 Limited Scope Rule which was limited only to PWR, namely 16 piping, and recently approved publication in proposed form of 17 the Broad Scope Rule, which opened up the door a little wider, 18 providing certain specific criteria were met.
19 I think the key tnirig I would like to point out 20 here, our research fed into that, but I think that this is a 21 point where we nave had in place regulatory guides for a long 22 time that said that we really thought were conservative, by 23 assuming a double in the pipe break, and protecting against it 24 was conservative.
25 However, on balance I think it is pretty clear at
24 1
least to many pecple providing these criteria that indeed we 2
actually have a better balance in safety in many cases by not 3
assuming a double in the pipe break.
If indeed it can happen, 4
and things like pipe rsstraints which cause higher 5
occupational exposure, and difficulty in in-service 6
inspection.
7 So, I think this is a case where we really struck 8
our blow for safety, provided we can convince ourselves that 9
indeed these things can happen, and our research fed directly 10 into that program.
11 USI, Unresolved Safety Issue A-2 is a high 12 asymmetrical blowdown.
This was a concern whereby we had the 13 problem of the discharging fluid from a nozzle.
May actually l
14 try to overturn the vessel, and y ull it off its pedestal.
t 15 Based on our work again, this problem sort of went away.
We 16 had input into some of the more parochial documents of NRR 17 seeing the review plans on intermediate pike breaks was also a 18 big help.
19 Lastly, I would like to point out anticipatory 20 again.
Here we have generally agreed with the technological 21 community that doubling the pipe breaks under certain 22 conditions aren't going to happen.
23 The question now comes in what do we replace it 24 with?
Particularly for things that are non-dynamic.
We are l
25 applying the double in the pipe break -- elimination of a pipe I
25 1
break to things in a dynamic area.
That is for' piping 2
restraints.
3 However, what do we do about things like containment 4
or ECCS.
I am not quite so sure.
Right now, we continue to 5
design those for the discharge of the pipe break.
6 But, really to have a consistent base of 7
regulations, we really are to try to understand is there a 8
base for a replacement criteria, and that is part of our 9
program.
10 Particularly the final bullet is the one where we 11 are going to be looking hard at.
This is going to be -- I say 12 going to be because we have gotten some very good indications
{
of interest, but nobody has actually sent their checks yet.
13 14 The UK, Frar.ce, Japan, the Swiss, the Swedes, Taiwan, Canada, 15 and EPRI have all indicated an interest in going into a joint 16 partnership on what we call the IPIRG Program.
17 This is where we would actually take big piping,
(
18 some of it taken directly that han been degraded in-service, 19 and test it under very big loads of seismic and static 16 ads 20 to see exactly where -- is there a critical size length that 21 obtains, and if so, can we relate that to a particular break, 22 thereby trying to get to a hope -- I am not sure we will get l
23 there -- I hope a replacement criteria in the middle of the 1
24 pipe.
l 25 Next slide, please.
26 1
[ Slide.)
2 I would like to show you this.
This is what piping 3
restraints really look like.
They are massive in nature.
4 Thirty-six inch steam line.
I got the answer.
S All I wanted to do is make a comment here is that 6
these piping restraints, in small parts could be a few hundred 7
pounds, and could go up to thirty tons for the bigger pipes to 8
protect against one pipe break.
I am not too sure about 9
safety.
10 Next slide, please.
11
[ Slide.]
12 I would like to continue to talk a little bit about 13 the fixes that have been proposed, and what we have done.
The
- t l
14 key fix is called weld clad overlay.
This is where two things l
15 are done.
They actually put beads of weld over the top of a i
16 crack of a pipe, thereby giving it a greater mass of material.
17 But in addition, it puts the crack in compression.
18 Thereby, try to hold it together.
We have had a significant 19 input to our research program.
One showing that the veld clad i
l 20 overlay, we have actually tested them in bending, and the 21 bend.ing stress is much higher and it stayed together.
32 In addition, we got a twenty-two inch pipe from the 1
l 23 old Hatch Plant, and we examined that and the crack was 24 blunted and had not drawn, and the stresses, the residual i
25 stresses were still compressive.
c
27 1
So, we feel comfortable that indeed the weld overlay 2
is a very good way to repair a pipe if you can identify that 3
the cracking is limited.
4 I would also -- two more other fixes that we are 5
looking at, and one is induction heating stress improvement.
6 This is a technique that has been principally evolved from the 7
Japanese.
Here we actually tried to treat the piping so that 8
it will stay in compression, thereby resisting the potential 9
for crack growth.
10 The other one is that there is an interest in 11 actually injecting hydrogen into the feedwater system of 12 certain BWRs, and thereby being an oxygen getter, and reducing
(
13 the potential for corrosion due to oxygen.
(
14 This is actually a system that is being prima plated 15 in Dresden, sponsored by EPRI and GE and with Commonwealth 16 Edison, and we are trying to follow that program.
We are not 1
17 going to make a major safety program out of that.
40 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Excuse me.
You said reducing the 19 corrosion?
20 MR. ARLOTTO:
Oxygen is the bad acter.
j I
21 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Yeah, I know.
I thought you said it 22 the other way around.
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
Oh, I am sorry.
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
No, I misunderstood you.
I think i
25 oxygen is a bad actor, and it does cause corrosion.
I guess I l
l
28 1
misunderstood you.
I thought you were trying to say that 2
oxygen was good.
3 MR. ARLOTTO:
No.
I said the hydrogen gets the 4
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Okay, fine.
6 MR. ARLOTTO:
I have so much to cover, and so little 7
time.
8 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One quick question on the 9
pipe cracks.
If we had done what the Japanese did on the BWR 10 pipe cracks, basically replace the high carbon steel, do IHSI, 11 do hydrogen addition, how much of this program that you are 12 doing now would be unnecessary?
13 MR. ARLOTTO:
This particular program?
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yeah, and I suppose the 15 follow-on one, which is NDE techniques.
16 MR. ARLOTTO:
If we had the IHSI, I think that on 17 all piping before it went in, I think we would see a 18 significant decrease in cracking.
The hydrogen bothers me a 19 little bit, I am still concerned about hydrogen frcm side i
(
20 effects.
Concerned that hydrogen could end up coming together 21 let's say at an air rejective of BWR, thereby adding the 1
l 22 potential for explosion.
l 23 I am concerned about hydrogen.
I know that some of 24 my associates are not.
I would be a little bit more concerned 25 about a hydrogen system, but I do think the induction heating
29 1
from a basic engineering viewpoint has great promise.
2 I think from what part of our program would not be 3
of concern, I just can't really say whether or not I would 4
still stress corrosion cracking.
If you see stress corrosion 5
cracking, there could be a problem.
6 One of the bullets I had not hit on gives me why I 7
am concerned.
It is that we have been using in many of the 8
more aggressive utilities have replaced piping with 3/16 9
nuclear grade material.
f 10 Some of the work we are doing at Argonne indicates 11 that 3/16 very definitely does resist stress corrosion 12 cracking.
- c 13 They are beginning to see certain trends in cracking 14 if we don't keep the water very pure.
15 So, again I hate to use the words there are no free 16 lunches, but you have got to be careful, as I indicated with 17 the discussion on pipe whip restraints, what seems to be very 18 conservative may not on balance be good for safety.
19 I think that we have an obligation to be in a 20 position not so much to advance the state of technology, but 21 be in a position so that we can verify and feel ccmfortable, 22 indeed, that safety is being improved.
23 So, the answer to your question is I really didn't 24 answer your question saying my program would go away. I really 25 don't know.
I think it is a little early.
We are doing
30 1
environmental cracking.
Perhaps after we see some real 2
effects of how good stress -- particularly induction heat on 3
stress.
This particular technique can give us some headaches 4
if the pipe is really cracked.
5 MR. STELLO:
Maybe the short answer is what extent i
6 this would go away, but also we don't know to what extent a 7
different program than the one we have would have necessarily 8
understood what was going on as well.
9 I think both questions, we don't know the answer to 10 either one.
i 11 MR. ARLOTTO:
Next slide.
12 (Slide.]
13 I just thought I would show you this is the bending 14 normally put on the weld overlay repair, just to give you an 15 idea, and that thing held up very well, i
16 Next slide, please?
I l
17
[ Slide.]
18 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is that a real old pipe?
19 MR. ARLOTTO:
No, that was not a real old pipe.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I guess I shouldn't say, 1
21
'real old.'
Is that a pipe that --
22 MR. ARLOTTO:
We fabricated the weld overlay for 23 that pipe, but we did look at some of the hatch piping.
l 24 Turning to the steam generators, I would like to 25 simply point out that we have seen different forms of
1 31 1
degradation of steam generators, wastage, denting, stress 2
corrosion, cracking, -- we have seen a great deal of different 3
kinds of degradation.
4 And our key safety concern has always been can we 5
have a situation where we have degradation essentially 6
uniformally, and then have a transient of some kind, such as 7
from an earthquake, or internal transient, that might have 8
several tubes go at one time, thereby putting primary water 9
into a secondary system, which has this conduit going outside 10 containment, and possibly the relief valves are outside 11 containment, and the primary system is directly in contact 12 with the environment.
13 That is our key concern.
We are -- we have had l
l 14 direct input into some Reg Guides already, but I think that a 1
1 15 program which -- people say we never finish -- our program on 16 steam generators is over in '87.
We intend to write reports 17 and put together -- begin to decommission that facility, since 18 we'have that obligation.
19 I would like to point out, though, where we real2y l
l 20 expect us to have our biggest impact from this program is we 21 have a Reg Guide 1.83 which puts forth basically a sampling of 22 how to do an inspection on a steam generator, but it is 23 basically based on random techniques.
l 24 I think that our program at Surry will clearly 25 indicate if we are going to have a sampling program, where is
4 32 1
the best place to sample?
The engineers and statisticians are 2
pulling tubes there in a statistical manner so that we can 3
develop a meaningful sampling program, thereby not putting an 4
excess burden on the industry in doing inspections, but doing 5
it in the right places.
6 The second thing is we also have another Reg Guide, 7
1.121, which really talks about what time do you have to plug 8
tubes.
Now it says forty percent thickness.
Our work at 9
Surry will do two things.
10 One, it will validate whether or not the Eddy 11 current techniques, which is the in-service inspection l
12 techniqua used for steam generators, how valid they are.
By 13 doing these particular base line -- running the Eddy current 14 throughout the whole steam generator by different methods, 15 then constructively examining those to see if they picked up 16 those cracks, and did they properly characterize them.
l 17 The second thing we c.re going to do is pull out some 18 tubes, and then burst some of them and see what kind of margin l
19 wa have.
Again, all directed to the issue of saraty of steam 20 generators.
21 Next, please.
22
[ Slide.]
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Aren't you going to talk about i
24 chemistry on steam generators?
25 MR. ARLOTTO:
I don't talk too much about chemistry I
l
33 i
1 on steam generators simply because we generally leave most of 2
that to the industry.
EPRI has a massive program in looking i
3 at water chemistry in steam generators.
{
4 We feel that that is a preventive mechanism that the 1
5 industry has to pick up the ball on.
We need regulatory 6
decision on how can you tell whether or not the steam 7
generator is okay, that is -- we think the industry ought to i
8 do something, and they have.
They have spent millions of 9
dollars.
10 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I don't think they have done 11 enough.
I know they are doing more now, but it has been kind 12 of late coming.
I had a chance to see that Surry steam 13 generator out there, and it is awful isn't it?
14 It really is, and certainly it looked to me like i
15 there wasn't much chemistry involved in that.
Through water 16 in there and let her go.
17 The thing only lasted six years, and it was suppcsed 18 to last thirty, or something.
But I am sure there are lots of 19 things that can go wrong, but it really looked corroded and 1
20 eroded, and it was pretty clear to me that nobody paid much 21 attention to chemistry.
l l
22 It is pretty basic, I think, in whether we do it or 23 they do it, but when it gets in that bad condition it seems to 24 me perhaps we should be concerned about it.
l l
25 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well, we have, under the new
~.
J
34 1
organization, we do have a group within the materials which are part of my chemistry group, which we expect to be looking 2
3 at water chemistry, but I don't know if the budget can stand 4
it, or I can't get what I want by leaning on the industry in I
5 this area.
6 MR. ROSS:
I wanted to point out something.
7 Philosophically, we had this same dilemma with the research 8
program on steam generators as the CRGR did.
9 If the steam generator has to be replaced, it is 10 certainly an economic impact, but it may not be a safety 11 impact.
We regulate the safety aspects, and maybe the steam 12 generator has to be replaced every five years.
13 As long as it is safe, maybe that is as far as a 14 regulatory should go.
15 It has been a dilemma on how to run the research 16 program in this area, and also how to regulate it.
17 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Sure, I appreciate that.
But all I 18 can say is that Surry steam generator, it would be hard to l
19 call that very safe from my standpoint, and that points out 20 the big concern is the primary water being released beyond the 21 steam generator and so forth, and it is a concern.
1 22 But I appreciate what you are saying, and we have i
23 also heard the Numark people talk to us not too long ago on l
\\
i 24 their initiative on chemistry and I listened to that.
We all 25 did.
And I appreciate the fact that they are involved in it, l
.p,-
, -. ~ - - - _,,,, - -. -..,
,.an..
. -. -. - -. ~
i 35 1
but I am not so sure that we are involved in it as heavily as 2
we ought to be.
3 I really think it is something that is a safety l
4 issue, or could be anyway.
It is something we ought to 5
revisit.
6 MR. ROSS:
One point that the Commission fifteen 7
years ago roughly decided while Appendix K issues were being 8
litigated, not to consider massive rupture of steam 9
generators.
That was not an issue.
And you can see from the 10 stresses that must have been present in those divider plates 11 at Surry, incredible stresses to actually make material ficw 12 several inches.
13 You could decide a safety issue -- unevaluated 14 stresses on the shell of the steam generator.
However, that 15 is not really part of our program at this time.
16 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
You know, I agree very 17 much with what the chairman was saying, and it seems to me the 18 safety issue comes up not so much in the case where it is so 19 clear you just have to replace the steam generator, or just 20 keep replacing him.
l 21 The problem comes up in this area as well as in the 1
22 pipe crack area where the industry comes in and says well, we 23 know things are degraded, but we still think it is all right 24 to run the plant this way for an extended period of time, l
25 whether it is with the pipe cracks and boilers, or in the l
36 1
degraded steam generator tubes.
That is where we get stuck 2
with the safety issue, to try and decide vell, there are 3
clearly things that could have been done to maintain the 4
condition of the plant at a much higher level, if they would 5
have just been done that way early on, but should we get 6
involved and make them do it that way to keep it at high 7
material condition to avoid ourselves having to deal with a 8
more difficult situation later.
9 How long are we going to let them run in a much more 10 degraded situation.
I think the Japanese experience seems to 11 focus on maintaining that high material condition to start 12 with, to avoid a lot of the headaches later on, and I think 13 f
you are right, that maybe it is time for us to start thinking 14 that forward looking approach.
15 Make the industry do as much of it as possible, but 16 make sure the attention is focused that way.
17 MR. STELLO:
I don't know that you need to do a lot l
18 more research to answer that question.
To mandate that now by I
l 19 rule, you just say I am going to order you to do these kinds 20 of things for water chemistry.
21 That becomes the difficult question to ask, l
22 philosophically.
When you say you order, you also have to say 23 because.
l l
24 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
I appreciate that.
Maybe this is a 25 very good one the industry ought to be trying to prove
37 Certainly more than -- although I recognize the 1
themselves.
2 Numark folks didn't tell us that they have a big program.
I 3
just think it is clearly in their best interest, but it does 4
indeed have a bearing on safety, and I don't know that we 5
should step entirely clear, but I think perhaps there is a j
6 balance here somewhere where they should be doing a lot more, 7
and then perhaps we should be doing some more, but to not be I
8 doing much more than we are doing, it bothers me a little bit.
9 I am not so sure that we need a rule, but it seems 10 to me we ought to have emphasis of some kind of another on 11 chemistry, and just because I think it could have a bearing on j
12 safe operations.
l 13 Certainly it is to my own best interest to keep.
I 14 those steam generators clean and pay attention to chemistry.
I 15 That is just a good utility practice which we ought to i
16 encourage.
17 I know IMPO is doing that, but there is a way to go 18 in this chemistry field, in my judgment.
Along with 19 maintenance, it is still something that needs to be improved.
l 20 But also, I think -- I don't want to prolong this, 21 but it does seem to me that perhaps we might take another 22 look.
23 Fifteen years ago I suppose it was probably a proper 24 decision.
Fifteen years has gone by, and maybe it is time to l
25 take another look and see if Chemistry doesn't play a little
38 1
more part in safety than we have considered.
2 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
One last question on steam 3
generators.
Guy, given the work you have done now, your 4
knowledge of the conditions of the steam generators that are 5
out there, the level of sophistication in the testing work 6
that is being done now, what is the potential for a multiple 7
tube rupture?
8 MR. ARLOTTO:
Well --
9 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Would you be extremely 10 surprised to see one?
11 MR. ARLOTTO:
I wouldn't be so extremely surprised, 12 but that is strictly a personal view.
I think that the
[
13 potential for a -- p'articularly if we got a very high input 14 load, and we saw a very high internal transient, or a 15 significant external event, such as an earthquake, with 16 degraded steam generator, we might get a couple or three tubes 17 breaking at this time.
18 I think that I am not completely satisfied that we 19 have a really good handle on interpreting eddy current signals 20 properly characterized tubes, particularly centered in the l
i 21 support plate, and we may be missing certain degradational 22 cracks.
I wouldn't be anywhere near as surprised as if 23 somebody told me we had double in the pipe breaks some place.
24 So, that is a personal judgment.
It is off the top 25 of my head.
1
39 1
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Are we doing enough to 2
deal with those on the regulatory side?
3 MR. ARLOTTO:
I think that we are doing enough to 4
deal with those on the regulatory side.
I think they are on 5
top.
Three USI's has already been talked about, and had been j
6 focused on.
Nobody is walking away from this one.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Okay.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Proceed.
9 MR. ARLOTTO:
Thank you.
Let me go to NDE, 10 Nondestructive examination.
11 The obvious safety issue is we are going to make 12 responsible decisions based on an inspection, and the i
(
13 inspection will be reliable.
14 Next, please.
15
[ Slide.]
16 Here, I think I would like to point out regulatory i
17 input into several issues, including the fact -- some of our 18 techniques have gone to Dresden and to Vermont Yankee and 19 actually done some inspections to show, in one case, there 20 were really no cracks in a particular cracks when there was a 21 disagreement between two different teams doing it.
22 We have worked with I&E on I&E Bulletin 83.02.
This 23 was to help identify how a particular person doing in-service l
24 inspection should be qualified.
25 What kind of samples he should be looking at.
This I
l
40 1
was done with I&E and our contract, and fed back to APRI to 2
qualify their operators..I feel this was a good success of 3
how the industry trying to deal with an issue, and us trying 4
to deal with an issue, fed back and to meet our bulletin, I 5
guess telling them what they were going to have to do.
6 I would like to point out an spend a minute or two, 7
Mr. Chairman, on the last bullet on the right, which is 8
PISC-III.
This is the program for inspection of steel 9
components.
This is a major international program.
The 10 first PISC was done in '75 to
'80.
It showed certain 11 shortcomings of several of the procedures used in in-service 12 inspections, including the ASME Section 11 procedures.
It was principally done using -- principally to see whether or not 13 14 the procedures being used are any good.
l 15 And PISC-11, we just concluded, and in fact, they e
i 16 are going to have their major symposium in Italy in october.
17 They will put out the report of what they learned here, and 18 here they actually have come up with certain kinds of 19 improvements that could be made to the in-service inspection l
20 techniques for better detection, and so I think flaws.
21 These were done with artificial flaws that were 22 machines.
PISC-111, which is the new program that we are 23 involved in.
Spence Bush, our contractor, is vice chairman of 24 the group.
Some of our people are directly involved.
It is 25 intended to be over in 1990.
It is a sixteen million dollar l
i 41 1
program, which we bought in for one million dollars of 2
contribution in kind, which actually in our case meant giving 3
them samples that we already had.
4 So, we expect that this program which will actually 5
use real cracks to see how well -- project the size of the 6
cracks will be.
A big plus.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Guy, what is the state of 8
the art now in terms of the in-service, the NBE techniques and 9
abilities of these teams for the pipe cracks and how well can 10 they do through overlays?
11 MR. ARLOTTO:
Two things.
One is overlay is very 12 difficult.
I wouldn't bet my life on somebody detecting and 13 sizing an overlay crack.
There is no question abcut that.
14 There would be certain problems in respect to detecting and 15 sizing cracks in cast stainless, simply because the 16 microstructure is such that the reflection of the sound waves 17 is distorted.
18 I think there is big progress in the area of carbon 19 steel, even in the area of the heat affected zone and welds.
20 I think in the main body, we are in pretty good shape.
21 In stainless and particularly in the area of the 22 heat affected zone and the welds of stainless, there are still 23 some concerns about that.
I think we do not have 100 percent 24 reliable in-service inspection technique.
We have made 25 progress.
We have a system called SAFT, which we have used, l
i 42 1
which has proved to be extremely good.
The big thing with j
i 2
SAFT is it begins to get the operator out of the room.
The 3
key problem is people.
Qualify these people that have civil 4
Ph.D.'s in order to read these squiggly lines and say, yes, 5
there is a crack and it is
.4 inches deep.
6 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Have the automated 7
techniques proven to be fairly effective or not?
8 MR. ARLOTTO:
Not completely.
You still have to 9
rely a great deal on the people because he has to also put the 10 probe at a particular angle.
11 I am going to talk a bit about aging.
This program
)
12 is a relatively new program.
Of course, we have done aging, j
f 13 all the stuff I have talked about in the material is really 14 aging.
Remember, this is an integrated program.
We have to 15 try to focus on things other than the straight metals that 16 were focused on over the years.
17 Our really key concern with aging is we have plants 18 operating for many years, we are getting to a point where 19 many of the components of degrading uniformly and setting 20 themselves up for up failure.
That is a real safety concern.
21 This program, as I will talk about, really we are l
22 talking mostly about plans.
Basically the progran is directed 23 at trying to detect the degradation of key components to do 24 something before we end up with a safety problem.
We are 25 looking at principally input into decision making, that is
43 1
, feeding back to NRR, industry and hopefully to see how and 2
what could be done if indeed we do turn up certain issues that 3
could be helped by actions now.
4 We have two major professional societies, both the 5
ASME and YEEE have set up specific committees to deal with and 6
look into what we call the aging life extension problem.
7 We have set up within the agency, as directed by 8
Mr. Stello, a group to integrate all agency activities.
It is 9
a task group made up of people from I&E, NRR, and from 10 Research, AEOD.
We have representatives from the regions, and 11 international programs.
In order to be sure that this program 12 is directed in the right manner.
13 In the research area, we are focusing very heavily
..\\.,
14 on getting components that have been aged in service to see if 15 we could detect how to degrade it, and second of all, what 16 detection techniques are actually in-service and work, whether 17 they be surveillance, a continuous non-intrusive method, or 18 testing, which is a periodic exercising of some kind, 19 in-service inspection.
We have to have some idea of how we 20 are going to detect these degrading mechanisms.
21 This would be extremely useful obviously to life 22 extension.
One of the things that the Commission may have to 23 grapple with when it begins to look at regulations may be we 24 need trends.
We may have to have some idea ten years before a 25 life extension application, what is the trending in our aging
)
~
44 1
data to help us in that area.
2 We have a very good relationship with DOE to Naval 3
reactors and to exchange correspondence.
We actually have an 4
egreement where they will let us take 81 components in a i
5 shipping port for inspection for this purpose.
i 6
COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Is this going to look at 7
variables, like environmental conditions, the electrical cable i
8 at Santa Onofre, for example, if you run it next to a hot 9
pipe?
10 MR. ARLOTTO:
Yes, sir.
Cable is one of the key 11 elements, a lot of heavy focus on electrical stuff.
12 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
It is not very 13 sophisticated.
It is just identifying where the potential 14 failure modes are.
15 MR. ARLOTTO:
As just discussed, just like the 16 limitations of in-service inspection of metals.
~
17 I would like to at least touch on our seismic 18 program.
We have a program here where we are concerned 19 principally about whether or not current seismic design 20 criteria we use again might provide an imbalance, particularly 21 between normal operation and seismic events.
I think that is 22 a very low probability.
We are putting in a lot of things 23 like snubbers that makes piping very stiff, thereby increasing 24 thermal stress, increasing the probability for cracked grills j
25 and breaking pipes.
We have to be careful that we are not 1
- ~, -.... -..
45 really hurting safety by thinking we are being conservative.
1 2
The second thing is there is no question about the 3
fact that there is a problem with respect to certain concerns 4
about data making us re-look at various plants because 5
earthquakes greater than design might be possible.
The third 6
thing of concern to safety is several of our PRA's, 7
probablistic risk assessments, indicate seismic can be a major 8
contributor to risk.
9
[ Slide.]
10 MR. ARLOTTO:
Regarding our input into the ability 11 of operating plants to withstand earthquakes larger than 12 design basis; this is a real problem.
The Avalo Canyon design T
13 from.4G to.75G.
That is a real problem.
Santa Onofre, due 14 to the San Fernando earthquake in 1971, changed its design 15 from.5G to.67G.
We have no reason to believe that we are 16 not going to see these kinds of changes.
17 I think the Commission must be in a position, I know 18 if I were you I would want to be in the position to have some l
19 techniques available to make some evaluations.
Those people 20 believe there is a great deal of margin in plants against 21 seismic events.
Our purpose is to develop the methodology and 22 to benchmark it so that we can make some decisions regarding 23 is there really a need for change or is that already there.
24 I will quickly point out one more difficult issue 25 that had to be faced by NRC about seven years ago.
We had a l
46 1
five plant shutdown because two different methodologies showed 2
a difference of a factor of six for a certain earthquake.
I
~
3 think I can say today as clearly as I can, I think if we had j
4 known as much as we know today, the decision may have been 5
different.
6 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
What is the fragility data 7
bank?
8 MR. ARLOTTO:
Fragility data bank is a bank by which 9
we are working to get all the -- for some reason, people in g
10 the seismic area use fragility to mean failure.
When are 11 things going to fail, so that the fragility data bank is a a
12 place where we have tried to accumulate all the data we can, 13 particularly associated with active plant components, like l
14 valves, pumps, relays, and at what level of seismicity will 1
15 those fail.
In the bottom line, in evaluating seismic, the i
16 components within a system is what gives us the concerns.
17 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
Is this business of the 18 failure mode or failure point of concrete shear wall 19 structures a serious concern at this point?
I remember when 20 we were out at Los Alamos a while back, we spoke to some of i
21 those folks about deviations in the stiffness values than what 22 had been expected.
Where are we on that?
23 MR. ARLOTTO:
We first did some shear wall things, 24 and what you are talking about.
We did it on some very small i
25 scale, one inch thick kinds of things, and reinforcing with l
l
47 1
chicken wire.
We saw in effect a micro-crack that reduced the 2
stiffness considerably.
As a result of that, we have done a 3
three inch wall, because we were concerned about is it a size 4
effect.
We still see the same kind of thing.
5 We are now beginning to believe and in my discussion 6
particularly with Dr. Seese of the ACMS, is that he feels that 7
perhaps the problems we are seeing is because we are not a
benchmarking the right methodology.
We are looking at 9
methodology that had assumed no crack.
He thinks if we look 10 at methodology that assumes cracking in the concrete, possibly 11 we will be closer to getting at it.
The problem is it is an 12 open issue.
I do not know whether or not -- we are very 13 close.
This could be an issue because these shear walls are 14 in auxillary buildings and diesel buildings and could be of 15 concern.
16 MR. ROSS:
I should point out we are increasing 15 17 percent in our level of research in that area, trying to make 18 sure we get a prompt answer.
19 MR. ARLOTTO:
I would like to focus on the last 20 bullet on the right just for an item of where we are trying to 21 go with the Japanese.
We are about ready to sign an agreement 22 for them to conduct tests on a PWR primary loop on the Tadotsu 23 facility.
It hss 3,000 tons force.
It may be the largest one 24 in the United States has something like 300.
It is an order 25 of magnitude difference.
48 1
We are hoping this will help us benchmark our codes 2
as they go in elastic.
The Japanese basically use this for 3
proof testing.
We are trying to look at it from safety, in 4
terms of what will happen as they go from elastic to inelastic 5
response.
We are in a very good position.
We are only going 6
to contribute $450K, EPRI is putting in $250K and the Japanese 7
are putting in about $2 million plus the use of a 8
multi-hundred million dollar facility.
We feel we are getting 9
a good bargain in getting these test done.
10 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I am very pleased you are 11 participating in that.
That is an unique facility.
It is 12 tremendous.
It is a real opportunity.
(
13 MR. ARLOTTO:
I like the cost benefit.
14 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Yes; that's true.
It is 15 good to see it used, too.
That's a tremendous investment on 16 their part.
17 MR. ARLOTTO:
I think they are very interested in 18 giving that kind of visibility to it.
19 This is again our concerns.
We do have some 20 regulatory guides and standard review plans.
We have really 21 developed in pieces over the year.
I sort of think that each 22 of the different groups, structural engineers, mechanical l
23 engineers, and seismologists, all added their own little 24 safety factors.
We may be in a position where we have too 25 much margin and it may be giving us problems in safety.
1
._-..--.__y.
49 1
We are looking hard at feeding back into these r
2 particular regulatory guides and also input into the ASME code 3
regarding the fact that the ASME code now has a criterion 4
which we call Section collapse, which is really a strange 5
criterion for seismic but a lot of our work indicates it 6
really is a fatigue phenomenon, and if we could handle that 7
issue, I think we may see a major improvement in our seismic 8
safety designs.
9 I would like to focus a little bit on a couple of 10 programs.
The first program is a program we are operating 11 with EPRI, and again, EPRI is putting up about $2 million.
We 12 are putting up $600K.
This is an unique program where they
- {~
13 actually construct a slab in a high seismic area in Taiwan, 14 with the idea of waiting for an earthquake to occur, so that 15 we can actually compare the actual response of an earthquake 16 compared to our simulated earthquakes.
They have put up a 35 17 foot diameter by 50 foot high concrete structure.
They 18 already had an earthquake of.3G at 6.6, and we have gotten 19 some good data on that which we will feed back to our 20 contractor, to make these kinds of comparisons of real 21 earthquakes with our simulated ones.
22 The other one I would like to point out is the third-23 bullet where we have a program with the Germans, a cooperative 24 program with the Federal Republic of Germany on their HDR 25 facility, which is an reactor that has been out of service for
50 1
a while.
Here, to a very nominal amount, we are going to get 2
a key element that we need to benchmark our codes, which is 3
systems interaction.
They have piping systems that interact 4
with vessels and with the containment, whereby not only what 5
we have heard about fragilities on individual loops, like in 6
the Japanese facility, but here we will have some input into 7
our interaction of these systems.
8
[ Slide.]
9 MR. ARLOTTO:
The last area is containment.
This is 10 the only area that is sort of more directed at mitigation and i
11 prevention of accidents.
I would like to simply say that the i
12 obvious is if, when and how containment fails, it is very
,'r
13 critical to risk.
If you could hold a containment together, i
14 what happens inside a containment is a never mind, if I can 15 speak as an engineer at this point.
l l
16 Our containment program is principally one in which 17 we are looking at it as a system.
You look at it in four 18 different separate effects and then pull it together.
19 Containment has got electrical penetration.
These are usually 20 made of a poxy of glass and they have unique characteristics 21 and concerns of their own.
They have mechanical penetrations 22 usually made of metal with some kind of a seal, such as your 23 equipment hatches or air locks.
They have their particular 24 concerns.
We have valves which penetrate containment and the i
25 capability for them to close and hold tight leakage-wise is l
51 1
important.
The last part is we have the structures.
2 Our containment program tries to address all of 3
these as a system.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. ARLOTTO:
We have had some input already t
6 directly from our containment program.
The first thing I 7
would like to point out is particularly there are many 8
different codes by both people within this country and 9
overseas to try to predict how a containment would respond.
10 It probably recognizes that people like the ASME and others 11 basically design containment to stay elastic.
They want it
{
12 altogether.
/
13 We are in our regulatory arena, we are looking at 14 how does a containment respond to conditions for which it 15 wasn't designed, above design.
We have to look at response of 16 containment under conditions basically for what it wasn't 17 designed as we begin to approach in today's terminology severe 18 accident type conditions.
19 Some of the codes that are used have been designed 20 to validate for that.
Some are being modified.
We are really 21 not too sure about how well these codes will predict the 22 containment as elastic.
We will go back to that when we are 23 a lot more confident in one area.
24 I would like to point out that we have already i
25 confirmed, if you look at the second bullet, our key element.
_______________________________________________________________)
52 1
The ASME code has stiffening rings around a containment to 2
help hold it together and not have it completely balloon out.
3 However, they again limit it to elastic behavior.
We had 4
concerns about whether or not as we go above and go above 5
design pressures, whether or not the containment would respond 6
and each stiffness could be treated the same way.
The 7
stiffness right now is treated by smearing out and actually 8
putting a film or thickness across the whole thing.
9 We have confirmed that indeed even after containment 10 begins to go from elastic to inelastic, the stiffening, the 11 modeling stiffness is good.
We feel that was something that 12 was a worthwhile confirmation.
j 13 In addition, particularly our big steel containment 1
1 14 has shown we have significant margin, the stiffness began to 15 break away at about 160 PSIG, which was about four times the 16 design pressure.
The ASME code says the ultimate strength 17 should be about a minimum of three times as the design 18 pressure.
Again, we feel that our work has confirmed some of 19 the things that might occur as these things begin to approach 20 concerns where we might be at severe accident conditions.
21 That actual vessel actually failed at 195 PSI, which 22 was nearly five times the design pressure.
23 I would like to say that we have been -- the way we 24 are approaching this program is first we have pre-test 25 predictions, particularly our concrete, because that is used i
53 1
more although we have many steel containments in this 2
country.
We have gotten in essence commitments from France, 3
the U.K.,
Italy, as well as EPRI to make pre-test predictions 4
on what is going to happen with this 1/6th scale concrete 5
containment that we are going to test sometime in fiscal 6
1987.
I don't want to go any further than that.
7 We have already tested steel.
That is finished.
We 8
tested three different 130 second scale steel containments 9
which helped us do these things.
I told you about 10 confirmation as well as 1/8th scale steel containments.
Some 11 of you may have seen that.
12 The next thing we are doing is we are looking at 13 separate or fixed tests, some penetrations on valves, to 14 factor these in, and thereby ending up with an interval model 15 of the containment behavior under severe accident conditions.
16
[ Slide.]
l 17 MR. ARLOTTO:
This is just a picture of our steel 18 containment that we tested.
19 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
You washed it, didn't you?
20 MR. ARLOTTO:
Right.
21 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS:
You may not know this 22 detail.
What is the diameter of this and what is the wall 23 thickness?
24 MR. ARLOTTO:
14.5 feet diameter.
I don't know the 25 wall thickness; about half an inch, my men say.
It had a 230
t 54 1
two inch equipment hatch in it.
It had a 12.5 inch personnel 2
air lock.
We had many typical penetrations including the 3
stiffened penetration, to put some reactive forces on it.
I 4
I thought our contractors were very wise in putting 5
a big steel net above it, so that we didn't have missiles 6
flying around.
7 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
Was it built to the same j
8 standards?
9 MR. ARLOTTO:
We made it clear and our contractor 10 made it clear -- this was built by Chicago Bridge and Iron, 11 which built many of the steel containments in this country, i
12 and it was built strictly to ASME.
We told them we did not I
13 want a laboratory vessel.
14 We feel rather confident that if somebody takes the 15 effort to build a vessel to ASME code, and pays some attention 16 to QA, that we could have a vessel that has considerably more 17 margin in it.
18 (Slide.)
19 MR. ARLOTTO:
We ara looking at separate effects.
20 We are particularly looking at mechanical / electrical 21 penetrations.
That work is about over.
We feel very 22 confident.
We looked at the three different types of 23 electrical penetrations, E.G. O'Brien, Westinghouse, and 24 Conex.
All of them held integrity at these conditions, as 25 high as 700 degrees F, 135 PSI, which looks like severe
55 1
accident pressures.
We feel quite confident about the 2
electrical penetrations.
3 The mechanical penetrations, we are not finished 4
with, but we will look at air locks, particularly up to about 5
700 degrees F, and 150 PSIG, and we will look at equipment 6
hatches.
Here we are concerned about the rotation.
As the 7
vessel begins to distort, we are concerned that perhaps the 8
seal will not hold in those places where there may be 9
restrictions due to various hatch configurations.
10 Lastly, we are looking at the containment valve l
particularly to performance of the isolation valves.
Here we 11 12 are concerned about the effect of containment wall movement on
!/
13 these valves.
14 That, Mr. Chairman, concludes my briefing.
I stayed I
15 within my limit.
I hope that was informative.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Very good.
Thank you very much.
Do 17 my fellow Commissioners have questions?
18 COMMISSIONER ASSELSTINE:
I have pretty much covered 19 mine.
20 COMMISSIONER BERNTHAL:
I just want to say that was 21 a nice presentation, Guy.
I also would say that unlike some 22 other elements of our research programs, it seems to reflect a 23 sense of where we are, where we are going, what we are trying 24 to do, and how we are going to get there, that I would hope we 25 can develop throughout the research program.
56 1
My sense is that at least in these engineering 2
intensive areas, we are doing pretty well.
Maybe the problems 3
are easier to define here than in some other areas.
I suspect 4
that is true.
Let's not let that take away from what appears 5
to be a program that has a sense of purpose in what it is 6
trying to do.
I think it sounds good.
7 MR. ARLOTTO:
Thank you.
8 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Thank you very much.
I would also 9
like to thank you, Guy, for a very informative and interesting 10 presentation.
I think these presentations are very useful.
I 11 We all recognize the importance of research to all of our 12 regulatory responsibilities.
I do think it is particularly 7 -
13 important occasionally to be reminded with a briefing such as 14 this, how research really is on a day to day basis 15 contributing to our mission.
16 I think it is important when we involve ourselves in l
17 budget matters and other things to recognize that research 18 does indeed play a very important part in what we do, a very 19 important part in safety, and that is our job.
I think a 20 briefing such as this periodically, and I know this is what 21 you have in mind, Vic and Denny, I think it is very helpful.
l 22 I think we should continue these on a periodic basis 23 so that you will bring before the Commission and we take the 24 time to hear and be reminded again of the valuable l
25 contribution research is making to our agency.
I think it is j
l l
l
57 1
very important.
I command you for a fine presentation.
2 MR. ROSS:
This did not get covered.
We do have an 3
outrearch philosophy, of trying to make this information 4
available to other countries that might need it.
Most of it, 5
99 percent of it, is at no charge.
This, for example, I have 6
already had an extended discussion in Taiwan, Korea, and 7
Yugoslavia.
I think there are some countries that need the i
8 information and for various reasons can't get it on their 9
own.
We try, like a true missionary, spread the gospel and to 10 a reasonable degree, it is working.
j 11 CHAIRMAN ZECH:
Very good.
If there is no further 12 business, we will stand adjourned.
f 13
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the commission meeting was
!N 14 adjourned.]
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE l
3 4
This is to certify that the attached events of a 5
meeting of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission entitled:
6 7
TITLE OF MEETING: Briefing on Engineering Research Program (Public 3
Meeting) 8 PLACE OF MEETING:
Washington, D.C.
9 DATE OF MEETING: Tuesday, August 5, 1986 10 11 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original 12 transcript thereof for the file of the Commission taken 13 stenographically by me, thereafter reduced to typewriting by 14 me or under the direction of the court reporting company, and 15 that the transcript is a true and accurate record of the 16 foregoing events.
17 18 IbEdEb Gar tt J. Walsh, 19 20 21 22 Ann Riley & Associates, Ltd.
23 24 25
'W BRIEFING FOR THE U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ON I
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PERFORM BURST TESTS TO CORRELATE CHEMICAL CLEANING 0F STEAM REMAINING MARGIN WITH EDDY CURRENT GENERATOR.
RESULTS.
o SHOWED NO VIBRATION RESULTS FROM CORROSION PRODUCT REMOVAL FROM SUPPORT I
PLATE H0LES.
O
19 O
NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION SAFETY ISSUES IMPROPER DETECTION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF FLAWS COULD LEAD TO COMPROMISING THE SAFETY o
SYSTEMS THROUGH LEAKS AND FRACTURE, RELIABLE INSERVICE INSPECTION RESULTS REQUIRED TO IDENTIFY AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBLE o
REGULATORY ACTIONS FOR CONTINUED PLANT OPERATIONS, l
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NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION RESEARCH PROGRAM REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 0
EVALUATE RELIABILITY OF INSPECTION O
PERFORM UT INSPECTIONS ON CARBON AND DATA FOR RESPONSIdLE REGULATORY ACTIONS.
STAINLESS STEEL PIPING AND WELDS.
O BASIS FOR AND UPDATE OF ASME CODE AND 0
PERFORM DESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION OF INSPECTED REG. GUIDES ON INSPECTION PROCEDURES.
PIECES TO VALIDATE INSPECTION RESULTS.
O PROVIDED BASIS FOR IEB 83-02 RESULTING 0
PROCEDURES AND EQUIPMENT FOR UT OF VESSELS IN IMPROVED UT PERFORMANCE DEMONSTRA-AND PIPING; COORDINATE WITH EPRI NDE CENTER.
TION OUALIFICATION FOR PIPING.
O EVALUATE TECHNIQUES FOR INSPECTION OF DIFFICULT 0
USE OF SAFT-UT FOR INDEPENDENT THIRD-AREAS.
PARTY CHECKS OF FLAW DETECTION AND 0
EVALUATE ACOUSTIC ENISSION TECHNIQUE FOR SIZING IN VERMONT YANKEE AND DRESDEN-2.
DETECTION AND CHARACTERIZATION OF CRACK o
CllPPnRT lIFF fX1FNSION.
INITIATION AND FXTFNSION IN VFSSft. AND PIPING APPLICATIONS.
O PARTICIPATE WITH THE INTERNATIONAL GROUP, PISC-III, ON ISI 0F VESSFLS AND PIPING.
~ -
AGING / LIFE EXTENSION SAFETY ISSUES AGING 0F SAFETY SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS COULD RESULT IN COMMON MODE FAILURES, o
AGING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS, COMP'ONENTS AND STRUCTURES COULD REDUCE DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH, o
AGING / DEGRADATION PROCESSES COULD REDUCE SAFETY DURING EXTENDED LIFE, o
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___3
AGING / LIFE EXTENSION RESEARCH PROGRAM REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 0
PROVIDE Tile LICENSING AND INSPECTION O
IDENTIFY IMPORTANT SAFETY COMPONENTS THAT STAFF WITH INFORMdTION TO IDENTIFY AND MAY BE AFFECTED BY DEGRADATION.
EVALUATE STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND 0
IDENTIFY AND UNDERSTAND DEGRADATION COMPONENTS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ADVERSE PROCESSES.
O PERFORM DETAILED TESTING AND EVALUATIO'N AGING EFFECTS.
OF COMPONENTS.
O INPUT INTO NATIONAL STANDARDS O
EVALUATE METHODS FOR SURVEILLANCE, TESTING AND REGULATORY DOCUMENTS.
AND INSPECTION.
O EVALUATE EXISTING METHODS FOR DETERMINING RESIDUAL LIFE.
O EVALUATE MAINTENANCE, REPAIR, AND REPLACEMENT.
J SEISMIC PROGRAM SAFETY ISSUES CURRENT SEISMIC DESIGN CRITERIA MAY RESULT IN AN IMBALANCE IN SAFETY BETWEEN o
OPERATING CONDITIONS AND SEISMIC EVENTS.
DO OPERATING PLANTS IIAVE SUFFICIENT SEISMIC SAFETY MARGINS TO WITilSTAND EARTHO o
LARGER THAN ORIGINAL DESIGN ' BASIS?
SOME PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENTS COMPLETED TO DATE INDICATE TilAT ACCIDEN o
BY LARGE EARTHOUAKES ARE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTOR TO PUBLIC RISK.
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SEISMIC PROGRAM 1
REGULATORY APPLICATIONS RESEARCH PROGRAM 0
INPUT TO DECISIONNAKING REGARDING 0
DEVELOP PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ABILITY OF OPERATING PLANTS TO ESTIMATING SEISMIC MARGINS.
WITHSTAND EARTHOUAKES LARGER THAN O
CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON SCALE MODEL REINFORCED THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS.
CONCRETE SHEAR WALL STRUCTURES TO EVALUATE O
IllPUT FOR EVALUATING SEISMIC PRAS.
FAILURE MODES.
O COLLECT AND EVALUATE EXISTING FRAGILITY DATA 0F SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS.
O IN COOPERATION WITH EPRI, CONDUCT PIPING i
FAILURE MODE EXPERIMENTS.
O CONDUCT NECESSARY FRAGILITY TESTS TO COMPLETE FRAGILITY DATA BANK.
O IN COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE AT TADOTSU, CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON PWR PRIMARY LOOP.
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SEISMIC PROGRAM 1
RESEARCH PROGRAM REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 0
UPDATE REGULATORY GUIDES AND STANDARD 0
IN COOPERATION WITH EPRI, PERFORM SOIL-STRUCTURE INTERACTION EXPERIMENTS IN REVIEW PLANS.
TAIWAN.
O INPUT INTO ASME CODE, SECTION 111.
O CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON SCALE MODEL REINFORCED 1
CONCRETE SHEAR WALL STRUCTURES.
O IN COOPERATION WITit FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, t
CONDUCT HIGH' LEVEL VIBRATION EXPERIMENTS ON PIPING SYSTEMS AT THE IIDR FACILITY.
O COLLECT AND EVALUATE EXISTING PIPING DAMPING DATA.
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0 IN COOPERATION WITH EPRI, CONDUCT PIPING l!
FAILURE MODE EXPERIMENTS.
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l CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY i
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SAFETY ISSUES IF, HOW AND WHEN EONTAINMENT FAILS, PARTICULARLY IF SUBJECTED TO SEVERE ACCIDENT LOADS, j
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i IS KEY TO EVALUATING RISK, 4
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o CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY RESEARCH PROGRAM REGULATORY APPLICATIONS 0
EVALUATE STRUCTURAL AND LEAK BEHAVIOR 0
PERFORM PRETEST PREDICTIONS BY NRC CONTRACTORS, OF STEEL AND CONCAETE CONTAINMENTS EPRI, AND FOREIGN ENTITIES.
UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
O CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON MODELS OF STEEL AND 0
CONFIRMED THE ADEQUACY OF MODELING CONCRETE CONTAINMENT STRUCTURES THAT CHALLENGE TECliNIQUES FOR STIFFENING RINGS KEY PARAMETERS OF THE CALCULATIONAL METHODS AND MODELING TECHNIQUES.
USED BY APPLICANTS.
O CONFIRMED THE ADEQUACY OF THE ASME O
SEPARATE EFFECTS TEST ON PENETRATIONS AND i
SECTION III ULTIMATE STRENGTil VALVES.
l CRITERIA FOR STEEL CONTAINMENTS.
O INTEGRATE AND EVALUATE THE RESEARCH ELEMENTS INTO OVERALL ANALYTICAL MODELS THAT CAN BE USED TO PREDICT THE STRUCTURAL AND LEAK BEHAVIOR OF THE VARIOUS CONTAINMENT TYPES.
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CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS TO DETERMINE THE BEHAVIOR
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TIONS.
O CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON LEAK BEHAVIOR OF 0
BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE ABILITY OF ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL PENETRATIONS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION AND PURGE UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
VALVES TO OPERATE AND REMAIN LEAKTIGHT.
O CONDUCT EXPERIMENTS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF CONTAINMENT VALVES WHEN SUBJECTED TO ACCIDENT CONDITIONS.
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ADVANCED COPY TO:
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FROM:
SECY Correspondence & Records Branch 33:
3 Attached are copies of a Commission meeting transcript and related meeting 3
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